You might be interested in an article by Harvard's Stephen Walt, professor of international relations describing with surprising accuracy much of the bullshit that goes on in this thread...

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/29/the-perpetually-irrational-ukraine-debate/

What I find especially striking is how liberal interventionists, unrepentant neoconservatives, and a handful of progressives who are all-in for Ukraine seem to have no doubts whatsoever about the origins of the conflict or the proper course of action to follow today. For them, Russian President Vladimir Putin is solely and totally responsible for the war, and the only mistakes others may have made in the past was to be too nice to Russia and too willing to buy its oil and gas. The only outcome they are willing to entertain is a complete Ukrainian victory, ideally accompanied by regime change in Moscow, the imposition of reparations to finance Ukrainian reconstruction, and war crimes trials for Putin and his associates. Convinced that anything less than this happy result will reward aggression, undermine deterrence, and place the current world order in jeopardy, their mantra is: “Whatever it takes for as long as it takes.”

Sound familiar?

This same group has also been extraordinarily critical of those who believe responsibility for the war is not confined to Russia’s president and who think these war aims might be desirable in the abstract but are unlikely to be achieved at an acceptable cost and risk. If you have the temerity to suggest that NATO enlargement (and the policies related to it) helped pave the road to war, if you believe the most likely outcome is a negotiated settlement and that getting there sooner rather than later would be desirable, and if you favor supporting Ukraine but think this goal should be weighed against other interests, you’re almost certain to be denounced as a pro-Putin stooge, an appeaser, an isolationist, or worse.

Mmm... I wonder if we could possibly find examples of such approaches anywhere nearby...

He concludes...

If the world is forced to choose the lesser evil from a set of bad choices, a more civil and less accusatory discourse would make it easier for policymakers to consider a wider range of alternatives as well as make it more likely that Ukraine and the coalition that is presently supporting it make the right call.

But hey, fuck it, it's far more important to score brownie points with the Twitterati by reminding everyone how much we agree that Putin is bad...

Would it be worthwhile differentiating? (intentionally omitted "shoot on sight!")
I wouldn't say Chomsky "and a myriad of others" are being gagged. — jorndoe

That's not the point. The moment society places a higher premium on adherence to government-sanctioned narratives than it does on actual qualification we've lost.

It's not about degree, it's about the existence and active promotion (as we see enthusiastically here) of a notion that there's something instantly suspicious about people who speak out against the government.

Governments need to be held to account. They need to be frightened of their populace. Having three quarters of their populace actively doing their own propaganda for them by casting suspicion on dissent is beyond scary.

Your points seem so trivial and carping that sometimes I think you just like to argue for the sake of it. — Janus

Of course you do. Because the alternative would require you to entertain the possibility that you might actually be mistaken.

Not allowing people to speak is censorship, and omitting truth is propaganda. I hope people realize this is taking place in what were formerly known as civilized societies. — Tzeentch

By far the most important issue here.

We are censoring debate among experts.

Not idiots on Twitter, not Russian trolls, not paid lobbyists...experts in their field.

The day we decide government-prefered narratives are more important than expertise we might as well go back to the dark age.

Again nonsense from you. I think... — ssu

Views opposed to what you "think" are not thereby nonsense. It's called disagreeing.

And correlation is not causation.

Nothing in that establishes that those countries made those changes because of western influence, or were accepted into the western sphere because of an internal desire to make those changes.

Likewise with Ukraine and Belarus, it is not established if their failure to adopt western political systems was a result of being in the Russian sphere of influence, of whether they sought the Russian sphere of influence because of a lack of interest in such policies.

It's so funny to read the same people who've been bleating on about the evils of removing Ukrainian 'agency' all of a sudden fine with laying all the progress former Soviet states have made at the hands of the great 'western influence'.

Where's their agency now? Lithuania are great because Europe/NATO made then so. Ukraine are shit because Russia made them that way.

Suddenly lost all their agency have they?

I see. So Ukraine may or may not "improve", it's plausible the EU might help but the evidence isn't in the charts, but it's "obvious" so there's no need for you to actually show any... and we don't need evidence anyway because we're just a philosophy forum... and Ukraine is "different" from any of the places where western influence hasn't worked (but oddly the same as the ones where it might have), but again, no need to actually specify how because.... hey, who needs all this 'evidence'... and 'deregulation' is the means by which regulations are sometimes enforced....

But somehow this is all enough evidence to justify full-throated support for a devastating war which many experts think risks full nuclear exchange...

Yeah, I think we're done here.

I believe that broadly speaking all societies would prohibit acts that they interpreted to be of those four kinds because broadly speaking no one wants to be raped, murdered, stolen from or lied to. — Janus

But that's what the example of the Incas disproves. No one wants to be left on a hillside to die. Yet it was not proscribed.

The killings which will be prohibited are the ones that will cause social disharmony or at least unmanageable social disharmony — Janus

On what grounds do you claim this. It could just as easily be that the killings which are prohibited will be those which most harm the powerful.

What?

they would not have thought of it as murder — Janus

Right.

So all you've demonstrated is that all societies have social mores.

You've not shown any unity regarding the content of those mores.

If 'murder' is just the word given to killings society thinks are wrong, then all societies are going to prohibit murder aren't they? It's the definition of the word - 'those killings which we prohibit'

I’ll keep reasoning over the evidence I have — neomac

No, you're ignoring the evidence and continuing with your fairytale in spite of evidence to the contrary.

Your theory is that Western influence on Ukraine would improve human right compared to Russian influence.

You've given data showing that some ex-soviet countries improved their human rights record (according to one metric) after leaving the USSR, but others didn't. Those that did later joined the EU, some later joined NATO.

You've not shown that Western influence was responsible for this improvement, not even given any data at all regarding the cause.

You've not shown that Russian influence was responsible for the lack of improvement in Ukraine (and Belarus), not even provided any data at all on the matter.

What we do see, however, is data which opposes your theory.

1. During the last decade many countries in the EU have shown a decline in their human rights record, during the same period Russia and Belarus have registered an increase. You can't argue the EU are a protector of human rights when countries in them decline whilst countries outside of them improve.

2. Many other countries within 'western influence' like Saudi-Arabia, have seen their human rights record decline (from an already poor start). If there was a significant driver of human rights improvements in the ex-Soviet nations post 1999, western influence clearly wasn't it since it did not have a similar effect outside of those states and that time period.

3. The US (the chief 'western' influence in Ukraine) has a steeply declining human rights record and is currently below Belarus, a Russian puppet state.

To summarise.

• You cherry-pick a particular group of states at one very narrow period of history (ex-Soviet states post 1999 to early 2000s) and then extrapolate a general theory from those despite the fact that you've been shown other states and other time periods which contradict that theory.
  
• You infer reasons for those cherry-picked improvements which are not given in the data ('western' vs Russian influence), again despite being given data which shows the opposite - the Russian-influenced Belarus is now above the archetype of western influence, the US.
  
• You then ignore all other data, such as the fact that Ukraine's post-war policy is documented as being one of "deregulation", continuing instead with your fantasy that somehow western regulations are going to improve human rights. The fact that no state the US has aided militarily has actually improved. The fact that Ukraine's human rights record has not tracked Russia's (declining when Russia's improved)...

So no, you're not "reasoning over the evidence". You're regurgitating the message your newspapers are ramming down your throat and ignoring anything which contradicts it.

When I talk about US interests or European interests I'm talking about their governments, which, in turn, largely means the interests of their corporate lobbyists.

Yes, I'm sure the Ukrainian government has its interests and lobbyists too. They do, after all, consist of some of the wealthiest people in Ukraine.

What I've objected to is the notion that some unified group called 'Ukrainians' have a single view, and that, even if they did, that view should matter to US and European policy above than any other.

Interestingly, an article on some of 'benefits' of western control Ukrainians can look forward to...

https://jacobin.com/2023/01/ukraine-postwar-reconstruction-western-capital-blackrock-neoliberalism/

Ukraine is being sized up by neocolonial vultures from BlackRock to the EU for a carve-up after the war is over. On the menu is deregulation, privatization, and “tax efficiency” — measures that may have already begun.

Among the policy recommendations are a “decrease in government spending,” “tax system efficiency,” and “deregulation.”

Perhaps you could explain to me how "deregulation", the removal of what you call "conditional requirements", can have the effect you're claiming is likely?

All this bullshit fairy tale you're spinning about how EU rules are going to keep human rights up to scratch is counter to the documented reality that westernised post war Ukraine is planned to be a deregulated neo liberal nightmare.

The collapse of the Soviet Union + ensuing independence is correlated with boost in human rights support to the top for many countries in eastern block and post-Soviet countries. — neomac

Not derivable from the charts. As I said, V-dem bias their scoring heavily in favour of democratic representation which is only a small part of human rights. We can say with certainty that the collapse of the Soviet Union produced a strong increase in democratic representation (and associated freedoms). The rest of human rights are not addressed by your charts.

After some of those countries joined EU/NATO, they managed to keep their positive trends relatively stable, and for those which experienced a noticeable decline (like Poland) still the trend doesn’t look as bad as it looks for other post-Soviet countries still under Russian influence — neomac

Again, that's not what the charts show. The trend is similar in EU nations as it in Russio-sphere nations (in fact the trend is, on average, slightly more positive in Russio-sphere nations than it is in EU nations). The starting points in EU nations are often higher (explained by the weighting given to democratic representation).

we have good reasons to think that EU may have been a stabilising (if not a boosting) factor, while Russia may be a destabiliser and threat to human rights. — neomac

We have no such reason from the data you've provided. You've given no evidence that EU pressure, monitoring and requirements improve human rights as a whole. You've given no evidence that Russia is responsible for the low V-dem scores of the nations which chose not to join the EU. Basically you've come at this with a preconceived notion and squeezed the data into your theory.

What we actually have is...

1. Post Soviet break up, some nations chose to move toward joining the EU, for which they increased their systems of democratic representation which dramatically improved their V-dem scores. We don't have any data on why or how.

2. Other nations chose not to, so their V-dem scores remained low. We don't have any data on what influenced them to make this choice, certainly nothing showing that 'Russian influence' was the determining factor. That is entirely a fabrication of yours.

3. We have no data at all on comparisons between non-democracy related human rights such as freedom from slavery and the right to respect for family and private life.

4. We have no data at all on the impact of the post-soviet states on the human rights of other nations such as developing world trading partners.

Relating this to Ukraine. We have no reason (from the data you've given) to think that Ukraine defeating Russia would lead to a Lithuania-style improvement, or maintain the previous Ukraine-style levels. We don't know why Ukraine had such a low score and we've no evidence at all to suggest that might be related to Russia in a way which their defeat in a land war would prevent.

it’s good that you see electoral reform and democracy in post-Soviet Eastern European countries have improved human rights. — neomac

I've said no such thing. I've pointed out that V-dem scoring system weighs democracy highly.

since the XIX century Ukrainians are striving for having an independent nation and resisting Russification and Russian subjugation pursued by any Russian regime — neomac

Bollocks. There has been a civil war raging between those who want to remain in the Russian sphere of influence and those who don't. Your elaborations of data are bad enough. If you're going to just start making shit up we can't progress at all.

NATO expansion has so far secured certain East block countries against the perceived Russian threat — neomac

...and a single shred of evidence for this would be...?

it’s important to not discount other promoting factors (like EU membership) that might counterbalance potential declining trends — neomac

It is unequivocal from the data you yourself provided that the EU is no such promoting factor. Look at the data. The main net gains during the period after most states joined the EU were from Russia and Belarus. If anything, the data show the exact opposite, that being outside of the EU is a better influencer on human rights.

how likely is that Russia will spare Ukraine from becoming Russian puppetry given all its strategic relevance — neomac

That depends on the progress of the war. If the war goes very well and Russia lose quickly and completely, then that will secure Ukraine a free and intact future. If the war goes really badly and Russia make gains, that will actually increase the chances of Ukraine becoming a puppet state over say, simply ceding Crimea and Donbas right now. If the war drags on, then it will be the worse outcome of all since whether Russia win or lose will be irrelevant. Ukraine will be financially crippled and will be utterly under the control of either Russia or the IMF. In neither case will it be free to make its own choices.

there is no reason for the West to let Russia take Ukraine for free — neomac

Firstly, No one is talking about Russia taking Ukraine. That has never been a negotiating position of either power. The dispute is over the territory of Donbas and Crimea and the security thereof.

Secondly, there's ample reason. The longer the war drags on the more people die (or are put at risk of death) both Ukrainians and other affected groups such as those reliant on Ukrainian exports and those who care not be destroyed by nuclear holocaust.

No one has yet provided a shred of evidence showing that a Russian controlled Donbas/Crimea would be so much worse for the people of those territories as to justify the deaths of thousands (and risk to millions) of a continued war. All the evidence points to the fact that life for the people of those regions would be much the same either way (pretty bloody awful).

If Ukrainian casualties... — neomac

We're not talking (primarily) about Ukrainian casualties. We're talking about the risk of nuclear war, mass starvation, and future economic devastation. Ukrainian casualties are a drop in the ocean. More people died from Ukraine's appalling environmental pollution that died in the war so far (civilians). I don't see that over the front pages day after day.

I am heartened to see... — Paine

Exactly.

You care more about mollycoddling the current media darlings than you do about holding the most powerful nation on earth to account. I find that morally bankrupt, but if you're proud of it, there's little I can do about that.

For those struggling with the link between gun availability and mass shootings. The explanation might be a bit technical for some, but stick with it...

The trouble is that for reasons which we can only attribute to some key lessons missed at school, @NOS4A2 doesn't understand the meaning of the word 'cause' so will be confused by...

More guns = more mass shootings — Mikie

...thinking that the guns alone cannot shoot people.

Oddly though, he was totally fine with censorship causing a loss of literature, when, as any true student of causality knows, the only cause of loss of literature is people choosing to comply with the government's wishes, who, of course, merely spoke or wrote their edicts, and we all know that mere words are powerless (although oddly something is still lost when they're censored).

I think it's that governments can cause things, but corporations and right-wing pundits can't... I think that's how it works...

The defenders evidently aren't and war crimes (so far mostly) the attackers/imposers. — jorndoe

The 'evidence' that the defenders aren't is little more than overt apologetics. Amnesty produced a report which made the mere mention of potential war crimes but was forced to retract by the rabid Twitterati.

But a 'who committed most war crimes' contest seems more than a little tasteless.

The point is that territory and the means of acquiring it are two different issues. Both Ukraine and Russia need to improve both their military discipline and their human rights record.

How much territory each have whilst doing so is utterly irrelevant.

Why not try to engaging on the actual issues and not "this is true, because John Mersheimer said so and he's an expert". — ssu

No one here has argued that the provocation argument is true "because John Mersheimer said so and he's an expert". Not a single comment has been to that effect.

The invocation of people like Mersheimer has been entirely a means of rebutting your (and other's) feeble attempts to paint all opinion that disagrees with yours as uninformed Russian propaganda.

This latest reference to Mersheimer, for example, came after your incredibly insulting...

your view is largely irrelevant — ssu

Previous attempts to vilify anyone who disagrees with you...

some seem to go with Putin's delusional propaganda — ssu

simple ignorance — ssu

fail to understand — ssu

reurgitation of Russian propaganda — ssu

totally forgets — ssu

The problem is not other people failing to engage with the issues. The problem is your failure to do so. Your need to insult the intelligence of your interlocutors. The thought is that perhaps invoking experts might limit your supercilious sneering... Apparently not.

I have actively protested against every war the U.S. has ventured upon since Vietnam. — Paine

You clearly haven't because you've not spoken a word of opposition against this one.

I am not trying to "exculpate the US." I am trying to introduce the perspective that things happen outside of it. — Paine

I can't see why. No-one is using the argument "nothing happens outside of the US" so there's no need for such a counter-perspective. Clearly some things happen under US puppetry, others don't. We're trying to establish which this is. Simply reminding us that some things happen outside of US influence doesn't help us decide whether this particular thing was one of those.

Then you better get to work and find this sign. — Paine

Already have. As I demonstrated, a large proportion, if the not the majority of political analysts at the time though this evidence was a sign of US orchestration. It's only now the narrative needs to change that people are pretending otherwise. I've already cited the BBC's chief political analyst at the time

this transcript suggests that the US has very clear ideas about what the outcome should be and is striving to achieve these goals...Washington clearly has its own game-plan — https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26079957

Here's another...https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/13/ukraine-us-war-russia-john-pilger

the US is threatening to take the world to war. With eastern Europe and the Balkans now military outposts of Nato, the last "buffer state" bordering Russia – Ukraine – is being torn apart by fascist forces unleashed by the US and the EU

As I said, the trouble with hastily trying to change the story is that we have the internet now.

If the revolution was a staged event, and can be shown to be so, this will undermine the authority of Ukraine as an independent nation. — Paine

I don't see how. High quality elections have taken place since then. What it proves is the US's meddling in the region. It puts the lie to the idea that the US are only involved because of the Ukrainian people's sovereignty. They don't give a fuck about sovereignty. They want US (or US friendly) control over the gas supply to Europe (among other boons) and are willing to do anything to get it - change regime, fight Russia, train neo-Nazis, flood the world's biggest black-market arms dealer with weapons, sabotage a pipeline...

It is interesting to see how small you have made me. — Paine

Any time you feel like actually holding power to account, feel free to show your mettle. Otherwise, yes, simply regurgitating the narrative of the most powerful nation on earth is pretty small. They really don't need any help.

Is JSTOR access some kind of flex? You guys are cute. — Baden

I don't know what went on there, but I think we've established that not only do I have JSTOR access, but that my access is bigger than Frank's, and (and I don't mean to be rude), but Frank's using a girls access. It's for girls.

@Moliere

Seeing as @frank seems to want to continue with the secrecy. The section on wages from the article he's citing is, in full...

Missing was a microanalysis of why the market laws of supply and demand did not work in the downward direction. The answer is that wages are determined not by the market, but by wage administrators - by wage negotiators, representing workers and employ ers, who have the power to command wages to stay up even when the market is telling them that they should be going down because supply is greater than demand.
Keynesian economic policy to avoid severe de pression was beginning to be applied with some suc cess in the 1950s and 1960s, and then the wage administrators discovered that their power to defy the market was not limited to keeping money wages from falling in the face of depression. They discov ered that they could also use their power in the up ward direction and get money wages to rise even in the absence of any excess demand.
By the early 1970s, extraneous events had brought about a rate of inflation in the United States of about 6 percent per annum which was generally expected to continue. It was kept going by the wages rising to keep up with prices, and the prices rising to keep up with costs. The same wage administrators who, with stable prices, had prevented wages from falling, now did exactly the same thing, in real terms, by prevent ing wages from falling behind the expected 6 per cent rise in prices. And so the inflation could con tinue. But the law of excess demand - that excess demand always caused inflation - was read back wards by the government. They read it as saying that inflation is always caused by excess demand (by too much money chasing too few goods) and their re sponse was to try to check the inflation by holding down the level of spending. This did not stop the in flation (which was not being caused by excess spend ing) but it did reduce the level of employment and of economic activity and so we had stagflation - infla tion with depression.

Keynesians, seeing wages and prices rising even though there was much less than full employment, realized that Keynesianism was not enough. Their response was to turn again to governmental macro economic policy (which had been so successful in dealing with depression) for a solution to the new problem of "premature inflation" - inflation setting in before increased spending had brought about full employment.
I was one of those Keynesians. In the middle 1940s I suggested that prices could be kept stable by certain regulations to stop wages from rising more rapidly than productivity. Many others sug gested such regulations.
The regulations had two objectives: (1) to stabi lize the price level by limiting the wage increases, on the average, to the expected average rate of in crease of productivity in the economy; and (2) to bring about appropriate relative movements of wages by awarding higher wage increases in sectors where there was a less-than-average oversupply of labor (unemployment relatively low) and lower wage in creases (or no wage increases) where there was a more-than-average oversupply of labor (unemploy ment relatively high). These ideas also surfaced later in theoretical discussions of "incomes policy" and in practical policies of "wage-price guideposts" under Kennedy and "wage-price guidelines" under Nixon.

...for any that don't have academic access.

You don't have JSTOR access, do you? I suspected not. — frank

What? I don't have a clue what my JSTOR access has to do with anything.

(You mean the article which begins page 19 with "In this article I have attempted to indicate the most logical and most efficient means for offsetting the excessive pressure for rising wages")?

Can you guys just tone down the adolescent aggression and just talk like normal fucking people? — frank

You made a point as if you were the fucking Oracle of Delphi, without either citation, or argument, and then acted as if anyone questioning must be ignorant of the subject.

What you said was...

Neoliberalism doesn't really come from Ayn Rand. The main originator was Hayek. If you're interested in labor unions, it's really worth looking at how powerful unions helped set the stage for the Neoliberal take over. It's a lesson in what not to do. — frank

Then...

It's a standard analysis of the stagflation of the 1970s. — frank

Then when politely asked for a source ...

For me, the best approach to understanding history is to shelve condemnation and blame and just focus on the culture and agendas on the scene at the time.

The quick, easy, emotion packed narratives that advise the listener what she ought to lament have a place in human life, but I think it's important to recognize them as partial bullshit. I wouldn't jump to the conclusion that bullshit is all you can spew. Why don't you offer me the same courtesy? — frank

...

What you meant was...

"I read an article suggesting unions might be somewhat to blame, it's here"...

If you want to discuss with grown ups, you need to act like one.

I haven't seen any arguments that directly tie those changes to a nation that has "deaths of despair". — Philosophim

It may be that @Mikie has a clear enough idea to respond, but in any case, I'd like to know what sort of thing you feel would satisfy this request. If there's a link between, say, mass shootings and deregulation in small arms industries, then what sort of proposition would constitute an 'argument' to that effect (beyond simply "there's a link between mass shootings and deregulation in small arms industries")?

Likewise if we were to draw a link, say, between CEO share-based remuneration and policies designed to maximise share value, what kind of argument would be required to make that point, beyond, again, simply stating it to be the case?

In most cases we're talking about factors which make some outcome more likely in real world scenarios. We can't carry out controlled trials, we can't eliminate variables one at a time, or find cohorts with only a single variable not in common. So all we'll ever have is loose correlation and plausible mechanism. If that's not enough, then no statement can ever be made about the real world impact of policies on social issues.

Read up on the history of the stagflation of the 1970s, particularly in the UK where union gains were clearly unsustainable. — frank

So I did that. Google Scholar on "stagflation in 1970s UK"

The first cites inaccurate estimates of the degree of excess demand in the economy, the second monetary policy and world recession, the third perverse estimates of export and import price, the fourth back to monetary policy, the fifth oil price shocks again.... Haven't yet found even so much as a mention of unions.

Perhaps, rather than this bizarre clandestine dance you could just cite your source.

For me, the best approach to understanding history is to shelve condemnation and blame — frank

...

powerful unions helped set the stage for the Neoliberal take over. It's a lesson in what not to do. — frank

A real leftist would be interested in that question. — frank

You're confusing being interested in the question with giving a shit what you 'reckon' is the answer. I assure you entire shelves of literature is available on what barriers are in the way of progress. Not believing you isn't listed.

The U.S. has proven itself capable of doing many nefarious things. The worst of those can be related to accounts of how they were carried out by the people involved. Nothing like that has been presented as yet in regard to the unfolding of the revolution. My observations were given to underline how difficult such an operation would be under the circumstances. — Paine

Yep. "always opposed to the previous war, never the current one". That way the war machine can just keep trundling on and everyone gets to pretend they're not supporters.

It's often decades after the event that we find out the sort of details you're using the lack of to exculpate the US. And this isn't a court of law, we're holding them to account, not bringing criminal charges. We don't need a smoking gun, we need the barest whiff of abuse of power.

If they did it, they will get away with it if nothing more than suspicion is presented as evidence. — Paine

Nonsense. Have you even read a newspaper? Governments have been brought down on the basis of nothing but hearsay. If the government didn't care whether we knew (but didn't have the evidence), they wouldn't put such enormous amounts of effort into controlling the narrative would they? Do you think Cambridge Analytica used the power of solid evidence-based arguments? Are we concerned about Russian troll farms because they might present bundles of court-ready evidence dockets? No we're concerned about their effect on public opinion.

If there's even the slightest sign that the US are repeating the same abuses of power that we know for a fact they've done before, then it matters that we kick up a hue and cry about it. It matters that they feel nervous. A government should be terrified of its people.

Right now they know can expect nothing but obsequious compliance from the likes of you so long as they don't slip up and release documentary evidence of the master plot in excruciating detail.

I don't know what to make of this trivialization of Ukrainian experience right after you say: "we've allowed power to dictate foreign governments to suit their needs." — Paine

Hopefully make of it exactly what it said. Hurt feelings are less important that holding power to account.

If the US government were involved, it's very important that they feel nervous (if not petrified) that their electorate will not stand for it.

If the US government were not involved, it is far less important (of virtually no consequence at all) that we properly congratulate the people who did actually do it. Hopefully they didn't do it for the praise.

Not that any of this is anything other than a smokescreen. after all, on this same thread, woven in amongst our conversation, you have @neomac literally arguing that Western influence is so instrumental in improving a country's human right record that it's worth fighting a bloody war for, and yet you've remained entirely silent about that.

No complaints about removal of agency when the argument supports the war.

we take what we have when trying to better understand the attacker/imposer and defender — jorndoe

What "we have" is the relative conduct in Crimea, which you're ignoring for some reason. We're trying to answer the question of what a Russian controlled region of Ukraine would be like and you want to start examining unrelated factors and ignore the example of a Russian controlled region of Ukraine.

I care comparing the likely trends concerning human rights institutions of ex-Soviet Republic between those which joined EU/NATO and those which didn't and remained under anti-West Russian influence. Why would I care about such comparison? For the obvious reason that Ukraine wants to join EU/NATO to escape from Russian sphere of influence. So it's relevant to understand what might happen to "human rights" institutions in the 2 cases. And since no trend in Russia/Belarus is close to reach any trend in ex-Soviet Republics that joined EU/NATO so far (EVEN WHEN IS DECLINING), my hypothesis is still very much plausible. — neomac

And yet...

Those trends do not discriminate between driving factors (e.g. domestic vs foreign). — neomac

So you admit that you cannot possibly derive anything from them about Ukraine's likely trajectory by knowing only one such factor (sphere of influence).

Here's the charts you're using from the breakup of the USSR (beginning 1988, finalised 1991) to now. All countries including Russia registered a surge because having democratic elections scores very highly. Then very little happens. Russia declines, Belarus and Ukraine are turbulent but level, the others show virtually no change.

Depending on the nature of the democratic process installed, each country's score rose at the time democracy was established, then stagnated. This is largely to do with V-dem's heavy weighting of electoral procedures in its index (https://www.v-dem.net/data/).

Ukraine, however, already has democratic elections. Famously good ones (apparently) with Zelensky commanding the country's full mandate we're told.

So what improvements could you possibly anticipate, since electoral reform is petty much the only improvement that's consistent and even Russia achieved that with the break up of the USSR. I don't see any evidence of Ukraine's 'likely' path there.

What's more, at issue is not simply the question of whether Ukraine would be better off outside of Russian puppetry (undoubtedly yes). It's whether a protracted land war is the best, or even acceptable means of achieving that, considering the enormous cost.

None of the countries you cite as examples have come out of long protracted land wars, nor have such significant far right nationalist sentiment, nor have such influential natural resource reserves, nor have Ukraine's position strategically for Russia... Nor a dozen other factors. The charts I selected show that there's nothing causal about entering a Western sphere of influence. Some countries improve (Lithuania, Estonia), others don't (Croatia, Saudi-Arabia, Iraq). so there's no reason at all to believe that it's the Western influence, and not internal factors that drive the changes.

Certainly not enough reason to justify supporting a devastating war on the back of.

I think that Putin has mentioned himself for example PNAC, but you don't have to refer Putin on it — ssu

Right. Absolutely no one here has used Putin as a source of evidence on anything ever. So what the fuck are you on about?

What I'm against is the reurgitation of Russian propaganda — ssu

...which is absurd.

Russia is opposed to the US. It's going to promote any story that reflects negatively on the US.

If you're going to repress all Russian propaganda you're effectively denying all opposition to the US, since all negative actions of the US will undoubtedly figure in Russian propaganda.

It seems that some modicum of the burden of proof here should be on those claiming the change was caused by the U.S — Paine

Why?

The US is the most powerful nation on earth. It's necessary to hold power to account otherwise it can just do whatever it likes.

So on what possible ground is it right to give the most powerful nation on earth the benefit of the doubt here?

If they did it, and we let them get away with it, then we've allowed power to dictate foreign governments to suit their needs.

If they didn't, and we assume they did, we hurt the feelings of the people who actually brought about the revolution.

Which is the more dangerous outcome to hedge against?

if they support my claims, that’s good — neomac

They don't. I've just demonstrated that. Croatia's human rights record declined on joining the EU.

Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Hungary made no progress at all.

But I see you have a new favourite metric. So here's Poland since joining the EU. Declined.

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-rights-vdem?tab=chart&time=2004..latest&country=~POL

Estonia. Declined. Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria... None of these countries made any significant improvement in human rights since joining the EU and most worsened.

You argument is simply not supported by the evidence. Joining the EU is unlikely to improve human rights in Ukraine based on the unequivocal evidence that it has not done so for any other country.

I just hope it's simple ignorance about the actual history. — ssu

So the BBC's diplomatic correspondent is likely to be ignorant about the actual history?

this transcript suggests that the US has very clear ideas about what the outcome should be and is striving to achieve these goals...Washington clearly has its own game-plan — https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26079957

And George Friedman, director of Stratfor, U.S. intelligence strategic advisory institute? Also likely to be ignorant about the actual history when he calls the euromaidan...

it truly was the most blatant coup in history. — George Friedman, director of Stratfor

Or the Guardian's associate editor...

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/30/russia-ukraine-war-kiev-conflict

... Basically, until it came time to rewrite history to conveniently fit the new narrative, the idea that the US were knee deep in this was commonplace.

Now, of course, it's time to dig up some Ukrainian government-sponsored academic and pretend that the idea of the US's involvement is ridiculous.

The trouble is, the internet exists and we can all see quite clearly what the view was at the time.

One more for fun. Since we've not touched on NATO.

Out of the longest running ex-soviet states in NATO... Lithuania.

Here's it's chart (again with your preferred metric), since joining...

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=2004..latest&country=~LTU

Bugger all progress.

Here's it's chart that it achieved all on its own first ...

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=earliest..2004&country=~LTU

Notice the difference? In 2004 Lithuania joined the EU and NATO. That move ended all progress in your chosen metric of human rights.

Oh, and one last for you all

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&time=2009..latest&country=HRV~BLR~IRQ~RUS~SAU~UKR~USA

Which are the only two countries to have shown a net improvement in the last decade?

Russia and Belarus.

The rest of Western countries (including ex-Soviet republics) are much better than the US, Ukraine and Russia. — neomac

Here's your preferred statistics relevant to the actual argument.

https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/physical-integrity-rights-fkr?tab=chart&country=HRV~BLR~IRQ~RUS~SAU~UKR~USA

1. Note Croatia, the most recent accession to the EU, whose record has gone down since joining.

2. Note Belarus, undoubtedly a Russian puppet state whose score is higher than the US.

3. Note Saudi Arabia, an ally of the US, performing identically to Russia.

4. Note Iraq, a famous beneficiary of the US's military help, at the bottom of the list below everyone.


Even with your own cherry-picked proxy for human rights (which are so much more than just democracy and government freedoms), your argument falls flat on its face.

Here all the stats you want: — neomac

And you're using physical integrity rights as a proxy for human rights because...?