We disagree, I'm moving on.

"Can one say: "Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either (OC 121)." The doubt, in the sense of challenging one's knowledge claim, is essential to what it means to have objective knowledge. Otherwise, we end up with pronouncements like Moore's, as if the pronouncement itself is enough. It also seems to be why Wittgenstein says in OC 4 to consider the negation of these kinds of propositions. If the negation doesn't make sense, then it's not epistemological it's a hinge. The epistemological use of "I know..." has to make sense when considering its negation. If it doesn't then it's just an expression of a hinge belief. It's the doubt that separates the epistemological from the hinges. In the former the doubt makes sense, in the latter it doesn't.

We have to remember that Wittgenstein never finished this work (OC), so it hasn't been edited. We don't know what passages would have been left in, and which passages would have been removed.

With regard to knowledge and doubt in On Certainty:

6. Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not. - For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely
important mental state seems to be revealed.

What is this mental state? — Fooloso4

The mental state Wittgenstein seems to be referring to is the mental state of conviction. Moore's use of "I know..." is just that, a conviction of certainty. In OC 42 Witt refers to what is expressed by tone of voice and gestures (expressing a conviction), which fits Moore's use of "I know..." as he pronounces "I know this is a hand," by raising his hand before an audience. It's not an epistemological use of the words "I know..." where one is expressing a justified true belief.

In OC 7 Witt points out that our lives show (by our actions) these kinds of hinge beliefs, for example, by getting the chair or shutting the door. These are the subjective certainties of our world picture, which is how we act in the world. It's a misuse of know in the epistemological sense, we don't justify these kinds of beliefs, which is what Moore is trying to do and why Witt is criticizing his use of know. If OC 7 isn't about one's inner certainty, then it would be making the same mistake Moore makes.

Just to reiterate, there's a difference between one's inner subjective certainty (or using know as an expression of a conviction) and the epistemological use of "I know..." as an expression of objective certainty (knowledge). Witt uses know and certain in both ways, and it's important to distinguish between the two.

Knowledge claims are epistemological. Justification does not mark a distinction between epistemological and non-epistemological knowledge claims. — Fooloso4

Again, what I'm saying is that there are uses of the word know, as Witt points out, that are not epistemological. For example, "I know...," as an expression of a conviction, which is what Moore's use of know amounts to. This is a non-epistemological use; it refers to how I feel about a belief.

Science is a form of knowing in a participatory and a practical sense. We know the world, in the sense of participating in it, via science. It is practical too in the that it is a practice, a know-how. Propositional knowledge though, it seems to me, requires observation. I know I have hands because I can see them, observe myself using them and so on. I know it is raining when I am out and I feel the rain on my body and see the drops falling. In those kinds of cases, of which there are countlessly many in our lives, we cannot be mistaken, barring faux-doubt and bizarre thought-experiment scenarios, which I don't believe deserve our concern. — Janus

Science uses the same justification methods we all do, logic (inductive and deductive reasoning), sensory experience (observation), and testimony (peer reviewed papers, lectures, etc). It's just that science is generally more precise with these methods than the general public. Most knowledge in general is practical, not just science. Moreover, science draws conclusions based on whatever method of justification it's using, and these conclusions are in the form of propositions. If science presents a theory based on experiments or mathematical models, then someone probably believes the conclusions are either true or false. If they believe they're true or false, they're using propositions. Most all of what we know is in the form of propositions.

Knowledge can come in the form of a skill (know how) or in the form of a belief. Mostly when we talk about knowledge we're talking about beliefs not knowledge as a skill (like riding a bike or conducting skillful experiments). Although skills overlap with knowledge as a belief.

When you say "So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken." I have no problem agreeing with you because it is not a claim that I know, but a claim to have good reason to believe that I know. And this highlights the strangeness of saying that I could know, without knowing that I know. For me, if I don't know that I know, as I say I do in cases like 'I am a human being' 'my body is bilaterally symmetrical (more or less)', I have hands and feet'. 'My head sits on my shoulders' and so on endlessly, then I would say instead that I don't know, but I believe or don't believe this or that, or I reserve judgement. — Janus

A claim to have good reason to believe X is partly what we mean by know. Good reasons are how we justify many of our beliefs and why we make claims that a proposition is true. It is a claim to know.

Part of Wittgenstein's argument against Moore is that we don't know we have hands. The hinge belief that we have hands is just part of the world picture we have along with a million other things, but it's not knowledge. I believe Witt is correct about this.

I see, not knowing and doubting, but believing and doubting as more inextricably tied. The problem I have with the idea that knowing involves uncertainty or defeasibility, is that it seems weird, inconsistent or incoherent. to say that you know, but that you could be mistaken. — Janus

It could simply mean that your inductive reasoning, which is a legitimate form of knowing is only probable (most of science is inductive). So, I could say without sounding weird that I have good reasons to believe I know X, but that there is a small chance I could be mistaken. This happens all the time. Evidence changes and so do our conclusions. I think the problem is when we conflate the meaning of knowledge as JTB for example, and one's claim to knowledge, they are two different things. The definition is one thing, that is what it means to know, but your inductive claim doesn't have the same force of necessity (if necessity is the correct word).

Epistemological considerations may come much later but knowing and doubting do not. It is not clear what the distinction you are making between knowing and doubting and their epistemological uses. If the point is that epistemology as an branch of philosophy arises later then yes, of course. — Fooloso4

Witt seems to point to two senses of know and certainty throughout OC. He talks about using know as an expression of a conviction which is not an epistemological use. He also talks about subjective certainty which is the same as know when used to express one's conviction. This is what I mean by non-epistemological uses of these words. An epistemological use of these words includes the proper justification and their truth.

Since hinges can and do change, even if only rarely and slowly, epistemological considerations are not off the table — Fooloso4

While it's true that most hinges can and do change, some don't. I gave these examples earlier, but you seem to ignore them or you're not reading everything. My examples include, there are objects, there are other minds, we have hands, etc. It's hard to see how there are objects could change.

If you going to critique what I say at least read with more care. That said, I'm sure we have disagreements nothing new here.

I'm saying that knowing and doubting as epistemological uses are more sophisticated language games. Knowing and doubting does not occur as an epistemological language game when speaking of hinge beliefs, generally. So, if you're speaking in terms of primitive man there is no knowing and doubting epistemologically. And, even if we're talking about modern man and their language games hinge beliefs also fall outside epistemological considerations.

OC 3 is just an example of where it might be proper to doubt and how we might satisfy that doubt. Moore's use is not such a case.

7 is referring to a subjective knowing and certainty. That's my interpretation.

None of the rest of your e.g.'s hurt my position. You don't seem to be following my position carefully. At least that's what it seems to me.

But recall that Wittgenstein regarded the ordinary meaning of "to know" to not imply infallibility, in the sense that even if a fact P necessarily implies another fact Q, "knowing that P" does not necessarily imply Q. — sime

Right, he never implies that "to know" means some infallibility on our part.

I don't think Wittgenstein would use phrasing like "P necessarily implies some fact," or what others use, viz., "P if and only if P," etc.

This stems from his epistemic consideration that in a literal sense nothing is knowable in the sense demanded by a philosopher. And yet he appreciated that everyone including himself ordinarily use the verb "to know" all the time. Therefore he concluded that the ordinary meaning of "to know" isn't an insinuation of ideal knowledge. — sime

Philosophers don't, as a general rule, hold to the notion that knowledge implies infallibility if that's what you're implying. Inductive reasoning is probabilistic, so any knowledge gained by inductive reasoning is not infallible by definition. I think Wittgenstein's point is that some uses of "I know.." are not epistemological as in Moore's case, at least that's part of Witts point.

What I am emphasizing here is what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty in the following:

110 “….As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.” — Richard B

Yes, that's an important part of his thinking in OC.

"Giving grounds [justification], however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;--but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting [non-linguistic], which lies at the bottom of our language game (OC 204)."

Wittgenstein's ideas seem to build on each other. At the bottom, i.e. the grounding or the world picture, then we have our actions (non-linguistic actions) within that grounding. On top of this comes a primitive language, then more sophisticated language games like knowing and doubting. Knowing and doubting come much later, it's parasitic on the world picture.

"The reason why the use of the expression "true or false" has something misleading about it is that it is like saying "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't", and the very thing that is in question is what "tallying" is here (OC 199)."

It seems very easy to say that a proposition is true because it tallies, mirrors, corresponds, etc. with the facts, but in Moore's case what does it mean? Moreover, what does it mean for any proposition to tally with the facts? There must be a way of deciding for or against a proposition (OC 198). Some propositions are determined to be justified and true based on what method of justification we're using, for example, logic, sensory experience, testimony, linguistic training, etc. To determine how most propositions are true we use one of these justification methods. The question though, for Wittgenstein has to do with certain kinds of propositions, Moorean propositions, which hold a special place in our system of beliefs, viz., the grounding of our epistemological talk of justification and truth. If justification comes to an end with hinges, then tallying loses its meaning with hinges, which seems to be why the question "What is tallying with the facts?"

"Really 'The proposition is either true or false' only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like (OC 200)."

My interpretation is that the ground refers back to the world picture or inherited background, i.e., it grounds our very talk of justification and truth. Moore doesn't see that bedrock doesn't need grounding; it is the ground. Indeed, most of us don't see it. This solves the infinite regress problem, viz., where does justification end?

Wittgenstein's point is that no justification is required. Certain propositions, viz., hinge propositions are generally outside our epistemological language games.

"What does this mean: the truth of a proposition is certain (OC 193)?"

"With the word 'certain' we express complete conviction, the total absence of doubt, and thereby we seek to convince other people. That is subjective certainty.

"But when is something objectively certain? When a mistake is not possible. But what kind of possibility is that? Mustn't mistake be logically excluded (OC 194)?"

Wittgenstein uses certain in two different senses in OC, subjectively certain, as an expression of a conviction or feeling about a belief, and objectively certain, which is another way of expressing a piece of knowledge as JTB. So, certainty and knowledge both have their subjective and objective counterparts, and they are often confused.

OC 194 brings up a very interesting point, i.e., the tendency is to say, "I know...," and here one thinks one is using know in the epistemological sense (as Moore's does), as a guarantee that one knows, as if a mistake is not possible. However, if a claim to know is in itself knowledge, it would seem that knowing would lose its force, it would be akin to a conviction, opinion, or intuition. Knowledge must stand up to the doubt, "How is it that you know?" Note that with a mere belief, one might respond to the question "Why do you believe that?" with the answer "I just do," and that's acceptable as a mere belief; but a claim to knowledge as JTB requires more, it requires that the belief be justified and true. And of course, Wittgenstein in challenging Moore's use by asking what would count as a justification for "I know this is a hand." Wittgenstein is telling us that Moore's use of "I know..." is akin to an expression of a conviction, not objective knowledge as Moore thinks it is. Of course, this brings us full circle, viz., that the propositions that Moore retails as knowledge hold a special place within our world picture. Moore doesn't know, in his context, what he thinks he knows.

There is a lot to unpack here, and I've just scratched the surface.

"Even if the most trustworthy of men assures me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows [my emphasis] (OC 137)."

There is a side issue with knowing that seems to get conflated with what we mean by knowledge (JTB), and what we claim as knowledge. A claim to know, even if one believes that they have the proper justification, doesn't always equate to knowing. This seems obvious, and yet people think that there is some problem with JTB because one can seemingly have a belief that's justified and true, and yet that belief can turn out to be false. Claiming to know is not necessarily knowing. We often believe we know, but later find out that we didn't know. It's simply a difference between one's claims and reality, they don't always match. Moreover, most of what we know is probabilistic and subject to what we think is likely the case, not what is necessarily the case. Given the probabilistic nature of most of our knowledge, it's reasonable to conclude that sometimes what we believe is justified and true, is simply false. This is just part of the nature of our claims and not a flaw in how we define knowledge (JTB). Within any system of beliefs, there will always be some false beliefs, even if we think those beliefs are well-established.

At the bottom of our epistemological use of "I know..." is an ungrounded way of acting, in other words, justification comes to an end. It ends with "...a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions (OC 136)." It seems clear that Wittgenstein is referring to our world picture or our inherited background.

"The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments (OC 137)." It's the role hinges play in our system of judgments that's important, and it's certainly not about whether they're true or false. "We don't for example, arrive at any of them as a result of investigation (OC 138)." If someone wants to say they're true, then I ask, "How do you know they're true?" If you point to some criteria for their justification, then I believe you're missing Wittgenstein's point.

I think sometimes we lump hinges into a very large pot, as though they're all the same. However, that there are other objects or other minds isn't going to change, at least as far as I can see.

Watch out @schopenhauer1 the Wittgensteinians will take over the thread. :yikes:

It seems to me that knowledge and doubt are two sides of the same coin, i.e., you can't have one without the other. "Can one say, 'Where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either (OC 121)."

One could use the word doubt in a way similar to expressing an opinion, viz., there is no justification or very little justification for the doubt, similar to a feeling or intuition. However, just like many of our opinions, it generally carries very little weight. Just as knowledge is superior to mere belief, doubting backed by good reasons or good evidence is superior to a doubt that lacks some form of justification.

Some expressions of doubt are senseless. For example, doubting that there are other persons, grounds for doubt are lacking, everything speaks in favor of there being other persons and nothing against it. What would count as a grounding for such a doubt? "And couldn't we peacefully leave him to doubt it, since it makes no difference at all (OC 120)?"

"If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty (OC 115)."

What is the certainty that is presupposed? Well, we've been talking about this in the previous posts, viz., the world picture or inherited background. Doubting by its very nature requires a place of certainty. "If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of the meaning of your words either (OC 114f)."

There is an important point about doubting that's similar to a point raised in earlier posts about knowing, viz., both have uses that point to an inner feeling; Knowing as an expression of conviction and doubting as an expression of intuition or a feeling of unease. Both of these uses are proper, but they are different from the uses of these words in an epistemological context.

"And isn't that what Moore wants to say, when he says he knows all these things?--But is his knowing it really what is in question, and not rather that some of these propositions must be solid for us (OC 112)?

Wittgenstein makes the point that some propositions must be solid for us. This is important in terms of what can be rationally doubted within our world picture or inherited background. However, given how broad our world picture is, there will inevitably be false beliefs within it, so what might be a hinge at T1, might not be at T2. In the past, I've mainly focused on hinges that tend not to change or that change very little over time, but Wittgenstein's hinges are much broader in scope. In other words, Wittgenstein's hinges would include actions (linguistic and non-linguistic actions) within any system of belief, even beliefs that are mere myths. There are groups of language games within these various systems that support the system, including epistemological language games. For many religions, belief in God is a hinge. So, we end up with competing systems, with hinges in one system that aren't hinges in another system. What's solid in one system won't be solid in another, and what is doubtable in one system may not be doubtable in another.

That said, certain hinge beliefs ground all of our systems, and these hinge beliefs tend not to change or change very little over time. Again, examples include: "There are other minds," "There are objects," "We have hands," and "The Earth has existed for a long time, etc." These hinges should be in a group of their own because they tend to be the most solid and beyond the reach of any reasonable doubt. They seem to be core hinges.

"And now if I were to say 'It is my unshakeable conviction that etc.', this means in the present case too that I have not consciously arrived at the conviction by following a particular line of thought, but that it is anchored in all my questions and answers, so anchored that I cannot touch it.

"All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life (OC 103, 105)."

Of course, this refers again to the "inherited background or world picture" that forms the system in which we have our forms of life, language games, and our talk about epistemology. This also includes things that are not only true but also false, which explains why the riverbed of hinges can change. Some hinges are more fixed than others and the changes are more imperceptible.

Now that I think more about it @Fooloso4 there are some hinges that tend to be more immutable. For example, that we are beings that move through space, that I'm a being separate from other beings, that there are other minds, other objects, etc. These may even be necessarily hinges given the laws of the universe. I don't know if I've brought this up before, but maybe that's where you got the idea from. So, there are hinges that range along a kind of scale, some being more or less immutable, and most not being immutable at all.

Yes, and this is just what he did, he was in front of people when he expressed his "common sense" view that he knew he had a hand. It's not always as easy to spot the linguistic problem as you might think.

Ya, I think I agree with that.

Our world picture is subject to change isn't that the purpose of Wittgenstein's riverbed analogy in OC 96?

Before we go on, what makes you think that I believe the inherited background is fixed and immutable?

"The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them [my emphasis] (OC 100)." Of course, Moore does not know what he claims to know, that's part of Wittgenstein's point, and if he does not know them, then he doesn't know they are true, at least not in an epistemological sense of being justified and true. Moore's use of know, even though he believes it to be an epistemological use, is more akin to the use of know as a conviction of what one believes. I believe we can trace Wittgenstein's thinking on this from OC 6 where he points out that Moore is misusing the concept know by pointing to his hand as something he knows. Wittgenstein continues, "And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state is revealed." What mental state? The "mental state of conviction." One's conviction can be the same whether it's "knowledge or false belief (OC 42). Moore conflates, as many people do, the use of "I know..." as an expression of a conviction, as opposed to an expression of epistemology (JTB). "Suppose I replaced Moore's 'I know' by 'I am of unshakeable conviction' (OC 86)?"

So, what might a theory of knowledge look like for Wittgenstein given the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty? Of course, this question might be antithetical to Wittgenstein right from the start given his propensity to eschew philosophical theories. So, maybe one could give some guiding principles instead of a theory of knowledge. What might be some guiding Wittgensteinian principles that would hold us in good stead when thinking about knowledge?

1. First and foremost, the inherited background that forms the backdrop for our actions, linguistic and non-linguistic. This is the very framework that allows all of our talk about epistemology and doubt. The context of knowledge and doubt can only occur where there is a framework of foundational beliefs.

2. The formation of our beliefs against this backdrop, and here I'm thinking of Wittgenstein's hinge beliefs, examples include, "I have hands," "There are other minds," "The Earth has existed for a long time," and "I am a being separate from other beings." These beliefs are generally or mostly outside our epistemic language games of knowledge and doubt, which means they fall outside any need to be justified, and any need for them to be referred to as true or false. This seems to be part of the progression of the development of language, i.e., much simpler language games developed before the language games of epistemology.

3. Wittgenstein's view of language games within the context of our cultural forms of life. So, we need to be mindful of the different ways we justify a belief within the context of different language games. We might see, for example, correct reasoning (logic), testimony, linguistic training, sensory experiences, and some other methods or uses of justification within our forms of life. The same applies to the use of the concept of truth.

4. The meaning of these concepts (e.g. justification and truth) needs to be seen under the rubric of Wittgenstein's family resemblance. This helps to keep us from dogmatic definitions.

These are just some of the ideas that might inform my thinking on epistemology.

This is just a cursory view of the subject, but I think it's a good place to start.

The "belief" that I have hands does not arise from an inherited background but from the activities of using our hands. Sticking them in my mouth, grasping things, and so on. — Fooloso4

I agree with this. Part of what I mean by our inherited background is not only the fact that we have hands but also the use of our hands within the context of the reality we find ourselves in.

Hinge propositions are regarded as true, but the question of their truth does not usually arise, except for some philosophers or when we can no longer hold to propositions such as, the sun revolves around the earth. — Fooloso4

This I disagree with, i.e., what hinge propositions are according to Wittgenstein (at least it seems like a general consensus), are those basic beliefs that inform our discussions of justification and truth (our epistemology). So, generally speaking, hinge propositions are the foundation of all talk of justification and truth. The key is the phrase "generally speaking," there are exceptions and Wittgenstein points these out. Of course, this only happens where a doubt makes sense.

"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false (OC 94)."

One of the most important ideas that arose out of Wittgenstein's unfinished final notes (On Certainty) is the logical connection between knowledge and doubt (both require a good justification). His emphasis is on the foundational (not the traditional meaning of foundational epistemology) and practical side of epistemology. For Wittgenstein, there seem to be propositions, of a sort (hinge propositions), that consist of very basic beliefs that form the foundation of our claims of knowledge and our expressions of doubt. One such hinge belief, is the belief that "I have hands," which comes from Moore's paper, Proof of the External World. The idea is that certain beliefs arise based on our inherited background of reality. These beliefs (hinge propositions) are not generally justified or true. Their foundational nature gives rise to our epistemological language, i.e., without these very basic beliefs, not only would there not be language but more specifically there would not be epistemological language. Moreover, doubting itself only functions within a particular framework of foundational beliefs, otherwise doubting would lose its meaning. And, just as our epistemological language needs a justification, so does doubting. Without hinge propositions, the whole system of knowledge and doubt would collapse.

This, I believe, is one of the most important ideas to arise out of On Certainty, and it's critical to our understanding of knowledge.

Is this a response to me?

Why is it that Wittgenstein can have a pass to riff off his own thoughts, but others cannot in relation to Wittgenstein? Odd. Being how ahistorical Wittgenstein was, I would think even the reading of Wittgenstein would invite more caprice than that of a more systemic philosopher. — schopenhauer1

Where do you think Wittgenstein has gotten a pass? Because, again, mostly we're just trying to understand what he's saying. Some of us who have studied W. for many years do have more hardened ideas about what he's saying, but that doesn't mean that he gets a pass. Maybe if you could give an e.g.

It's not as though we don't know anything about what he's saying, and where there is general agreement there tends to be more hardened views.

I tend to agree. Of course there is some interpretation involved in what counts as 'serious study' of a subject. it seems to me that most members here autodidacts and hobbyist philosophers. — Tom Storm

When I speak of "serious study" I'm referring to reading and studying his many writings (primary source material), and writing about it yourself, including reading other interpretations. I don't consider myself an expert, but I do think I've seriously studied Wittgenstein's early and later thinking.

:up:

I may be wrong, but you started this thread shortly after the response I gave you in my thread on Wittgenstein, so I assume that by "Asshole Tendencies" you were, partly at least, referring to me. I should be flattered that you would do such a thing, and I am.

All kidding aside, I've read much of this thread, and as usual, I agree with some of it and disagree with other parts. For me, Wittgenstein is extremely important in terms of what we can learn, not so much from the Tractatus, but from his method of linguistic analysis in his later philosophy, starting around 1933. I've always admired his thinking, not only in philosophy but in other areas of his life. The two areas of his philosophy that interested me, were his method of analysis as presented in the PI, and his thoughts on epistemology in his final notes (On Certainty). Epistemology is such an important part of philosophy that to ignore On Certainty is to miss an important advance in epistemological thinking.

That said, I disagree with much that was written in the Tractatus (as do many other philosophers, including Wittgenstein), and I disagree with Wittgenstein's views on metaphysics, which he carried into his later philosophy.

In terms of gatekeeping, I hope that my views have not slammed the door on others. I certainly don't consider myself a gatekeeper. I'm still learning and have found myself wrong when interpreting this or that passage. We often can't interpret correctly what we say to one another, let alone interpret Wittgenstein's passages correctly.

I don't have much patience for people who pretend to know what they don't know. What I mean is this, if you haven't seriously studied a subject, then you shouldn't be dogmatic about your views on the subject. If you are, then that seems to be more about one's ego than getting at the truth. I don't know about the rest of you, but my observation has been that most people in here are more interested in winning their argument, at any cost, than trying to ascertain what's true.

So, do I have "asshole tendencies?" Maybe here and there, but I try.

Sincerely,
Sam

Ahh, my error.

If you feel unable or unwilling to have a textual discussion in a textual thread, I don't know what to say! — fdrake

I'm not sure why you would make such a statement. You've witnessed me in several of the threads on Wittgenstein. When have I been unwilling to generally engage? I may not engage with everyone, but I've engaged with people in my threads, including you. So, I don't know what to say.

I did some of that if you read the thread. However, it's up to me whether I want to engage on this or that interpretation.

I create some of my threads for people to visit if they want more information on a particular topic. I feel somewhat qualified since I've been studying Wittgenstein for years. People aren't always going to agree with me, but that's the nature of the subject matter. Besides most people who give a commentary don't understand even the most basic aspects of the Tractatus. They just want to express their opinion, that's fine, but it's not good information.

Practicing a religion could gain you divine favor in the afterlife. — Scarecow

Who cares about divine favor, especially if you don't believe in God? Your argument, if you want to call it that, assumes that some religious God exists. Your presupposition that God exists, forces you to assume that divine favor is important. It's rather circular.