There are many situations which apparently require me to make assumptions instead of actually knowing what is true and what is not. Is there any way to get rid of this constant uncertainty? I feel like I become really uncertain about many things if I don't constantly check them or if I'm unable to do so. — AnonThinker25

I'm not sure I'm clear on what you mean by "knowing?" Part of the problem may just be that you think knowing X means that you have complete certainty or absolute certainty. Much of what we claim to know is probabilistic, that is, we know with a degree of certainty. I know the sun will rise tomorrow with a very high degree of certainty (here I'm talking about objective certainty - based on good reasons or good evidence). I know my car will start with a high degree of certainty. I don't know with absolute certainty, but that doesn't mean there is good reason to doubt that my brand new car will not start. What you need to ask yourself is, "Are there good reasons to doubt?" Just because you could be wrong, that doesn't mean you should be skeptical. In many cases there are good reasons to doubt the doubt, we shouldn't doubt willy-nilly.

Are you really going to say that looking at your watch isn't sufficient justification for knowing the time? — dePonySum

I would say that it is a sufficient condition, i.e., that generally we can trust our watches and our senses. However, we also know that whether we are justified or not is probabilistic, namely, watches sometimes fail to give the correct time because of various mechanical or battery failures. So, given that justification is only probabilistic (in the watch case) we shouldn't, and in fact are not, surprised when sometimes justification fails us. Therefore, we can't say with absolute certainty that we are justified in such cases.

It doesn't follow from this (as some people think) that because justification is only probabilistic that we can't make the claim that "We know X." For example, I claim to know algebra, but that doesn't mean that I had to get every problem correct on every test to make the claim. You can still make the claim that you know algebra, even though you only got 80% correct. I only bring this up because sometimes people conclude that you can't claim to know if your claim is only probabilistic. However, this is an error, since the correct use of the word know often involves what's only probable.

It also follows, that while our definition of knowledge as JTB is absolute, our claims are not. This is an important point.

On page one starting with post #2 I talk about the Tractatus. In the Tractatus the theory of truth is the correspondence theory, or the picture theory.

There is no theory of truth in the PI.

Keep in mind that I'm constantly re-writing these posts.

By the way, I'm starting my own forum. The forum will be mostly on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. I just started it today.

https://philosophicalthinking.createaforum.com/general-discussion/

Do you think Wittgenstein's goal in OC was at some foundationalist attempt, despite there being a lot of controversy about logical foundationalism in the TLP, and contextualism or correspondence in the Investigations? — Wallows

No, that wasn't his goal, although some might think so based on some of the things he said. I don't agree with your characterization of the TLP or the Investigations.

I hope things are well with you Wallows.

It is true that some bedrock propositions change over time, but not all. For example, Moore's propositions, for the most part will not change, unless in the future we evolve into beings that have no need for hands, but then, other bedrock beliefs will fill the gap. It is true that bedrock propositions/beliefs are contingent, so I guess given enough time most or all of them might change. Although it's difficult to think how being a person separate from other persons would ever change.

Let me just say again that I'm expanding on what Wittgenstein is saying in his notes, I'm not claiming that Wittgenstein would agree with me, or that this is where he was leading.

I started working on intuitions. To see what a philosophical intuition is (or rather, what one type of philosophical intuition is), consider the following:

You might think knowledge is justified and true belief. But suppose I look at my watch and it says the time is 12:37. On this surely reasonable and justified basis I believe that the time is 12:37, and indeed the time is 12:37. However, unbeknownst to me my clock is stopped. It just so happened to stop on 12:37, and by coincidence this happens to be the time now.

Many people have the intuition that in such a case you do not know that the time is 12:37, but you are justified in believing it, your belief is true, and you certainly do believe it. Thus, they argue, having a justified true belief does not guarantee knowledge. If this is true, it overturns what was the almost universally accepted view of what knowledge almost two and a half millennia- that knowledge is justified true belief, often shortened to JTB. This sense of wrongness about the idea that the person in the example knows that it is 12:37 is a paradigm case- perhaps the defining example- of a philosophical intuition. A philosophical intuition is typically (and these are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions!) a sense of rightness or wrongness about the application of a predicate- for example “Knowledge” in a hypothetical case. This sense of rightness or wrongness does not seem to rely on anything external to itself for its own justification, rather it just sort of seems self-evident. — dePonySum

This is just Gettier warmed over. There is nothing wrong with the definition of knowledge as JTB. The problem is that believing that one is justified, is not the same as being justified. There is nothing new here. The example, as in all Gettier problems, is that you fail to meet all of the criteria. As you look back on your justification, i.e., later you find out that your watch stopped, this in itself demonstrates that you did not meet the criteria. Thinking one is justified, call it intuition or not, is not the same as being justified, even if you lucked out in drawing the correct conclusion.

This seems like more like rhetorical bluster than anything of conceptual import, much like his grumbling about 'depth' and 'surface' in §111: an effort to change our metaphors, our attitudes. — StreetlightX

PI 129
I think this paragraph is much more important than just rhetorical bluster. It goes to the heart of much of what he's saying. We often miss the obvious in spite of it being "always before our eyes." It's as if we have to be reminded over and over again in order to see the obvious. This is partly what Wittgenstein does with the language-games by comparing and contrasting similarities and dissimilarities.

And what you call grumbling about 'depth' and 'surface' grammar is partly what we miss, i.e., we are fooled by propositions that have the same surface grammar. For example, "All rods have length," and "All roses have thorns," have the same surface grammar (the same sentence structure) - we can imagine roses without thorns, but not rods without length (depth grammar that goes beyond sentence structure). You can also see this with sentences about time. Compare the river flows with time flows.

Another good book to read on language is "Sense and Sensibilia," which is reconstructed from the manuscript notes of J. L. Austin.

Maybe we can keep this thread alive.

I'm sorry MU, but I'm not going to waste my time going back and forth arguing with your private interpretations of Wittgenstein. I think it ruins the thread.

The idea in PI 128 is a kind of ideal, i.e., if we were able to apply Wittgenstein's methods (it's not method by the way), then clarity would be achieved. There would be no debating the obvious, we would all agree, and thus no thesis or theses to advance.

The problem according PI 129 is that what's hidden is what's before our eyes, it's something so familiar that we tend to ignore or miss it because of its "simplicity," or again, its "familiarity." It seems as though the answer to our question or confusion lies in the open, which means according Wittgenstein, that we fail to be struck by it. However, once seen in a new light, it becomes "striking" and "powerful."

A Note of Clarity:

In the first paragraph I speak of an ideal, but this should not be confused with the idea that there is some perfect sense to all our statements, in other words, some meaning that eradicates vagueness. No, the ideal or the clarity spoken of, is the realization the our statements of ordinary use, are in perfect order just as they are. This is difficult to grasp, because when we encounter a vague statement, the tendency is to what to explain it further, but there may not be a need for further explanation. Exactness is not always necessary.

First, let me say that I'm not a religious person, so I'm not trying to defend any particular religion. That said, I think you can make sense of the idea of a trinity.

The problem is in the definitions as some have already pointed out. No definition will satisfy everyone, but that doesn't mean that you can't make sense, in some contexts, of the idea of a trinity. Definitions are just guides, they're not the be all and end all of how we use words. There is no definition that will satisfy every use of the word game, but that doesn't mean we can't use the word to refer to particular games.

My take on the trinity is simply this: There is nothing logically incoherent in saying that there can be three persons all partaking of the same nature and yet be three distinct beings. For example, let's say the nature of God is 1) omniscient , i.e., he/she knows all that is possible to be known; 2) omnipotent, i.e., can do anything that is logically possible; and finally, 3) omnipresent, in so far as one can make sense of what it means to be omnipresent. If consciousness is what is at the core of reality, then it could make sense that a being might be everywhere at once. Moreover, even if you throw one of the three core ideas (say omnipresent) out, you could still make sense of the other two. I think one can make sense of the idea, in some context, or some use of the terms.

The objections are going to be that the definition goes against some religious orthodoxy, but I don't care. My point is to make sense of it in some context or use. Just as we can make sense of children playing a game without the game have clearly defined rules, or without there ever been such a game before. We still know a game when we see it.

For Wittgenstein the process (his methods) take us from confusion to enlightenment. "This is reminiscent of a Zen master's procedure: 'Before you have studied Zen, mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no longer mountains and rivers are no longer rivers; but one you have had Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are rivers (D. T. Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected writings of Suzuki, pp. xvi-xvii)." It seems that the ideal for Wittgenstein is complete clarity, and clarity, as it were, is what's always been before our eyes.

Each linguistic confusion has a particular cure, which is why Wittgenstein's methods are like curing an illness, that is, there is no one particular method that works for all linguistic confusions. Always ask yourself, "What is Wittgenstein doing (K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, p. 104 - 105)."

Even though Wittgenstein wants us to not think of his writings as advancing a theory, I think he is putting forth a theory, a kind of anti-theory. It's a theory of method. It's as though we're looking at the linguistic landscape from a variety of angles, which gives us a better picture of language and how clarity is achieved.

We must remember the cures as we think of the many confusions that arise in philosophical thinking. This gets back to "assembling reminders." If we forget the cures, we will continue to live with the illness (confusion). Each reminder serves a particular purpose (PI 127), that is, it untangles linguistic knots.

I once started a thread, "Does Language Deceive Us?" - this is what I had in mind, namely, linguistic knots or confusion.

Maybe something like the following:

Once some of these passages are understood it will not only make clear some of what Wittgenstein is doing, but also help us to get a better picture of his method/s overall. Wittgenstein's philosophy is a kind of confession, especially as he criticizes his former self (Tractatus). You can see this in passages where he says "I'm tempted here to say," or "I feel like saying." etc. We don't develop theories based on confessions, they are either helpful or honest, or not. Confessions can be seen as cures, because remember, Wittgenstein is showing the fly the way out by clarifying the obvious through a series of case histories, like a doctor might do.

All throughout the PI Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to some very important linguistic facts, and it's each of these facts should serve as reminders. Each case study has something important to tell us about how easy it is to get tied up into linguistic knots. We often forget, especially while doing philosophy, the important ideas that Wittgenstein points out. However, Wittgenstein's cure is to keep these reminders before our eyes, or at our side as cures for what ales us. Reminders are exactly what is needed to keep our philosophy down to Earth and clear, that way, we can find our way about.

We often ask ourselves the wrong questions while reading the PI, it should never be, what kind of theory is Wittgenstein espousing?

Again, what are the reminders, they are the case histories, they help us achieve clarity, as opposed to the confusion that is caused by being tormented by language (as in the bewitchment of language). Once clarity is achieved, then we can stop doing philosophy and rest our minds - we can walk out of the bottle.

/

The main area that I part company with Wittgenstein is in reference to the limit of language. He still believes in the PI that there is a limit, I do not.

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Ironically, lucid dreamers use the presence of their dream hands within a dream as a cue to detect that they are dreaming. Said in this dream situation, is the sentence "I know I have hands" a hinge proposition or an epistemological claim? If a dreamer insisted the former they would fail the reality check and remain non-lucid. — sime

I would say that anytime it makes sense to say, "I know I have hands," whether dreaming or not, then it's not a hinge-proposition. Wittgenstein gives an e.g. in On Certainty where it makes sense to say "I know I have hands," e.g., after waking from an operation with bandaged hands. Hinge-propositions, as you probably know, are non-epistemic. It's senseless to say "I know...," or "I doubt..." if it's hinge or bedrock. If someone insisted in saying that such a proposition was epistemic, it would just be senseless, as in Moore's propositions.

I'm not sure I follow the reality check idea in reference to bedrock beliefs.

Hmm, I don't think that works: "The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections... of just what it is that philosophy is trying to do". — StreetlightX

I have Anscombe's translation (third edition). I'm not sure exactly what Wittgenstein's is saying, you may be right.

Not much to say about these other than they recapitulate, again, that philosophy is descriptive and subtractive, and not explanatory. That said, I'm not sure what it is that the philosopher 'marshalls' when he or she 'marshalls recollections': recollections of what? Any ideas? — StreetlightX

It isn't so clear, but it seems that in context it's reminders of (you must have a different translation, mine uses reminders, not recollections) of just what it is that philosophy, as Wittgenstein sees it, is trying to do (PI 126). This is where I part company with Wittgenstein.

"The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, thing do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules (PI 125)."

This is true not only of mathematics, but of any language we use to describe reality. Part of language's function, as I see it, is to describe reality, and we create language-games (governed by rules) to do just that. The contradictions, may not be contradiction of facts in the world, but the contradictions arise in the way we describe things, and the rules involved in the language-games used.

"A whole series of confusions has arisen around the question of consistency.

"Firstly, we have to ask where the cotnradiction is suppose to arise: in the rules or in the configurations of the game.

"What is a rule? If, e.g., I say 'Do this and don't do this', the other doesn't know what he is meant to do; that is, we don't allow a contradiction to count as a rule. We just don't call a contradiction a rule - or more simply the grammar of the word 'rule' is such that a contradiction isn't designated as a rule. Now if a contradiction occurs among the rules, I could say: these aren't rules in the sense that I normally speak of rules. What do we do in such a case? Nothing could be more simple: we give a new rule and the matter's resolved (Philosophical Remarks, p. 344, Notes of December 1931)."

No problem Wallows, I wasn't complaining just asking.

I'm not sure what any of this has to do with On Certainty. I'm sorry but I don't see the connection between any of this and my points in my paper.

What Wittgenstein is talking about on p. 223 has nothing to do with what I'm talking about.

No, again it has nothing to do with intuitionalist thought. It's quite different. Why would you think that?

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No it's not an intuition. It's more than that.

I'm repeating myself in a lot of ways, but it helps to re-word some of these ideas to make them a bit clearer. As I've already stated there are two kinds of hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs. First, there are those that occur in language. For example, the rules of chess are bedrock to the game, along with the board and pieces. Second, there are those that occur prior to language. For example, the belief that we have hands is something we learn prior to language, and the belief manifests itself when we use our hands. What can be confusing is that we can state these prelinguistic beliefs once we learn a language, as Moore did (I have hands.). So, how do we know when a beliefs is prelinguistic? Any belief that manifests itself in our acts or actions is most likely a hinge-proposition or bedrock belief.

l

It's interesting to note that foundational doctrines and structuralist assertions within the field of philosophy have only led to very few bedrock or hinge propositions. Such, as "I think, therefore, I am", and the next closest thing as the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which has been discredited as of late. — Wallows

Actually there are many bedrock beliefs, in fact, too many to list. The examples you give are not bedrock. The following are some...

2+2=4
I have hands.
I live on the Earth.
My name is Sam.
This is a tree.
That is a person.
etc, etc.

Wittgenstein's ideas about hinge-propositions are quite unique as far as I can tell. And by the way, his ideas are not the same as traditional foundationalism.

l

I would have to agree with Fdrake, i.e., that whether we are talking about the propositions of mathematics or otherwise, both can have an empirical side. I'm not that up on Wittgenstein's mathematical views, I'm just giving my take on the language of both mathematics and other linguistic propositions. Either way we're using symbols to describe reality, at least in part.

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How's it going Creative?

The problem of course, is that natural language is it's own meta-language; it is therefore incapable of expressing a distinction between the publicly linguistic and the privately non-linguistic. This is why, contra-Wittgenstein, I think natural language is inappropriate for discussing philosophy. What you need is a special notation for signifying your pretheoretic and private sense of "hand". — sime

I'm not sure how your response is connected with what I was saying. It sounds more like you misunderstood my point.

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