Right, we can use knowledge by acquaintance to justify our beliefs, but that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified. That one sees a pink tree - be it illusory or not - is not a belief at the moment experienced. Hence: — javra

Well, I would take issue with "that which we know by acquaintance is not of itself a belief - that in turn needs to be justified," because if we know it, then by definition it's a belief, viz., one that's true and also justified. And, why wouldn't something be a belief the moment I experience it? If for example someone pulled a gun on me, and surprised me with that gun, my reaction would probably be immediate based on my knowledge (the belief) that they have a gun.

I don't discover my pains. I have my pains. Knowledge is something I learn. How would I learn of my pain?

And this knowledge of “being in pain” isn’t JTB or some variant but, instead, one’s direct awareness of oneself being in pain; hence, a variant of knowledge by acquaintance. — javra

I'm familiar with knowledge by acquaintance, and I do believe that it falls under the umbrella of JTB. For me, JTB has a variety of uses, as seen in particular kinds of language-games. My view is that we justify our beliefs in a variety of ways, including sensory experiences, which directly relates to knowledge by acquaintance. For example, you might ask me after I say the orange juice is sweet, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" my justification is, "I tasted it." I think it's clear that we use sensory experience as a justification for many of our beliefs. Similarly, we can justify our knowledge (knowledge by acquaintance) of certain people, because of our direct sensory experiences with them, but justifying the belief that one is in pain seems way out of place. Why? For the various reasons just given in this thread.

You definitely have a unique way of interpreting Wittgenstein.

But that's simply the way language is, it does not consist of rules. Each person decides, based on one's own experience, what to call any different object, or any different feeling — Metaphysician Undercover

Wow, that's some statement. Now I understand how it is that you can make some of the statements you put forth.

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. If it makes no sense to doubt whether you are having pain (when you are having pain), then it makes no sense to be certain of it, either. — Luke

Agreed, and this is the whole point of this thread.

If we look closely at §258, we see that ‘I remember the connection correctly’ refers to remembering a meaning, namely, the meaning of the sign ‘S’, not to making sure that I infallibly apply ‘S’ only to S’s in the future. — Banno

Ya, I agree, I've mentioned this several times. Maybe I should have emphasized it more in the post Hanover is talking about.

I knew Wittgenstein was nuts.

Edited 12/10/21: Actually Hanover brings up an important point, which I never really addressed.

I'm stuck here. It's hard to imagine a language that doesn't rely on any social conventions. — Wheatley

That's the point, you can't. Unless you think you can imagine it, then it's a matter of understanding what Wittgenstein is trying to tell us about language.

That's funny, but I don't blame you.

Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people
— Sam26
Why does he think it is necessary? — Wheatley

The main problem is rule-following. What does it entail to follow a rule? Imagine a private language, i.e., just one that you're creating. Now try to imagine that you have to remember how to use all the words/concepts involved in your language. Are you remembering the correct use of your words? How would you know if you're making a mistake? Wittgenstein points out that you wouldn't, i.e., what would seem right in the use of your words/concepts, would be right. So, your use of words, in terms of correct and incorrect, would follow any application you deemed correct. Note that this is not how language works, I can't just decide to use the word car to refer to a pencil. Why? Because there is an objective standard (for the most part) that helps us to understand where a mistake has occurred. This, again, is only done with others, in social contexts. This is my take on it, at least partly.

I don't think there are many people who would agree with Gertie's statement ("Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject."), which I used to start this thread. The point that I was trying to make about the statement, is directly connected to much of what Wittgenstein talks about in the PLA. We've been a bit side tracked, but that's okay.

Why does Wittgenstein mention "imagination"? — Wheatley

It's a kind of thought experiment. Given his thinking about how language develops, viz., that it's not a totally private affair, it's done necessarily with other people. And, given that language is necessarily a rule-following endeavor (implicit and explicit rule-following), he then concludes that this process, being that they are both done with others, cannot be done totally in private. It's almost like trying to think of the two-sided triangle. He wants you to think about it, try to imagine it.

I'm against the proposition that philosophers can tell you what you can imagine. How's that? — Wheatley

I would be against any philosopher telling me what I can imagine too. Unless the philosopher is telling me I can't imagine a two-sided triangle, then I would think he has a point.

It's okay Wheatley, argue anyway. We learn by arguing, especially when you have to write out your arguments. We're all learning in here. I'm constantly re-thinking my beliefs. It's the way we advance, hopefully.

I was talking to a friend the other day about investing. In particular, about options, viz., a put, a strike price, etc, etc, I didn't have a clue, so it happens to all of us.

"Okay," what kind of response is that? :gasp:

Since when did philosophers become experts on limits of human imagination?

I can imagine it. Prove me wrong. — Wheatley

This has nothing to do with limiting human imagination.

All "Prove me wrong" means is that your mind is made up and there is nothing I can say that will change it. Ya, so you're right, I probably can't prove you wrong, the idea of proof here is too subjective.

Okay, give an example of what you're talking about so we can compare (in terms of doubting one's pain). Are you referring to something like phantom limb pains?

Ya, I agree, it's a matter of learning his method of analyzing.

↪Banno If you think I missed something, you should be able to explain what it was you think I missed. — Janus

Ya, answer that in your one sentence reply. :yikes:

↪Sam26 Discussions of the argument usually get stuck - as this one - in explaining it. It'd be interesting to move on to critiquing it. — Banno

Wittgenstein is not easy to understand. In fact, some of what he says, seems, at first glance, to be plainly incorrect. When Russell first read the Tractatus he completely missed the point. Moreover, it's difficult to explain some of these ideas, which is why we get stuck. We end up just repeating ourselves.

But from my point of view it would make no more sense to doubt I was seeing the tree I'm looking at, than it would to doubt that I'm feeling the pain that's throbbing in my toe. — Janus

I agree with this, but note again, that we can imagine a doubting situation with the tree e.g., but not the pain e.g..

Perhaps that artilce can serve to move beyond mere explanation to critique of private language? — Banno

I like figuring it out from the primary source. Some of these philosophers may or may not understand Wittgenstein's points. However, this is also true of me. Too many of these so-called Wittgenstein experts just have it wrong. Although you and I are excluded. :wink:

Are you saying that you just have private sensations, but that you don't know you have them? I don't see the difference between feeling a pain in my foot and seeing a tree in my garden. neither of these experiences require any further justification. — Janus

It's not a matter of knowing you have a pain. Contrast this with it's negation, "I don't know that I have a pain in my toe," it doesn't make sense. If we claim to have knowledge, then this has to be juxtaposed with not having knowledge, which is why it's important to understand the importance of the doubt. What would it mean to doubt you're in pain? Wittgenstein asks the same question of Moore's proposition, viz., "What would it mean to doubt this is your hand in the context Moore's using it?"

You don't see a difference between not being able to doubt you're in pain, as opposed to being able to doubt there is a tree over there. Of course the latter depends on context, it would be easy to imagine someone doubting that your seeing a tree. For example, maybe it's foggy and you can't see clearly. However, try doubting the pain you're having.

Is not feeling pain a kind of sensory experience? I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard".. — Janus

Usually when we refer to sensory experiences we're talking about the five senses, so in this sense feeling a pain is not sensory. We do use the words in similar ways, i.e., the grammar is the same, viz., "I feel the pain" vs "I feel the table." Our sensory experiences generally refer to things in reality. I see the tree, hear the trumpet, touch the table, smell the flowers, etc. However, pain manifests itself as a cry, or the word ouch for example.

Moreover, it makes sense to claim to know based on sensory experiences, but not, to claim to know that I'm having a pain, which has been the main idea of this thread. There's no knowing one is having a private sensation, I just have them.

'll maintain that we are referring to the hand, and expressing the pain. But I think it a moot point. — Banno

No, it's not a moot point, if you mean by moot that it has no relevance, it's very important to understanding W.

Where are you heading with this thread? We've differed as to what is to count as "knowledge" before; is the concern here more about sensation or about private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject. — Banno

I'm trying to show why statements like,

Experiential states exist as private certain knowledge to the experiencing subject

are meaningless; and, how its being meaningless, is connected with Wittgenstein's PLA.

I thought our other disagreement was over pre-linguistic beliefs, but I'm not sure.

The referent in "I have a pain in my hand" is my hand, not the pain.

but it's just as real,
— Sam26

Yes, it's real. So is the beetle. ∮293 takes pain as its example. Note the last paragraph there: if we treat pain talk as object-reference then the object vanishes.

Indeed the more I re-read this the more convinced I am that pain talk expresses, but doesn't refer. — Banno

The referent, is where the pain is, viz., in my hand. It's not the hand. The hand just happens to be the location of the pain. The point of the beetle example is that someone doesn't know "...what the pain is only [my emphasis] from his own case (293)!" In the case of "the pain in the hand," I'm not suggesting that anyone knows what the pain is from their own private case. In this case (the pain in the hand) we've learned how to properly use the word pain in social settings, and we are properly referring to a pain in the hand. Moreover, pointing to the hand as the location of the pain, is not deriving meaning based on this context. In other words, my example doesn't make this mistake, and this is the mistake we should concern ourselves with.

"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch.
— Sam26

Perhaps. But if we read the text as saying that it is, ∮245 works.

What's being rejected, and here I think I'm following Kenny, is that notion that talk of sensations takes the form of object and reference - see ∮293. So Kenny to:
To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation.

The sensation has the same grammatical structure as an object: "I have a pain in my hand" against "I have a phone in my hand". The phone is a thing; the pain is not. We refer to the phone, but give expression to the pain.

So if one refers to a pain it is not in the way one refers to a phone, despite the superficial similarity int he grammar. — Banno

In 245 it seems that he's saying you can't use language to get between pain and its expression. There's nothing between me having the pain, and the expression ouch. The ouch is an outward expression (linguistic expression) of the inner experience. The ouch replaces other outward natural expressions, i.e., we learn to replace crying with words and sentences. So, the ouch is bringing the natural expression into language. At the end of 246 I think we see what he's getting at, it's the mistaken idea that ouch somehow describes crying. It doesn't describe it, but replaces it. If we were trying to use the expression of pain as a description of crying, this, it seems, would have the affect of "...try[ing] to use language to get between pain and its expression."

This also means that we don't learn the language of pain by referring to an object, like we might learn to use the word cup, i.e., we would teach a child how to use the word cup by pointing to objects that are it's referent. We can refer to where we're having the pain, for example, in my toe. We do this all the time with others, so we know that to refer to where I'm having the pain, is a correct use of the word. It's not as though I'm deriving meaning from this context, the context of pointing to my toe as the source of the pain, and this is the point.

I agree with you that the meaning of pain is not the name of a sensation, but I can use the word pain to refer to where I'm having a pain on my body. I'm not sure, but it seems you think that if I refer to a pain on my body, that this equates to what we mean by pain, but it doesn't. We're not naming the sensation on our bodies, we're simply showing where its located. The location of a cup is not the meaning of cup. Where is the cup, or where is the pain, is something different. I have to learn to use these words first before I can locate them. Although the pain location is not as specific, unless we're pointing at a cut on our toe, then the pain location is a little more specific.

To sum up: if by name one means "word who is meaning is learned by bare ostensive definition" then pain is not the name of a sensation; but if by name one means what is ordinarily meant by the word then of course "pain" is the name of a sensation. — Banno

I don't quite follow this paragraph. I don't know about you, but it seems to me that we're talking about what is ordinarily meant by these words. The only thing out of the ordinary is the incorrect use of language.

I agree that the use of the word pain in a sentence has the same grammatical structure as the use of the word phone; and this is where some of the confusion lies. But, again, I disagree that we only express pain, we also refer to them, and we do it all the time. Of course it's not exactly the same as referring to the phone. And, I wouldn't call it a superficial reference when referring to the pain in my toe. You seem to think it's superficial because the pain is not a thing like a phone, but it's just as real, so it doesn't seem superficial. And, in this context what would superficial mean except some subjective view of referring.

So "I have a pain in my neck" is the same as "ouch!"

and at the start of §244 ""How de we refer to sensations?" - the italics are in the original; the answer is that it is muddled to think of ourselves as referring to sensations at all. We express them.

Language cannot refer to a pain - it cannot get between a pain and its expression. — Banno

"I have a pain in my neck" is not the same as ouch. Ouch replaces the natural pain behavior, like crying etc, but that doesn't mean that the pain in your neck is the same (not sure what you mean by same) as ouch, that would be weird.

The child is learning new pain behavior, but that doesn't mean we can't refer to pain. For example, a doctor asks, "Where are you having pain?" You respond, "Here, in my big toe." It's true that a child in Wittgenstein's example (PI 244) learns to replace crying with "ouch" or "that hurts," but this doesn't mean that it's always muddled to refer to pain. It depends on how we're referencing the pain. If we think that meaning is attached to my pain, then that for sure is muddled. It's also muddled to say, "I know I'm in pain." but we can definitely refer to pain in certain contexts. Remember he's starts out talking about meaning in reference to a private language, and how that's nonsense due to rule-following and such. He then goes on to explain how we learn to associate words with certain behaviors in social contexts. He's not denying in the last paragraph of 243 that we can express or refer to our inner experiences. He's denying it in particular contexts.

By the same argument when I look at the tree in my backyard, I don't know or believe there is a tree in my backyard, I see the tree in my backyard, I see that there is a tree in my backyard. — Janus

Hi Janus,
I think we have to be careful here. We do use sensory experiences as justification to believe that something is the case. So, it's very appropriate to say, "I know the orange juice is sweet." Someone might reply, "How do you know? (this would be the case even if you just said, "The orange juice is sweet.)" You answer, "Because I tasted it." Sensory experiences are important in observing experiments also. It's true that you can simply say, "I see the tree," but many statements of knowledge are said without the "I know..." Note that the doubt often makes sense in these situations, which demonstrates the appropriateness of the knowledge.

My revised question still does the same thing I guess. Are you saying we can't question the existence of concepts, because they are more like principles or models to explain things? — Yohan

Concepts have a use in language that's governed by rules (implicit and explicit), and they exist insofar as they have that use. Either the concept has a use or it doesn't, if it does, then it exists as something useful in our language. You may question how a concept is used, viz., its application, but I don't see how you can question the existence of the concept causality. If someone tries to create a concept, you might question if that concept is part of a language, so I guess in that sense you could question if the concept exists. Even concepts without a referent have existence. For example the concept unicorn, even though unicorns don't exist it still has a use as something that fictional writers might use.

Ya, this debate has been going on a long time. My philosophy professor back in 1978 actually had Cora Diamond as one of his professors. He was working on his doctorate around 1973 at the UVA. I remembered his disagreements with her, only vaguely though. These interpretations, I'm sure, will go on forever.

Antony and i were, in different ways , arguing for a different reading of Wittgenstein, in which rules and grammar only have existence in radically contextual, situational and personal situations. — Joshs

I've got three or four threads going in two different forums, so it's hard to keep up with everything that's going on. But, I definitely would have a problem with this reading of Wittgenstein.

I think the question, "Does causality exist?" reflects a misunderstanding of how the word causality is used in linguistic settings. It's like asking, "Does 2 exist?" they exist as concepts which are used in particular ways. Asking if causality exists, is not like asking if the Earth exists, so I think the question reflects a confusion, but this happens all the time when philosophizing.

Actually the awareness of those who have an NDE is not dreamlike. In fact, most of them say that it's more real than what they normally experience. It's a heightened awareness. Many say that this reality seems dumbed down by comparison, as if it were dreamlike. This is interesting because you would expect, especially if the brain/body was shutting down, that reality would be fading, not becoming more vivid.

I'm not too keen on using the word soul in reference to NDEs. I prefer consciousness, but I know what you mean. I'm not religious, so I prefer not to use that word.

If we refer back to the OP, and in particular to how we use the word know, how we use this word is governed by the rules of use, much of course is implicit and difficult to weed out. We can see this by the many different theories of epistemology, some just point to one or two kinds of uses, and other theories are just confusions, grammatical confusions.

How do we learn the use of the word know? Understanding this gives us clues to the rules of use. We know we don't learn it in private, there's not some innate knowing, it's done with others, and only with others. It's a social word. We justify what we know to others, it starts socially, by learning the concept and using it correctly. Knowing has to be seen in the context of being wrong (I thought I knew), but how in the world could you be wrong about "I know this is my hand" in Moore's context? A grammatical mistake, right? Can we be mistaken in Moore's context? The same is true of our sensations, "I know this is my pain" what?

"The proposition 'Sensations are private' is comparable to: 'One plays patience [solitaire] by oneself (PI 248].'" The confusion is a grammatical one, not an empirical one. How else could you play patience? And, in what sense are sensations private? These kinds of propositions are also similar to others that Wittgenstein points out, viz., "Every rod has a length." or "This body has extension."

My understanding of Wittgenstein's grammar is that grammar sets out the rules governing the moves we make in language. Similar to the rules of chess governing the game of chess, viz., the moves. This is a correct move, this is an incorrect move. So, grammar is what we use to govern whether someone has made a correct move, to reiterate the point. The rules are difficult to grasp because some rules are explicit, but others are implicit and not easily understood.

That depends on how one defines "death". True death is not the cessation of cardiac function, and the flat line on the EKG monitor; such hearts are regularly caused to resume their functioning with the application of electric impulse to the torso. True death has occurred when the brain has died, and cellular metabolism has ceased. You are correct in stating that semantics fail us here... — Michael Zwingli

Semantics don't fail us here, mostly in here we're talking about clinical death. You can sometimes be brought back from clinical death. Moreover, with reference to an NDE, it's a near death experience, obviously you didn't die in the absolute sense. Doctors often use the word death in reference to those who have been brought back, it's perfectly acceptable.

By inference. We presume that others are just like ourselves. I think it’s a perfectly valid presumption. ‘I know how you must feel…’ ‘I can’t imagine how you must feel…’ and other such statements are intelligible statements.

I can't remember the context of what you're referring to, but ya, I agree (I can't find where I said that). This is why solipsism doesn't have a good argument.

"'Only you can know if you had that intention.' Wittgenstein, explains how we might use such a statement, i.e., how it might make sense to use know in this way. The only way it would make sense, is as an expression of doubt, not as an expression of knowing. Only you could know? What does that mean? In other words, as he said earlier, you don't know it, you have it, viz., the intention, in this context.