I think it's important, as we think about what Wittgenstein is saying, to think about how we as individuals make these kinds of mistakes in our own thinking. So, where have we gone wrong in our thinking by making the mistakes that Wittgenstein points out. It's one thing to grasp what he's saying, but it's another to actually apply it as we do philosophy.

§69
Wittgenstein keeps saying the same things, only from different angles. It seems that philosophers and others get hung up on the form of the proposition/statement, as opposed to the function of the proposition/statement, word, or concept. Clarity of thought is not about some very precise definition, which as it turns out is generally impossible. This is clearly observed in our use of the word game, which doesn't have clearly defined borders. On the other hand, clearly defined borders may be drawn if we're talking about a particular kind of game, say chess. However, the tendency for philosophers is to look for unifying principles, or some theory that sums up the concept in some neatly defined idea.

As Wittgenstein points out, someone might say that before we come to understand these unifying principles or theories, we didn't have a very exact definition or an exact measure, but then the problem raises it's ugly head again, what do you mean by exact. So, the problem continues because we aren't seeing the social nature of language in the stream of life.

There are similarities in the Tractatus and the PI in that Wittgenstein is still trying to mark out the limits of sense. In the Tractatus he sets out the limit of language, but in the PI he speaks of the limits (plural) of language, which are found in how we use language. These limits (in the PI) are seen in the various uses of propositions, words, and concepts, they are open to view. They are not hidden, as in the Tractatus, but open to view in the stream of life.

Another similarity between the Tractatus and the PI, is that Wittgenstein is still trying to understand the function of language. In the PI there is no absolute method of determining sense from nonsense, no formal boundary as he set up in the Tractatus. Something only makes sense (in the PI), or is nonsense in a particular language-game. Even the term make sense is vague, just as the term game is vague. Just as the word game would alter its meaning from context to context, so making sense would alter its meaning from context to context, or from language-game to language-game.

This is an expanded version of PI 69, pulling together a general overview.

In my Wittgenstein Commentary thread I start out by talking about the Tractatus in general terms. You can read some of my comments there.

We can always start a thread on the Tractatus.

It is not simply a matter of how propositions connect with the world but of the logical structure of the world from simple objects that make up the substance of the world (T 2.02 - 2.021) that combine in determinate logical ways to form the facts of the world (T 2.01). — Fooloso4

I don't find anything to disagree with here, at least not in this statement. I'm very familiar with the Tractatus and what it says.

I still think it is important to emphasize that the rejection of Tractarian logic is as much a rejection of an ontology as it is a rejection of a view of language and the activity of analysis. — Fooloso4

Yes, but it depends on what you mean by his ontology. If you mean his analysis of how propositions connect with the world, and the limits he puts on language, then I agree. Although, in the PI he still believes there are limits to what can be said, it's probably where I disagree with Wittgenstein.

Logic, according to the Tractatus underlies and is the scaffolding of both language and the world.

In the PI logic is not prior to, independent of, or determinate for the language game. — Fooloso4

I'm not saying that it's the same method or the same kind of logic. His understanding of the role of logic in language is much different in the PI.

It is not the logic of language but the logic of the language-game, different games different logics, that is to say, different grammars or rules. — Fooloso4

Your point seems to be a distinction without a difference. When I speak of the logic of our language I'm talking about grammar, rules, use, and finally meaning or sense, which would obviously include how words and concepts are used in language, and thus language-games. This expression is used not only in the Tractatus, but in the PI (PI 93, 345,).

§66
This paragraph reminds me of the courts trying to come up with a definition of pornography. A definition should be seen more as a guide than some absolute measure of meaning. Although, many definitions try to show how a word is used in a variety of contexts. However, most people use the dictionary as some absolute arbiter, and in some sense it can be used as an arbiter. And although there are not always clear boundaries around the definition, as seen in W. idea of family resemblances, there are still uses of the word that fall outside normal usage. This in turn may give rise to the idea that there is some way of setting limits, or of being more exact in our talk of games. This desire is so powerful that even after understanding what W. is saying, we are still drawn to the idea that we can describe the game more precisely.

§68
It's interesting that even the concept number, which we tend to see as more rigid, is not necessarily bounded. It too can have uses that are unbounded, just as the concept game has unbounded uses.

The question is: Why does this trouble us? It seems to be our desire for exactness, but even the concepts of being exact or being precise is not subject to a strict boundary. So, it seems we are fooled into thinking a certain way due to our lack of understanding of just how language works. Hence, Wittgenstein's method of showing us the way out of this kind of thinking.

Finally, although there are rules that govern the uses of concepts, concepts are not everywhere bounded by rules. There seem to be just enough rules to allow us to say this or that is correct or incorrect, but also enough elasticity to leave room for expansion or growth in terms of what we say, and how we say it.

We don't learn concepts of types, like "game" through ostensive definition. There must be some other form of rule, other than a rule of definition, which is at play here. — Metaphysician Undercover

He's not saying that you can't learn how to use certain words by referring to things or objects. We teach children all the time by pointing to things (cups, houses, trees, etc). He's saying that meaning or sense is not derived in this way, i.e., not by pointing to some object. So, ostensive definition can be part of the learning process. Learning meaning or sense involves a wide variety of uses that may include pointing to this or that in social contexts, but is not dependent on this or that object.

Part of the problem with philosophers and probably with thinkers in general is that we want exactness, we want some final analysis that will answer our questions. And analysis can be useful when done properly, or when seen aright. Part of the problem of the Tractatus was that Wittgenstein was trying to give propositions clarity of meaning or sense. In the Tractatus this is done via elementary propositions in terms of the simple and complex, i.e., propositions are complex until we break them into their constituent parts, viz., elementary propositions and still further into names. So, by understanding the simple parts of propositions (names), and correlating these simples to the simplest parts of facts in the world (objects) we come to some final analysis. For Wittgenstein it's objects, for Russell it was individuals, in terms of the simplest components of reality (facts).

His talk about the broom and the table in terms of some final analysis should be seen in light of his former thinking, as some of you have already pointed out. And isn't this our tendency, as philosophers especially, we seem to think that if we can get to the bottom of what is meant by this or that term or concept, then we have a more exact sense of meaning. It seems to be the case that the more exact we are with a word, for example games, the more inexact we become, i.e., we exclude many other uses of the word.

Wittgenstein still believes in the logic of language in the PI, but it's the logic of use, and not the a priori logic found in the Tractatus. The PI is more of an a posteriori investigation, or a pragmatic investigation of language usage. There is clarity in the PI, but it must be seen in terms of use and context, and one must be careful about being too dogmatic, and not to overgeneralize as is seen in many philosophical theories.

I mean, two pages of self-congratulatory fake 'eureka' to arrive at the basic standard Hacker and Baker interpretation of a single aphorism which I can only presume (from the level of implied scholarship) that everyone has already read. So what was the point? I just don't get it. — Isaac

I hope these interpretations are just Hacker and Baker interpretations. I know I don't use Hacker and Baker, most of my interpretations are my own.

its a really tough one so I’ve had to try and dig at it. Still not totally happy with the exegesis and I think I’ve missed some details — StreetlightX

I feel the same way you do about 58. I've read it several times, and I still feel as though I'm missing something. It's probably just about use, as opposed to some ontological meaning we're attributing to a particular context (not sure). It would be interesting to see how this applies when philosophizing.

Thanks Fdrake, but for some reason my writing lately has been piss poor. I can't put my thoughts down very well. Help, I'm getting old.

§60
Wittgenstein continues in 60 to repudiate that the sense or meaning of a proposition/concept/word is somehow enlightened by some deeper analysis, as in his example about the "broom." This again points to his former thinking in the Tractatus. However, note that this analysis is not about a deeper understanding of an idea (the ideas for e.g. in the PI), but a deeper understanding of the object associated with the word. As if the meaning of broom really refers to the parts associated with the word.

If I say, "Bring me the broom," do I need some further analysis to reveal what is really meant by the statement/word? Does further analysis of the kind described in 60 really add something that's missing? And if we were to ask someone, as Wittgenstein points out, what they really meant, would they add this missing analysis, i.e., would it reveal the thinking behind the statement?

This reminds me of how people try to analyze what we really mean by the word nothing, as if there is some metaphysical thing associated with the word. You'll even find threads on the word nothing, as if there is some hidden meaning or sense in the word itself, apart from its use . If you ask me to look in a particular room to see what's in there, and after looking I say, "Nothing," - then later, you look in the room and note that there was a desk in the room, would you come back and say, "What do you mean there was nothing in the room?" You might, but we can all think of circumstances where it would be completely appropriate to use the word nothing in this situation depending on context. Now there is a difference between Wittgenstein's example in 60 and this example, but I'm pointing out that the use of a proposition/word/concept will tell us much more about meaning or sense than most anything else.

if a name is employed in its capacity of standing for a paradigm, then it is necessary that such a paradigm exist ('out there' or 'in the mind'), in order for the language-game to work.
— StreetlightX

I think this is backwards. A name does not stand for a paradigm, a paradigm stands for, shows the meaning of, a name. — Fooloso4

You're right to point this out. The paradigm is the color or the yard stick that the name refers to.

A quick interpretive note on the last two sections I wrote about: it's often noted that Witty is targeting the idea that the use of names must correspond to images in our head. The open question is whether this entails the opposite position, namely, that words (or names, to be more specific) must then correspond to things 'out there' in the world instead. But, given the equivalence established between 'out there' and 'in here', one ought to instead read Wittgenstein as rejecting the inside/outside dichotomy altogether. — StreetlightX

I agree, and this is very important in so many areas of our thinking. It has particular importance in our understanding of epistemology.

How do you relate #59 in this way? It appears to me like "meaning is use" has met the paradox of 58. We want to say "red exists" means that the word red has meaning, rather than that there is an existing thing called "red". However, since meaning is use, and we use "red exists" to say that there is something, a colour called "red", we cannot do what we want to do, the attempt contradicts itself. So it appears to me, like he has met this dead end, this paradox at 58, so he goes all the way back to the proposition "A name signifies only what is an element of reality" at 59, to get a fresh start, from a new perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

"A name signifies only what is an element of reality [the interlocutor, or his former self] (PI 59)," is not him going back because he is at some "dead end." He is continuing with his analysis of the idea that a name signifies some thing in reality. Just like you said, the name red, in terms of meaning, is not bound to some object for the reasons his already given in various analogies and examples. Much of 59 is connected with his view of objects and names in the Tractatus. As if some deep analysis of the names and objects will reveal the nature of the logic behind the connection, those things that are the simples. In other words, that one-to-one correspondence between the name in the proposition, and the object, which is the simplest part of a fact in the world. He concludes with, "These are the materials from which we construct that picture of reality." "Picture of reality..." is also pointing back to the Tractatus, viz., the picture theory.

Much of this is an argument against his former view, his early philosophy as seen in the Tractatus. I'm not exactly sure what it was that I said that was confusing or unclear, so I tried to give you some insight in to my thinking as I read this paragraph.

§58
If the meaning of a word is not tied to an object, paradigm, sample, memory, or any other object (mental or otherwise), then it seems to follow that the meaning of "X exists," is derived in another way. In particular, meaning is derived how it is used in social contexts. So, "X exists," if it is to mean anything, means, there is such-and-such a use for the word. Although as Wittgenstein points out this is senseless.

We could extend this to the proposition that "God exists," which does not derive meaning from whether or not the thing associated with the concept has an instance in reality, but how we use the concept in a variety of social contexts. We should not think that a name is only meant to be some element of reality (PI 59).

This is not to say that the object has no place in the conversation, only that, when it comes to meaning, we need to separate meaning from the aforementioned objects. In saying that "Red exists," it appears "...to us as if we were saying something about the nature of red..." This causes us to look for some thing to associate with the color, which can cause confusion about meaning.

I think there is much more to what Wittgenstein is saying than what we are capturing in our comments.

But not all games are played by rules that are set and clearly defined. Sometimes the rules are made as we go along by some kind of consent and agreement. There are no rules that stand as the rules for making rules. In addition, the existing rules may no longer be adequate when something new is learned, as in the case of quantum mechanics, where the Newtonian rules do not apply. — Fooloso4

I agree, and part of the problem with language and/or concepts, is that because there aren't always clearly defined rules, we have a tendency to limit the use of a word based on a particular context, and forget other contexts in which the word is also correctly used. We forget the family resemblances associated with being in a family, and focus on only brown eyes and large noses. It's as if when thinking about the concept game we're only focused on board games and ball games.

So why is it a case of "you must see it my way or else you don't see it at all"? It really does not come down to "I must see it your way, or else I don't see it". What makes your way the correct way? — Metaphysician Undercover

One of the things I did MU was to read primary sources and make an interpretation based on what I understood the interpretation to be, then I compared that interpretation with other philosophers who knew the material. One of the ways I knew I was on track was that my interpretation was lining up with what others were saying. If my interpretation was not in line with what others were interpreting, at least generally, then I would have good reason to suspect that something was wrong. So it's not a matter of seeing it my way, or having an open mind, it's about understanding the material.

My first challenge to you would be to find other philosophers who see it the way you do, no interpretation is a matter one person's view, as if you can simply choose any interpretation you want. So why don't you find other philosophers who view rule-following the way you do, and present the argument.

One of the things you seem to have a hard time with, is that rule-following is intrinsic to the actions associated with linguistic activities. This is just basic stuff. It's fine if you disagree with it, but all I'm saying is that I don't follow your arguments. I've read your responses, and I can't make any sense of some of what your saying. It's not personal, it's just that I can't see how anything anyone can say will change your mind, or make you understand.

Whenever I'm arguing with someone in person, and I suspect that they're not understanding my argument, I'll ask them to explain my argument as they see it. In this way, I'll know that either I'm not explaining the argument well enough, or that they don't understand the argument.

My second challenge to you is to explain Wittgenstein's rule-following argument as you understand it, whether you disagree with it or not. Explain it like you were explaining it to someone who never read Wittgenstein, and use supporting paragraphs.

Oh god, I just want to laugh when I read all of our work trying to get MU to understand. These disagreements with MU go back years. In the forum most of us belonged to before this one, I had a thread that went on for years, and MU has never given up this position. No serious student of Wittgenstein, if even they disagree with Wittgenstein, would deny many of these points being made about rule-following. There may be disagreements, but most of this is understood by those who study Wittgenstein in a serious way.

The one thing I can say about MU is that he keeps his cool about all of this. In that sense he is better than me. The Marine in me wants to take the person and kick them in the ass, which would solve nothing. I think it comes down to this, you either see it or you don't. If you don't see it, fine, just move on. Now, if I can take my own advice, I'd be doing well.

I have nothing against you MU, you may be the greatest guy in the world, I just don't have the patience with continually arguing or repeating myself over and over again. Luke seems to be able to do it. Luke has also been arguing some of these ideas for years.

What's interesting is that I'm going to be giving a class to some people on some of this material. I hope I can keep my cool. Just kidding, I'll be fine.

My point is that if you think you're going to get anywhere with your explanations you're living in a dream world. The only reason I see to answering some of his questions is to help others who may also be confused.

In some ways this is pretty funny, and frustrating, at least for me.

Sorry Luke that wasn't clearly written so I erased it. It's 2:30 in the morning and I'm to lazy to re-write it. :gasp:

So, it seems that we use objects (physical or abstract), memories, pictures (mental or otherwise) as tools to learn meaning, not that these things entail meaning for the reasons Wittgenstein has already shown. For example, I will teach a child how to use a word by pointing to an object. I say "cup," as I point to the object sitting on the table, and before the child learns to use the word correctly I may have pointed to many different cups in many different contexts. None of these objects entail the meaning of the word "cup," as much as I'm tempted to think so. As someone analyzing the word (as a philosopher might analyze the word nothing) I might think I'm discovering something special in the cup itself that gives meaning to the word.

Paragraph 58 I find very interesting. I'm interested in how some of you are going to interpret it.

Thanks for that post Andrew. I couldn't agree more.

I know that you've said the exact opposite to this, that's the point. Wittgenstien, has not yet established the relationship between language and rules, to make the conclusion which you have made. So I suggested the very opposite to your conclusion, as still a possibility from what Wittgenstein has so far exposed. Whether a person needs to understand language to learn a rule, or whether a person needs to understand rules to learn a language has not yet been determined. So as much as you might assert that a person cannot learn language without learning rules, these assertions are irrelevant to the text we're reading. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your only argument is that I'm going beyond what the text is saying at this point, I say, of course I am, and I've said as much.

If it requires that one knows a language in order for that person to learn a rule (I.e. if we can only learn a rule through language) then it is impossible that all language-games are rule following activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

[my emphasis]

Here's where you seem to go wrong. Where did anyone say this? Language would never get anywhere if this was the case. In fact, I've said the opposite, "[t]he rule (known or unknown) is in the bringing of the correct stone in response to the call." Moreover, what do you think learning a rule is all about? When one learns to act in accord with a command, one is learning to follow a rule. It doesn't require that you know a language, or that you know what a rule is. Animals can even participate in rule-governed activities. Think of learning to follow simple commands. The learning of language, and the learning of following rules are things that happen at the same time, viz., if you learn a language, then you are learning to follow rules (implicit or explicit, known or unknown).

Don't confuse the concept of rule-following (or the concept rule), which involves a certain understanding, with learning to follow a rule. The two are quite different. As the animal or primitive man, or even modern man learns to respond to a language, say commands, they are both learning a language and learning to follow rules (it's a simultaneous act). In fact, knowing is not involved at all, one simply acts in accord with, or acts along with others, and as one does, one learns. The learning gets more and more involved until the animal is left behind in its ability to learn or participate in more complicated linguistic forms. However, the human excels at using concepts, until the human learns what the concepts mean, and how to use the concepts in more sophisticated ways.

The only thing that is required beforehand, is that you have the ability to learn a language, whether primitive or not. It's not required that you know anything, in fact, you don't know anything. The language-game of knowing is much more advanced, and requires an advanced understanding of the use of the concepts involved.

I'm not yelling when I use the bold letters, I'm just using it as a very strong emphasis.

This would require the assumption that the game, or "social context" has inherent within it, rules, by the means of which, such a judgement of correct or incorrect could be made. But we have not yet found, in the close-up examination of the details, the existence of any such rules. We haven't even gotten beyond the problem which is that philosophers are commonly opposed to making such a close-up examination. Why do you simply assume that there are rules inherent within "social context"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand how it is that you do not agree with this, namely, that any language-game, which by definition is social, necessarily has rules (implicit and/or explicit). The rules are observed in the actions of those who participate, either correctly or incorrectly. So, if the call is made for a slab, and someone brings the correct stone, they, by definition, are following the correct rule. What is the rule? The rule (known or unknown) is in the bringing of the correct stone in response to the call. If there is no rule, how can we say that they followed the correct action? Keep in mind that even if there is no concept of a rule, as in primitive man, the act of retrieving the correct stone is the act by which we can attribute the concept rule as we know it.

Any language-game by definition is a rule-following activity, if not, then there would be no consistency of actions that would make it work. If there were no rules there would be no agreement in how to proceed, and thus no game of any sort, language or not. What is the rule that dictates that I should go left or right when I see an arrow? There surely isn't something intrinsic to the arrow. It has to be consistency of action within the group as they respond in various contexts to the pointing of the arrow, and that's what the rule consists in, necessarily.

I'm not assuming anything, I'm basing my conclusion on the evidence, as just presented in the previous paragraphs, and as presented by others as they too have interpreted these ideas. I'm not just pulling this out of the air randomly.

Afterthought:
This is not connected to my response to MU.

Kripke's paradox, by the way, is dependent on an interpretation of a rule, which is not what correct rule-following is about (not something in me, as if my understanding determines what's correct or not). It's not my interpretation of some rule that determines what it means to follow a rule correctly, it's in the agreement of the acts within the social group that determines what's correct or not.

I think Kripke has gone wrong in attributing one's interpretation of the rule with correct rule-following. So, the answer to Kripke's paradox is in the dissolving of the problem, which is done when one see's correct rule-following in the right light.

We are in agreement StreetlightX, even where you expanded the point a bit in the first paragraph, and clarified the second paragraph. Excellent work!

I know you're going beyond the text somewhat, but there are some ambiguities with this reading, I think. First, I'm not clear on what it means to say that actions 'determine' what is correct and incorrect: is it not the case that actions are correct or incorrect? (i.e. you seem to introduce a temporal logic - actions > in/correctness - where I'm not sure there is one; But perhaps you don't quite mean this and I'm over-reading). Second, the "it" in the "the characteristic signs of it" seems to refer to 'distinguishing between mistakes and correct play' and not correct and incorrect play itself - the act of distinction, and not the objects of the distinction, as in, not:

(1) "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour"; But:
(2) "[the] characteristic signs of it [distinguishing correct and incorrect play] in the player's behaviour";

This insofar as the immidiately preceeding sentence is:

"But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players’ mistakes and correct play? - There are characteristic signs of it in the players’ behaviour": the 'it' seems to refer to the verb - the act of distinguishing in/correct play by players in the game, and not individual correct and incorrect play in themselves. — StreetlightX

What I mean by "...the actions determine what's correct or incorrect" is that the actions within the social context is the means by which we distinguish what's correct or incorrect. No action, as I understand it, is intrinsically correct or incorrect, except as it is seen within the game, or as seen within a social context. No more than an arrow is intrinsically pointing, it points within the context of the actions associated with the arrow.

I do think there is a kind of temporal logic to it, i.e., there is an action, then there is the determination if that action is correct or incorrect. How does one separate the action from the act of distinguishing right and wrong, correct and incorrect? There would be no temporal logic if the act itself was intrinsically right or wrong, correct or incorrect. The acts are only deemed correct or incorrect as the social group determines. When I use the word determine, I'm saying that the social groups decisions to say the bishop moves diagonally is not determined by any move in itself, but is determined within the social context of distinguishing correct and incorrect moves.

As to your last point, I agree that the "it" in the characteristic signs of it refers to the distinguishing between mistakes and correct play. However, the acts of distinction cannot be separated from the objects of distinction. Don't they go hand-in-hand?

I'm not sure I've understood your points, because in the first paragraph you seem to suggest that it's the actions that are correct or incorrect. However, in the last paragraph you do distinguish between the act of distinguishing correct and incorrect, from the acts within the game. However, the acts within the game are what determine correct or incorrect, but only as we determine that they are correct or incorrect. The two seem to be logically connected.

I've repeated myself, but only in an effort to clarify. I've probably misunderstood your points.

§54

For me, the most important aspect of Wittgenstein's rule-following analysis, is not only the idea of the complexity of rule-following within language-games, but the necessary connection of rule-following with actions. Hence, the importance of "[learning] the game by watching how others play." So the rule, for e.g., thats bishops move diagonally, isn't a rule apart from the actions associated with the rule. And of course it's those actions that determine what's correct and incorrect, i.e., "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour." And obviously it can't just be any behavior, but the behavior of the social group in relation to the game.

It's also interesting that Wittgenstein points out how that same behavior can be recognized in languages we're not familiar with, which he mentions in connection with a slip of the tongue. It's almost as if there are bedrock behaviors that are associated with all acting, i.e., acting that transcends language in some respect.

§55

The first quote of 55, it seems to me, is referring to his ideas in the Tractatus (not exclusively of course), i.e., his picture theory of language. So true propositions, in the Tractatus, refer to the idea that the proposition (the names - primitive signs) match up with facts (objects - the primitives that make up facts). Hence, the name corresponds to the object, which then gives meaning to the sign.

So part of what Wittgenstein is talking about in terms of the primitive language-game given at the beginning of the PI, is in direct opposition to his thinking in the Tractatus. He demonstrates in the PI using various analogies and examples how the idea of meaning is not, for the most part, connected up with a sign associated with an object. That meaning still has sense even if the object that corresponds to the sign doesn't exist, or is destroyed. Where does that sense reside? It resides in the complexity of the language-game, grammar, rules, and actions (correct and incorrect) within social contexts, all of these work together to establish meaning.

My interpretation is not necessarily exegetical, but seen from a broader perspective.

A good interpretation of the text involves understanding Wittgenstein from the Notebooks (around 1914), which is his early thinking on meaning, all the way through to On Certainty. It doesn't mean you can't understand it without this background, but understanding the background gives you an advantage. Obviously there are going to be different interpretations, but that doesn't mean we can't get the gist of his thinking. It also doesn't mean that any interpretation is a good interpretation.

Even his Austrian background, viz., the culture in which he grew up is important to understanding the way Wittgenstein writes and thinks. Music played an important part in his family life growing up, and this too had an influence on the way he thought. So, the more you know about the man, the more you are able to understand his ideas. Reading letters he wrote to answer questions, looking at his style of architecture, examining his reasoning across a wide variety of his notes, etc, etc. All of these ideas are important to get a good understanding of his thinking.

There are obviously some spots in the texts that are very difficult to interpret. Even Wittgenstein looking back over some things he wrote wasn't able to always recall his line of thinking, so yes, there are things that are a matter of opinion. But I think as to the main thrust of what he's saying most people who have studied the texts can agree on many things, and other things are open to question.

When I give an interpretation of Wittgenstein I'm bringing in things that are not obvious to the text. For example, Wittgenstein wrote about grammar long before he wrote the PI, so his ideas of grammar are important to the text. It's also worth noting that there is a surface meaning to Wittgenstein, and there is a depth of meaning to Wittgenstein. Compare it to someone enjoying music in a very superficial way, as opposed to someone who has a very in-depth knowledge of music. You just aren't going to see or understand what they see and understand.

Streetlight has done a pretty good job for not having much of a background in Wittgenstein (if I understood his earlier comment correctly), but this is probably due to his philosophical background. If you can bring a wide array of thinking to bear on the subject, that too helps.

Some people just don't have the ability to think abstractly very well, and it's obvious who these people are when reading their posts. That's just the way it is. I'm not going to pretend that I'm good at basketball when I'm not, and if I do pretend, it will be obvious to those who know how to play, that I'm don't know what I'm doing.

Much of this, including §47, is his way of arguing against his old way of thinking, and by extension arguing against how many philosophers knowingly or not think of meaning. As if simple, for example, can be reduced to some irreducible thing, giving us a one-to-one relationship between the word and the object (the referent). This is what Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus with his explanation of the smallest constituent part of a proposition (name), and its direct association with the smallest constituent part of a fact (object). As if sense can be derived from things in the world.

When Wittgenstein is talking about composite he is leading us in the direction of use, as opposed to some referent in the world (although there are times when the referent is obviously important). For example, "'Is what you see composite?' makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity-that is, which particular use of the word--is in question [my emphasis]." So, once we understand how we're using the term composite within a particular context of use, then "...we would have a clear sense--a clear use."

Note also when referring to how we might talk about the chessboard as being composite, that is, we might be tempted in some absolute sense to think that the chessboard is composite based on number of squares, colors, wood, etc. Thus, the point is that asking whether the board is simple or composite outside a language-game gets you nowhere. It's not what you have in mind that determines meaning. In other words, because you have in mind a particular association between composite and number of squares, colors, or bits of wood, that is not what gives meaning to the word composite. But if in a social context that's what we mean (which is based on use or grammar), then that use gives sense to the concept composite.

Streetlight you are correct to point out the relationship between all of this and epistemology. I think grammar should be seen as having the role of governing the moves within language-games, as opposed to the actual moves. An actual move may or may not conform to the rules of grammar. It follows from this that a correct move is in conformity with the grammatical rules. If we extend this analogy to epistemology, epistemology is simply a move in a language-game governed by the grammar in social contexts.

I tend to agree with Conant/Diamond here insofar as I take it that this is what Witty understands therapy to consist in and why the notion is so central to his meta-philosophy. You can't shout Terrapin into understanding this point, as you seem to be doing in your post. Nor can you force him to engage in the sort of philosophical therapy he needs to understand it so long as he refuses to work with L.W. qua therapist in order to fully realize the point through a sort of anerkennen (i.e. if he reads Wittgenstein as his buddy rather than as a philosophical diagnostician who needs to be allowed some pathos of distance in order to show the reader what he wants him to see). — John Doe

I think Conant and Diamond are incorrect in the way they interpret parts of Wittgenstein, but that's a subject for a different thread.

I don't know why you would characterize my reply to Terrapin as shouting, maybe because of the force of the comment, I'm not sure. In fact, I tried to inject a bit of humor into the comment. When I write I'm not only writing as a reply to a specific post, but I'm writing to those who might be following along, so I think it's a good idea to reply to certain posts, even if it seems to be not worth the effort as Banno suggested.

Okay. — Luke

I didn't think you would let him off the hook so easily Luke. Now I'm am forced, in my own inimitable way, to say that not only is Terrapin incorrect, but what he's saying is logically impossible, or at the very least linguistically impossible. Moreover, no argument you give will save you from this error. What error? This error, Terrapin says, "I don't believe that meaning is public. It's not at all possible to make meaning public..." This is akin to saying, "I don't believe triangles have three sides." It's the nature of rule-following to be public, just as it's the nature of triangles to have three sides. Period! And no response you can give will change that. If you can't see this, then your ability to think through this stuff is called into question. In other words, what I'm saying is that you can't be more confused than this when reading the PI. In fact, I wonder what you will get out of reading the PI if you don't understand this central point.

Now, you can come back and tell me how wrong I am, but any response you give will dig the hole much deeper.

Ya, that makes sense. I figured it was just a point of clarification.

What do you think of Terrapin Station's reply to me?

That is: ostensive act (pointing) + utterance of words. If this coupling is not kept in mind, the discussion here will be unintelligible. — StreetlightX

I'll definitely agree with this, if you uncouple these two things you'll definitely be lost.

But how is the person to whom the explanation is being given supposed to differentiate when you are pointing at one feature instead of another, if the only change in the "pointing" is your (private, mental) concentration of attention. — Luke

This is also an extremely important point to keep in mind when thinking about what Wittgenstein is trying to say in the long run. The meaning of a word/concept can never be the result of one's private mental happenings. There is nothing within you that gives meaning to a word. I was reading a book on epistemology by a philosopher who was trying to give meaning to the word knowledge by associating the word with something going on privately, as though you could give meaning to the word by some internal mechanism apart from social context. It's difficult to catch their mistake when it's coupled with language that's correctly used.

On my reading, Wittgenstein indicates that understanding an (ostensive) definition is not something which happens only in the mind of the listener or student, and neither is it something which is only tied to a specific set of accompanying behaviours; rather, it depends on the wider circumstances surrounding the language game. — Luke

I agree with the first part of this, but the last half raises questions. What could understanding what it means to play chess, be, other than specific behaviors associated within the social context of the game? Are you talking about private behavior? I agree that it depends on the wider social context, but aren't these wider social contexts or surroundings "accompanying behaviors?"

Read carefully 34-36. Notice at 35 he describes how there is no bodily action which has a necessary relation with "I mean the shape", or the colour. No necessary relation means that there cannot be a rule. This is why he claims a separation between what the speaker intends and what the hearer interprets at 34, because there is no necessary relation (like cause and effect) between the two activities, allowing them to be associated. There is nothing to signify to the hearer in any necessary way, what is intended by the speaker. There is no rule which the hearer can refer to, such as "this bodily action means colour", or "that bodily action means shape". Even if there are characteristic actions which occur often, they do not always occur, [so this excludes the possibility of a rule]. He even repeats this at 35:

To repeat: in certain cases, especially when one points 'to the shape' or 'to the number' there are characteristic experiences and ways of pointing—'characteristic' because they recur often (not always) when shape or number are 'meant'.

Wittgenstein is describing this type of learning as one which does not involve rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Part of the point of Wittgenstein talking about the ostensive definition model or deriving meaning from this medium is that there are no rules in this medium unless it's connected up with other people and actions. If I point to an object and say pencil, how would you know what I'm referring too? Do I mean it's color, its length, that it has an eraser, etc? There is no way for the word pencil to connect up with the object, no social rule. This example is not even a language-game, it doesn't have the requisite social settings. However, if you compare this with the language-game at the beginning of the PI there is a big difference. So, in Wittgenstein's example, he says pillar, or points to the object and says pillar, and there must be the corresponding action that tells the builder that the assistant understands what's required, i.e., that the assistant understands the rules of the game. He must bring the correct object. If the assistant doesn't do the required action, then the builder will correct him by showing him the correct action, until finally the assistant understands the rule.

Often when we teach children this method (ostensive pointing and learning) there is a period of time where they don't understand. When they finally do get it, it's not because they've grasped some mental process on our part, but because they learn what is required through trial and error (correct and incorrect) - they have grasped the logic behind the use of the word (the grammar). Their actions have matched the rule-governed activity of the social group. Just pointing at something and uttering a sound isn't enough in itself, it must be coupled with other things within a social context.

We've jumped a bit ahead, because in this early part of the book he's trying to show us something about the ostensive model, and how it sometimes lacks what is needed for someone to learn what is meant by a word or concept. He's pointing out the deficiencies of this view of language. He's pointing out the deficiencies of his previous view. He's also doing much more, but to explain I would have to write a lot more.

I don't think this will help you MU, i.e., I'm pessimistic, but it will help others, hopefully.

I agree that it may be difficult to imagine someone knowing how to play chess without having learnt the rules of chess, but consider that children learn how to speak before they learn any rules of language, by mimicking the behaviours of others. Also, bear in mind that Wittgenstein is attacking certain prevalent philosophical assumptions of his time, including those of his Tractatus, that language is exclusively a private, mental phenomenon. He is trying to remind us that language is instead (or also?) a shared, public, cultural and behavioural phenomenon. — Luke

I generally agree with Luke, but want to add something about rules which will be coming up in the PI. As you know grammar for Wittgenstein is much more than what we usually mean by grammar, i.e., it's much more than what we might learn in an English class covering nouns, adjectives, and verbs for example. His use of grammar extends to the logic of use, which governs linguistic practices as a whole, including how we use words in social settings, and the physical actions associated with the use of the words.

So, if you're learning to play a game by watching others, then by definition you're actions conform to certain rules. If a child learns how to speak using words, then the child actions comport or conform to the rules. Moreover, the child is learning how to follow a rule without knowing he/she is following a rule. If the child has learned to use a word correctly, then using the word correctly is, again, following the rules.

One can probably only go so far without learning some of the explicit rules of language, or without learning some of the written rules of chess. In other words, some games, including language-games, and even mathematics can be learned up to a point by watching, but at some point you will have to learn the rules.

Note carefully what Wittgenstein said in PI 31, "[o]ne can imagine someone's having learnt the game without ever learning or formulating rules," he's not saying you can learn a language without participating in rule-following. He's not saying you can learn a game without following rules, but without having learned or formulated rules, that's much different from saying, you can learn a game without the actions you're learning conforming to the rules. Just as a child needn't learn or formulate rules to learn how to use the word cup, and yet the child's actions do conform to rules. There is a subtle difference here.

However, rule-following at this stage of the PI is closely associated with what he's talking about in terms of ostensive definitions, and it's closely related, as Luke rightly pointed out, with his former view of language.

Anyway, I don't want to derail the conversation but I do want to push back a tad on the notion that Sellars inherits or continues Wittgenstein's legacy in any significant way. *push* — John Doe

I will definitely agree with this.