2. The beliefs that have no definite rational or inductive knowledge or ground. The beliefs that come from a private psychological state, which does not require evidence, justification or proof. Religious beliefs are in this category, and only in this case, the concept of faith should be applied to the beliefs. — Corvus

I'm just responding to some of what's in this quote, and expanding on it a bit.

What you're describing here is an opinion or an intuition, which by definition has no justification, or very little justification. I think it's true that psychology plays a large role in what everyone believes, i.e., everyone is affected by their experiences, culture, friends, etc, but the goal, at least for many, is to have a justification for what they believe beyond the subjective. Beliefs that are justified, are superior to beliefs that aren't justified. Moreover, justification comes from different sources, logic, sensory experience, testimony, linguistic justification, etc., so we shouldn't think that logic is the only way a belief should be justified.

For me, I find little evidence to support any religious worldview, which isn't to say that there aren't truths within these worldviews, but to say that these worldviews as a whole have serious flaws. For example, beliefs that damn half the world to hell, or beliefs in the resurrection, or beliefs that we should kill infidels, etc.

On the other hand, I find that the materialistic worldview to be about as close-minded and biased as you can get. In many cases they are unable to see beyond their myopic perspective, but this isn't just true of atheists, it's true of many people who have a passionate worldview.

As some of you know, my study of NDEs is centered around what we can know, so it's an epistemological study of the testimonial evidence.

Also, my conclusions are not coming from a religious point of view, especially since I'm not religious. I also don't believe that NDEs necessarily support the idea of a God, so I'm agnostic about that. It is true, however, that people who have had an NDE believe they've encountered religious beings (God, angels, Jesus, Muhammed, etc.), but I have found when comparing NDEs from around the world that one's culture affects how one interprets the beings they encounter. So, just as our everyday experiences are sifted through our worldview, the same is true of NDEs. I have found very little evidence that supports the idea of a particular religious God, which is not to say there isn't some supreme being, but only to point out that if there is, it's probably very different from how religion defines God. There does seem to be some source that we emanate from, i.e., some base consciousness.

In this thread my argument has centered around the conclusion that consciousness survives the death of the body. This means that consciousness is not a biological function, no more than a radio or TV is the source of the programs that you hear or see. The brain, for lack of a better analogy, acts as a receiver, and when the receiver is destroyed in some way, it no longer picks up the signal. The source of the signal is still there, but the receiver (the brain) is no longer able to receive that signal.

There are other conclusions that can be inferred based on the evidence, but I've tried to limit the scope of my conclusion to make it as simple as possible. Some of the other conclusion that can be inferred is that our loved ones have survived the death of the body (encountered deceased loved ones happens quite often in an NDE), that our home is not here, i.e., we originate from another place (metaphysical place), that there are specific reasons why we choose to experience this life, and that we choose many of our experiences prior to coming here. There is also the idea that we have experienced many lifetimes, but I don't like using the term reincarnation because of the religious baggage that comes with it. What seems clear to me is that if we do live out other lives there has to be a source that maintains the continuity of the self, otherwise it's difficult to make sense of the idea. I do believe there is a point from which the self operates, and from that point it can place itself into other realities. In a way, we do this already with games like WoW or Final Fantasy XIV, but in a very limited sense. I can play multiple characters in the game, but each character is still me, i.e., I can maintain the continuity of the self, even though I can act through different avatars.

For those of you interested in the study of NDEs, and related subjects, I've been invited to do a podcast next year. After the podcast is complete it will be uploaded to Youtube, and I will provide a link. I will be providing more information in the coming months. I don't have a firm date yet, but I've been assured an upcoming spot.

Growing Evidence of Life After Death

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I0AvstZQl1o

Nothing fancy, just recording on my camera and editing with the software that comes with Windows 10.

There's obviously a lot more that can be said, but I'm calling it a day. I'm actually working on Youtube videos on this very subject, viz., NDEs. Whether I post to Youtube I'm not sure, but I am developing a script. In fact, I have the script for about three videos so far, and they're each about 15 minutes long, give or take. Once I develop a script for about four videos I'll start posting them, maybe.

The title for my video's will be - Near-Death Experiences and the Testimonial Evidence. There is a possibility that I could change the title, but that's what I have so far.

That's a very big "IF" there. You don't really expect these people to have an "open mind"? Obviously, they're basing their arguments on unexamined assumptions and unfounded hypotheses for the sake of being contradictory because they've got nothing better to do. — Apollodorus

There are some people here who have an open mind, and there are some people here who really do care about truth, even if they disagree. So, I wouldn't necessarily agree that people are just arguing because they have nothing better to do, or because their communists. I don't quite go as far as you. But one thing is for certain, convincing people, whatever side of the argument you're on, is a very difficult thing. As Banno would say, cheers.

The point is that the report of an embodied person does not stand as evidence of a disembodied person. — Fooloso4

I see, so the corroborated testimonial evidence while my heart is stopped and I'm no longer breathing, i.e., the testimony that I'm observing my operation from a point outside my body is not evidence. The fact, again corroborated, that I'm describing conversations and the equipment used in the operation is not evidence of being disembodied? Or, describing a conversation of relatives in a waiting room while the operation is being performed in another part of the hospital is not evidence of being disembodied? I'll refrain from saying what I really want to say. The point is that many people who are materialists, or who just deny that such events can happen refuse to open their eyes to the evidence. Firsthand testimonial evidence, is evidence, and whether its good evidence depends on factors I've already given in this thread and in my thread https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body/p1 . So, I wouldn't wouldn't put much stock in these kinds of statements.

It is not simply a matter of explaining how it is possible but of giving a coherent account of whatever it is that inhabits or is tied to a body but is somehow separate from it. Whatever it is that perceives and feels and yet is not a body. — Fooloso4

This just doesn't follow, i.e., because I can't explain how it is that people are able to have an OBE, then it follows that they aren't having an NDE. Of course I can't give a coherent account of how it's possible. Nobody understands the mechanism whereby these OBEs happen. Moreover, I haven't tried to give a coherent account other than speculation. This however, doesn't negate the fact that it's happening, i.e., people are experiencing corroborated OBEs. When people first conducted the 2 slit light experiment no one knew what was going on, and no one could give a coherent explanation of what was happening, but did that negate the evidence that something weird was happening? No. Did it negate further research? No.

If you have an open-mind and are not completely shut off from reason, then you have to say, at the very least that there is something to these NDEs. Here is an example of an NDE that can't be explained away with the arguments that disembodied existence just isn't possible, or that it's incoherent.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKyQJDZuMHE

I'm not saying that mind or consciousness is necessarily biological, I'm saying that continuity must be preserved, biological or otherwise. It's the "otherwise" that we disagree about.

:grin:

Factual possibility is the only modal distinction that makes a difference regarding facts of the matter. — 180 Proof

Well, that depends, because if someone claims that something is not factually possible, as you seem to be claiming, then are you saying that it's logically impossible (viz., contradictory). If it's logically impossible like a four-sided triangle, then conceptually you can't even imagine it. Again, this seems to be what you're implying. But surely I can imagine things like dancing cartoons, which have no bodies other than what we imagine. Moreover, I'm able to conceptualize these kinds of things. We can even conceptualize dancing ghosts, and we know what we mean by dancing ghosts. You seem to want to say that if my dead father appeared before me, as a ghostly figure, yet recognizable, and he danced, that would have no conceptual meaning. Most people would understand what that meant whether they agreed that people really see dead people or not.

On the other hand, if we are referring to square circles, there is no conceptual framework that includes such a thing, unless you make it up. Under our current ideas of geometry there just isn't such a thing as a square circle, it's contradictory. But this isn't the same conceptual problem as disembodied dancing, because I can clearly imagine such a thing; and I can talk about it with some understanding of what it would mean.

As far as I or anyone is rigorously aware "NDEs" & "OBEs" are, at most, uncorroborated anecdotes. Idle speculation, like idle doubt, maybe passes the time like daydreaming but that's context-free diversion which neither presupposes commitments nor entails prospects. — 180 Proof

This just shows that you have really studied the issue. The testimonial evidence is not all just anecdotal. It has been corroborated in many many cases. There are objective means to verify what people claim to have seen while out of their bodies. Like interviewing doctors, nurses, hospice workers, etc, who can verify some of what these NDEers claim. The testimonial evidence for NDEs is extremely strong, and only those committed to a particular worldview seem to reject the evidence.

I love how people try to belittle the beliefs of other with whom they disagree. Using words like "idle speculation," or "daydreaming." Now to be honest, I've done my fair share of saying things to others that may belittle or otherwise dismiss them too, so I'm not complaining. I'm only pointing out that this is mostly done to make it look like your beliefs are somehow superior, and maybe in some cases they are. However, the only thing that counts are good arguments, not using words that dismiss others.

It is always an embodied person who has an alleged out of body experience. It is always an embodied person who related their experience. — Fooloso4

So, your conclusion is that because it's an embodied person who does the reporting, it follows that disembodied existence is not true or couldn't happen? Don't you think that's a rather weak argument? After all, how could an embodied person report on something I believe is not possible.

What does it mean to be disembodied? Who or what is it that is without a body? "You"? Is it not you who gets hungry? You who feels pain? You who feels loves and desires? What would such things be for a disembodied you? Is it not you but a body that somehow happens to be yours that experiences these things? — Fooloso4

To be disembodied simply means that we can exist as persons apart from a biological body. Just because someone can't answer all the questions of how it's possible, that doesn't negate all the testimonial evidence showing that it's possible. In fact, it's more than possible. I will state emphatically that it's not only possible that people can be disembodied, it happens all the time. There is just too much evidence that it happens to discount it.

Yes, it's me that gets hungry and feels pain, etc, and it would be me as a disembodied being who would feel some of the same things.

I can't discount reports like Pam's out of Atlanta, GA who underwent surgery for an aneurysm deep in her brain. While not only sedated, but the blood drained from her brain, and her heart stopped, she described what doctors and nurses said and did to her, including describing instruments they used. And, she described it from a position outside her body according to her. Moreover, her eyes were taped shut and there was a covering shielding her face from the rest of her body. Her description of the proceedings were verified or corroborated by doctors and nurses at the scene. Now one incident is not particularly convincing, but there are literally millions of accounts across the world of people having similar experiences. The testimonial evidence is just too vast to just discount these experiences.

"disembodied dancing" doesn't make conceptual sense — 180 Proof

Well, again, in this case, as in many other cases, what you believe makes conceptual sense is determined by your presuppositions, or your worldview. If it's true that people are having an OBE, and they are seeing deceased relatives and friends (as has been reported in thousands and thousands of accounts), then is it your contention that if one of these deceased relatives danced it wouldn't make conceptual sense? The only way it wouldn't make conceptual sense is if it's not logically possible to be disembodied. Don't you think that's a bit too dogmatic? Are you saying disembodied dancing has the same conceptual problem as a four-sided triangle? At the very least it would be metaphysically possible to dance as a disembodied person.

I know, and I was trying to be funny, but failed. lol

Actually I'm not kidding. :grin:

There are papers on the following site about reincarnation.

https://med.virginia.edu/perceptual-studies/category/academic-papers/

Ahhh, true. :ok:

Following Searle and others, mind is to brain as digestion is to gut. That looks pretty clear to me, if still debatable. Suppose that someone were to suggest that digestion could become disembodied. That the digestion from one body could move to another. Would you think this idea had conceptual issues? — Banno

I don't think Searle's analogy holds any water, to say the least. First, it's clear that digestion is a biological process, there's no debate amongst philosophers and scientists about that. However, it's not clear that consciousness or mind is strictly a biological process. Of course if you assume your conclusion, then yes, it's a biological process, how could it be otherwise (being facetious)? It only has conceptual issues if you assume your conclusion, viz., that consciousness is a product of biology. However, this is the debate, and I for one would argue against Searle's analogy as being specious at best.

There are two main factors, and obviously others too, that make us who we are, continuity of memory, and continuity of experience. There has to be continuity of the self in order for anyone to say that that is Banno. I can't make any sense out of reincarnation if this continuity isn't preserved. Otherwise, you could claim to be anyone from the past, and there would be no way to distinguish you from anyone else. This would be a genuine conceptual problem.

Can't right now, but will later. Take care.

Thanks for the response. I don't have much more to say.

There is very little evidence in this thread that reincarnation is a real possibility. I'm not saying there isn't any evidence, only that in this thread there isn't much in the way of evidence.

I would tackle the problem a bit differently. I would start with, is there any evidence of out-of-body experiences? Because the idea of reincarnation is dependent on whether or not it's possible that one's consciousness can exist apart from our present body. If it can exist apart from our bodies, then we have evidence that consciousness is more than brain activity. Thus, moving into other bodies (reincarnation) would be a real possibility, since we can move in and out of our present body.

Furthermore, I would still contend that even if we don't understand the mechanisms involved, we have a considerable amount of testimonial evidence that OBEs do indeed happen. It is also true that since the claim is rather fantastic to some, that you need an extraordinary amount of evidence to support the idea that disembodied existence is possible or highly probable. My contention, and I've made this claim in other threads (viz., Does Consciousness Survive the Body), is that there is an enormous amount of testimonial evidence to support the conclusion that consciousness does survive the body.

I often read, "There's no evidence," it's as if testimonial evidence, is not evidence. While it's true that testimonial evidence tends to be weak, it can also be strong under the right circumstances. What makes testimonial evidence strong is exactly what makes an inductive argument strong. What follows is a list of what makes the argument strong.

First, number, how many people are claiming to have had an out-of-body experience? Gallop did a poll years ago, and estimated that about 5% of the population had an NDE. Worldwide that's hundreds of millions of people. Now numbers aren't the be-all-and-end-all of inductive arguments, which is why you have to have more than just numbers.

Next, variety, viz., is it happening across cultures? Are there different age groups involved? Is the experience happening in a variety of circumstances? Has it happened through history? Is it happening to people with differing worldviews? The answer to all of the question is yes, it happens in a wide variety of situations and contexts, even to people who aren't near death.

Third, consistency of the testimony, the consistency of the testimony has been examined by many, and it has been found to be consistent. People are seeing basically the same things. Moreover, the consistency of the testimonial evidence is just as consistent as any testimonial evidence that involves large numbers of people. There have been many academic studies out of the University of Virginia detailing the consistency of the testimonial evidence. Here is a link to one such paper -

https://med.virginia.edu/perceptual-studies/wp-content/uploads/sites/360/2020/11/Nov-2020-NDE-C-CC.pdf

The fourth criteria is truth of the premises. To know if the premises are true we need corroboration of the testimonial evidence, a high degree of consistency, and firsthand testimony. In all or most of these cases, it seems clear that we have all three. We have millions of accounts that can be corroborated by family members, friends, doctors, nurses, and hospice workers. Corroboration is important in establishing objectivity to what is a very subjective experience. It lends credence to the accounts. One example of corroboration is given in Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA, which can be seen on Youtube.

Another aid in establishing the truth of the testimonial evidence are firsthand accounts, as opposed to hearsay. There are literally thousands of firsthand accounts being reported by the International Association of Near Death Studies (IANDS). Moreover, according to polling, there are millions of firsthand accounts of NDEs.

There are other points that can be made about what strengthens an inductive argument, but this is a good starting point.

The testimonial evidence, i.e., the various reports are all over the place, but IANDS is a good place to start.

I don't see how you get more compelling testimonial evidence, it's overwhelming. Do I need to know the mechanism for OBEs in order to know if NDEs are veridical? Do I need to know the mechanism of any experience to know if the experience is real or genuine? Of course not. We have firsthand experiences all the time without knowing the mechanisms involved.

There are a variety of academic papers on the following site dealing with the subjects of this thread.

https://med.virginia.edu/perceptual-studies/category/academic-papers/

Here's the question again: what is it that is reincarnated? — Banno

Before I respond, let me just say that because reincarnation carries a lot of religious baggage I don't like the term. However, that aside, I'll respond a bit to Banno's question.

First, even if the question can't be answered fully that doesn't mean there isn't evidence to support the idea that consciousness survives death, and may indeed be able to reside in other bodies. So, "...what is it that's reincarnated?" The answer is, your consciousness, viz., whatever it is that makes you, you, for example, your memories and your experiences. Do we know how that's possible? No. Do we know the mechanism? No. Do we understand any of the physics of such a process? It's doubtful.

Many investigations start out with unanswered questions, and many theories have unanswered questions, but that doesn't mean that there isn't evidence to support the theory. The question really is, is there any evidence to support the idea that consciousness survives the death of the body? The answer is emphatically yes. There is a ton of strong testimonial evidence, and there is some evidence to support the idea that consciousness can move out of a body, and back into another body, as a choice, i.e., we can choose to do it. If the testimonial evidence for NDEs is veridical (genuine objective experiences of reality), which I believe they are, then they, at the very least, demonstrate that our consciousness can move in and out of our body, and probably other bodies as well.

There are many unanswered questions about consciousness, but that doesn't mean that consciousness doesn't exist, or that consciousness isn't more than brain activity.

As I read it, the author isn't saying that grammar is completely independent of nature. He makes this clear in the first part of the paper. Moreover, I haven't decided yet if I'm in complete agreement or not. Grammar does seem to have an arbitrary aspect to it though.

The arbitrariness feature, an aspect of the autonomy of grammar,
does not mean that it is unimportant, capricious, or even discretionary;
it means, and this point is crucial, that it cannot be said that grammar
is correct or incorrect, right or wrong, by appealing to how things are
in reality (cf. [5]).

p. 80

So, if I understand this correctly, when using the concept fact (state of affairs), it's not what's in reality that determines how we use the word fact, rather, it's the grammar involved in language that determines it's correct use. So, our grammar is isolated from reality in an important sense, and that sense seems to be how we use language in a culture, and it's arbitrary features. There is nothing in reality that tells me how to use the word fact correctly. The arrangement of things in reality (the state of affairs) is not what determines the correct use of the concept fact.

In the same vein, Wittgenstein, in his Philosophical Investigations ([29], 1953, PI), claims that grammatical rules can be called arbitrary if that means that the purpose of grammar is the same as the purpose of language (cf. PI, §§372, 496, 497), and points out in Zettel (1967, Z) that cookery rules are not arbitrary because cookery is defined by its purpose, while grammar – or language – is not (cf.Z, §320). Thus, “[d]ifferent grammatical rules, unlike different cookery rules, are not right or wrong, but rather determine different concepts”([4, p.193]).3

p.80

It wouldn't be correct to say, it seems to me, that there is no correct or incorrect use of grammar, but that there is no correct or incorrect use as defined by something in reality. By comparison Wittgenstein points out "...that cookery rules are not arbitrary because cookery is defined by its purpose, while grammar - or language - is not (Z. 320)." So, the rules of bread making, for example, are correct or incorrect based on how the bread turns out, i.e., the outcome in reality determines the correct or incorrect recipe. It's in this sense that the recipe for bread making is not arbitrary. However, the rules of grammar are arbitrary, i.e., they are not dependent or determined by reality.

The question, at least for me is, how does this affect what Wittgenstein means by hinge-propositions? Is epistemology completely determined by the rules of grammar, or is it akin to cookery rules?

I'm working on another thread, analyzing On Certainty.

Many Christians believe that there is strong evidence to support the conclusion that Jesus rose physically from the dead. What do you think?

These are interesting points, good job.

The problem that arises, is with the idea that since language is not completely independent of reality, it may lead to the incorrect idea that language is conditioned or determined by facts of nature. This does seem to fly in the face of how Wittgenstein viewed language, viz., that it is autonomous. That language is autonomous has nothing to do with language being completely independent of language, but rather that, it is not "...accountable (or answerable) to any reality in terms of correction; and it is, in an important sense, arbitrary (p. 80)."

And also, "...language itself, grammar itself, constitutes what is meant by fact, and hence by reality. This is why grammar is presupposed when we speak of facts. In other words, in order to speak about facts
we already presuppose a grammar that constitutes what is meant by fact (p. 79)."

A Plea for Rhees’ Reading of
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: is
grammar conditioned by certain facts? — Sam26

The reason I'm bringing this up has to do with a particular interpretation of Wittgenstein that is probably incorrect. Moreover, I want to check my own interpretation against the points brought up in this paper.

So, the question is, is language conditioned by certain facts of nature? First, what does it mean to say that language is conditioned by facts of nature? According to this paper conditioned by certain facts means something like "that there are essential and necessary features of reality such as general facts of nature, and that this is a truth about reality, which by way of different mechanisms, for instance by repeated exposure, condition our grammar (p. 78)." The question is, is this what Wittgenstein is saying? It's one thing to say that without reality there would be no language, but it's another thing to say that language is conditioned by certain facts of reality. Another way to say this, if I'm correct, is that language had to form in a certain way because of particular facts in nature or reality. It would be like saying that objects in nature condition our grammar (as pointed out in this paper).

The paper isn't rejecting that there is some kind of relationship between the facts of reality and language. It's rejecting the notion that language is conditioned by these facts. "[T]his is a metaphysical illusion produced by projecting onto reality what should remain within grammar (i.e. grammar tells us what is a general fact of nature) (p. 78)."

My idea has been that reality is foundational to language, i.e., that without reality there would be no language. This seems obvious.

Finally, this paper is contrasting the IMoyal-Sharrock’s interpretation against the Rhees' interpretation. The Rhees' interpretation is important because of his association and discussions with Wittgenstein regarding OC.

Before going on I have to say that I'm reconsidering the idea that basic mathematical propositions are hinge-propositions. Although, with the caveat that there is a lot of debate on this issue. Moreover, it's not a simple issue to resolve. So, Moore's proposition, viz., "I know this is a hand," is not the same as 2+2=4 in terms of a hinge. The problem though, is that there are similarities between the propositions of mathematics and Moore's propositions, and Wittgenstein used mathematical propositions to bring out some point of comparison, or to clarify some point. The comparison of the two statements (Moore's propositions and basic math propositions) has given rise to the idea that basic mathematical propositions are hinge-propositions.

If you are going to say that basic mathematical propositions are hinges, then you have to be consistent and say that they are not true or false in the same way that Moore's hinge-propositions are not true or false, i.e., not epistemological.

This next part is taken from the introduction.

A Plea for Rhees’ Reading of
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: is
grammar conditioned by certain facts?
Sergio Mota

"Accordingly, the goal of this paper is twofold, as it were. On the one hand, it is my interest to show that the proposition ‘grammar is conditioned by certain general facts of nature’ has no metaphysical, absolute
sense (i.e. that ontology does not condition grammar). By the expression “metaphysical sense” I mean expressions that refer to the essential, necessary, and universal features of reality. Thus, to say that grammar is conditioned by certain facts of nature may mean that there are essential and necessary features of reality such as general facts of nature, and that this is a truth about reality, which by way of different mechanisms, for instance by repeated exposure, condition our grammar. Furthermore,
to say that grammar is conditioned by certain facts sounds as though there was an absolute conception of grammar, as though everything we call grammar was conditioned by facts. However, I do not read Wittgenstein as though he were relating a bit of language to a bit of the world. In other words, we are not relating a bit of grammar and a bit of the world as though they were ontological items. Rather, in the same sense that grammar tells us what kind of object a thing is, grammar tells us what is meant by fact. But this does not mean that facts condition our grammar, or that objects condition our grammar (see below for further discussion). So I am not rejecting that there is a relationship between grammar and facts, I am just saying that this relationship is not captured by speaking of facts as conditions.1 However, when it is said that grammar is conditioned by certain general facts of nature it seems that it is the grammar as a whole that is conditioned, without focusing on concrete language-games. It seems that it is claimed that this class of general facts of nature is that on which the possibility of language itself
depends. I think that this is a metaphysical illusion produced by projecting onto reality what should remain within grammar (i.e. grammar tells us what is a general fact of nature)."

As is mentioneded this paper Rhees' has something important to tell us. And, along with this, is must be mentioned that Rhees' had discussions with Wittgenstein on this topic. Therefore, his insights shouldn't be overlooked.

So, there is a distinction according to this paper between the proposition that 'grammar is conditioned by certain general facts of nature,' and the idea that "grammar as a whole is conditioned, without focusing on concrete language-games" i.e., that a certain set of general facts of nature, gives us the possibility of language. So, language depends on reality in some important sense. The question arose, "How could language be conditioned by certain facts of nature?

I'm not sure I quite understand this yet. Time to read on.

I've been doing some reading, and it may be that I haven't paid close enough attention to Wittgenstein's idea of grammar. I think this paper I'm reading has something important to add to how OC is interpreted. However, I haven't fully grasped the idea yet, so I'm going to continue reading.

For those of you interested, I'll provide a link:

http://www.kriterion-journal-of-philosophy.org/kriterion/issues/Permanent/Kriterion-mota-01.pdf


A Plea for Rhees’ Reading of
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: is
grammar conditioned by certain facts?

Sergio Mota

Abstract

"This paper is more than a plea for Rhees’ reading of the work
of Wittgenstein (particularly of On Certainty). My interest in
Rhees’ interpretation lies on its resemblance with my own reading,
on the one hand, and on its being (surprisingly) unmentioned by
other interpreters, on the other. The two core aims of this paper
focus on Rhees’ main ideas. First, I argue that although certain
facts that are accepted beyond doubt belong to the method,
which in turn is included in grammar, this does not mean that
these facts are expressions of rules of grammar. Second, I argue
that grammar is not conditioned by a certain class of facts (i.e.
general facts of nature), but a language-game is possible because
we do not call in question certain facts (i.e. grammar is not
conditioned by something like ontology). The point is that those
facts that are not called in question are beyond truth and falsity,
but this does not mean that these facts must be true. The logical
role these facts (and the sentences used to express them) play
in a language-game is not that of being true or false. Moreover,
grammar itself constitutes what is meant by ‘object’, ‘fact’, or
‘general fact of nature’."

So, you don't think there are mathematical hinges? No one is saying that there are instances where one can doubt a mathematical proposition. Just as there are instances where you can doubt that "This is a hand." Let's say I'm in the context that Moore is in, and I say, "It's true that 2+2=4." Isn't it just as out of place as, "I know this is a hand?" A doubt in that situation is just as silly.

Of course if you change the context you make sense of the doubt. The point is that there is an inherited background that allows you to distinguish between true and false.

If it were the result of Wittgenstein's philosophy that hinge propositions are neither true nor false, have you considered that this might not be because they are indubitable, but because they are usually non-propositional (except for W's exposition of them)? If memory serves, I believe that Daniele Moyal-Sharrock regards hinges as non-propositional. — Luke

I do think of hinges as basic beliefs, and that they are non-propositional. I said this earlier in my posts. It might be that indubitable is the wrong word. I very seldom use the word indubitable, but on occasion I have. It seems to me that any system of belief, must have basic beliefs, including mathematics.

Ya, I was a bit harsh on Fooloso4.

Of course it is true that 2+2=4. No one here doubts that. — Banno

I do hold to the idea that if a proposition is basic or hinge, then to say that it's true is just as mistaken as saying "I know this is a hand." So yes I'm saying that Banno. My interpretation of OC is not unique, there have been many papers written on this subject. However, I'm not saying there aren't instances where it makes sense to say that 2+2=4 is true. The thing about hinges is that they depend on context. If I'm teaching someone how to use the word hand in English, then I might say "I know this is a hand," i.e., I've learned that this is what I call a hand. So, in this case "I know..." means that I have learned how to use the word hand. The same can be said of 2+2=4, in some contexts it can makes sense to say it's true, other contexts not so much. I don't know what Wittgenstein would say about this. OC 10 doesn't give enough information. Moreover, Wittgenstein never edited his thoughts in OC, it's just a rough draft.

The fact that it doesn't make sense to doubt Moore's propositions, seems to also hold for the mathematical proposition 2+2=4. Can I doubt that it's true that 2+2=4. It seems senseless to doubt it.

Obviously your interpretation is the correct interpretation. And yes, 2x2=4 is not an interpretation, but whether it's a hinge or not is. It seems to be more about ego with you than getting to the truth about what Wittgenstein is saying.

I could say the same thing, but it gets us nowhere.

We disagree and that's fine, but I'm moving on to continue the analysis.

Let me try a different approach. It probably won't help, but that's life.

If Moore's propositions or hinges cannot be known, it follows that there are no grounds/justification or reasons/evidence to say they are true. If it's nonsensical to claim that Moore can know "This is a hand," then it follows that it cannot be true either. It follows also that these basic beliefs cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed, i.e., they are arational beliefs or hinges.

If we know X, then at the very least we know they're true, but Wittgenstein is claiming that Moore's statements have no grounds to secure their truth, and thus they cannot be known. Hinges are fundamental arational beliefs that ground any talk about epistemology. They are a given, part of the reality around us. They are not ordinary propositions or statements.

Yes, I know I'm repeating myself.