Many of the definitions of philosophy in this thread are just incorrect or too narrow. Moreover, many think (mostly the general public) that philosophy is strictly something that academics do in a university setting, but philosophy is something all thinking humans do on some level.

Think about what philosophy does, i.e., the branches of philosophy (epistemology, ethics, mind, religion, logic, metaphysics, etc.), it's about analyzing beliefs and belief systems. The analysis of belief systems is about creating better systems of belief. So, in a very general way, it's about what we believe. The only question is whether we do it well.

Post 16 (edited 5/10/24)

To appreciate Wittgenstein, one must realize that certain terms in the Tractatus have a Wittgensteinian twist, especially terms like saying and proposition among others (object, name, form, showing, etc). What can be said, the propositions of natural science (T. 4.1, 4.11, 4.111), can be said clearly. For Wittgenstein, the propositions of natural science are all the facts (states of affairs) of the world, and any proposition that tries to go beyond this limit is nonsense. Wittgenstein wants us to be silent about the propositions of metaphysics. For Wittgenstein, the propositions of metaphysics can only be shown not said. These propositions include, but are not limited to, religion (praying for e.g.), poetry, music, and art, so there are many ways to express the inexpressible.

Silence for Wittgenstein doesn’t mean complete silence. For example, praying is a way of showing the metaphysical, yet praying can be very verbal. Wittgenstein is telling us to be silent when it comes to statements that seem to convey facts but are metaphysical statements instead of Wittgensteinian propositions. Only Wittgensteinian propositions (or propositions of the Tractatus) convey facts or states of affairs in reality.

How does Wittgenstein show what is shown in the Tractatus? After all, he says in the Preface that the truth of the propositions outlined in the Tractatus is unassailable and definitive (Preface p. 4). It seems almost contradictory, and some have interpreted Wittgenstein as contradicting himself. In the Introduction to the Tractatus Russell says that Wittgenstein seems to say a lot about what cannot be said. Wittgenstein shows us how to climb the ladder, by showing us what can and cannot be said. So, we take many of the metaphysical propositions seriously up to a point, they show us how to climb the ladder, and once we reach the top and realize what can and cannot be said we can throw those metaphysical propositions away. After all, they have done their job by showing us the way. The propositions of the Tractatus are important because they show without saying. In other words, the metaphysical propositions of the Tractatus are similar to the propositions of poetry, neither convey facts according to Wittgenstein’s view of a proposition. And to the extent that Wittgenstein’s propositions convey facts that are unassailable and definitive.

Post 15

Wittgenstein specifies what the aim of the Tractatus is, viz., “…to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (T. Preface, p. 3).”

Wittgenstein attempts to demonstrate what can be said and said clearly by first defining the world (reality), which is all that is the case (the facts) (T. 1 and 1.1). This sets the limit to what can be said. If you attempt to go beyond the world of facts into the metaphysical, then you are failing to give meaning to your propositions because metaphysical propositions do not contain any factual information. Of course, this did not mean that Wittgenstein had a disdain for the metaphysical as the logical positivists supposed, it only meant that we could not assert anything factual about the metaphysical. The logic of language falls apart when trying to assert something metaphysical. There are no facts for the proposition to picture when trying to say something metaphysical. There is no way to decide if a particular metaphysical proposition is true given Wittgenstein’s logical analysis of the proposition and its connection to the world via names and objects.

:up:

My question is how does one know when that is the case - ie they're chatting sh*t. And to the contrary, when they really do know what they're talking about. — Benj96

The answer to this question is not easy. The answer will cover the psychological, one's intelligence, and the epistemological, and that's just the beginning. People sometimes forget just how important the psychological is in the formation of our beliefs. What I mean is, for example, one's ego plays a role in what you believe is true, and it plays a role in what you're willing to reject in terms of your beliefs. When the ego gets involved, in many cases truth doesn't matter, what matters is protecting one's ego. Also, you have peer pressure which extends all the way up the ladder of life.

Second, one's ability to think through some of these difficult subjects is often beyond the ability of some. You have to know your limitations and be willing to learn. Even here the ego raises its ugly head. Some people think they have all the answers or at least more answers than they have a right to bloviate about. Also, I mentioned intelligence, and it's important, but more important is being knowledgeable. Sometimes people with less overall intelligence can be more knowledgeable about a certain subject. This is where hard work pays off.

A third problem is not having a good epistemological background. I can't overemphasize the importance of this subject. And since the subject is quite vast one has to seek out the best philosophers to study. I chose a Wittgensteinian approach because I don't think many philosophers can match his intellect.

One of the problems with epistemology is that some people have to narrow a view of epistemology, and others have to broad a view. In other words, some limit their epistemology to science, and others allow too much subjective nonsense into their thinking.

So where do you start? You have to examine your head. What are you trying to accomplish? How big is your ego? Are you afraid of being wrong? Do you love philosophy? And you have to seek out the best of the best and learn from them because 90% of what you'll read in philosophy is just bullshit. Moreover, in a philosophy forum, many people haven't even studied the subjects they're arguing for or against. So 98% percent of what you read in here is bullshit.

As I mentioned, much can be said on this topic, and I haven't scratched the surface.

:up:

No. I'm not thinking in terms of justification. I just see my hands, feel them, use them, so I know I have hands. — Janus

When you say, "I just see my hands, feel them, use them, so I know I have hands," you're giving an argument using a sensory justification. It seems to me it's just an enthymeme. I'm not sure why you would think that's not a justification. You're even using the word know epistemologically.

Hi Sam26, I am glad you bring this up. It is kind of confusing TO UNDERSTAND, and apparently not just for me to understand that statements like Janus' "So, when I look at my hands I cannot but be certain that I have hands — Janus," that are used NOT to defend "knowledge" but defend "certainty". I wonder the same thing, — Kizzy

We often use the term certainty as a synonym for know, so there is no problem there. You seem to be using the word certain as a kind of subjective feeling, i.e., as a conviction of what you believe. If you're using certainty in this way, it's not an epistemological use. We also sometimes use the word know in the same way, i.e., as an expression of one's inner conviction. Both uses are fine, but you have to be clear about how you're using these concepts, otherwise, things get a bit muddled.

The pictures do not compose the world. The world is not a collection or arrangement of pictures. The pictures of the world are pictures of reality made possible by the logical structure underlying both the picture and the world, that is, the picture and reality. — Fooloso4

I agree that pictures don't compose the world. Wittgenstein's picture theory is composed of thought and propositions, thought (we picture facts to ourselves, and a logical picture is a thought T. 2.2 and 3) being the precursor to the proposition. All propositions are possible pictures of facts in the world. True propositions are pictures of actual facts, as opposed to possible facts. The logical structure of both the proposition and the world of facts provide the impetus for his picture theory.

So, when I look at my hands I cannot but be certain that I have hands — Janus

I'm wondering what you're saying here. Are you saying that looking at your hands (sensory observation) provides a justification for the belief that you have hands? There is no epistemological justification for the belief that you have hands. To know this is the case ask yourself if there is any good justification for doubting the belief that you have hands. If there are good reasons to doubt, then justification makes sense, but if there are no good reasons to doubt, then justification doesn't make sense. The connection between knowledge and doubting is an important epistemological connection. This is an important point that Wittgenstein makes in OC.

Knowing and doubting require good reasons when we speak epistemologically. Given what you wrote previously you seem to agree, at least, with some of this.

Oh yes absolutely. I have in mind Austin's comment that while word use should be the first word on a topic, it need not be the final one! — fdrake

Agreed.

I view each of your examples as different ways to justify a belief, and each of these justifications, it seems to me, falls under the subject of epistemology. Mathematical proofs are very similar to logical proofs in that they start with certain assumptions or premises and proceed systematically to a conclusion. Scientific experiments may use a combination of justifications, such as sensory justification (what we observe), logic (deductive and inductive reasoning), and expert testimonial evidence. A history book may use, as a justification for a particular conclusion, testimonial evidence from other writings (past and present). Archaeology may also be used to justify certain historical claims, again mostly testimonials along with artifacts.

Most justifications can be categorized under the following methods, which are simply different categories of use.

1. Reason (inductive and deductive)
2. Testimony (books and lectures from experts, for e.g.)
3. Sensory experiences (often used in experiments)
4. Linguistic training
5. Mathematical proofs
6. Etc

These are a few uses of justification that fall within the subject of epistemology.

To understand an idea, look at how the word is used. — fdrake

This is exactly where we need to begin because we get our meanings from how we, as a group (not as individuals but as a group) of language users, use our words or concepts. How we use words precedes our definitions. The evolution of using words correctly, started with use, not definitions. I say this to point out the importance of what @fdrake is saying.

If you start with a particular use and use that as your overarching definition, then you're not getting the full picture (at least generally). For example, if we use the word know as an expression of a conviction (which is just an expression of how we feel about a belief), then we're not using it in an epistemological sense. If we're talking about epistemology, then we're necessarily talking about some form of justification; and even where we are referring to justification there are different uses. For example, using reason (logic), using testimonial evidence, and using sensory experiences, to name a few ways we justify our beliefs. Our tendency is to conflate these uses (uses outside epistemological uses) as if we're referring to the same thing, and we're not. Throughout this thread people are conflating the many uses of know as if they're all referring to the same thing, and they're definitely not the same (hence, conflation).

Knowledge in the epistemological sense is at its core, a belief, but it's a particular kind of belief. It's a belief that achieves its goal, that of being justified and true. If it's not justified and true, then necessarily it's not knowledge. If you're using the word know, for example, to express some feeling about a belief, then you're not using it epistemologically, you're just conflating your meanings and adding to the confusion.

I did say that I was going to sum this up in a couple more posts, but it seems there will be a few more than I thought.

Post 14

There is a clear, at least at a certain level of analysis, ontology in the Tractatus. Reality for Wittgenstein is composed of facts, not things [not Wittgensteinian objects] (T. 1.1). In other words, reality is not composed of individual objects, i.e., in isolation, but objects in combination, which form atomic facts and facts proper. As has been said many times throughout this thread objects are simple and unanalyzable, and they only exist as the smallest constituent parts of states of affairs (facts). “[O]jects fit into one another like the links of a chain (T. 2.03).” Objects are necessarily prior to the facts in the same way atoms are prior to material objects. This does not mean that atoms are like Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., atoms are not simple or unanalyzable in the same sense that objects are.

If the world had no substance, and by extension no objects, then whether a proposition was true or false would depend on other propositions (T. 2.0211, 2.0212). (However, it seems to me that it would be hard to imagine propositions without a world of some kind, and thus facts of some kind.)

In 2.0212 Wittgenstein first introduces the idea of a picture and its connection with truth and falsity, then, in 2.1 he says “We picture facts to ourselves.” We have now moved from the world of facts to thoughts. When we picture facts to ourselves we are modeling reality (T. 2.12). “A logical picture of facts is a thought (T. 3). “In a proposition a thought finds an expression… (T. 3.1).” We move from thoughts, specifically pictures of possible states of affairs, to expressing these thoughts/pictures using propositions. “[A] proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world (T. 3.12).” What a proposition projects is not included in the proposition, but its possibility is, and so a proposition does not contain its sense but the possibility of expressing it (T. 3.13).

I'm going to write one or two more posts to sum this up in the coming days.

Interesting NDE - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZfaPCwjguk

This is a good example of why I believe both religions and materialists have it wrong. There are 100,000's of testimonials like this.

I guess at some point when discussing this Wittgenstein's logic begins to break down, but I'm not sure where it begins breaking down. I point this out because we know that there are no such things as names and objects in the Wittgensteinian sense. That said, when Wittgenstein states that "the variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object (T. 4.1272)." - he is simply saying something about the essence of symbolic representation in formal logic. 'X' is simply a placeholder for any object within a particular domain, and Wittgenstein has created his own domain with his concept of objects. The concept of an object, as Wittgenstein envisions it, is not real in the sense that it lacks empirical content or logical significance within his analysis. However, 'x' may still function as a sign within his logical context even though what it represents is considered a pseudo concept.

Strangely, he refers to objects as pseudo-concepts, and at the same time, they form the building blocks of atomic facts. Maybe it's a pseudo-concept because no concept can capture their essence. I'm not sure.

I must point out that you don't have to understand all of this to understand Wittgenstein's basic ideas in the Tractatus.

Post 13

According to K.T. Fann Wittgenstein is trying to answer two questions “How are propositions related to the world?” and “How are propositions related to one another (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, p. 8)?” These questions are related to Wittgenstein’s goal, viz., “My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition (Nb. p. 39).”

It's already been stated in earlier posts that Wittgenstein assumes a priori that if we can talk about the world, then some propositions must be connected with the world. These propositions are called elementary propositions, and what determines their truth or falsity is the world, not other propositions. Complex propositions, made up of elementary propositions, are truth-functions of elementary propositions (e.g., T. 5). Elementary propositions are combined using truth-functional connectives such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, and implication (T. 5.101).

We know that elementary propositions consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221). “It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names (T. 4.22)” We also know that Wittgensteinian names are not the kind of names we’re used to, viz., dog, cat, Plato, pencil, etc. Names are simples that cannot be dissected “…by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” “Names are simple symbols: I [Wittgenstein] indicate them by single letters (‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’) (T. 4.24).”

Wittgenstein was a traditionalist in his early philosophy because his view was that the meaning of a name was the object it denotes. “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (T. 3.203).” So, elementary propositions, composed of names, if true, are arranged in a way that pictures or mirrors the objects in the corresponding atomic facts, which make up states of affairs. Objects are important in that they provide meaningful referents for our language. Objects are the building blocks of states of affairs, and thus the world (reality). Objects also play an important role in showing the limits of language and what can be meaningfully said. There is nothing for names in elementary propositions to latch onto besides objects in atomic facts, which make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021). In other words, you can't go beyond the substance of the world using language. The mystical, for Wittgenstein, which does go beyond the world, can only be shown not said.

Some of this has already been said, but hopefully wording it a bit differently will help to clarify misunderstandings.

Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact? — Fooloso4

No, I wouldn't go that far. My intention was not to go this far into the meanings of these Wittgensteinian concepts and their place in the world. It's beyond the scope of this thread.

Both are true, I believe. As I pointed out in post 12, one of the internal properties of objects is that they can combine with other objects. Whether it does combine depends on whether or not the atomic fact obtains.

The purpose of the post above "Taking a step back..." was to clarify my earlier statements, in which I used a couple of terms in a different sense than Witt. This caused you to think I meant one thing when I meant another. My error. I think we're pretty close to interpreting objects in the same way.

Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ...
— Sam26

What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them? — Fooloso4

I'm thinking along the lines of what Wittgenstein said, viz., "...there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others (T. 2.0121)." In other words, it's only as they combine with others that we get atomic facts, otherwise we just have Witt's substance. Or it's only when they combine with other objects that they're actualized into atomic facts or complex facts. That's my take.

This is going much further into the Tractatus than I intended, but it's interesting.

Post 12

Trying to be clear about objects, so a step back.

We know this, viz., that objects, which make up the substance of the world, can be arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). This is basic to what an object is. You move from object  to atomic facts  to complex facts. Logic dictates this for Wittgenstein. Objects contain the possibility of arranging into any potential fact (“If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the beginning (T. 2.0121).”). Whether the fact obtains depends on the arrangement of the objects in an atomic fact. Objects by themselves are mere potentiality, like any building block, but also unlike any building block we are familiar with.

My understanding of Wittgensteinian objects leads me to believe that they are the fundamental components of objective reality, i.e., they’re real things that combine. They combine to form states of affairs (T. 2.01). If states of affairs are objectively real, it would seem to follow that objects are real, at least in some sense. Otherwise, what would be combined to form states of affairs? They also seem real because they can occupy logical space. Obviously, Wittgenstein’s objects don’t exist, but Wittgenstein’s theory of objects is a theory that postulates them as real.

You must be careful about what you say about objects because you can’t ascribe external properties to objects, only internal properties (T. 2.01231). One such internal property is that they are simples, but it’s not the only internal property. Other internal properties include the ability to combine with other objects to form atomic facts, and that they make up the substance of the world of facts.

Keep in mind that to have a basic understanding of Wittgenstein’s picture theory you need not have a perfect understanding of objects or names. After all, we’re not trying to write a doctoral thesis.

Sorry, I'm falling behind. I'm in the middle of a move, and I'm recovering from a virus.

I've made a couple of misstatements that I have to also correct, as @Fooloso4 pointed out.

I have no problems with the way the thread is going.

Sorry Banno, but I think we disagree on the nature of objects. It's pretty clear what Wittgenstein had in mind, at least partially clear.

:up:

I don't find much to disagree with here, and I didn't skip over objects.

Post 11

We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).”

This ends my comments on the second of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus.

Post 10

We know that the idea of propositions being pictures, as presented in his picture theory of propositions, is central to his thinking in the Tractatus. So, propositions represent reality through their pictorial form. The elements of a picture include several things, including the following: Names, of course, are part of what is included in the elements of a picture, names correspond to the objects, i.e., the arrangement of names corresponds to the arrangement of objects that make up atomic facts and hence complex facts.

Second, is the logical structure of the picture (all propositions whether true or false have a logical structure). The logical structure of the picture (the proposition) also includes the logical connectives, such as disjunction, conjunction, negation, etc., and they determine the truth-possibilities of propositions (T. 4.31).

Another way to talk about the elements of a proposition is to refer to the representational content of the picture. So, the elements of a picture can be talked about in different ways. A propositional picture is a particular picture, say of A as opposed to B, because of how the pictorial elements of A (the form of the picture) relate to the situation pictured. They are identical (T. 2.15).

Geez, I think I'm misreading @013zen I need a break. Talk later.

You mean atomic facts, right?

I agree with that, I've said that over and over again. Do you disagree with that @Banno?

I may have read it years ago. I should re-read it. I don't think I'm at odds with her, am I?

I haven't read everything. :gasp: I only read every other word.

I agree with that.

You're not saying there are untrue facts are you? Every proposition represents a possible fact, but whether the proposition is true or not is dependent on whether it is a correct picture of the fact/state of affairs.

What? I don't follow.

All propositions picture possible facts, a true proposition is one where the fact obtains.

Yes, I agree. I think maybe Wittgenstein's negative facts cause some problems, but I'll let @013zen explain what he means.

@Banno

It's easy to be misunderstood because of Wittgenstein's use of these concepts. Hell, even Wittgenstein couldn't remember what he meant by certain statements. Years after he wrote the Tractatus he was asked about what he meant by this or that statement and he couldn't say. So, I'm not going to claim that my interpretations are always correct. We're all going to be off to one degree or another, and we're certainly not all going to agree.

The logical form of a true or a false proposition shares the same logical form as that of a fact; As you point out, a fact can either be true or false. So, that sentence, I'd remove. It might be more helpful at that point to reference 4.063, which reads: — 013zen

I would probably clarify it this way: The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a positive fact. Some of the confusion has been that when I've been talking about states of affairs or facts I've been talking about positive facts/states of affairs.

Post 9

Just a couple of points of clarification before I continue.

When a proposition is true it mirrors a positive fact. False statements are possible states of affairs not actual states of affairs, in other words, they don’t obtain, but they still have sense because they picture a possible fact. Again, there is nothing in a false statement that connects with reality, i.e., it’s a picture that isn’t representative of a positive fact. The logical form of a true proposition matches the logical form of a fact. “Logical form is mirrored in propositions. Propositions show the form of reality (T. 4.121).” In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally (Nb p. 7). A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (T. 4.01).”

Post 8

I will continue with a few more remarks. All of this is still under the second main proposition of the Tractatus.

“What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
What’s obvious is that states of affairs are real. For example, “The Earth has one moon,” Is a state of affairs. The proposition represents a picture of a fact. A fact is something real, not imagined. The two parts of complex facts are atomic facts and the objects that make up atomic facts. These things (things in the normal sense) are real for Wittgenstein. “Objects make up the substance of world [reality] (T. 2.021),” so substance and therefore objects are real.

Philosophers going back to Augustine have believed that names, in the normal use of the word, refer to objects (objects in this sense are things like chairs, pencils, cars, etc.). Wittgenstein develops this idea into his theory of names and objects. Of course, his idea of names and objects is much different from what philosophers traditionally meant, at least up to Frege, Russell, and maybe a few others.

“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true (T. 2.0111). In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false) (T. 2.0212).” Pictures, of course, are sketched by propositions, and names are the smallest component of propositions. The names within a proposition refer to objects in the world. All propositions for Wittgenstein are logical pictures. A picture presents a form, i.e., the arrangement of the elements of the picture, and the “…elements of the picture are the representatives of objects (T. 2.131).”

So, the form of a proposition, which is the arrangement of the elements of a picture (made up of names), must match the form of a fact, which is made up of the arrangement of the objects. “There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all (T. 2.161). What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly—in the way it does, is its pictorial form (T. 2.17). A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc (T. 2.171).”

All propositions have a sense, and that sense is represented by its pictorial form. Whether that sense is representative of reality depends on whether its logical form matches the logical form of reality. The sense of a proposition is independent of whether it matches the form of reality. This must be for us to understand the sense of false propositions or pictures that do not match reality.

“A picture represents its subject [the subject being the possibility of the existence of a fact] from a position outside it (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly (T. 2.173). A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form [a picture presents or shows its form] (T. 2.174).”