What makes you think I haven't done things like this already. Besides who are you to give advice to me, especially since you don't know me. It's also probably likely that my system of ethics is much more advanced than yours, so I have a good idea about right and wrong actions. I might not always make the best choice based on those ethics, but I know something about right and wrong. Sometimes I make poor choices, as do we all, but more often than not, I make the right choice.

Except I'm not religious at all.

Do you not see the title to this section, it's the lounge.

A belief is about something: "I believe that..." What follows the ellipsis can only be a linguistic statement. Unless by "private" you mean something like "unformulated", where the person is unaware that they hold a particular belief. If that's the case, then I don't think they should be called "private", given the Wittgensteinian connotations (i.e. that they are unable to be made public). — Luke

A belief is about something, true, but it doesn't necessarily have to take the form "I believe that..." one's actions can express one's beliefs. And yes the belief is unformulated in terms of language, but as I pointed out in earlier posts which people seem to skip over, is the fact that we know that people who have had no language think in terms of beliefs. People who have been deaf and blind can have quite a sophisticated belief system, quite apart from language.

It's not meant to absolve me of anything. I'm just responding to your asinine comment in a thread about sports cars. This isn't a thread about the ethics of owning cars, or cars that you deem bad for the environment.

But of course there's still room in there for mystical Oneness underlying everything, although that's not my cup of tea. — mcdoodle

Come on Mcdoodle, let's have that cup of tea. :D

True, very true. X-)

Ahhh, am I messing up the planet for you. Poor baby.

Whether there are things that are more fun than cars is very subjective, but I agree, I would much rather be with friends than have a sports car. However, I can have both, and I can afford it, so why not? There are always things more important than having fun, or enjoying a car.

There's not much that's better in terms of bang for the buck.

Ya, Bentley's are great cars, but not my taste. It's a hobby, albeit an expensive one.

Then let's use a different example. I've never met Trump; only ever seen him on TV and in photos. I've learned to use the term "Donald Trump" by associating it with certain digital images. But do those digital images have anything to do with the meaning of "Donald Trump". Of course not. The name refers to the man himself. — Michael

Are you saying that we learn meaning only by understanding that there is "the real Donald Trump?" (as opposed to the digital image) - or that there is some referent X that is required? It would seem that we can not only use the word correctly by referring to his image, but that we understand the meaning by using the word to refer to the image. What more do we need? What more would we understand if we saw the real referent as opposed to the image of the referent? We understand that it's not the real thing when looking at the image, but how does that take away from the meaning of the word? The important thing is that we use the word correctly, and in doing so we show that we understand what the word means.

Yes, the name does refer to the man himself, but can we derive correct usage, and as such, meaning, by only referring to the digital image? Yes. The "middle-man" works just as well for the term Donald Trump. The digital images themselves, or the text on a page, are not what gives meaning to the word, but how we use the word in reference to those images, or for that matter how we use the word to refer to the actual person. The object conveys no meaning in itself. It's only as we use concepts within a language that meaning is conferred. If the object conveyed the meaning, then how is it that we understand the meaning of Aristotle? The referent is gone, it no longer exists, so how is it that we understand what the word means?

I don't see why this is any different in the case of "pain". The public expression is just a middle-man; a "hook" with which I can connect the word and the sensation.

When I talk of others being in pain, I'm not talking about them behaving as I do when I have that sensation; I'm talking about them feeling as I do when I have that sensation. The behaviour may be an inevitable consequence, but that's it. — Michael

Yes, again I agree, that in the case of the concept pain, it is just a middle-man, the "hook" as you put it, but it is very important in this case, more so than in the other example. More so because of the beetle-in-the box example, that is, without the pain behavior we wouldn't know if we were referring to the same sensation (the same referent). The pain behavior is essential to understanding correct usage and meaning. My private experience, although important, is not what gives meaning to the words we use, that is, meaning happens as we use words in a rule governed activity (language).

There is another aspect to this that's important, and I think it goes along with what your saying, if I understand you correctly. Without the existence of the pain (the private sensation) there would be no pain behavior, and thus no meaning to convey. This is true, but the existence of the private sensation although necessary for pain behavior, is not necessary for the correct use (meaning) of the word in a language setting. It is a kind of backdrop, a necessary backdrop, as in the case of my prelinguistic beliefs, to the development of language.

It is true that when we talk about the pain of others, we are talking about how they feel. However, how is it that we learn how someone feels? How is it that we learn how to associate the word pain with that feeling? Is it not by observing pain behavior? If there were no pain behavior what feeling would we be referring to (again the beetle-in-the-box)? What would it mean to say that I am in pain without pain behavior in a linguistic context? The pain behavior, although an outgrowth of our private sensations, is a necessary outgrowth in terms of our understanding of the concept. In some cases the middle-man is necessary for meaning and understanding to take place (within language). It is not necessary for my private understanding, but it is necessary for a public understanding.

You say we learn the word "pain" by associating it with certain behaviours, and so therefore these behaviours have something to do with the meaning of the word "pain". How is that any different to learning the word "Aristotle" by associating it with certain texts? — Michael

The point is that we learn correct usage in a public forum, and that forum can take a variety of forms, including texts. There is a difference though between words that refer to things, as opposed to words that refer to an abstraction, which Aristotle is presently for us. We learn them by using them in a variety of contexts in conjunction with implicit and explicit rules, but we don't learn them in isolation. The difference then would be that pain is referring to public behavior that reflects my private sensations, but the way we learn to use Aristotle is also public, but not in the sense that there is something to point to, that is, there is no longer the thing we call Aristotle. There are just a variety of language-games that arise in various public venues.

I know that what I mean by "pain" is the sensation, not the expressions. Wittegenstein can argue all he likes that I'm actually talking about the expressions, but my own reflexive understanding of what I mean when I use the word is far more compelling than his arguments. — Michael

How did you learn to use the word pain? You didn't learn it by associating it with your sensation. You learned it by using it publicly in association with your own sensation, and the pain behavior of others. I agree that your experience of pain is much more compelling than any meaning associated with the word, but that's quite a different thing. The point, I believe, is how we learn the use of a word in a linguistic setting. What you mean by pain is quite irrelevant in terms of meaning.

I hope I answered the question, but maybe not completely.

This seems like saying that the meaning of "Aristotle" gets a foothold in textbooks, given that none of us have ever met the man. The word refers to the philosopher, not the text. — Michael

I don't quite follow the analogy. How is what I'm saying, like saying the meaning of Aristotle gets a foothold in textbooks?

I'm sure almost all of us will say that the word "pain" refers to the sensation, not to the public expression.

That's why we can talk about people faking pain. — Michael

My point is that the meaning of the word pain gets a foothold in public expressions. The meaning isn't solely tied to my private sensation, which would be the beetle in the box scenario.

My understanding of the private language argument is the following: In PI 244 Wittgenstein talks about words referring to sensations, he doesn't deny the sensations, the private things that are happening to us. He wants us to consider the connection between the name, and the thing named, that is, how is it set up? How do we learn the meaning of the word pain? So a child learns for example to associate the word pain with certain behaviors. These are behaviors we can all see. Thus, the concept pain is not something private, but something we're all able to observe, it's not like the beetle in the box. You're able to see my behavior, just as I'm able to see yours, so it's not private.

Note though that he's talking about the public use of the word pain, which is associated with the public expression of our sensations. What Wittgenstein seems to be saying in the private language argument, is, that a word cannot refer to something that's totally private, like the beetle in the box. The word pain has to get a foothold in something public for us to have a shared meaning.

None of this denies that there are private sensations, or that there are private beliefs. Wittgenstein is saying that for us to share in language what these are, we must be able to associate the concept with something that's not private, something that's communal. And by the way, there is language present in the private language game, but the language is meaningless in terms of what we mean by the beetle in the box. So again, I don't see how my view is anything like the private language argument.

I'm simply saying, again, that the beliefs, the private beliefs apart from language, are similar to the private sensations we have. And these private sensations are also prelinguistic. They have an existence quite apart from any statement about them. Their existence is not dependent upon language.

Everyone, to one degree or another, twists the evidence to suit their conclusions. Some more than others, but we all do it. None of us are immune from such behavior. One could say atheists are delusional because they ignore certain evidence. I say, stick to the arguments, and stay away from these kinds of attacks.

If someone believes X based on what they perceive as the evidence or reasons for their belief, it's not a delusion or mental illness. If this was the case, then all of us would have a mental illness or be deluded, because all of us have distorted reasoning to one degree or another. Are some religious people irrational? Yes. Are some atheists irrational? Yes. I dislike much of what religious people believe too, but I'm not going to say their mentally ill because I disagree with them. What's the next step, putting them in mental institutions? Giving them medication? And what if someone deems your belief to be a form of mental illness?

The analogy that I drew between non-linguistic beliefs and a dormant life force was made in response to your question/assertion that without non-linguistic beliefs, "what would be the springboard of language? How does one get from a mind of no thoughts and no beliefs, to a mind that is able to express one's thoughts linguistically?" This appears to indicate that language could not have evolved from scratch, without some assistance from non-linguistic beliefs. I tend to agree with Banno's complaint that this smacks too much of a private language. — Luke

When I say that language evolved from scratch that doesn't mean there wasn't anything there as a basis for language. It's like saying I baked a cake from scratch, that doesn't mean there wasn't anything used to bake the cake. Yes, and I do believe there was assistance from non-linguistic beliefs. That there are non-linguistic beliefs is self-evident for me.

How can it be similar to a private language, especially if there is no language present. If we can have beliefs apart from language, and beliefs can arise apart from language, then how is this even remotely similar to having a private language?

This example relies entirely on the shared meanings/concepts of words like "snake" and "dangerous". I really don't believe that Wittgenstein had much interest in what causes our beliefs or how our language developed, which is much more theory than description. I mention this only because you claim this to be your view based on your reading of Wittgenstein. — Luke

Much of my theory relies on some of Wittgenstein's thinking, but not all of it. I'm not attributing causal beliefs to Wittgenstein.

There is clearly a distinction, at least for me and others, between causal beliefs and reasons for a belief. Roughly, a reasoned or rational explanation is something that involves a choice, in that I could have done or thought otherwise. However, a causal explanation is something that occurs apart from rationality, and many of our beliefs are like this. Also, a cause for a belief is an explanation of why an event occurred, like the turning on of a switch, which allows the electricity to flow to the light bulb, thereby, causing the light to come on. The same can happen with a belief. The cause of Mary's belief is the bite of the snake. The effect is Mary's belief that snakes are dangerous. Mary didn't reason her way to this belief.

How is it any different? Aren't the snake bite and its subsequent effects evidence that snakes can be dangerous? — Luke

A reason speaks to the truth of some conclusion, but a cause is not concerned with truth.

It's an interesting question. It seems to me that when we say that logic is fundamental to the universe, then we're saying something about how we talk about the universe, or how we describe and make sense of the universe. Logic is a language that's used as a tool to reason, to correctly reason.

In another sense there seems to be something built into the universe that lends itself to logic or mathematics. I would think that any possible universe is governed by rules, and by rules that have some consistency, at least generally. I would say that for any possible universe there are fundamental rules or laws that allow us to use logic to describe that universe. One could also argue that the fundamental rules or laws that govern any universe, IS the logic that's part of the reality of that universe. So maybe in that sense one could argue that logic is fundamental to any possible universe. It's hard to see how this wouldn't be the case.

The Mercedes is actually faster than the Camaro Zl1, which surprised me. I've driven all of these cars except the Mercedes. They are definitely fun if you like sports cars, if not, then buy something that suits your taste. It's an expensive hobby though.

I already have a Toyota Corolla.

The point that Wittgenstein would make (as I interpret him), and I agree, is that how we use language is not relative. There's a kind of logic of use that is generated by language users, and the word doubt like other words has correct and incorrect uses. For example, let's say that I'm teaching you the game of chess, that is, I'm explaining the rules of the game, but you are doubting everything that I tell you. Now according to you it's okay, because doubting is a relative concept, that is, one can use it any way one sees fit, but how can this be the case? Aren't there rules of correct usage, or do you apply your own rules?

Also I don't think of what's reasonable as relative either, that is, it's not a matter of opinion.

Who said anything about conversation, remember these beliefs are pre-linguistic. You're trying to stick what I'm saying into language, but it doesn't belong there, only insofar as we're talking about it. This is also why it doesn't fit PI 293.

The point is that nothing is immune to doubt. And what is rational and useful is relative. — Magnus Anderson

You left out two key words that I use in conjunction with doubt, reasonable and generally. Is it reasonable for me to doubt that I have two hands generally? Is it reasonable for me to doubt whether I'm currently sitting at my computer typing? Is it reasonable for me to doubt my own existence? These things are generally immune from ANY reasonable doubt, generally.

That quote doesn't apply to what I'm talking about. The point in that quote is that the concept belief would have no meaning for us if it referred to something internal - something in the box. However, I'm not discussing concepts.

Sorry I don't follow?

So while a belief is uniquely yours, it is not private. — Banno

The only thing that I would question is this statement. Why can't my belief be private? The language which states a belief is not private, but my belief, it would seem to me, starts out at being private before there is any showing or stating.

The point in talking about beliefs, prelinguistic and linguistic, is to point out that there are some beliefs that are foundational or basic to epistemology, that is, our epistemology rests on such beliefs. Moreover, these beliefs are outside of epistemology (outside justified true belief), which means they aren't subject to, or in need of justification. Nor should they be referred to as being true or false. As soon as you speak of these foundational or basic beliefs in reference to being justified, or as being true, or as something known, then you are bringing them into the domain of epistemology. Of course the classic example's used in this thread are Moore's proposition's that he claims to know, e.g., - "This is a hand," or "I live on the Earth."

In order for any (any that I'm aware of) epistemological theory to gain a foothold there must be some beliefs/propositions that are immune from reasonable doubt, at least generally. Even in science there must be things that are not doubted, things that are part of the nature of reality that are immune to reasonable doubt. For example, that we are humans, that we have legs and arms, that there are mountains and valleys, that the Earth has one moon, etc. - if this were not the case, then how could one conduct experiments with any assurance of gaining knowledge?

Note that I said "reasonable doubt," there are cases, although not many, where it would be reasonable to doubt foundational beliefs. Wittgenstein points these out when discussing Moore's propositions. However, we're talking about cases in which such beliefs cannot be reasonably doubted. In fact, it seems to be nonsensical to doubt them.

An important point about knowledge is its juxtaposition with doubt, and this is a point that Wittgenstein makes over and over again in OC. I think it's an important point. The point isn't that I know and doubt at the same time, but that one's knowledge is always questionable, up to a point. If I say I know X, you might naturally want to know how it is that I know. You want to see for yourself that I'm not mistaken, so your questioning my knowledge. If it's something we both know, then there is no need for me to say to you that I know, especially if we both know that we know. A doubt just wouldn't arise, at least until there is good reason to doubt that we know. A teacher may have doubts about your knowledge of algebra, but after administering a test she no longer has any doubt about your knowledge. Also note the objective criteria involved. It does no good to just say that one knows, your assurance means nothing, it must be objectively demonstrated.

Perhaps language just evolved from scratch, like life. It's similar to asking how did we get from the absence of life to the presence of life unless there was some mystical dormant life force (where the dormant life force is analogous to your non-linguistic belief).

How are beliefs causally formed? It seems to be the case that beliefs arise causally within the mind based on the interactions between our sensory experiences and the world around us.
— Sam26

This seems to apply equally to linguistic beliefs, including those beliefs that we learn in school and which are taught to us by others. What about instincts and natural physical/bodily reflexes - do you consider these to be a kind of non-linguistic belief? Is there a way to distinguish these just by observing behaviour? — Luke

I do believe that language evolved from scratch, but not without very active and sophisticated brain phenomena. Even if you want to say they evolved together from one primitive state to another, I don't see how this hurts my position. I also don't think it's the same thing as going from the absence of life to the presence of life. I'm not saying we're going from the absence of something to the presence of something. I'm saying we're going from the presence of brain activity, to then, linguistic activity, which occurred very slowly and deliberately. Unless I'm misunderstanding you.

Causal beliefs can arise in the following manner: Mary was bitten by a snake, and as a result of the bite she now believes snakes are dangerous. This is a causal explanation of Mary's belief, namely, it shows the relationship between the bite and her belief. The bite is sufficient to cause her belief. This kind of explanation is different from beliefs that arise based on evidence, or what we deem to be evidence.

"Instincts and natural physical/bodily reflexes..." aren't beliefs, and no, I don't consider these to be non-linguistic beliefs. If these things show beliefs, then we could say that amoebas have beliefs, couldn't we?

How does it seem like this? Care to offer an example? Perhaps this is nitpicking, but in the feeble examples I can imagine, it usually seems more suitable to say "he/it thinks..." rather than "he/it believes..." That is, the "belief" seems short-term or fleeting.

Instead of there being non-linguistic beliefs, could it just be that we apply statements of belief to the non-linguistic behaviours of others in an attempt to explain those behaviours? — Luke

I have given examples in my writing, and I also have quoted Wittgenstein to you before about this very thing (OC 284, 285). Well, it's true that we can say that primitive man thinks, but thinks what? If we see primitive man building something, we can say that he thinks something, but can't we also say that he believes something. Doesn't the thinking reflect the beliefs? Isn't thinking a general term that we apply to many different ideas, whereas one's belief seems to be a subset of thinking.

It is true that we are applying statements of belief to non-linguistic man, just as I apply statements of belief about my dog. These statements do explain the behaviors, but they also tell us something about the nature of a belief. How do you explain people who have been deaf all their lives, who haven't had a language as part of their lives, who once being introduced to language talk about having a quite active thought life, and belief system apart from language? Language, it seems to me, is just a way for us to communicate what going on in the brain already. Language doesn't give life to this activity, the activity is there quite apart from language.

That leaves private concepts and notions and languages and so on. Which is an odd but interesting way for us to differ.

Because I reject the very notion of such things, and suppose myself to be following Wittgenstein in so doing. Yet you also understand Wittgenstein but apparently leave room for private mental furnishings.

How can this be? — Banno

I don't believe one can have private concepts, can they? Wouldn't that be akin to having a private language? Your use of the term "mental furnishings" isn't clear to me. All I'm saying is that there are things going on in the brain that coincide with actions quite apart from language, and that some of these actions demonstrate that primitive (prelinguistic) man had beliefs. I also think that Wittgenstein believed this to be the case, which was the reason I quoted him. These mental things (thoughts, states, etc.) are not concepts, because remember I think of them prior to language.

Even when we bring language into the picture, when I say, "I believe X," am I not referring to something that's unique to my mental thinking? It's not as though "my beliefs" only get their existence from language. The fact that it's mine shows that there is something that's unique to me, to my thinking. Don't confuse this with the idea that words get their meaning from how a community of language users, use certain words. There is nothing in me that gives concepts their meaning, no mental furnishings, if you will.

When you say, "I reject the very notion of such things," are you saying you don't believe there are mental states or thoughts going on in the brain prior to or along with one's actions? Again, I do believe these mental phenomena do reflect beliefs; and these beliefs, at least for me and my understanding of how beliefs can be shown, are a reflection of something internal.

You're spot on, right, you don't know what the hell your talking about.

I explained over and over what I mean by brain states, so you can go on with your criticisms that it's nonsense or jargon, but I'm moving on.

You're taking this too far into neuroscience, which is fine, but my reference to brain states doesn't rely on a scientific understanding for it to make sense. All that's needed, is to understand that there is brain activity that precedes or coincides with our actions, and that some actions are expressions of beliefs, quite apart from statements or propositions.

Sorry but I’m more familiar with the language games of neuroscientists than your private language. — apokrisis

Well, it's not my private language, many philosophers have talked about brain states or states-of-mind in reference to beliefs. What a particular neuroscientist means by brains states may be quite different based on their particular theory. So I chose the words I chose based on the language some philosophers have used.

You can say "whatever the heck a state is" in reference to my talk about states, but one could also say the same things about "brain activity" or "neural goings on." You act as though those phrases are somehow more accurate, and not as vague. Much of this is vague because much of it is not understood precisely. Besides it wasn't meant to refer to something very precise.

There is another important point to make about actions reflecting beliefs, it may be that even if actions reflect beliefs, we may not necessarily know which belief it reflects. So, in your case Banno, you exhibit certain behaviors/actions related to tomatoes, and these behaviors/actions reflect certain beliefs. For example, your action of going to the supermarket and buying tomatoes, reflects the belief that you'll find tomatoes there. However, by simply seeing one's actions that doesn't necessarily mean I can point to a specific belief, only that they reflect beliefs in general. This we know based on our own actions of going to the supermarket. And I don't need to express a belief to know that I have a belief.

In particular, does it follow from the use of this shorthand that there must be a brain state that corresponds to Banno's belief that tomatoes are good; and further that this brain sate is distinct from and yet somehow responsible for all of those behaviours?

Or does that belief amount to nothing more than the collection of tomato-related behaviours? Including that internal soliloquy that just came up with this post... — Banno

I never meant for the term brain states to be defined in a very precise manner (not that you're necessarily doing this). It's simply a term that refers to mental activity that precedes our actions, and I don't think that when philosophers and others use the term, that they had in mind some one-to-one correspondence between one's belief and a particular brain state. And as you know from other posts of mine, I tend to be careful about giving some precise definition to a particular word, especially a word like brain states. I think that words like brain states, reality, knowing, etc., refer to a wide range of uses, and don't lend themselves to very precise definitions, like the word game that Wittgenstein discusses in the PI.

So if we think of brain states as generalized brain activity that precedes one's actions, and by extension one's beliefs, then we get a picture that these actions/beliefs don't arise in a vacuum. I think you would agree with this. So when you say, "...there must be a brain state that corresponds [with] Banno's belief that tomatoes are good;" I say, yes and no, which means, it depends on what you mean by corresponds with. If you mean some one-to-one correspondence, then no, I don't think that. If you mean that there is brain activity happening prior to your actions/beliefs then yes, but there is no brain state X that one can point to that says, ahhh, Banno believes Y.

Another point about brain states, is that I'm simply pointing out that prior to the rise of language, beliefs are reflections of what's happening in the brain. The evidence is in one's behavior, and the evidence is in what we know about our own private experiences. Actions in themselves don't necessarily tell us anything about these private experiences, because even computers can be programmed to perform certain actions. Moreover, we know that computers don't have the kind of private experiences (generalized brain activity or states) that humans do. So the point, again, is that there is something private happening when we form beliefs, some brain activity (brain states as I referred to them earlier) that precede or coincide with actions, and/or coincide with statements or propositions.

I do think that brain states, as I'm using the term, are responsible for our actions or behaviors, but I'm not prepared to say all actions or behaviors. I just don't know enough about the brain to make such a claim.

Which is where Banno and Sam go astray in trying to treat the truth-makers as some uninterpreted ground of experience. — apokrisis

This interpretation is just wrong. It shows that you haven't read the posts carefully.

Likewise Sam is imagining that the brain has "states". At some instant in time, you can take that instantaneous snapshot view which gives you a timeless representation of how the brain was, in a way that will forever after be recorded as such. — apokrisis

This just isn't the case, where did I ever define brain states in such a way? This is simply your interpretation of what I said, not what I actually said. As I said in another post, the term brain states is simply a term used to refer to whatever is happening in the brain prior to a particular action. I don't think there is any way one can point to activity X (some one-to-one correspondence) in the brain that is associated with a state, which is then correlated with a belief. There is a multitude of overlapping activity (frequencies and chemical reactions) that take place in the brain. I'm using the term brain states in a very generalized way to point to mental activity. I'm sure that most of you agree that there is mental activity taking place that is associated with our actions. I'm also saying that these actions show our beliefs, regardless of the existence of language.

Much of what I said is getting distorted. These are just a couple of distortions, but there are many, and I don't have time to address each and every one. The problem seems to be that people aren't reading all the posts I've written, or they're reading it quickly and simply responding with their take, and that's fine, but unfortunately it's not accurate.

Do we agree that propositions cannot exist without language? — creativesoul

Not really, because what you mean by contingent and dependent is a bit different, especially if you reject modal logic. If you reject modal logic why didn't you say that several posts ago? We'll just move on like you say.

No. When something is existentially contingent upon X, it cannot exist without X. — creativesoul

This is a point about modal logic, and it's important. When something is contingent upon X, it means that it's possible for it to be otherwise. Thus, it's a subset of possibilities. If you say that X cannot exist apart from Y, then it's necessarily dependent on Y, i.e., there is no possible way for it to exist apart from Y. For example, contingent truths are truths that can be otherwise. It's true that the glass is sitting on the table is a contingent truth, but not a necessary truth. Contingent truths can be otherwise, necessary truths cannot be other than what they are "Triangles have three sides."

Sorry I made a typo.