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For the most part beliefs have more to do with psychology than reason. Even people trained in proper reasoning techniques are not immune to how powerful psychological affects are in terms of what we believe. Our psychology has a powerful effect on how we see the evidence. As most of you know, how we see the facts determine our conclusions. I'm not saying that we can't be objective. I'm saying disagreements are mostly over how we see the evidence or facts, and our psychology has a powerful influence on our ability to see the facts, or not see the facts.

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What you seem to be saying is that we never possess knowledge. We only possess claims of knowledge. Does that make any sense? — Harry Hindu

No, I'm not saying that we never possess knowledge. I'm simply pointing out that there is a difference between the definition of knowledge (justified true belief), and one's claim to knowledge. Just because one claims to have knowledge it doesn't follow that they do. By definition knowledge is a true belief, but knowledge claims are not by definition true. You seem to be conflating the two.

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"Knowledge" is simply some set of instructions for interpreting sensory information. We have all had the experience of believing that we know something and then realize that we didn't know it at all, or were mistaken. "Knowledge" can be wrong. — Harry Hindu

When we talk about knowledge we are talking about language, and how we go about making a claim that we know something. If I say that "I know X," then presumably I have the evidence, or I have good reasons for making the claim to knowledge. However, knowledge by definition is true, as opposed to someone making a claim to knowledge. One's claim can always turn out false, i.e., saying one knows is different from how we define knowledge. We have all experienced making a claim to knowledge, but later we find out that the claim was false.

There are rules for saying that one "knows," and Wittgenstein shows us in On Certainty how we can unlock the rules by examining the many uses of the word know. Knowing though goes beyond simply sensory information, however, it also includes sensory information. For example, I can know the orange juice is sweet by tasting it, but knowing that triangles have three sides, is something that can be known apart from sensory experience. By definition triangles have three sides. This is not to say that I can't have a sensory experience of a triangle, but that my knowledge of what a triangle is not limited to sensory experience.

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If language doesn't refer to things that are real, or accurate, then how is it that any one can talk about language itself? What does it mean to talk about, or communicate things about, language, like it's rules and symbols? What was W. doing when he talked on and on about language? What was he referring to? What was he getting at? — Harry Hindu

Where did you get the idea that "...language doesn't refer to things that are real, or accurate..." - Wittgenstein sure isn't saying this.

I'm not sure how your example hurts my argument. The point of an unconscious desire is that it's not conscious. However, in your example you're simply giving a different cause to the desire (hypnosis), but if you have a desire for apple pie, then you are aware of the desire. You may not be aware of the underlying cause, but that's a separate issue. Many of us are unaware of many of the causes for our behavior, and some of those causes may or may not be subconscious.

Much of our language, or psychologist's language, isn't accurate or as precise as it should be, and it's confusing.

An unconscious desire would be some motivation you're not aware of that influences your behavior. The psychological explanation is that what we are conscious of is only the tip of the iceberg as to what actually causes our behavior. — Marchesk

There is no doubt that there are subconscious things that influence our behavior. However, I can't make any sense out of subconscious desires or beliefs. I either have a desire or I don't, and if I'm not aware of a desire how can it be a desire? If I have a desire for apple pie and I act on it, it's because I'm aware of the desire. If I'm not aware of it, then how can I act on it? Do I just start eating apple pie without knowing of the desire? Why am I eating apple pie? I don't know, it must be some desire in my subconscious. Moreover, if I'm not aware of the desire, how can I call it a desire? Maybe it's some other subconscious thing that's motivating me.

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Don't you mean subconscious desires? And I'm not sure what that means, viz., to have unconscious desires, or subconscious desires. I think how people speak about our subconscious states is a bit weird. Isn't a desire by its very nature something you're aware of? What would it mean to have an unconscious desire? I have a desire for X, but I'm unaware of it. If I am aware of it, then it's not unconscious.

I'll change my name. X-)

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Rules are for others, not for me.

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I'm not sure what you expect me to do, and I'm not sure if there is an analogy here or not - maybe.

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Here's the problem. Wittgenstein goes on to assert the validity of pictures depicting reality, without specifying what criteria are being met to accurately or correctly depict reality. It's not a matter of semantics as to what degree are we 'accurately' or 'correctly' depicting reality because if the assumption that either a picture is in accordance with reality (the state of affairs of being 'True') or is not in accordance with reality (the state of affairs of being 'False'), because we are already making the assumption that what we are saying is 'True' as opposed to being 'False' when talking about pictures of reality (or the representation of states of affairs in reality via the use of elementary propositions, eg. names). Otherwise, if we can't specify the meaning of "correctly" or "accurately" in this context, then sad to say the whole thing is nonsense. — Question

My understanding is that he does specify what criteria has to be met in order for a proposition to depict reality. And you're correct it's not a matter of semantics, it's in accordance with his understanding of how a proposition matches up one-to-one via names and objects. If the proposition's names match with the objects in reality, then you have a one-to-one correspondence, if not, then you have a false proposition. Correctly and accurately, as you state, is simply determined by the relationship between the proposition (names) and the world (objects).

Many or most claim that their sensory experiences are heightened, viz., their ability to see, hear, understand, etc. Also that it's this reality that seems dreamlike in comparison to the experiences they have in an NDE or a DMT experience. I compare it to waking from a dream, generally in a dream our experiences seem dumbed-down. When one has an NDE, this reality seems dumbed-down.

There is a metaphysical assumption lumped into that paragraph that plagues the Tractatus and for the matter the correspondence theory of truth. Namely, that to know if a picture is accurate in depicting reality, we already have to know what reality looks like. In other words, there is a certain unspecified set of criteria that has to be met for a picture to be in accordance with reality, which exhaustively can never be achieved (A central reason why Popper's Fallibilism will always be superior to Verificationism). Wittgenstein does not go into detail about this set of criteria, which is unfortunate. Perhaps, this is just a game of semantics over "correctly" or "accurately"; but, this is where I think Wittgenstein is lacking in his appeal to the scientific process or logical positivism, which would have made his Tractatus a lasting work of philosophy if it already is not one. — Question

Wittgenstein thinks there is a one-to-one correspondence between the smallest constituent parts of a propositions (names), and the smallest constituent parts of the world (viz., obects). This idea is repudiated in the PI; and you're right he does make metaphysical assumptions that aren't substantiated. He didn't think it was his job to provide examples of names or objects, but he wasn't unaware of the problem.

I do think there is something to the idea that propositions picture reality, or mirror reality. The problem is that philosophers are always trying to find a precise definition that explains what correspondence means, and precision is not always possible or needed. I think we generally understand what it means for a painting to picture reality, and in many of the same ways we generally understand what it means for a proposition to mirror reality. Is it a model that fits every instance of a proposition? No.

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Thanks.

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Is it possible to have consciousness if there is no external reality? I don't believe it is possible.

What does it mean to be conscious? Consciousness is synonymous with awareness. To be conscious is to be in a state of awareness. And in order to be aware there are two requirements: the being that is aware, and the subject of the awareness. To say that I am aware of the hands in front of me, is to acknowledge myself, and the existence of my hands.The same is true for anything else.

An idealist or a skeptic might claim that all we are aware of is experience. Thus being conscious only proves the reality of experience - not an external world. To that I would ask: what is experience? Again, I experience a hand in front of me. There are two requirements for that experience: the being that has the experience (me), and the object being experienced (my hands).

What about illusions and hallucinations? For example, you are conscious of an bent stick in water when there is no bent stick. To that I say that you are not conscious of any actual bent stick. What you are really conscious of is a mental image of a bent stick.

But couldn't everything be an illusion just like the bent stick in water? What if everything you see is only mental imagery? This brings me back yet again to duality of consciousness. What is an image? An image is a representation of a thing. In order for there to be an image there must be two things: the representation, and the thing that is being represented. In order to have a mental image of stick there must exist a stick somewhere in the past present, or future. — Purple Pond

I'll give my opinion for what it's worth. It's based on my studies of near death experiences, and what people have experienced while taking DMT. Reality seems to be far more fantastic than what most people believe, religious or otherwise. What seems to be at bottom of everything is a mind/s, or you could say consciousness. Consciousness probably gives rise to all reality. There seem to be different levels of consciousness, or higher and higher states of consciousness. Dreaming is an example of a low level of consciousness, nevertheless it's created by our minds. Waking reality is a higher state of reality, but it also seems to be created by our mind, or in conjunction with other minds. What people experience in near death experiences seems to be even a higher state of consciousness or awareness.

Everything seems to get back to the idea of some kind of oneness, but at the same time it seems to allow us to have our individuality, and yet remain connected to this oneness or consciousness. It's as though we are individuals amongst a sea of consciousness. But it's even more fantastic, I believe, than this. It seems that who we are is much greater than who we are as humans, i.e., we are beings of light that are having human experiences for a variety of reasons.

I know it sounds crazy. Our memories seem to be suppressed, just as our memories are suppressed in a dream state. The analogy between dreaming and waking and what we experience in higher states of consciousness is quite remarkable.

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Wittgenstein: On Certainty Post #2

"If you do know that here is one hand [G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World], we'll grant you all the rest. When one says that such and such a proposition can't be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be derived from other propositions; any proposition can be derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain than it is itself (OC, 1)."

So, Wittgenstein grants that if Moore does indeed know that he has a hand, then Moore's conclusion follows. The skeptic says that such a proposition can't be proved. This doesn't mean, though, that we can't derive them based on other propositions. However, the derivation may not be any stronger than the proposition we started with. There seems to be something foundational here, viz., that some propositions are foundational to our claims of knowledge or our claims of doubt. When you reach bedrock no part of the foundational structure is stronger.

"From it seeming to me--or to everyone--to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it (OC, 2)."

The skeptic may have a point (although it may not be the point he/she is trying to make), that just because people (or Moore) say something is so, it doesn't follow that it is. However, Wittgenstein points out that what we need to ask, is whether the doubt makes sense. Doubting occurs in a language-game, and language-games have rules - later Wittgenstein will point out that a doubt that doubts everything is not a doubt.

Knowledge has to be demonstrated - whereas Moore seems to just state his propositions as facts, and this need to be shown or demonstrated in some way.

Wittgenstein: On Certainty Post #1

What follows is my own analysis of On Certainty, and this analysis is done with very little input from other philosophers. Hence, some of my thoughts may diverge or converge with others, but they are mine and I take responsibility for them. Hopefully, I will hit the mark from time-to-time, at least that is my goal. Maybe some of you will get something out of this, but I can tell you it takes a lot of work, and even then, it is easy to miss the point of Wittgenstein's thinking. I have read and re-read On Certainty many times, and each time I do, I learn something new.

Wittgenstein wrote On Certainty in response to Moore's papers, Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense in which Moore lists a number of propositions that he claims to know with certainty. Propositions such as the following: "Here is one hand" and "There exists at present a living human body, which is my body (G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers (1959), p. 1)." Moore continues to enumerate other propositions that he claims to know, with certainty, to be true. These propositions provide for Moore a proof of the external world, and as such, they supposedly form a buttress against the skeptic.

As we read On Certainty we note that it is not only Moore's claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein criticizes, specifically Moore's use of the word know, but he also critiques the skeptic, and their use of the word doubt. Wittgenstein's response to Moore's propositions is not entirely unsympathetic, although he argues that Moore's propositions do not accomplish what Moore thinks they do, viz., to provide a proof of the external world; which in turn is supposed to undermine the doubts of the skeptic. Moore's proof is supposed to show that the conclusion follows necessarily, and if it does, then the skeptic's doubts are supposed to vanish - at least in theory. The proof would look something like the following:

1) Moore has knowledge that he has two hands.

2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands, to the conclusion that there exists an external world.

3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.

Wittgenstein is challenging the first premise in the above argument; more specifically, he is challenging Moore's claim that he knows that he has hands. Moore demonstrated this by holding up one hand, and then the other.

Having knowledge of something presupposes that there are good reasons (at least in many cases), or at least some justification to believe it, but exactly what is it that Moore has knowledge of? He claims to have knowledge of the existence of his hands, but what would count as evidence for such a claim? Do I know that I have hands because I check to see if they are there every morning? Do I make a study of my hands, and thereby conclude that I do indeed have hands? I have knowledge of chemistry, physics, history, epistemology, and other subjects, and there are ways to confirm my knowledge. However, in our everyday lives do we need to confirm that we have hands? And, do we normally doubt such things?

From here I will examine On Certainty, sometimes line-by-line, other times a section at a time.