If we ask the person who claimed they are following definite rules will he be able to say what the rules are? If we ask the people who were playing, what would they say? — Fooloso4

Maybe I'm not being clear. I'm not saying that every game is defined by a set of rules, this is obviously not the case. My point at the start of this conversation is that logic still plays a role in W's later philosophy, although it's not the formal system that is used in the T. Even in the quote from the PI there is still a kind of logic built into the actions, it's harder to define, granted, but it's still there. You seem to want to point out the exceptions as though I'm speaking dogmatically about rules and logic, but I'm not. Rules in some cases can and do dictate some of the logic involved in games, but the logic does extend further than just the rules. When I speak of logic, I'm not referring to formal logic, but the logic that is seen in our actions. For example, there is a kind of logic that dictates, in a sense, that when I leave my house I don't try to walk through walls, but use the door. The logic of the T. is a priori, whereas the logic of W.s later philosophy is more of an a posteriori logic seen in our general experiences, especially as it relates to language.

Theology as grammar (PI 373)

this is not an appeal to logical syntax. It is, instead, about looking at how theological terms are used. What they mean for those who use them. The role they play in the life of those who believe. One might devise or derive rules, but the game is not determined by rules, but rather by what is felt and experienced and believed, by how the words resonate, by how one is moved, by how one is compelled, by how they matter. — Fooloso4

I agree that it's not an appeal to logical syntax. When I say the logic of language, it not only includes logical syntax, but Wittgenstein's deeper sense of logic, which includes other kinds of actions, beliefs. etc.

The game is partly determined by the rules. The rules in a sense set the game in motion, but the logic of the game has a much wider sense, in that it includes other kinds of actions. These other actions are closely related to our "forms of life."

I don't think I agree with "...the game is not determined by the rules." I agree that there are other factors involved, but there would be no game of chess without the rules that dictate how, for e.g., a bishop moves. It wouldn't be the game of chess as we know it. It would be a different game. The same is true for the language-game given at the beginning of the PI. The rules dictate how one should respond to the calls of the builder. It matters not how I feel, what I believe, or how the words resonate, it only matters that I respond in the correct way to the calls.

This is an amazing story of an NDE and its transforming power.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oDNGOwC3AFM

Analogously, the rules of chess are not an underlying logic of the game. — Fooloso4

It's partly what makes up the logic of the game, i.e., without the rules there wouldn't be a logical move. In fact, there would be no game.

Of course, I'm not saying that playing chess necessarily leads to logical moves, but if you know how the pieces move this is part of the logic of the game. The same is true of a language-game. In fact, some language-games, are simply illogical. This doesn't take away from my main point, that there is an underlying logic to language, viz., in the use of grammar (syntax) or the expanded grammar that Wittgenstein refers to.

So what is the perfect definition of knowledge? — Cidat

There is no perfect definition of knowledge, and if you're trying to find a perfect definition you're going to be disappointed. Look at it in terms of use, how is the word knowledge or know used across a wide spectrum of subjects or contexts. In one case someone might say "I know..." to emphasize a conviction, which is simply a subjective point of view, or simply an expression of their feelings about a particular belief. In such a case the person may not have good evidence or reasons, and so their belief isn't justified. In fact, in this e.g. one could even challenge this particular use as being knowledge at all, as Wittgenstein did in his notes called On Certainty.

Another use of know that is stressed by philosophers is acquiring knowledge through correct reasoning or the use of logic (inductive and deductive reasoning), which is also used in science. Much of science is based on inductive reasoning as a result of experimentation or observation.

A third use of know refers to knowledge gained by testimonial evidence. This is used in courts of law where the testimonial evidence is challenged or accepted depending on its strength. People often forget that this kind of evidence comes in the form of lectures, books, friends and family, etc. Without testimonial evidence much of what we believe would simply collapse. Being able to evaluate good testimonial evidence is a skill, because testimonial evidence can also be very weak. However, on the other hand it can be very strong depending on the circumstances.

A fourth way of knowing is pure reason or pure logic, viz., I know based on the logical structure. An e.g. is a tautology, "Either dogs are animals or they are not animals" is a tautology. It has the form either X is true or Y is true (X or not X).

Another use is that which is known by sensory experience. For e.g., "I know the orange juice is sweet because I tasted it."

Another use of know is linguistic training, i.e., I know is based on the correct public use of words or concepts.

In many of these uses there is considerable overlap. For e.g. in science sensory experience is part of observation.

So there are a variety of uses of know depending on the language-game, as Wittgenstein would say.

What does logic consist of in W. later philosophy? This is not easy to pin down because it’s not a formalized system like the logic used in the Tractatus. The logic of the PI is seen in, for e.g. the language-game, grammar, our forms of life, and all the actions that correspond with each of these activities. The logic of the PI is broad in its scope, but it’s definitely not a formalized system .

As an e.g. we might think of the logic of chess, i.e., what does the logic of chess look like? First, the rules of chess, viz., knowing how to move a piece based on the rules is part of the logic. Knowing where to place the pieces on the board, and knowing who moves first; knowing which move is best in a particular situation is also part of the logic. So, one could say that the logic of the game, although not spelled out, is intrinsically connected with the rules, the pieces, the board, the clock, the color of the pieces, the shape of the pieces, combined with our actions, etc, etc.

The logic of the PI, although much different from the logic of the T. is seen in the use of language in our everyday lives, and what governs this logic, again, it's a multitude of things that connects to W. concept of forms of life, grammar, and our actions as a people within the language game. This is how I see the logic of language in the later W.

Sounds about right. :grin:

I agree with much of what you're saying, and where we disagree it's seems to be more about the nuances of his thinking, at least that's how I see it.

In terms of Wittgenstein's picture theory and truth function theory of language "[t]he world is all that is the case," at least in the Tractatus. He still believes that the truly important (e.g., ethics, aesthetics, the mystical), that which is beyond the world of facts, is not part of this world in terms of what can be said, it can only be shown. My point about T. 1 is a propositional point, it's not meant to include the transcendental or mystical. There is what is mystical, but it's not a point of fact, i.e., there is no fact beyond the limit of the world, which is the limit of what can be said in the T. I'm not saying that everything W. talks about is covered under the umbrella of T. 1, that's obviously not the case.

In his later philosophy the proposition is still limited to the world, but the way it functions, the way it has sense, is not through the a priori method of analysis given in the Tractatus (the picture theory and truth function theory). As you know it's more social, but it's still in the world, and I believe that what can be said in his later philosophy is still limited to the world. He still has little patience for factual talk about the metaphysical, even though the metaphysical has importance to him. So, again these are propositional points about the limit of language.

My goal in my video is to try to explain, as simply as possible, his picture theory and truth function theory of the proposition; and to show that he is still holding on to the traditional view of meaning in the T.

I think of passages like the following: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical use to their everyday use (PI 116)" And also, "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language (PI 119)."

Passages like this make me think that there is still a strong sense that "The world is all that is the case (PI 1)" in his later philosophy." But there are other passages that seem like he's saying something else, which is why there is so much controversy over interpretation. I think what should be emphasized is his method of doing philosophy in his later works, as opposed to some philosophical theory or truth. However, the tendency is to look for some philosophical theory or truth, which I've done in OC.

There is no doubt that W. repudiated much in the T., but for me there is some continuity. I guess it depends on what you're emphasizing. Anyway much of this is beyond the scope of what I want to say in my video.

A good book that gives a basic understanding of W.'s early and later philosophy, and it's one that I've mentioned before, is K.T. Fann's book called Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy.

What I'm saying is, he still believes that the "world is [still] all that is the case," that there is a limit to what can be said in terms of the metaphysical. Although the limit in his later philosophy is confined to the language-game, grammar, and forms of life for example.

So, the continuity is there in terms of what can be said about the metaphysical, and it's still part of his thinking. He has an affinity with the mystical for example, but would still, even in his later philosophy, bemoan arguments for the existence of God because, I believe, he still held that there were no facts to latch onto. He still sees the world of facts as quite separate from the metaphysical, which is something that can only be shown, not factually stated.

As I said a few posts ago I think there is continuity between Wittgenstein's early philosophy and his later philosophy, but there is also much that he rejects. One of the ideas that W. seems to keep is proposition 1 in the Tractatus, viz., "The world is all that is the case." My understanding of his later philosophy is that he still believes there is a limit to what can be sensibly said, which is why I think T. 1 is still something that he holds on to.

The other claim that I and others maintain is that the logic of language still has sway in his later thinking. However, the logic of language in his later thinking equates to the rules grammar, but his use of grammar is not the standard use. This confused G.E. Moore, who remarked that W. was using the word grammar in a very non-standard way (Moore made this remark in one of W.'s lectures), and he was correct. Wittgenstein expands grammar to more than just syntax, i.e., he expands grammar to the public use of words or language-games, which is much more than mere syntax. If we think of a simple language-game, like the one W. gives us at the beginning of the PI (between the builder and his assistant), we can, I believe, understand that the use of particular calls (pillar, block, etc) require certain responses beyond syntax. The logic of this language-game expands the use of grammar to how the assistant responds to the calls of the builder, and how the assistant may even use the word pillar or block. So, the rules of grammar in this case are what is meant by the logic of language. Just as the rules of chess make up the logic of the moves.

I do want responses, and they are appreciated, but I also know when an issue isn't going to get resolved within a few posts. Even if we spend hours and hours writing we're probably not going to make much headway. If you've been observing my responses you'll find that I don't spend a lot of time arguing, especially when I know that's it's a waste of time, but I do take note of the responses.

Interpretation can't be avoided, and I wouldn't claim that my interpretation is always correct, but at some point one just settles on an interpretation, unless there is a clear mistake. I think I understand the main thrust of the Tractatus. As for continuity, they've been arguing over this for the last 100 years. Even W. when asked what he meant by this or that couldn't always remember his thinking around a particular passage. I don't mind the disagreements, but I don't always have the time to argue through each issue.

Again, I appreciate any response I get.

I'm not going to get into a long drawn out discussion about interpretation. We'll never resolve that issue. Besides this is beyond the scope of what I'm trying to do. I suspect this has a lot to do with the different schools of interpretation.

Without too much exaggeration, the only thing they have in common is the word 'logic'. — Fooloso4

So, the word logic is empty to you? You see no thread in terms of the logic of language that goes from his early thinking to his later thinking? That flies in the face of almost everything I've read.

The transcendental logic of the Tractatus is not simply the logic of language, it is the logic of the world. — Fooloso4

That's strange since W. clearly says in the preface "The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reasons why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood." It's the logic of language and how it connects with the world of facts. The logic of language is demonstrated in his picture and truth-function theory of language.

I'm not sure why you keep using the term "transcendental logic," its simply truth functional logic that he's using. It shows, he believes, how a proposition has sense.

The latter Wittgenstein rejects the transcendental logic of the Tractatus. This is not a continuation but a repudiation. — Fooloso4

I agree, which is why I said "what is meant by the logic of language in his early thinking is much different from the logic of language in his later thinking." However, there is still the "logic of use" in his later thinking, i.e., logic still plays a role, but not the same role. I would have thought that was clear from what I wrote.

I'm sure we have disagreements on some of this, but I'm sticking to my guns.

There are probably more than 15 ideas in the T. that Wittgenstein rejected, but there is also continuity between his early ideas and his later ideas. Are you saying that Malcolm didn't think there was continuity between W. early and later philosophy? I don't think that's true.

There are at least two points of continuity between W. early and later philosophy, and probably more. The two points I'm emphasizing has to do with the logic of language and that there is a limit to what can be said. I think most scholars would agree with this. Although, what is meant by the logic of language in his early thinking is much different from the logic of language in his later thinking. What seems clear is that logic has an important role in both the early and later W.

That said, you will always find disagreements about the connecting threads of his early and later philosophy. My goal is to make the T. as simple to understand as possible.

I haven't made my YouTube video yet, so the wording may change a bit.

Although the problems of philosophy include the problems of ethics, Wittgenstein does not regard ethics as a philosophical problem, which is to say he does not put an end to ethics. — Fooloso4

He only puts an end to ethics in the sense that there are no ethical propositions that state what is true or false in the world, i.e., no facts to picture. They are unsayable.

Continuing with a summary of the Tractatus.

Post 3

So, Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language is his attempt to demonstrate how it is that a proposition has sense. It has sense in that a proposition correctly pictures a fact in the world if true, or if the proposition is false, it incorrectly pictures a possible fact. “What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it—correctly or incorrectly-in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality (T 2.18).” So, the logical form of the picture that a proposition represents must match the form of reality. Each name in the elementary proposition matches each object of the atomic fact in reality, it is a one-to-one correspondence.

Along with Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language is his truth-function theory of language. “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T 5).” This means that if a complex proposition is true, then the elementary propositions that make up the complex proposition must also be true. In order to understand Wittgenstein's truth-functional theory, one would have to understand truth-functional logic, which is beyond the scope of this video.

“If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false (T 4.26).” If you had access to all true elementary propositions this would completely describe all the atomic facts of the world. All metaphysical propositions, which go beyond the world of facts, would simply be nonsense, because they do not depict any fact. This would follow given Wittgenstein’s first proposition that “The world is all that is the case (T 1).” However, to assume that Wittgenstein was anti-metaphysical would be a mistake. It was a mistake some philosophers made during the early 20’s. Wittgenstein had nothing but respect for those who tried to go beyond the limits of the world, and hence the limits of what can be said.

This is just a quick overview of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy. There is much more that could be added, but my goal is his later philosophy which grew out of his early philosophy. What I want you to remember is Wittgenstein’s idea that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes, because this traditional idea is mostly repudiated in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Moreover, the idea that meaning is connected to some object is the source of many philosophical misunderstandings, and misunderstandings in general.

Continuing with a summary of the Tractatus.

Post 2

So, what is the structure of the proposition? And how does the proposition’s structure connect to the world of facts? Wittgenstein believes that a proposition has two parts, viz., elementary propositions and names. Elementary propositions are directly connected to the world of facts, so that whether a complex proposition (our everyday propositions or statements) is true or false is a function of elementary propositions. An elementary proposition is the simplest kind of proposition, and it’s the elementary proposition that asserts the existence of states-of-affairs (facts) (T 4.21).

What is an elementary proposition? According to Wittgenstein, elementary propositions consist of names (T 4.22). These names are not what we would ordinarily think of as names, like doll, cat, pencil, car, etc., they are primitive signs (T 3.26) without parts. A name is where the propositional analysis ends, it’s the most primitive part of a proposition. Wittgenstein never gives an example of an elementary proposition or a name. He assumes based on pure reasoning (logic) that this is how it must be. He also assumes that language, which is made up of propositions, has a counterpart in the world, viz., fact, atomic fact, and object. The counterpart to a true proposition is a fact, the counterpart to the elementary proposition is the atomic fact, and the counterpart to a name is an object. So, objects like names are simples, i.e., just as a name is the simplest component of an elementary proposition, so too are objects the simplest component of atomic facts. A true proposition is a picture of a fact, i.e., it depicts the facts of the world correctly. A false proposition is also a picture, but it doesn’t correspond with any fact in the world.

The way an elementary proposition corresponds with reality is that it must have a one-to-one relationship between its parts (names) and the atomic fact (made up of objects) it describes. Think of a painting that is supposed to represent your home and the surrounding area. For the painting to represent reality correctly it must present the elements of the picture correctly. In other words, the objects in the painting must be in the correct logical order or correct relationship. The relationship of the things in the picture must correctly represent the relationship of the things in reality, viz., the facts. Think of a true proposition as a mirror image of the world, it correctly pictures a fact, or it corresponds to a fact.

Wittgenstein concludes, based on his logic, that this is how it must be. He accepts the traditional view of meaning “A name means an object. The object is its meaning (T 3.203).” The difference between what is traditionally thought of as a name and object and what Wittgenstein means by name and object is much different. Wittgenstein puts his own spin on these words. He tries to show logically how a name refers to an object. Again, remember we have no examples of what a name or an object are in Wittgenstein’s logic, other than they are simples, i.e., they are the simplest component parts of elementary propositions and atomic facts respectively.

Post 1

I'm currently making a video for YouTube that summarizes Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy with an emphasis on On Certainty. I'm going to add my summary of the Tractatus to this thread. The goal is to make it easy enough to understand that almost anyone with some effort can follow Wittgenstein's main points, viz., his view of the logic of language, his picture theory of language, and his truth-function theory of a proposition.

The Tractatus:

My goal is to explain, as simply as I can, the main thrust of his work, and to point out that Wittgenstein’s later thinking, on the logic of language, is a continuation of his early thinking with some important changes. What changes is his method of attacking the problems of language, and what Wittgenstein means by the logic of language changes. His early thinking is an a priori investigation, but in his later thinking is akin to an a posteriori investigation. It can be said with reasonable certainty that the early Wittgenstein did not understand where the logic of language would eventually lead, viz., that the logic of language would in his later thinking take on a social dimension. The early Wittgenstein had not grasped this social dimension, although there are hints of it in his early writing.

We know that Wittgenstein’s early thinking, especially in the Tractatus is influenced by Bertrand Russell and Gotloeb Frege. However, I’m not going to say much more about Russell and Frege’s contribution, other than to point out that they influenced Wittgenstein’s thinking, especially their emphasis on logic and language.

Wittgenstein sets the tone of the Tractatus in the preface. “The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood (Tractatus, Preface p.3).” The problems of philosophy include just about every subject one can imagine, including ethics, mathematics, metaphysics, religion, mysticism, epistemology, and consciousness to name a few. Wittgenstein believes that if we understood the logic of our language, that this will put an end to philosophizing. How will he do this? Well, we express what we think about the world in language, so if he can set a limit to the expression of thoughts, which amounts to a limit to what can be said, then this will give us clarity. Clarity not only of thought but to the expression of thoughts.

Wittgenstein confines what can be said to the world of facts or states-of-affairs, and anything that tries to go beyond the world of facts is simply nonsense. It is nonsense because there are no facts (no states-of-affairs) beyond this world. This is seen in the opening statement of the Tractatus. “The world is all that is the case (T 1).” So, any proposition that tries to go beyond the world of facts is simply nonsense. The metaphysical or the mystical is important for Wittgenstein, but it is outside the world of facts. If it is outside the world of facts, then it is beyond the limit of what can be said in terms of propositions.

So, Wittgenstein sets out to investigate the essence of language, its function, and its structure (PI 92), and it is logic that will reveal this structure. What is the logical structure of language, i.e., the proposition, and how does it connect with the world of facts? Logic has supreme importance in Wittgenstein’s investigation. In PI 89 he says, “For there seemed to pertain to logic a peculiar depth—a universal significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the bottom of all the sciences. For logical investigation explores the nature of all things.” With this view of logic in mind, Wittgenstein sets out to demonstrate how it is that a proposition connects to the world of facts, which again, sets a limit to what can be said.

To be continued...

Ya, you've got me figured out, you're a regular genius. Grow up.

Sorry, but I'm just not going to engage much more because I'm working on other projects, and that's taking up much of my time. I'm currently going back to my work on Wittgenstein's final notes called On Certainty and its epistemological implications. I'm hoping to create videos on YouTube that give an overview of Wittgenstein with emphasis on his final thoughts.

There is enough in this thread and videos to address almost all of the criticisms. Obviously much more could be added to address other questions, but I choose to move on. Thanks for all the responses, even if there is disagreement.

Happy Hunting

Okay, I'll bite. The first link is not an argument against anything I've said, it's basically a definition of a hallucination. There's nothing in that definition that I haven't said myself at some point, so I'm in agreement with how it's defining the term hallucination.

I also added a link to my argument which was a peered reviewed paper headed by Dr./PhD Sam Parnia which was an agreement among many academics from around the world stating that these death experiences aren't hallucinations.

Not true. Just because you do not accept my argument — you certainly haven't refuted it – doesn't indicate I haven't made an argument. Another showing that your reasoning, Sam, is quite poor.

What you fail to consider or recognize is that every life from its birth to its death is a "near-death experience" because we are mortal beings. There cannot be even a glimpse of – that there is – "life after death" by the not-yet-dead any more than "north of the North Pole" can be reached by a hiker. That people are revived to tell their "NDE stories" proves they were not ever fundamentally – metaphysically – dead to begin with. "Clinical death" only indicates the limit of medical interventions for reviving the patient; this, however, is not organic, irreversible death.

While the patient is "down" and there is a complete cessation of brain activity, this is proof that the patient's brain is not forming any new memory traces of the so-called "NDE" the patient believes she had while her brain activity was zero. So whence the "NDE"? It likely happens during the patient's revival after brain activity has resumed.

Notably, the vast majority of coma patients who revive from near or complete vegetative states do not report "NDEs"; that a very tiny fraction of "the clinically dead" have reported "NDEs" is no more statistically significant than reports of "alien abductions".

It's interesting that you say my reasoning is quite poor, which would mean that all the A's I got on my logic exams, must have been a fluke. Or, maybe I just forgot all the symbolic logic and modal logic I studied. Possible, but not likely. Moreover, if you're going to say that my reasoning is faulty you have to show where the argument is flawed, where the premises are false, or at least give an argument that puts the premises in doubt.

Second, your statement that, "What you fail to consider or recognize is that every life from its birth to its death is a "near-death experience" because we are mortal beings." Here, all you're doing is defining life as a near-death experience because all of us are mortal. This is not how the term is used in the context of my argument, and virtually no one I know, even critics of NDEs would talk like this. If this is supposed to be a premise to your argument you're going to have to do a bit better, to say the least.

I'm not going to respond to the rest of your so-called argument because it demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the concepts involved. All you're doing is re-defining the terms to fit your idea of reality. Let's just agree to disagree.

I agree that it's an attempt at an argument, but it's a poor attempt at best.

Happy Hunting

You obviously didn't listen to all of the videos where I addressed the issue of objective evidence
— Sam26
-Correct. I am not going to watch a video presenting claims that are in direct conflict with our current scientific epistemology. I am willing to read a scientific paper that challenges our epistemology through objective evidence...but not videos like this one( I am sure I have watched them before and I wont do it again).[/quote]

I'm inclined not to respond to this because you've already decided without looking at my argument, that the argument is in direct conflict with the epistemology of science, and therefore must be false. First, you act as though the science of consciousness is settled, which is incorrect. It's settled for some, but it sure isn't settled for others (other scientists), and still others are on the fence. The only thing that matters are the arguments (the logic), are they good inductive arguments or not. The epistemology of science is mostly based on logical (mostly inductive) reasoning based on the data (data here is used in a very broad sense including mathematics), and the observations (sensory experience) of various experiments. However, epistemology is much broader than just science, i.e., I don't need science to confirm many of our knowledge claims. I can use an inductive argument to reason to a conclusion without any use of science, and know that the conclusion follows. I explain this in my thread, and in my videos. I also explain in this thread how it is that we can have NDEs that are verified objectively, i.e., corroborated or verified testimonial evidence.

It's true that science generally adds to the certainty of our arguments, but it's not as though we can't know things apart from science. By the way, there is scientific data that supports much of my argument. There is science being conducted all over the world on this subject. However, I don't have to rely on science to reach my conclusion, even if it helps.

Also, there are no other videos like mine, so to assume that my videos are like other videos is just false. My video takes an epistemological approach to the subject based on different methods of justification. Anyone who takes the approach that you are taking isn't serious about challenging an argument. It's more likely that they are just giving a biased opinion with the words science and epistemology thrown into to make it sound intellectual, but it's far from that, and far from good philosophy.

lol You can't seem to think for yourself. All you know how to do is quote other arguments or other people. Don't you have any arguments?

So, let's see, cherry picking the evidence according to you is ignoring what? What in particular am I ignoring that explains these NDEs. I have read many of the counter-arguments, and I've addressed many of the counter-arguments. For example, hallucinations, lack of oxygen to the brain, drugs, dreams, memory explanations, arguments that the brain is the only source of consciousness, that consciousness is an illusion, on and on. Many of these I've addressed, and none of these explain what's happening when for example, someone is clinically dead, the blood is drained from the brain with no measurable brain activity, no heartbeat, no breathing, etc., yet they are able to describe in detail what's going on around their body and to their body. Moreover, their are too many cases that are very similar to this to ignore because you in your infinite knowledge deem it impossible. It can't be, says, , the science I rely on just can't be wrong.

I'm not cherry picking anything. It's just your way of trying to make someone look bad because you don't like what their saying. If you had a decent argument, then okay, I would say we just disagree, but you don't, and Nickolasgaspar is arguing without knowing my argument. I suggest you both take some basic philosophy, and learn how to respond to arguments.

Happy Hunting

Science relies on observation and experimentation, while the pursuit of God is often based on subjective experience and personal conviction. — gevgala

The problem with what you're saying is that "subjective experience and personal conviction" doesn't translate to knowledge unless there is some justification for the belief, and that doesn't need to be science. Science is only one form of knowledge, but it's not the only kind of knowledge that's available to us. So, there are other ways of justifying a belief, which is a matter of having a good understanding of epistemology. If you're going to present a belief that there is a fact, viz., that God exists (Christian or otherwise), then you need some justification other than some indefinable subjective thing, or some personal conviction that's based on a feeling. Much of what religion emphasizes is not about objective facts, but about how they feel about their belief.

You seem to think that philosophy or philosophical thinking is separate from religious belief, and in some ways it is, i.e., there is the professional philosopher who teaches at a university, or other philosophers who may have just spent much of their lives thinking and studying about philosophy. However, make no mistake about it, if you have a set of beliefs, whatever they may be, and you've spent even a small amount of time thinking about those beliefs critically, you're doing philosophy. Many religious people want to separate their beliefs from general philosophical thinking, but that's an illusion. If you think about God, Christian or otherwise, and what that means, and explain your beliefs as you've done above, then you are presenting a particular religious worldview, and in doing that you're doing philosophy. You can't escape philosophy it permeates all of our beliefs, science, religion, history, psychology, and every other subject you can think of including games.

The only question is, do you do it well? And, since language is the vehicle with which we communicate our beliefs you better have a good understanding of how our concepts/words work in the flow of language, i.e., how they connect up with the world of facts (abstract or concrete, metaphysical or not).

Happy Hunting

It always amazes me when people discount testimonial evidence, as not evidence. You obviously didn't listen to all of the videos where I addressed the issue of objective evidence. Moreover, I find it rich, that you talk about me not "taking in to account Academic epistemology..." which is what the soul of my argument has been about. You and should stick together because you seem to be expert at simply making pronouncements without an argument. If you can't give a decent argument that addresses the issues I've raised, then your objections amount to a hill of beans. How about reading and studying the literature and not assuming your conclusion is true without a basis in fact. Only one person in this thread gave a decent response to my inductive argument. Most of the other responses have been mostly visceral in nature, not logical.

This is the final video, the third video on my argument for an afterlife based on NDEs.



I will next be doing videos on Wittgenstein's On Certainty.

A better way to say it is this:

instead of purpose one could insert "to accomplish activities of a higher order," that would be more precise. So, in the case of a watch, we observe the parts working together to achieve a higher order, and the same in the case of the human body. The watch's higher order is to achieve the time, the body doesn't have one particular higher order but many, such as reproduction, digestion, immune response, etc.

My argument is not simply based on, "Well, it's just common sense, or it must be true because it's easy to understand,"
— Sam26

I never said it was. I said you were making a fallacy from incredulity. Might I say, a textbook example. — Tom Storm

The fallacy of incredulity includes what I said, but it also includes other things. Sometimes it takes the form that you can't imagine how a proposition could be false or true, therefore it must be true or false. Again, I know the logic , so don't insert this fallacy, it's not there.

Your points are interesting to me, I think it 's certainly possible to see similarities in things if you choose too. — Tom Storm

It's not a matter of just choosing to see similarities, as though there aren't objective things that make them similar. It's that there are objective similarities.

There's another fallacy from incredulity. 'I can't imagine how else it could have happened..." — Tom Storm

My argument is not simply based on, "Well, it's just common sense, or it must be true because it's easy to understand," so there's no fallacy here except what you want to see. It's an analogical argument between human artifacts and artifacts of nature. Sure, it's easy to understand, and it sure does involve common sense, but that's not the basis of the argument.

This is what the argument would look like with premises and a conclusion, it's an inductive argument.

(1) Human artifacts that have a structure such that the parts fit together to accomplish a purpose which is higher than any part alone, such as a watch, car, or computer, are the result of intelligent design.

(2) Artifacts of nature have a structure where the parts fit together to accomplish a purpose which is higher than any part alone, such as the human body.

(3) Therefore, since the objects of nature exhibit the same kind of structure, they are the result of intelligent design.

There is no fallacy here. If you think so, then you don't understand the argument. There's much more to the argument, but I'm going to leave it here.

Thanks for the response though.

I was simply responding spontaneously to your question about what is evidence of intelligent design. I think my answer is pretty sound, but I never pretended that it would determine with 100% accuracy all cases. No doubt there are elaborate things crafted from metal, stone and wood that are mysteries. Nevertheless, the fact that we can all tell they are crafted suggests design isn't entirely elusive. — Tom Storm

I understand, and by the way I never spelled out my argument, I'm just responding to what people generally mean by ID. I don't think the argument against ID is even rational, let alone sound. There are just too many similarities between human artifacts and artifacts of nature that point to ID, they're innumerable. The only thing that I can see that you have going for you is that most philosophers and scientists don't believe in ID, although many do. This gives the feel of being compelling, but is only a psychological point of strength (similar to peer pressure), probably based on many of the irrational arguments that come from a religious point of view. This is also what's behind many of the anti-metaphyiscal arguments, although not all.

Nevertheless, the fact that we can all tell they are crafted suggests design isn't entirely elusive. — Tom Storm

The fact that we can tell that they are the result of ID has to do with what we generally mean by ID (a linguistic point), which I talked about earlier in this thread; and the analogical similarities between human artifacts (and human artifacts that we have a difficult time explaining) and artifacts of nature. The alternative to ID is that the human body happened by chance, and this seems a bit of a stretch to say the least. The human brain is probably the most complex thing in the universe, if it's not, it's certainly among the most complex; and to think it happened by chance (which maybe logically possible, although probably not metaphysically possible) is to strain credulity.

It's interesting to me that when many scientists and philosophers who oppose ID talk about nature they give it the very thing that ID proponents say is lacking, viz., intelligence. Without intelligence nature would be completely random, not expressing a will that chooses this over that because of it's predilection to survive.

I don't think there is any way to explain, how for example, the human body happened without some intelligence behind its structure, other than to appeal to ID. Chance is certainly possible (although I wonder), but not likely. Because something is possible, this gives us no reason to believe it's true. This is one case where the general public is smarter than many of the academics.

I have no illusions that this will be convincing to many of you, but I think it's an important point to be made.

I'm thinking of a particular artifact that I can't find at the moment, but I've come across it many a time. It's metal, but we have no idea who made it, or what it was for. It almost looks like some kind of propeller, but not quite. The Antikythera mechanism is also one such object. When it was found they had no idea what it was or who made it, but no one would dispute that it was intelligently designed. They recently figured out what the Antikythera mechanism did and how it worked.

The point is that we do have objects that don't fit your criteria, and yet we know they're intelligently designed.

Man you have some good replies. I wish I could make such great arguments. :yikes:

Usually the reason we know something is designed in life is because we already know it is designed - it's manufactured and distributed by channels and makers we can go to and meet and we can understand (almost fully) how and why it was made. — Tom Storm

I generally agree, but there are things that we've found that defy this, and yet we know they've been intelligently designed. And we know just by looking at the thing/artifact.

Well, you can dismiss what I'm arguing, that's up to you, I really don't care. Your requirement that ID needs an explanatory model is just silly. If I say that that is a beautifully designed building, do I need some explanatory model or theory to justify such a statement? Of course not, and neither do I need some model to fit my use of ID in this argument. Most people understand the components of ID, which is why most people believe in ID, only committed atheists and materialists deny it.

There is also the question of why reality should be subject to human reason and why we should have the capacity to understand it. — Andrew4Handel

You had me up to this point. I don't understand. You seem to use reason, then you seem to want to dismiss it. Of course reason (logic) isn't the only way to justify a belief, there are other ways, but reason is probably one of the best ways to justify a conclusion.

This is your answer to my question? The first link is a strawman because I wouldn't make that kind of argument. He's arguing against a particular brand of ID, there is some overlap with my argument, but it's not precisely the same.

Since when do I need some court to tell me what follows logically. I really don't care what a particular court says. The argument should logically stand on its own. Why is it that you don't make your own arguments, you seem to always point people to this or that link. Make your argument.

Every argument against intelligent design commits the fallacy of the self-sealing argument. Why? Because they are unable to say what would count as evidence of intelligent design. If you can't do this then your argument is sealed off from counter-evidence, which is exactly what many religious people do.