A question for due consideration is whether Wittgenstein thought that language games were incommensurable. — Banno

I don't think there is a yes or no answer to this question. Some language-games are commensurable, and others are not. It seems clear that Wittgenstein thought that using the language-game of science to judge religious language-games is incommensurable. However, there would have to be something in common with the language-games of both to be able to have a conversation, i.e., there has to be some overlap. If the religious person, for e.g., is using the word know the way you're using it, as say, an objective justification, then both language-games are commensurate. However, if they're using the word know as a subjective justification, then it would seem to be incommensurate. It would be like one person playing chess, and the other is playing checkers.

There is no standard by which we could judge all language-games, there are just the games themselves. Each game has it's own rules, but there is a certain amount of overlap. There are rules that apply to all language-games, and there are rules that apply only to the language-game being played. There is no asking, "Which language-game is better?" It depends on what you're trying to do, or how you're using the concepts within the game. This doesn't mean that it's all relative, you can't just do what you want and expect to mean something with your words. There are norms of use, but you have to be careful just how far you extend that norm, just as with any concept.

Well, both of those questions could be asked within the same game. I'm asking if there is some standard by which we can judge the language-game itself. For myself, I don't think this is a legitimate question. Although, I haven't fully come to terms with it, but I'm leaning this way. I might be missing something, not sure.

There doesn't seem to be any absolute standard by which we judge one language-game over another. I don't believe this leads to a kind of relativism as some suggest. It's like asking if there is some standard by which we judge chess games. The standard would seem to be the actions within the game itself, the moves we make, etc.

Lately I've been trying to answer this question for myself. I've thought of possible answers, but nothing definitive. My problem is that most of my studies of Wittgenstein have been in isolation from much of what has been written. Mostly I've tried to read just Wittgenstein (the primary sources) just to see how my interpretation would later compare with others.

I ran into this problem on my own without reading what others have said, and have been puzzling over it.

Just a further remark about sense.

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense.

For example, I might use the word know in the following way, viz., to reflect my feeling of subjective certainty, which is reflected in the way I respond or gesticulate. This is far removed from how I might use it in terms of an epistemological justification for what I believe. The problem is that we try to apply a sense that's applicable in one language-game, but not applicable in another language-game. This is probably why Wittgenstein was against religious arguments. He seemed to think that we were applying the language-game, say of science, to the language-game of religion. The two language-games are just different games with different moves. Some of the moves would obviously have to be the same, but some of the moves are just different, with different senses.

You might think that this is just another way to say that context drives meaning, but it’s not. In other words, use is normative, but context is not, you can’t just change a words sense, by giving it just any context.

The question I am focused on is whether, in denying that a sentence is useful in some circumstance, do we deny that it is meaningful? Do we deny that it could carry a truth-value? — Srap Tasmaner

Depends on how we're using the term meaningful. In other words, I could use a sentence that isn't meaningful to demonstrate what is meaningful. So, in such a case the claim that, for example, "I know I have a headache," is meaningful in the sense that it's use shows where we go can go wrong. I would generally say though, that it has no truth-value, especially if the use is vacuous.

One alternative might be to say that "I know I have a headache" is necessarily true, and that the apparent failure of the negations or of the 'doubt' version, regardless of context, show that. The peculiarity of saying "I know I have a headache" would not be, then, due to a semantic catastrophe (that it's nonsense) but something else. — Srap Tasmaner

This doesn't seem right, viz., that "I know I have a headache," is necessarily true (not that you're necessarily saying this :smile:). So, the statement, "I know I have a headache," would be similar or the same as "All triangles have three sides," or "All bachelors are unmarried." In the case of "All triangles have three sides," what we mean by triangle is by definition, having three sides. However, you can't think that this is the same as, "I know I have a headache?" At least not in these cases. Is there something else you have in mind?

I can't seem to get my question across, because people keep telling me what I already know. I'll chalk it up to my inability to convey my question in a way that's clear. :smile:

If I say: "bad means good", is that in accord with or contrary to the rules of the language game? That depends on the language game is being played. A musician might understand what it means if someone says "that guy's a bad mofo", but someone unfamiliar with the language game might well think it means something very different. — Fooloso4

Of course it depends on the language-game being played. The meaning of a word IS its use in a language-game. Obviously there are various kinds of language-games that can occur with the same word, and even though this is the case, we still say meaning occurs within those specific language-games.

Moreover, not every use of a word has to accord with a rule, no more than every action in a game accords with a rule. For example, (Searle uses this e.g.) there is no rule that governs how high a ball is thrown when serving in tennis.

That said, no one seems to be following my point about language-games. It's been said that there are only language-games, not incorrect and correct language-games. Wittgenstein doesn't talk this way, supposedly, and this may be correct, but I'm not sure just yet about this. It seems weird to refer to language-games without reference to correctness, and it seems self-sealing. I can always say someone else's language-game isn't a language-game, because the word is not doing anything. And, in many cases this can be demonstrated, but in other cases, it's not an easy thing to do. Does this mean that there are cases that will never be resolved? Maybe that's just what it means. Is that just the nature of language. It seems to be. This is the point about my post.

I have no doubt about that, but I'm wondering if it's a problem. It doesn't seem to be easily resolvable.

You've missed my whole point. I guess I didn't explain it well enough. :lol:

Language-games

I believe that Wittgenstein’s methods in the PI are important, and at least for me, I see him applying his methods in OC. He points out subtleties that are very difficult to apprehend (which is seen in various interpretations), and very difficult to use.

That said, what I’m trying to convey here is based on the conversation I had with @StreetlightX earlier in this thread.

Most of us agree that W. puts forward the idea that meaning is derived from use in social settings; which is the setting where rule-following takes place. So, use and rule-following are two sides of the same coin; and they form the basis of the language-game. The corresponding analogy is the game of chess, i.e., the pieces move, but they move in accordance with the rules of the game. If you’re not moving the pieces in accordance with the rules, then obviously you’re not playing the game. By analogy, if you’re not using your words in accord with the rules of the language-game, then you’re not doing anything with your words – your words lack meaning. And moreover, not just any use conveys meaning, which brings me back to what I said originally to TMF, viz., the notion of correct use, which seems to be trivial, as @StreetlightX pointed out, but is it?

Aren’t many of our arguments over the correct use of a word? Even those of us who claim to understand Wittgenstein, argue over what the meaning of knowledge is. In fact, philosophers have created all kinds of language-games to convey what the word means. However, language-games are only language-games if they are language-games proper. Not every use of a word that occurs in a social setting can be said to be a language-game. Again, the analogy being, just because you’re playing what looks like a game of chess, that doesn’t mean you are. However, this analogy breaks down (as many analogies do), because the rules of chess are very explicit, and easy to understand. But, understanding which language-games are THE language-games, i.e., those language-games that are language-games proper, is what’s most difficult to discern. In terms of our use of the word knowledge there are many different language-games that convey how the word know is correctly used. There is no one language-game that will give you the correct use, i.e., the essence of the word know. And, this corresponds to what W. said about the definition of the word game, i.e., there is no exact definition that will convey every possible use in our language.

The real question is, how does one know if a particular language-game is correct or not. It’s easy enough to say that meaning occurs in language-games, but there is no easy method for determining what looks like a language-game from that which IS a language-game. There has to be some criteria by which we judge correctness here. And yet, nothing is definitive. Obviously, some cases are clearly not being played by the rules of the game, but language is much more complicated. There doesn’t seem to be any firm ground that isn’t slippery in some setting.

It seems to me, to say, that X isn’t a language-game, so there is no correct use in this context, begs-the-question, doesn’t it? Maybe there just isn’t any precision here. It’s just like the command, “Stand here!” There is no X that marks the spot, but this response can’t be satisfying, at least not to me.
So, is there a problem in what Wittgenstein is saying? Are there insurmountable problems in what W. is trying to communicate? I’m not sure, just thinking out loud.

Insanity is coming here everyday thinking you'll find answers. :worry:

It is clear from remarks he wrote elsewhere, that
he thought that if he could come to believe in God and the Resurrec­tion - ifhe could even come to attach some meaning to the expression of those beliefs - then it would not be because he had found any evidence, but rather because he had been redeemed. — Joshs

So, what's your point, and how does this lead to me recanting or reconsidering what I said. I've read enough of Wittgenstein to know that he had a mystical side. All you would have to do is read my thread on NDEs, and you would know that I'm not against the mystical. And by the way, the "make me ill" comment could also easily be made against the materialists, naturalists, and many atheists who think that their way of seeing the world is somehow intellectually superior to any view that looks beyond the material world. So, to be fair I'll add that little bit to the mix. And, I don't think that Wittgenstein is some kind of god, i.e., even if you pointed to something W. said that contradicted my point, that somehow isn't going to make me think I'm wrong. I enjoy W., and I think he contributed some important things to philosophy, but I don't think he was correct about all his musings. I'm sure you don't either.

I don't know whether there is a God or not, but it seems to me that if you're going to claim such a thing, you need some kind of justification. And, I don't think anyone is warranted in believing in some kind of inner knowing or inner justification.

What makes me use the phrase "makes me ill" in relation to religious belief is the conviction that they have some special access to knowing that the rest of us don't; and where this kind of thinking logically leads.

Justification is a linguistic concept, and the use of the concept takes place within our epistemological language, viz., propositions. The idea that justification is something within us, is just anathema to me, and to my way of understanding W. If you don't get anything out of W. surely this would be the one thing that sticks out for most student of W., viz., that meaning doesn't arise from within. Meaning by its very nature, is public; and, recently this has been argued about in the many threads that have sprouted up about W.'s thinking.

Second, as I've mentioned in the first post that kicked this recent tranche of posts, comparing the proposition "I have hands," to "God exists," in terms of W's bedrock or hinge-propositions is a bit of a stretch (which is what Pritchard is implying). One can see this if you compare doubting that one has hands to doubting that God exists. Hell, even Christians doubt their belief in God from time to time, but I'd find it amazing if they doubted the existence of their hands in ordinary circumstances from time to time. The key, at least the way I'm interpreting W., to understanding what a basic belief (or Moorean proposition) is, is that doubting them doesn't make sense, at least generally.

Now of course you can retort and claim that you have direct experiences with God, and if this is really true, then you would have access to something most people don't. However, most of these claims are very subjective, and are open to many different interpretations. Not only that, but they tend to be self-sealing, you can make any experience you have conform to a belief in God in some way. I compare this to the way many Christians, not all, but many, think of answers to prayer. There isn't a non-answer, every event in their lives is made to conform with an answer, i.e., even if they didn't get what they specifically prayed for, it was an answer, specifically a no answer. It's a self-sealing view. It doesn't allow for counter-evidence. What would a non-answer look like? In the same way, if every experience you deem to be of God, is of God, how would you know if you're wrong. These kinds of experiences are even worse than pointing to something internal and saying, "There is my pain." Why? Because at least with a pain there is something external to latch on to, a cry or a scream. But, the experiences many religious people refer to as "an internal knowing" have nothing external to latch on to. There is no corresponding ouch or other kind of thing that attaches externally to the experience, other than a claim. Surely this is the proverbial beetle-in-the-box, maybe worse.

I'm joking. Geez. Can't you tell by my body language?

You may be querying the basis of the way in which Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas but I find your claim that it makes you 'ill' as a bit extreme, even though I realise that you may be speaking metaphorically. — Jack Cummins

No, I literally threw up. :groan:

Extreme or not, I find their interpretation of W. to be very problematic to say the least.

I was going to post a paper I wrote, but decided to wait. Instead I would like to evaluate a video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x0j3uoH_-A8) in which Dr. Duncan Pritchard (background is seen here: https://www.faculty.uci.edu/profile.cfm?faculty_id=6341) sees Wittgenstein's views in OC as a kind of support for religious epistemological views. So, Wittgenstein is seen in OC as giving us arational supports for our epistemology, and many philosophers, including myself, believe this is the case.

So, there are some Christian philosophers who are saying that there are very basic arational beliefs that support Christian conclusions. This would mean that the statements "This is a hand," and "God exists," are equivalent, neither require a justification in that they are arational. I don't see this as a correct interpretation of what Wittgenstein is putting forward in OC.

I don't see that Moore's statement, "I know this is a hand," is equivalent to "I know God exists," i.e., I don't agree that Wittgenstein's critique of Moore's statement would be the same critique of "I know God exists." In the former statement the doubt makes no sense. It's hard to imagine such a doubt. Note though, in the latter statement (I know God exists."), it makes perfect sense to doubt that such a being exists. It's not in any way equivalent to "This is a hand." Many Christians want to say that their inner sense of God is equivalent to having a hand, i.e., it's so basic that it's foundational to their beliefs. So, in this sense it's beyond knowing, it's a kind of arational belief that goes beyond the epistemological.

This to me is an attempt to escape the required justification for the existence of God. And, many Christians are using Wittgenstein's ideas to claim that many of their beliefs are this way. This makes me ill. :sad:

Basically, epistimology is not the only way things make sense: are meaningful, have conditions, are judged by criteria, have identity, etc. The PI is showing that our relation to the world is not always epistemological (you're missing the third act where all the fun happens). — Antony Nickles

Of course "...epistemology is not the only way things make sense: are meaningful, [etc]," and I would never imply this. The point was, you don't know you're in pain in an epistemological sense, with emphasis on knowing. You might use know in a way that's not epistemological, as @StreetlightX pointed out above. So, when I say it has no sense, one can see this by pointing out the negation of the sentence, "I know I'm in pain," which must be seen juxtaposed against the statement "I don't know I'm in pain." Now if you want to say it has sense in other non-epistemological ways, that's fine, but that's not my point. Hope this clears up my point.

it's applying the wrong sense of "know". — Antony Nickles

Mostly, it's giving the concept know, no sense, as opposed to the wrong sense. What I mean is, it has no epistemological sense to say, "I know I have a headache."

I'm surprised no one commented on your comment, which is very important in terms of the use of the word know. Moreover, the negation of, "I know I have a headache" - is an important juxtaposition that points to something important about how we go about affirming that we DO know.

I don't think they could act like a conscious being because conscious beings' actions are sometimes caused by their mental states. — RogueAI

The point of course would be, how you could you tell the mental state apart from a programmed response? I don't think, in theory, you could.

Except the zombie is supposed to be identical to me except for being conscious. — RogueAI

Yes, and this is why I said, "...they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self," which was meant to mean they are not conscious. It's difficult to know if such a zombie would really act like a conscious being. It seems that you could in theory make them respond just like us. It would be like playing a game, say, World of Warcraft, and not knowing if you're talking with a real person or not.

f zombie-consciousness is devoid of phenomenality, what possible set of conditions could give rise to the zombie asserting phenomenality? Isn't this a petitio principii? — Pantagruel

One possible answer, is that the zombie is just programmed to say these kinds of things. If, for example, our reality is a kind of program of sorts, then it's quite possible that some being (what we refer to as a person) might just be part of the program. They act like us, they talk like us, but they lack the internal subjective experiences of a real self. It's certainly possible, but unless you were able to remove yourself from the program, it would be difficult if not impossible to tell the difference.

It's hard to see where he's committing a fallacy.

A philosophy major is a humanities degree path that will challenge students to examine questions with no right answers. — praxis

I definitely don't agree with this, but I'm not going to get into this right now. However, I will respond to the following:

Does a degree in philosophy make one an expert? If not, what might an expert training regimen look like? — praxis

I've been studying two subjects for years, viz., NDEs and Wittgenstein, and I definitely don't consider myself an expert in either field. Although, I'm closer to being an expert in the field of NDEs than I am on the subject of Wittgenstein.

A degree doesn't mean you're an expert. It certainly puts you on the path, in terms of knowledge, but it takes years of study in a particular field to become an expert, which is why so many people don't consider themselves experts. I would say that if you've been teaching philosophy for over ten years, that certainly gets you close to being an expert, but not necessarily. The most important criteria is probably what your peers think, i.e., those who have also been studying the same subject for many years. And, in philosophy, as opposed to surgery, you can be wrong about a theory, and yet be considered an expert on that theory. You sure wouldn't be considered an expert in surgery if your procedures were done incorrectly. Even in physics, you can be considered an expert in a particular field, and yet, it could turn out that a particular theory you developed was completely wrong.

I think most can agree that it takes a lot of study and/or writing to become an expert in any field. There isn't a clear answer to this question, just some general things we can say. Others may be able to give a better answer, I'm no expert. :smile:

I am a lazy person and a lazy philosopher. Yes, and I am, if not proud of it, at least resigned to it. This is reflected in one of my favorite quotes, from Franz Kafka, which I use often. I’ve even used it earlier today in Bret Bernhoft's Gnosis thread.

It is not necessary that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet. — T Clark

Suppose someone told you this about engineering. I'm a lazy person and a lazy engineer. If you're a lazy engineer, then you're probably not a good engineer. The same is true of philosophy. Philosophy, good philosophy, takes a tremendous amount of effort and time. It amazes me how many people jump into philosophical arguments without understanding the basics of the subject. Imagine if someone came off the street, with little to no understanding of engineering, and started telling you how to build a bridge. The arrogance is unbelievable. Of course no one has all the answers, but studying a subject with effort certainly gives you a lead, generally, over those who haven't.

There aren't many people who can do philosophy well, and most certainly you're not going to do it well without spending the time needed to study the subject, just like any subject. And, it certainly won't just come to you while you're alone, unless you're a genius. However, even geniuses have to engage with their ideas. Think of the amount of effort it takes to be at the top of any field, it takes a tremendous amount of effort. Most people have no idea how much effort it takes, and how much skill it takes to be one of the best. Wittgenstein agonized over his thoughts. It reminds me of people who come off the street thinking they can challenge experts in jiu jitsu, it's just laughable.

Now you may have said all this tongue and cheek, but there are many who think this way. You see it all the time.

I keep hearing some scientists and philosophers claim that consciousness is an illusion. This has to be one of the silliest claims I've heard. Having an illusion requires consciousness, i.e., it's a necessary feature of having an illusion that there be a conscious self. You can't deny the very thing that gives rise to an illusion. It's like doubting that you exist. Who exactly is doing the doubting?

"Can we live in doubt?" It depends on what you mean by "...live in doubt?" I'm going to repeat some of what @Banno said, because we are largely in agreement, with some minor disagreement.

First, I believe Wittgenstein worked much of this out in his final notes called On Certainty. If you want to understand the concepts of knowing and doubting, there is no better work, as far as I know. My whole framework of what it means to know and doubt is built on W. final notes.

These two concepts work hand-in-hand, i.e., they must be seen as working together. Both are built on a framework of arational beliefs, so both knowing and doubting arise from a place beyond knowing and doubting, which is why I'm saying that they are built on a framework that's arational. The framework is much of the reality that surrounds us. A lot of work needs to be done in terms of what that framework is, and how it can change, but we have a good idea as to what some of these arational beliefs are. The classic examples are, "I have hands," "There are objects," "I live on Earth," "There are minds," etc. These beliefs form the backdrop of the reality that we find ourselves in. Think of these beliefs, as those that can't normally be doubted, there are exceptions, but generally they are foundational arational beliefs that form the substrata of our talk about knowing and doubting. Which means, that they arise out of the reality we find ourselves in. We can't make sense of these concepts apart from this reality. This means that there are limits to what can be known and doubted, given the limits of language. Although the limits of language is not static, i.e., it's not a set boundary (I'm not claiming this is all based on Wittgenstein, some of it is, some of it isn't, but I think it follows from much of what W. said.).

So, again, you have to think of language as the soil (Language itself, grows out of the basic beliefs that form the reality that surrounds us.) that gives birth to the concept of doubting. Without that soil there would be no doubting, period, end of story. So, doubting is a linguistic phenomena (primarily), and as such, it takes place in a language-game (If you aren't familiar with language-games, there are plenty of threads that talk about it. More importantly, read the PI.). The language-game of doubting is very similar to the language-game of knowing. One of the primary drivers of these language-games (knowing and doubting) is justification, viz., do you have the proper justification for your knowledge, and do you have the proper justification for your doubts? Descartes missed the mark completely, that's all I'll say about that here.

So, to partly answer your question, "Can you live in doubt?" If you mean perpetual doubt, no. But, there are rational doubts, and this is a healthy thing. However, sometimes people doubt, where there is no justification for the doubt, and it's here that confusion about doubting happens. There are also areas where it's not so clear, in terms of whether its rational to doubt or not, so this is not always black and white. The same is true of what we know.

If you want to learn more, read On Certainty, and what spawned On Certainty.

Employments of language which do nothing, which serve no purpose. It is one thing to move the rook qua rook in the 'wrong way'. It is quite another to throw the horse shaped piece across the room and call it chess. In the one the piece at least has a role. In the latter it does not (incidentally, the issue of "role" appears over and over and over again in the PI - and it is almost criminally under-remarked upon - unlike 'misuse' which, again, doesn't appear even once in the entire book). The 'philosophical problems' that Witty diagnoses belong entirely to the latter category. — StreetlightX

So, it's one thing to correct someone who moves the rook the wrong way on a chess board, but it's quite another thing to correct someone who throws the piece across the room. Which is to say, that the former has a mode of correction, the latter doesn't. In the latter example, there is no mode of correction because you've removed the piece from all context of correct and incorrect.

This makes sense in terms of how Moore uses the word know, in, for example, Proof of an External World. The word know serves no purpose, it has no role in Moore's context, which means that it's not functioning in a language-game, which by definition, means it has no function. It appears to have a function because we are fooled by the grammar. Wittgenstein is saying that what Moore is doing is not epistemology at all.

The problem, it seems to me, is that in the chess example, i.e., throwing a piece across the room, that doesn't even look like a move in chess. At least in language, it appears that you are doing something with the word, because of the grammar of language. Maybe the chess example should involve something not so radical, to bring it more in line with what's happening in language, but I'm not sure what that would be. Maybe something like, after you have learned the moves, you keep trying to move the rook diagonally, to fit some notion you have about rooks. I'm not sure.

Actually even the word "knowledge" is problematic, to such an extent that we even say that justified true beliefs constitute knowledge. But this is highly problematic. One can have a justified true belief, but not have knowledge:

Imagine you watch the finals in the NBA and team A beats team B. You saw it and reached this conclusion. Unbeknownst to you, what you were watching was a replay of a previos game in which the same team wins (team A) against the same opponent (team B). In the actual finals team A does beat team B, but you were watching a replay, not the actual game. So you had justified true belief, but it wasn't knowledge. — Manuel

It's just another kind of Gettier problem, and I believe Gettier is just wrong about this. Believing one is justified, is not the same as being justified. It's the difference between a claim, especially probability claims, which always carry with them the chance that your claim is incorrect, and what we mean by justification. Just because my sensory experiences usually lead to correct conclusions, doesn't mean they always do. It's the difference between believing that X is a fact, and X actually being a fact. If I make a claim that X is knowledge based on a particular justification, and you later find out that your justification was unwarranted, then it doesn't fit the definition, viz., it wasn't justified. We may have a good ground for our conclusion, and that grounding gives us a warrant to believe the conclusion, but if later you find out that your grounding is unwarranted, then you don't have knowledge. You may have the right to claim it's knowledge, but that right is dependent on what reality actually is. However, this is a bit off topic.

that is, to obey a rule is to act; but the act governs the rule. — Banno

Ya, I see what you're saying. That's probably a better way to say it.

The temptation is to think of language games as discreet, and hence in terms of explicit rules. A few things mitigate against this. — Banno

I'm not sure I follow your point in terms of what I was saying. It seems that the rule and the use go hand-in-hand. The pawn in chess would would be quite useless without the rule, or a rule that governs its moves. So too, it seems in language-games, the grammatical rules (implicit or explicit) govern how we use the words, or in chess how we move the pieces (correctly or incorrectly).

If I understand @StreetlightX, his contention is that a language-game is analogous to a chess game, i.e., you're either playing chess or not. To say you're playing chess, when you're making the wrong moves, is not chess. It's not that you're playing chess incorrectly, you're not playing chess at all. My contention is that there are incorrect moves in the game of chess, so if you move the rook diagonally, then you're not playing chess correctly. If you're teaching the game of chess, then it seems obvious that there are correct and incorrect moves based on the rules. I think it can be looked both ways, but maybe @StreetlightX is giving a more nuanced interpretation.

Ya, that's a good point.

It's their attempt at a language-game. It would be like playing chess, but not understanding all the moves correctly. It appears to be the game of chess, but certain moves are missing. It's true that Wittgenstein doesn't talk of these kinds of language-games, but the implication of incorrect and correct uses of words is something implied, especially in terms of learning, you either learn the word correctly or you don't. Your use of the word demonstrates if you understand how it's applied.

Let me give you an example. I was arguing with some religious people recently, and their epistemological language-game was such that they have knowledge based on some inner knowing. Something that only they have access to. My contention is that they have not properly understood the use of the word know, i.e., the concept as they were using it, is vacuous. It doesn't matter that they have created a language-game that they use together to try to convey meaning. The way they use the word is just incorrect, language-game or not.

This second sentence doesn't follow. If I am trying to assert something, I should not use language in the manner of a command. And vice versa. What constrains the 'proper use of language' is what one is trying to do. But to ask if commands or assertions are 'on equal footing' or 'not on equal footing' is not a question that is sensical. — StreetlightX

All I'm saying is that you can't just create any language-game, and then suppose that you have somehow meant something by your words. This doesn't make any sense. Concepts can't be used just any old way, even if they're used in a language-game created by a group of people, and even if they're are trying to do something with their words.

The standard of the 'correct use of a word' just is the language-game. You seem to be implying that there are 'correct uses' that stand outside of language-games. But this is exactly what the entirety of the PI is geared against. — StreetlightX

No, I'm not saying that there are correct uses that stand outside of language-games, that's definitely not correct. I'm saying that not all language-games are on equal footing, some convey incorrect uses. If this wasn't so, then anything goes in terms of meaning.

The simple fact is that Witty doesn't talk about correct or incorrect use. Ever. Okay, a lie, he uses the term 'correct use' once at §146, and literally no where else in the entirety of the PI. 'Incorrect' use actually makes no appearance at all, ever. As for the postulated assistant who brings the pillar, sure, one can argue semantics over whether to call it an 'incorrect use' or simply not having learnt the use at all, but the latter is simply more in accord with what Wittgenstein actually said. — StreetlightX

So, I'm arguing semantics, I suppose that's meant to mean that it's trivial, or that I'm avoiding the point you're making. Incorrect use,would be, "...not having learnt the use at all." If anyone is arguing semantics, it's you. Surely, W. implies that there are correct and incorrect uses of words, whether he uses that phrasing or not. Let's use Moore's use of the word know in On Certainty as an example. What would be more precise? To say, Moore hasn't learned the use of the word know, or that Moore is using the word incorrectly in that context? I would say the latter is closer to what W. is trying to point out. Obviously W. is pointing out other more subtle things in the context of the PI, but this doesn't take away from what I'm saying.

And there is, moreover, excellent reason for that. The full phrase is: "meaning is use in a language -game". In other words, 'use' is always relational. To even talk about misuse simply makes no sense. Which is why the word 'misuse' also appears exactly zero times in the PI. To see this, simply try to invert the statement: "Meaninglessness is incorrect use in a language-game". But no language-game specifies 'incorrect use', because 'use' is a function of, let's call it, felicity ("The signpost is in order a if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose"). Either a use fulfills its purpose, or it does not. If it does not, it is not a use at all. Not only does introducing (and lets be clear, it is an extra-textual introduction that does not exist in the PI) 'correct and incorrect use' have practically no textual warrant at all, it also confuses things. It makes it seem as though 'use' could, even in principle, be something not in accord with a language-game. But Witty makes the point over and over and over gain that this is exactly what one cannot do. — StreetlightX

Of course, "meaning is use in a language-game," and of course it's "always relational," but that doesn't mean that any language-game conveys the correct use of a word. Groups of people create their own language-games all the time, especially religious people. I wouldn't go so far as to say they haven't learned to use the word at all, because in some contexts they do use the word correctly. However, in other contexts they're using the word incorrectly, and to say so, is in keeping with the PI, as far as I can see.

Use is always in accord with a language-game, but you seem to imply that there aren't language-games that don't accord with the proper function of words. Hence, language-games that don't convey the correct use of words, and here is where we disagree.

It seems to me that the inner sensation is useless. It doesn't matter if we all have different beetles in our boxes or if some of us have no beetles. — hanaH

It can't be useless. For example, if there were no inner experience of pain, then there would be no language of pain, no outward sign. It depends, I guess, on what you mean by useless. Even the beetle has a function, albeit not the one most people think, in terms of meaning.

Incorrect use" makes no sense in the context of the PI. There is simply either use, or not use at all. Witty never talks about the "incorrect" use of words. Only words which lack use entirely. — StreetlightX

I would definitely disagree with this assessment of the PI, viz., that "incorrect use makes no sense in the context of the PI." First, my point in pointing out to @TheMadFool, that use doesn't equate to meaning, is that it's imprecise. It's "correct usage" of words/concepts that drive meaning, i.e., a concept has various uses (incorrect and correct) driven by rules (implicit and explicit rules) within a given cultural language-game.

If we look at the first example of a language-game in the PI, we can clearly see there are correct and incorrect uses of words. We observe that if the assistant doesn't respond appropriately to the call "slab," then the assistant has not learned the language-game, and by extension has not learned the proper responses to the calls. Would you say that if the assistant brought a "pillar," that the assistant is "correctly" understanding the use of the word or the call "slab?" Obviously not. So, the obvious implication in this and other language-games is that there are "correct" and "incorrect" uses of words.

When teaching a child the correct use of the word cup, would we say there is no incorrect use? It's true, of course, that W. says that words go on a holiday, i.e., that they lack a use, but this is no argument against what I'm saying. If a philosopher is using the word illusion out of it's normal setting in which the word gets it's meaning, then not only does the word "lack use" in that context, but it's incorrectly used. ""Lacking use" surely also implies incorrect use, as opposed to correct use.