What link?

I don't oppose the mental. I just do not suppose it to be confined to the inside of people's heads. — Banno

I agree, if there wasn't some outward manifestation of the mental, then what would a mental life entail? Even if we exclude language, what's mental would have to seep out in some outward act (linguistic or otherwise). The mental, in order for us to call it mental, has to manifest itself in some way. We could say the same thing for what it means for something to be conscious.

If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. — creativesoul

You seem to be suggesting that you can't create a bowl without a language. I'm sure that pre-linguistic man created bowls of some sort, or maybe you're referring to a particular kind of bowl, say plastic bowls. Even if you're right, it seems like a stretch to the conclude that because a thing (maybe stove is more appropriate), is created by language users, that the cat's belief is dependent upon language. When I use the phrase "dependent upon language," I'm referring to the use of concepts as part of a statement of belief. So, the cat is not dependent upon language in this sense. You're adding another sense of "dependent upon language" that doesn't involve the direct use of concepts, which seems to be an indirect dependence. Am I understanding your point, or not? Mostly I'm talking about concepts, in particular the concept truth. The difference maybe in our focus.

Obviously linguistics played a part in the stove's creation, but the fact that stove exists, is just like any other fact of existence for the cat, and the cat's belief. What if we removed all humans from existence, but there still existed stoves, would there still be an overlap between the cat's belief and language? What if someone created a stove, ceased to exist, then cats came into existence later, would you still say that the cat's belief overlapped language? I don't see any reason to think that the cat's belief has a linguistic component simply because some language user created the stove. The stove is just another fact of reality, like a tree or the moon.

I may or may not be one of those philosophers, but I do think common language is capable of being precise enough. Language can be honed. — creativesoul

Ya, I'm not saying language can't be precise, only that some concepts resist precision. So, we agree.

A non-linguistic belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. — creativesoul

I agree, that a non-linguistic belief is not dependent on language. However, I would probably word the next statement a bit different. The concept bowl is dependent on language, but the fact that there is a bowl (the object referred to as bowl), this fact can be part of the of the cat's belief. In fact, many states-of-affairs can be part of the cat's belief. So, I'm separating the concept from the facts involved in the cat's belief.

Some language less creatures' belief includes content that is itself existentially dependent upon language. Believing that a mouse is under the stove for example includes the stove. This makes perfect sense given that the overlap between their world and ours includes things that we created via language use; some of which are perfectly capable of being directly perceived by language less creatures and thus could be sensibly said to be part of the content of their belief. — creativesoul

Again, here, including the stove is just including a fact about reality, their belief doesn't include the concept stove. The object that the concept refers to is not dependent on language, just as many facts aren't dependent on language. So, the cat's belief, it seems to me, is not dependent on language, at least our language, but maybe dependent upon some fact that has obtained as a result of our interaction with the world. So, I don't see an overlap, i.e., if I'm interpreting you correctly.

I agree with your assessment of your granddaughter's belief. I think your other thoughts may need more refinement. That's my take, for what its worth.

That's painful :gasp:

I'm through for the night. Maybe I'll be back tomorrow, not sure.

It would be absurd to say Witti spurned logic. — Banno

Who would say the W. spurned logic? I surely never said such a thing.

“The criteria which we accept for ‘fitting’, ‘being able to’, ‘understanding’, are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved—the role of these words in our language other—than we are tempted to think. (This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them; and so, a fortiori does the assertion that a word is ‘indefinable’.)” PI 182.

I'm currently reading a paper entitled, A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes by Rupert Read. I'm interested in whether anything he says applies to what we are discussing.

The liar is like someone saying "but look, I can move the king more than one space!" — Banno

I definitely don't see the liar's paradox as the same as saying, "Look I can move the king more than one space." Although I do use this technique in chess when I'm losing.

Facts are the stuff of science. But they are created -- rather than lying there for us to discover, we invent a lot to make them useful for ourselves. Actuality doesn't change with the facts -- facts are generated by our interaction with actuality, though. — Moliere

Your notion of a fact is a bit different from mine. I talked about facts in my summary of truth a few pages back.

What I meant is that seeing a tree, feeling its bark and leaves, carving your initials into it, climbing it and so on are all perceptual. — Janus

Ya, they're all sensory experiences. You're not saying it's all subjective are you?

What's all perception? Are you referring to what we mean by truth? Sorry, I haven't read everything in the last three pages.

We just are never going to get the kind of precision out of language that some philosophers want. It's like an itch that won't go away.

I'm not sure I understand your point. If you're saying there are other ways of gaining knowledge besides science, I definitely agree.

I definitely agree that truth is linguistic, and thus embedded in our forms of life.

You will take my point: logic remains primary in Wittgenstein. — Banno

No, I will not take your point in the way you seem to be making it. It depends on what Wittgenstein is talking about. You do not see the use of logic in the same way it's used in his early philosophy, where logic is primary. He's much more flexible in his later philosophy, not as dug in, in terms of using logic as a primary tool.

But, one of the points in the PI is that language is not always precise. Sometimes being vague is just what we need. So, he's not always trying to be precise, because ordinary usage doesn't always work that way.

Wittgenstein's logic of use in his later philosophy is much different from his early philosophy. I don't think it's as precisely used. The logic of language in the PI seems to entail something that's not so easy to pin down. Maybe the kind of logic entailed in our ordinary uses hasn't been invented.

You probably have a point, so I'll just substitute another more exact measuring device to make the point, i.e., the point of the post still stands. I don't know enough about measuring with lasers. Interesting though.

All our talk is only ever approximation when it is about the world — Janus

I agree, but I wonder about the above statement. It probably depends on how we're using the concepts approximation and exact, i.e., whether we are talking about a scientific measurement using lasers or a measurement using a ruler. However, even a scientific measurement that's considered exact in one setting, will only be an approximation in another setting.

Sam, do you think our everyday language is insufficient for explaining the Liar and/or all its permutations? — creativesoul

I think the problem lies in the vagaries of language, and trying to fit language into a very precise medium, like mathematical logic. Logic is a guide for our reasoning, but it has it's limits. The two mediums of logic and ordinary language are very different, and it's this difference that may contribute to the problem.

My guess is that Tarski is basing his theory on false premises. For example, the liars paradox.
— Sam26
Odd, since it's clear he explicitly deals with the liar by introducing levels of language. It's certainly not a premise in his argument, obviously. — Banno

My point is simply that he feels he needs to address the liar paradox, viz., that our everyday language is insufficient.

I'm asking because there is a substantive body of work, by the strongest logicians of the last hundred years, that depends on t-sentences. It would be odd if that were irrelevant. Worse if they were wrong. — Banno

They're irrelevant to our social uses of propositions as they correspond to facts. We don't need to understand Tarski to understand the relationship between propositions and the world. It would be odd if we did. I can see the attraction to 'p' is true, IFF p, but, again, I don't see a need for it.

Although, I do feel the need for speed. :gasp:

I haven't spent much time on his works. I've mostly been reading secondary sources, and even there, it's sporadic. My main point, is that it doesn't help to define truth for everyday usage. I don't think it advances much in terms of that.

This, perhaps, is the point Sam26 makes when he says that the T-schema is irrelevant? — Michael

My point was, that it doesn't help us understand the meaning of truth in the object language. The object language is fine without it. It just adds a layer of confusion to the nature or meaning of truth.

Think it's Davidson rather than Tarski. Tarski's work came out of considerations for formal languages right, — fdrake

From what I've read, it's Tarski, in "On the Concept of Truth in Formal Languages" (1935), where he's trying to resolve the liar paradox. Also, in the course of his thinking he uses Godel's incompleteness theorem as a model for his theory. This includes a meta-language to talk about our everyday language, in terms of truth, that's my understanding.

Thanks.

Yes.

I think we generally agree, with some differences. I have to calm my mind down before bed or I'll be thinking about this stuff into the early morning hours. Take care all.

It really gets back to Wittgenstein (unbelievable, I know), how do we learn to use concepts? I'm saying, if you want to understand what truth is, then you look at use in social settings. I don't believe that 'p' is true IFF p helps us to decide meaning as it takes place socially. We could completely disregard it, and it wouldn't change a thing. There would be nothing lacking.

Janus, while that is true, it is also true that "cat" is meaningless beyond what is communally perceived and conceived to be a cat. — creativesoul

Yes, the concept cat is meaningless beyond our social linguistic uses.

The cat can be hunting a mouse and that would be the case, even if there were no one around... ever. — creativesoul

I agree. The use of the concept fact goes beyond the linguistic.

Agreed.

I think if you were to analyze the uses of truth in social settings it would be more in line, generally, with a kind of correspondence. Would you agree?

My guess is that Tarski is basing his theory on false premises. For example, the liars paradox.

Like with Sam26 (I imagine), a theoretical emphasis on pragmatics and a central role for T-sentences in that theory are strange bedfellows. — fdrake

Yes, to say the least.

And yet, they are correct. I mean, you would not disagree that ("p' is true IFF p), would you? — Banno

I would disagree. I don't see that as helping people to understand the concept truth.

On this we agree, so far as substantive definitions. The idea that there could be a single or algorithmic definition of truth is self-defeating. T-sentences just point to the relation between use and truth. — Banno

T-sentences, in my view, do nothing to help people understand how truth is used in social settings. All it does is attempt to define truth in a setting that's so far removed from reality, one wonders if it has a use at all.

Your ability to misunderstand (whether deliberate or not) is remarkable. — Janus

I agree.

↪Sam26 repeats mention of the social aspect of language, combined with what looks like the picture theory of meaning. Truth is defined negatively, "If the proposition misses the mark, or does not accomplish its goal, as a picture or a correlate of reality, then it is false". — Banno

I think my view is a bit more nuanced than your interpretation. I don't subscribe to any "picture theory of language." I don't like any of these theories. If I'm close to a theory, then it would be something close to a correspondence theory. I also said, "If the proposition misses the mark, or does not accomplish its goal, as a picture or a correlate of reality, then it is false." How you get from this remark to "truth is defined negatively" is beyond me. If this is defining anything negatively, it's a false proposition, which misses the mark. The goal of a truth claim is to hit the mark, namely, does it correspond with the facts of reality, which, if anything is a positive.

There is no one definition of truth that will satisfy every use in our language. I thought I made this clear in my opening statement. "What we mean by our concepts, in this case truth, is a function of how we use concepts in our “forms of life,” that is, it is a linguistic social construct." So, if you want to know what we mean by truth, then you look at how we use the concept in a variety of social settings. Any definition of truth, is going to be inadequate, like trying to define, as in W.'s example, a game.

I agree.