Address specifically how I've lowered the bar. Don't just make statements without good reasons. Where specifically did the inductive argument fail? Did I not provide enough numbers, variety of NDEs, corroboration, consistency, etc? All your comment does is show that you don't follow the argument.

The interesting philosophical issue is the language around what it is that might survive death, especially how it could be identified with the deceased individual. The notion of soul is problematic. — Banno

I agree that the notion of a soul, in terms of pointing to something inner is problematic, which is why I talk about consciousness instead of a soul. However, we don't have a clear idea what consciousness is, so the question about what survives is not clear. There would have to be some continuity of consciousness, viz., memory, continuity of experience (subjective and objective experiences), etc.

Question: What about consciousness proves, no, suggests, its survival/continuation post death? — Agent Smith

If the testimonial evidence is reliable, and I believe it is based the corroboration of many of the testimonials, then when people talk about meeting their deceased parents, friends, and other family members, including seeing people they did not know had passed, this suggests that those who have passed continue to exist as themselves. This is one reason, there are other reasons, including what goes on in hospices just before people pass away.

Why think the experiences are veridical as opposed to dreams? — Bartricks

One reason is, they're much different from dreams. In these experiences people are describing what's going on in the operating room, for example, in real time. They're are describing the conversations that the doctors, nurses, and other medical personal are having while their heart is stopped, and while there is no brain activity. Since when do dreams give accurate details of what's happening around you while your unconscious (there are some exceptions, but generally dreams don't give this kind of information)? Moreover, these kinds of testimonials have been corroborated over and over again. I don't think it's reasonable at all to think they are dreams. All you have to do is read 20 or 30 of these to understand this. Moreover, dreams usually occur in REM sleep, and that's not what's going on here at all. These people are in a completely different state of awareness.

I read your post previously, or at least the first 10 pages. It seemed to go in circles after that. I really need more than sheer number of testimonials of the experience. I need information gained from the experience that can't be gotten by a person unmoving and stuck in the room. Like for example I heard such a story of a person who had an out of body experiences and claimed to see a sneaker on the roof of the hospital, and strangely enough that was true. I like to hear more like that. — TiredThinker

Ya, I repeat myself because people don't always read what is written carefully. So, I can see why it may appear to go in circles, but there is a lot that's covered. If you don't read it, you won't get the full impact of the argument.

And, you said you read the first ten pages, if you did, then you should know it's not just about numbers. I explained this in the first couple of pages. Moreover, why would you think that it's about someone "unmoving and stuck in a room?" It's much more substantial than that, and the experiences are much more than that. I'm not going to rehash the argument in this thread, but you don't seem to understand the impact of the inductive argument.

I assumed in my argument that most people have at least read some of these experiences, so I don't get into the various experiences, other than to point out the common elements of the experiences. Many of the experiences were taken from https://www.nderf.org, so if you want to read about these experiences, this is a good place to start.

The link that was provided in the above post, is a link to a thread that I created on the subject of Does Consciousness Survive Death? I make the claim based on the strength of the testimonial evidence, which is quite substantial, that we can know that we survive the death of the body. It's not speculation or an opinion, it's knowledge, based on the strength of the testimonial evidence. Don't be put off by many of the comments that there is no evidence. I would read through some of my posts in that thread, and decide for yourself, either for or against.

Most of what we believe comes in the form of testimonial evidence. If you read a book, listen to a lecture, and even listen to a podcast, you're getting testimony from someone. You have to know how to evaluate testimonial evidence, no matter what form the testimony takes. Testimonial evidence can be very weak at times, but it can also be very strong under the right circumstances.

Most people in here haven't studied NDEs, and you can see that in their responses. There was only one person who responded to my argument with thoughtfulness, and that was @Fdrake. He responded directly to the argument. We didn't agree, but at least he took on the argument directly.

By the way, my beliefs on this subject have nothing to do with any religious ideology. I'm not religious.

PI 43For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Right, I wasn't suggesting that W. was dogmatic about the connection between meaning and use. In fact, meaning can be associated with an object also in the PI.

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes this possible. — Fooloso4

In the Tractatus meaning is associated with the object, i.e., the name in the proposition is directly connected with the object in a fact. It sounds like you're saying that meaning is found in the proposition, but that can't be the case. The proposition gets its meaning by reflecting or mirroring the fact, which is W.'s picture theory of meaning.

In the Investigations reference is problematic when it comes to such things as sensation. If I am in pain I am not referring to some public thing that can be pointed to for others to see or experience. But this does not mean: — Fooloso4

We know, for the most part, when someone is in pain (having the sensation of pain) because of their very public cries, screams, moans, and other bodily or linguistic acts. There is a difference between the inner experience and the outward manifestation.

If it "doesn't latch onto the inner thing in terms of meaning", then why would the disconnect "eventually show up in our uses of the concept". Meaning is use. — Luke

First, I don't know about you. but for me, "meaning as use" has it's limitations. It seems rather obvious that not all "uses" of a word, equate to meaning. Obviously people use words incorrectly all the time. However, "use" is the best way to determine meaning, generally. Use must be seen within the context of a form of life, and it's within these forms of life that we are able to say that "your use" is incorrect. I say this as a point of clarity for others reading this, not necessarily as a point of disagreement. My guess is that you would agree with this.

To answer your question, I'm not sure I have a clear idea of how this would happen, it's more of an intuition. I was thinking that if people see different colors from what I see, then this would come out in the detailed uses of what we mean, for example, by red. So, as we get into the different shadings of red, and make detailed comparisons with other color samples, the idea that you're seeing yellow instead of red would seem to break down at some point. We would begin to recognize in our various uses that we're not seeing the same color or colors. If, on the other hand, there is no way to tell if you're seeing yellow instead of red, then the whole point is moot. Whatever's happening in the mind would fall away as as so much chaff, but I suspect this is incorrect.

My original response to your previous post, before I edited it, was going to be that you seem to be arguing that Wittgenstein's beetle is both necessary and unnecessary to language use. Wittgenstein tells us that it drops out of consideration as irrelevant; that it cancels out, whatever it is; that the box might even be empty; and that the thing in the box doesn't belong to the language-game at all. — Luke

Ya, my argument can be seen in this way, but how this plays out is complex. Moreover, I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's notions. It seems to me that if you remove what's going on in the mind, then your left with nothing. I don't think Wittgenstein goes this far, even though his beetle in the box seems to remove the thing as having any great import. Much of this, obviously, has to do with how certain passages are interpreted. And, I suspect we'll never arrive at a consensus.

It appears to me that Wittgenstein is saying that language takes its meaning entirely from behaviour, from use, and only from a third-person, external standpoint. Pain and other sensations do not refer directly to the private feelings but to the public expression of those feelings; to how you (and others) act when experiencing those sensations. Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke

Yes, I agree.

And if that is the case - if language is entirely behavioural/external - then we cannot talk about sensations in terms of private subjective experiences or qualia or any of that. This is where we run up against the limits of language, and where Daniel Dennett is correct that qualia cannot possibly be private, ineffable, intrinsic and immediately apprehensible by consciousness. On the other hand, it seems as though we can talk about sensations and feelings directly in terms of the private subjective experiences and the sensations themselves, and not only in terms of their expression, because that is what we are doing now - or at least trying to do! In that case, Wittgenstein would be wrong about language or grammar being entirely behavioural/external. — Luke

I definitely disagree with Wittgenstein's notion of a limit to language, at least in part. He basically still believes, as he did in the Tractatus, that there is a limit to language. If there is a limit, I suspect that it's not as limiting as he thinks it is. The fact that we can talk about some of these subjective experiences, as we're doing, seems to point at something problematic with Wittgenstein's limit. I'm sure that much of my disagreement has to do with my view on consciousness/minds.

It's not as though the concept needs some inner thing to latch onto
— Sam26

This seems at odds with the rest of your post. If this is true, then I don't understand why you would also say:

I would say that everything speaks in favor of common inner experiences, and generally nothing against it. Moreover, isn't this how "we know" that our inner subjective experiences are the same. If they weren't the same experiences, I believe the conceptual public use would break down.
— Sam26

If our concepts do not need "some inner thing to latch onto", then why would our "conceptual public use" break down without "some inner thing to latch onto"? It need not be that: — Luke

It doesn't latch onto the inner thing in terms of meaning, which isn't to deny that there is some relationship between the inner and the outer public manifestation. There is a correlation or relationship between our inner experiences and how we use the words, and this, it seems to me, would be severed, or would break down publicly. The disconnect would eventually show up in our uses of the concept.

I believe we do know with a high degree of certainty that people have the same inner experiences, which is based on the public use of the concepts. The assumption, which has no standing, as far as I can tell, is that we can't know, and this seems wrong to me. Maybe we don't know with absolute certainty, but we know, again, with a high degree certainty.

Not sure if that clears it up.

I thought it was an interesting question. Can we even talk about experiences or sensations in subjective terms? Or is doing so “running up against the limits of language”? — Luke

Why wouldn't you think that we can't talk about subjective sensations? We do it all the time. Moreover, we understand, for example, what people are talking about when they describe a beautiful sunset. We also understand when someone tells us the orange juice is sweet, which describes their subjective experience. There is common agreement, generally, about our subjective experiences. Everything speaks in favor of people seeing the same colors, tasting the bitterness of dark chocolate, feeling the hardness of a table, etc. I don't see how this runs up against the limits of language, unless I've misunderstood your point. It's not as though the concept needs some inner thing to latch onto, it just a use that latches onto our "form of life." Our inner experiences get their life through the way we interact linguistically or conceptually.

I would say that everything speaks in favor of common inner experiences, and generally nothing against it. Moreover, isn't this how "we know" that are inner subjective experiences are the same. If they weren't the same experiences, I believe the conceptual public use would break down.

What is the difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's logical atomism? — Banno

I know there is a difference, as you do, because Wittgenstein challenges both Russell and Frege's views. You're right, it's a matter of exegesis, and there is a lot of disagreement over the details. I know that Wittgenstein had a different view of logic, and a different view of propositions, but I'd have to do some reading to review the material. This goes into much more depth than my little mind is prepared to go right now. People are having a hard enough time just trying to understand what W. meant by object and name, among other things.

Good to see your involvement. — Banno

Thanks Banno.

I'd taken it that the world in the Tractatus is all that is the case, not a collection of simples. — Banno

Yes, for Wittgenstein, "The world is all that is the case (T. 1)," that's true. However, he breaks the fact into parts, viz., atomic facts, and atomic facts are broken into objects. "Objects [which are simples] make up the substance of the world (T. 2.021)." These simple objects, which he gives no examples of, are the simplest building blocks of atomic facts. The correlate is the proposition, the elementary proposition, and the name (the name is also a simple). "In an atomic fact objects fit into one another like the links of a chain (T. 2.03)."

Malcolm once asked Wittgenstein if he ever decided upon anything as an example of an object, but his reply was that it wasn't his job as a logician to decide whether this thing or that was a simple or complex. He said it was an empirical matter. Wittgenstein understood this problem when he was writing the Notebooks, "Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (p. 68 The Notebooks)." The way the proposition reached out to reality is through the name, which corresponded to the object. Wittgenstein was driven by this logic, i.e., there must be these simples in both elementary propositions (names) and atomic facts (objects). "Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite (T. 2.021)." Later he thought this was just silly, but he stuck with his logic and created the Tractatus. Remember the traditional way philosophers thought of meaning, it's the object it denotes. Wittgenstein stuck with tradition and created the logic to support this view.

Russell completely misunderstood the Tractatus. In fact, most who read the Tractatus misunderstood it, most notably the Vienna Circle who thought that Wittgenstein held their views of the metaphysical.

I'm sure this won't help much, but maybe.

And so a true proposition is a fact — Banno

True propositions mirror or picture facts, they are not facts in themselves. This is explained in W. picture theory of meaning.

Well, what is his aim in writing the book? He says, "Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts:" He does this by showing how language is limited to the facts of the world, and that there are no facts of metaphysics that language can latch onto.

Facts are all around us. It's not difficult to find facts. There are many facts that haven't been discovered, but his aim is very specific.

Q: What is meant by “facts”? Isn’t a fact something which is true? And isn’t truth a property of propositions? So, the world consists of all true propositions? If so, then “world” doesn’t refer to the physical universe but to the collection of true propositions about the physical universe. — Art48

So, a proposition is broken down into elementary propositions and names. Facts are broken down into atomic facts and objects. Think of elementary propositions as pictures of reality, if they are true (this is Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning), or if the elementary proposition is false, then the picture doesn't represent anything in reality. In other words, a false proposition is a picture with a form, but the form has no instance in reality. Think of a painting, a painting has a form, whether it matches something in reality or not. The form of the picture, is the arrangement of things (houses, trees, valleys, etc.) in the picture. If the arrangement of things in the picture correctly picture reality, then it is a true picture of reality.

Only true propositions connect via names to objects. However, don't think of names and objects in the ordinary sense. Names and objects as used in the Tractatus are simples. They are the smallest component parts of propositions and facts, respectively (Wittgenstein never gives e.g.'s of either of these, but he believes that logic dictates their existence). The elementary proposition, which is composed of names, asserts the existence of some state-of-affairs, or some fact. Only propositions can be true or false, depending on whether they reflect facts or don't reflect facts. There is no such thing as a true or false fact, only true or false propositions. So, again, whether a proposition is true or false depends on whether it correctly pictures a fact. "A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it (T. 4.01."

When thinking of a fact, an analogy might help. For example, think of a chess board and the pieces as the world, then think of the arrangement of the pieces (facts in logical space) on the board, as the facts in the world (the facts of the game). If you correctly describe the game, then you are describing some arrangement of the pieces on the board. I.e., the language you use correctly (if true) or incorrectly (if false) is supposed to picture the facts (arrangement of pieces) of the game.

The world consists of facts (T. 1.13, 2.04). However, the totality of true propositions describes the world, i.e., describes the facts of the world.

Hopefully this partly answers some of your questions.

Good Luck,
Sam

Does she answer them aside from taking them? — god must be atheist

She answers questions, but some of them are hard to hear.

If one limits propositions to spoken statements then the belief that we will find the parts of animals is not propositional if it is not expressed. But is this what Wittgenstein means by a proposition? — Fooloso4

In W. later philosophy propositions are functions of use, rule following, and forms of life; and, the definition of a proposition shouldn't be seen as some one essence that governs what we mean by all propositions. The definition of a proposition should be seen under the rubric of family resemblance. To demonstrate this it would take a separate thread, and an in depth analysis of the nature of a proposition in the T., and W.'s criticisms of how a proposition functions in the PI and in OC. And, not only how his view changed, but specifically, what remains of his early thinking, and, of course, what was discarded.

Finally, there is not going to be some final correct interpretation of W. which we can all agree is what W. meant by this or that. Wittgenstein's writing style, in particular, doesn't lend itself to easy interpretations. This doesn't mean that we can't agree on W. general themes (although, even here there is disagreement, to some extent), it just means that some of these difficulties will never be resolved.

Clearly Wittgenstein is connecting beliefs and propositions here. Does he distinguish between propositional beliefs and non-propositional beliefs elsewhere? — Fooloso4

"People have killed animals since the earliest times, used the fur, bone etc. etc. for various purposes; they have counted definitely on finding similar parts in any similar beast.

"They have always learnt from experience; and we can see from their actions that they believe certain things definitely, whether they express their belief or not [my emphasis] (OC 284)."

This is about as clear as it gets. These kinds of beliefs are not tied to propositions and/or statements, they are primitive, animal if you will. They are belief states revealed in a non-propositional way. We show these beliefs in innumerable ways. They are non-linguistic beliefs.

All beliefs are expressed in acts of one kind or another, i.e., either in linguistic and/or nonlinguistic acts.

Wittgenstein continues this thinking, viz., that beliefs are shown in our actions (OC 285). I interpret this to mean that our actions reflect what we believe apart from statements/propositions.

I agree, but my point is that more generally we should not read the later Wittgenstein in the same way we read someone whose work leads from premise to conclusion. — Fooloso4

I agree, but that doesn't mean you can't formulate an argument based on some of his ideas. Although doing that may distort his ideas.

We disagree about the nature of a belief. And ya, I'm not going to go over this ground again, at least not right now.

I don't think it is a matter of development but of looking at things in different ways, giving different examples, reminders of what we say and do, so as to obtain an overview, an übersichtlichen darstellung, a surveyable or perspicuous representation or overview: — Fooloso4

My point is that W. never finished developing his ideas in OC. In one passage (I forget the number), he expresses some frustration that he won't have time to finish his thoughts in OC.

Hinges should be viewed in the larger context of the problem of knowledge, doubt, and certainty, which, in turn, are viewed in the context of a form of life, as a matter of practice rather than theory.
Our actions occur along a continuum from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. Hinges do not function exclusively linguistically or prelingistically.

I have not been able to find anywhere where Wittgenstein talks about bedrock beliefs. — Fooloso4

I agree with all of this. And, you're right he doesn't specifically talk about bedrock beliefs, but I think it's one way of expressing what hinges are, from the prelinguistic to the linguistic. They are just very basic kinds of beliefs within our forms of life.

Does your picture of "very basic beliefs" correspond to what prelinguistic humans believed and practiced? How do you know? Did they believe certain objects and animals possess powers? Did totems exist in prelinguistic groups? Were there prelinguistic ritual dances, such as those before the hunt? Burial practices? In each case such beliefs are foundational, but not beliefs we accept. — Fooloso4

There are many different kinds of hinges or basic beliefs, but there are those that are common to all of us, prelinguistic as well as linguistic. When primitive man or modern man interacts within his environment, they show their basic beliefs by what they do, or the way they act. So, if a primitive man picks up a stone, that shows that he or she believes something about his or her environment, something fundamental, something very basic. For example, it shows that they believe there is a stone there, that they have hands, that they are a body distinct from other bodies or objects. These kinds of hinges, for the most part don't change. On the other hand, there are other kinds of hinges that we accept as certain (not epistemologically certain, but a certainty that's reflected in our actions), and they are expressed in other ways, maybe ritual dances, praying, that the Earth is flat, etc. These kinds of hinges change over time, and they are culturally dependent, and also dependent on our current fund of knowledge.

So, yes, there are hinges that some people accept as basic, but others do not. Religious people act as though belief in God is a hinge, but others reject this idea, so it's not a hinge for them. What we can ask, is, does it make sense to doubt what others take to be a hinge? And if it makes sense to doubt what's normally considered a hinge, then that belief is no longer a hinge (e.g. the Earth is flat).

There is obviously much more to this, and I'm sure I left some important ideas out, but this is basically how I think of hinges.

In terms of behavior, we aren't blank slates. Biology would suggest that some hinge propositions are genetic in origin. — frank

No doubt we aren't blank slates, but I don't see how hinge beliefs (I don't see them as propositions. However, since OC starts out addressing Moore, and Moore's claim that they are propositions, that's how W. talks about them.) could be genetic, but genetics sure influences many of these basic or bedrock beliefs. In other words, my position is that hinge's come into existence as beliefs, based on our sensory interactions with the world around us. So, at the very least, there is some correlation between genetics and such beliefs. However, if you are saying that the belief itself is genetic, that seems very problematic.

But at this point, we turn and notice that all I've just said rests upon untestable hinge propositions. Part of the connotation of "true" is that it's something solid I can push off from. To the extent that I'm confidently pushing off from hinges as I speak, I can say they qualify as true. — frank

I think of hinges, when put into statement form, (as opposed to non-linguistic hinge beliefs) as contingent rules of reality, like a rule of chess. As such, there is no need for testability, they give testability it's very grounding. And, this grounding supports the very concepts of epistemological language (knowing, justification, and truth). The rule in chess that bishops move diagonally, gives the grounding for us to say, in some contexts, that it's true that bishops move diagonally.

What we push off of is what allows for the concept of truth to take root.

That's funny. "A dizzying intellect."

I think there is a causal or correlatory relationship between the world and our sensory experiences that produce these beliefs and/or mind states. I haven't thought much of it beyond this.

Yes, language is in some sense is a function of these very basic beliefs; and it's these very basic beliefs that are the hinges that W. is referring to. The concepts of knowing, and therefore, justification and truth, are later in our development or evolution. You can think of these bedrock beliefs as non-linguistic, and that removes them from the concepts of knowing, justification, and truth. It's when they are incorporated into language that the confusion starts, because we fail to see where and how they originate. They are foundational or bedrock to all the language-games of ratiocination, which is why Moore fails when using the concept of know.

I think what you're wanting to say is that hinge propositions aren't truth apt? — frank

Actually I did say that. First, I don't think hinge-propositions are propositions, so they aren't truth apt. You have to read OC as Wittgenstein working through these ideas. So, it may appear that Wittgenstein is saying one thing, but later he may change it a bit. His thinking is developing as he writes.

I think of these hinges as bedrock beliefs. In the past I've talked about them as pre-linguistic, which I think fits with Moyal-Sharrock's animal beliefs. If you think of them as pre-linguistic, especially in terms of epistemology, then, I believe, it removes them from the concepts of knowing, justification, and truth. I'm thinking of beliefs in this context, not as propositions, but as acts apart from language, or more specifically, as acts apart from the language-games of epistemology. All of our accounts of epistemology are language dependent, but animal beliefs have no such dependency. Moreover, we are not free of these animal or bedrock beliefs. They are fixed as part of the background of reality, and the way we interact with reality.
So, much of this has to do with the way you think of beliefs, and only later, truth.

By the way, I've actually talked with one of the philosophers (Prichard). I sent him a paper I wrote just to get some feedback on some of my thoughts. Nothing I was proposing was out of the ordinary, i.e., it was in line with what other philosophers were saying. This doesn't mean that I'm right, but it does go to what some are saying in here, that my proposals are absurd, or that they don't follow.

Geez, for someone who studied logic you didn't even know what a valid argument was. Yes, indeed, poor Seppo.

I could write much more, but I don't see any point. There are other philosophers who are expressing the same views or close to it, so it's not an interpretation that's absurd. Much of what I've argued for has not even been addressed.

Time for a break, at least I hope so, my mind sometimes works overtime on some of these arguments, and that gets tiring. Cheers from sunny Florida.

Another point to be made about propositions and Wittgenstein's hinge's, is that propositions, since they have the potential as claims or beliefs to be true or false, allow for doubt. The doubt arises because of the potential for the claim to be other than what we believe. This also extends to knowing, i.e., even if I'm justified in believing that x is true, there is still the possibility that I'm incorrect (W. says we often forget the phrase "I thought I knew." OC 12); and where this possibility doesn't exist, viz, where it is senseless to doubt, then we're dealing with hinge's.

Given the nature of propositions as claims or beliefs, viz., that they are truth-apt (can be true or false), this is what allows for doubt. If this possibility wasn't part of what we mean by proposition, then there would be no reason to doubt. What would the doubt be about? Other than you are wrong, the proposition isn't true, or you are wrong the proposition isn't false. This is the doorway to doubting someone's claim. There is much more to this though, because I think in some sense W. was trying to go beyond our conceptual framework. He was trying to come up with a conceptual framework that allowed him to talk about hinge's, and their role in our language-games. You can see this in his many descriptions of hinges, which gives rise to some of the disagreements about hinges. In one setting he seems to say one thing, in another setting something else. It's an unfinished and unpolished work. We need to keep this in mind.

There are hinges (bedrock beliefs) that are so fundamental to our lives that they are non-propositional arational beliefs. Why is this important? You've heard it many times from me and others, but it's important to this particular conversation, because these kinds of beliefs are outside the impetus for doubting. What does that mean? It means that the impetus for doubting, viz., that the belief can be true or false is removed, which is why hinges can't be doubted. Moreover, it's why hinges are neither true nor false. The language-game of doubting has no foothold, no grounding, nothing bedrock to support it. These kinds of bedrock beliefs are needed for our conceptual framework of knowing, doubting, true and false to even function as a part of our forms of life. To doubt such bedrock beliefs, is to doubt that which gives rise to doubting in the first place. If one doubted such beliefs, then as W. has said, one couldn't even be sure of the meaning of our words. Our conceptual framework (including the concepts of true and false) would simply fail to have meaning. The uses of our concepts are reality dependent, viz., they are dependent on the interactions, at a very basic level (in an animalistic sense), that allow for the structure of language, and the many kinds of language-games to evolve (again, the conceptual framework).

And, @Banno, this is a realist position, a pragmatic look at language from the framework of reality being "...all that is the case." There is no need to point to some ideal to understand what W. is saying, no need for the anti-realist position, in terms of understanding these points. However, one needs to be careful not to put W. into some particular theoretical box, be it realist or anti-realist, there are bits of both in his thinking, but W. does lean heavily in the realist direction, as do I, by the way.

Do you agree with
Wittgenstein is arguing that Moore uses the word "Know" in "I know I have a hand" incorrectly; that what he might instead have said is "I am certain act I have a hand". — Banno

Here is a quote from one of Moore's papers, A Defense of Common Sense (second paragraph of first page).

"The method I am going to use for stating it is this. I am going to begin by enunciating, under the heading (1), a whole long list of propositions, which may seem, at first sight, such obvious truisms as not to be worth stating: they are, in fact, a set of propositions, every one of which (in my own opinion) I know, with certainty, to be true."

He's arguing against Moore's use of the word know, as an epistemological use, and all that entails. For me, that entails justification and truth. Moreover, Moore is stating above, what he knows, viz., he knows these truisms are true with certainty. And, he does use the word certain, as you can see, but certainty has different uses. It can be used as a synonym for knowing as W. points out in OC 8. It can also be used to emphasize my subjective certainty, i.e., as an expression of my conviction. The use of the word know is often used like this too. Of course the use of the word know and certain when used to express the subjective, is not an epistemological use, or an objective use (that I have evidence or good reasons), it's akin to a feeling or maybe an intuition. One often confuses an expression of conviction (e.g., someone might say with emphasis, "I know I'm right." - this is just an expression of a subjective conviction) with actual knowledge, but knowledge, as you know, is established objectively (OC 14, 15).

There is a kind of certainty that is expressed in our actions, i.e., as we act within the world, our actions show our certainty. However, this use is similar to subjective certainty above, but without the use of language. I act with certainty as I open the door. My actions show that I'm certain there is a door, that I have hands, etc.

So, again, what is it that Moore knows? He's claiming to know, and also that he has the proper justification (a proof) for, the truth of his propositional claims.

"I know I have a hand" is incorrect because knowledge requires justification. — Banno

I agree, knowledge necessarily requires some justification. Again, ask yourself, what are we trying to justify if not the truth of Moore's claims? Note in OC 21 W. says that Moore's assertions are more like the concepts of a belief, a surmise, or be convinced of "...in that the statement "I know... can't be a mistake. And if that is so, then there can be an inference from such an utterance to the truth of an assertion." This is the point of Moore's claims, their truth. However, W. argues, it's as if Moore's claims, that aren't justified, force us to the truth, but how in the world do they do that if they aren't justified, i.e., how do we know their truth without justification? Moore's supposed propositions are akin to mere beliefs or mere claims, which maybe true, or they maybe false. The truth of the claims have not been established without justification, which is why they cannot be true or false, neither has been established. Moore's propositions have the potential to be true, but they also have the potential to be false; and without justification one way or the other, we just don't know, which is why they aren't truths. Moore claims they are truisms, but W. argues against this whole view of Moore's. Any claim without justification, is a claim that only has the potential to be true or false. It cannot be said to be true unless there is a justification for that truth.

There is much more to this, but I'd have to do more exegetical work.

I don't recognize my thoughts as you repeat them back to me. This isn't going anywhere, so ya, we should move on.

I don't give two shits about anti-realists. My reading has nothing to do with anti-realists. Good God, have you lost your mind. Go talk to MU, maybe you'll get you mind back.

Where did you conflate truth and belief? Right there. A proposition standing alone can have a value of true or false; but it is not a claim or a belief until it enters into relation with the person claiming our believing. — Banno

I don't mean by "stand alone"' that it's not connected to a person. Why do you think I said it's a claim or belief? A claim or belief, is by definition, connected to a person. Claims and beliefs don't pop into thin air without people. What I mean by alone, is without justification. A mere belief without justification can be either true or false. It's not true, until there is some kind of justification involved. Otherwise it's just a simple claim or belief - an opinion.

Do you really wish to claim that when Moore held up his hand and said "Here is a hand", that what he said was neither true nor false? That strikes me as absurd. — Banno

Yes! Because that is what Moore is claiming, that he knows his statements are true. And, that is what W. is arguing against. What is it that Moore is claiming to know, if not the truth of his claims, and that he's justified in claiming they're true. The only thing that's absurd is keeping truth in Moore's statements while W. is saying he doesn't know what he thinks he knows. If he doesn't know that he has hands, then it necessarily follows that he doesn't know that they're true.

You have completely gutted Wittgenstein's arguments. Moreover, it is supported by the text. In fact, the quotes you took from OC don't support your position.

If my argument doesn't follow, then you have to demonstrate which of my premises are false, which you haven't done. Simply saying it doesn't follow, doesn't suffice.

I think the distinction he makes is not between hinges and propositions, but between propositions that function as hinges and propositions that do not. That is not to say that all hinges are propositions, but to say that the statement "the earth revolves around the sun" is not a proposition because it is a hinge is to make restrictive demands on its usage. — Fooloso4

I have no problem with that view. It's probably a better way to say it.

I think there are different kinds of hinges too. I believe that non-linguistic actions, like the action of opening a door, shows my belief in the door, my hands, objects, etc. It's the certainty of the background that is the springboard to epistemology and doubt.

Yep, hinges can become propositions and propositions can become hinges — Luke

This is an important point I tried to make earlier in the thread, and it's where a lot of confusion happens. Moore's propositions (not really propositions if they are hinges) for the most part are hinges, but W. gave e.g.s, where in some contexts, they are not hinges, and therefore propositions. It's this back and forth that causes many interpretative errors in my view.

If Wittgenstein did indeed understand 'true' to mean something such that ""I've never been to the moon" is true iff I've never been to the moon", then you're right, but I've never read anything to that effect so I'd be grateful for a pointer in the right direction. — Isaac

Wittgenstein had a more pragmatic idea of truth. It was never outlined as some are doing in this thread. It was never, something is true, iff such and such (unless you're thinking in terms of the Tratatus), at least as a general rule. This would be anathema to W.'s later philosophy. For W. one looks at a variety of uses within the context of our everyday lives.

The argument is invalid, its conclusion doesn't follow (as has already been pointed out to you) and the "force" of an invalid argument can't really "end the discussion", obviously. If you want to end the discussion, you could venture a reply to my post here. — Seppo

You apparently haven't studied logic. The argument is a hypothetical syllogism, which means that it's valid. What you have to demonstrate is that one of the premises is false, i.e., that it's not sound. So, the valid form of the argument is...

If p, then q.
If q, then r.
Therefore, if p, then r.

And, since you apparently don't know the difference between a valid deductive argument and an invalid one, I'm not even sure you're qualified to say whether the argument is good or not. And, by the way, your statement that the conclusion doesn't follow is also false, because given the premises, and the validity of the form of the argument, the conclusion follows necessarily. Again, the only way to defeat the argument is to show that at least one of the premises is false.

So, maybe you should rephrase your statements.

As I understand it, Wittgenstein's concern is not with a theory of knowledge banno @Seppo @Sam26. He is examining how ordinary (non-philosophical) claims of knowledge function in our language games and with one of his ongoing concerns, how philosophers confuse themselves: — Fooloso4

I agree with you on this point. Wittgenstein is not concerned with a theory of knowledge. And, he definitely believes that ordinary use (not to be confused with every utterance the ordinary man on the street makes), viz., a kind of general picture of how language is used in our ordinary forms of life, can keep us from philosophical (I'm using philosophical in a very broad sense, because even the man on the street is subject to these confusions) confusion.

No, it doesn't, unless one also adopts an anti-realist view that is not found in Wittgenstein. Hence ↪Seppo is correct. Conflating knowledge and truth is an error. Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's knowledge claimed are not incorrect because they are not true, but because they are unjustified. — Banno

Where did I conflate knowledge with truth? The problem is in how you're interpreting what I'm saying, not that I'm conflating knowledge with truth.

A proposition standing alone, i.e., without justification, can have a value of either being true or false, it's a simple claim or belief. Thus, we say propositions are truth-apt. Knowledge on the other hand, refers to propositional claims that have been justified in some way (evidence or good reasons, for e.g.). In my argument I make this clear. At least it should be clear with a little thought.

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.
(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.
(3) Hence, if knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions. (Hypothetical Syllogism) — Sam26

The first premise in my argument says, "knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth." The process of arriving at truth, is any process (I use the word process because there are many different ways of justifying a claim) that justifies that claim, belief, statement, or proposition. I've said this plenty of times, so to say I'm conflating the two, isn't so.

The force of this argument ends the discussion as far as I'm concerned. To deny that Wittgenstein's attack on knowing isn't an attack on justification and truth, fails, in my opinion, to understand the gist of what W. is arguing. Moreover, it fails to understand the implications of W. attack on Moore's claims to know.

Happy Hunting!

Don't spin my argument into what it isn't, since it's about justification and truth. Justification and truth are necessarily intertwined. What in the world do you think I mean by the process of arriving at truth if not justification? The process of arriving at truth, is the process of giving evidence or reasons, for example, to support the truth of the claim.

Or about justification claims. Truth is only one aspect of knowledge claims. Knowledge claims are also claims about justification. — Seppo

Of course there about justification. Why do you think I say there about the process of arriving at truth. That is the justification process.

Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's claim to know such propositions is incorrect, not because the claims aren't truth-apt, but because they are not justified. — Seppo

It's not that justification stands alone in this process, apart from truth, the very act of justification is supposed to lead to the the goal of knowledge, viz. truth. You're stuck in a contradictory place. The goal of knowledge and the justification process, is, again, the truth of the claim; and here it's Moorean claims.

Knowledge claims are logically intertwined with justification and truth claims.