Indeed, this is also called karma, and keeps the round of rebirth going.
All three of your examples (the ascetic, the suicide bomber, and the sage) creatively intend, hence they are bound to the round of rebirth, and thus suffering. — baker

All instances of suffering are a result of ignorance, isolation and exclusion. Karma refers to the quality of our interconnection with the world - it isn’t bound by ethics or this ‘round of rebirth’. The idea of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ karma is a Western notion.

The suicide bomber intends to put an end to his limited awareness of suffering by removing that awareness, along with certain other aspects of the world, by active exclusion. It is a destructive, reductionist intending that unintentionally increases suffering in the world beyond the bomber’s awareness.

The ascetic is bound by an isolated focus on their ‘individual’ round of rebirth, intending to minimise any connection they appear to have with suffering in the world. Any creative intending or karma here is isolated, and cannot extend beyond the individual, isolated from the world.

The sage recognises an underlying universal flow towards interconnection, and creatively intends to minimise suffering by maximising awareness, connection and collaboration. This is karma at work - it is not bound to rebirth, but rather highlights its limitations and extends beyond, and therefore beyond suffering.

So what is one to do? If suicide isn't a real option, there is only the perpetual cycle. The illusion is that it can be broken. Schopenhauer deigned freedom by asceticism. That was a nice consolation-hope to provide, but it's simply training the mind to live with the existential striving-after more easily. That is all- a mental technique. It is not a metaphysical escape hatch. We are stuck until we are not. — schopenhauer1

Why is suicide not a real option? This seems to be where any sense of being ‘stuck’ stems from. There’s a reason why you’ve excluded suicide, whether it’s purely reasonable, aesthetic or ethical (my guess is that for you, it’s ethical - a logical calculation of perceived affect or ‘harm’). FWIW, I don’t think there IS an illusion - the cycle CAN be broken - just not by you, intentionally, owing to your position. I have no issue with your position, of course - but it is a choice you make, and then blame others for having ‘started’ (for their own reasons) what you determine to be unconscionable, yet are unwilling to stop (for your own reasons).

What is one to do? Understand that there may be a broader perspective to this than an ethical one, which is relative to the human condition. Schopenhauer, like Kant, preceded Darwin’s revolutionary decentring of human existence in the temporal development of the universe. In this context, Schopenahuer’s essential striving-after may be far broader than any perpetual and seemingly pointless cycle of life over time.

The way I see it, there is a process to the universe in which we don’t so much serve a predestined purpose as ‘creatively intend’. The variability of this creative intention extends from asceticism (minimising both interaction and harm) not just to the suicide-bomber (maximising harm), but to what Laozi refers to as ‘the sage’: a balance between maximal interaction and minimal harm.

This additional dimensionality to Schopenhauer’s approach comes from recognising a qualitative relativity to both reasonable and ethical descriptions of the human condition. Schopenhauer’s philosophical ideas show no awareness of qualitative variability - this is particularly evident in his colour theory. With a father who supposedly committed suicide and a mother who seemed far from accepting of his personal qualities, I would say this is understandable.

Do we really think that attributing blame and directing anger towards someone will repair any damage or prevent future occurrences?

Of course. Blame and anger are effective means for gaining and keeping power over others. It's why people do it. — baker

This is a common misunderstanding. It is the threat of intentional violence, oppression or exclusion that is an effective means for gaining and keeping power over others. Blame and anger use this to compensate for ignorance, isolation or exclusion of affect.

But such humility would require them to give up their identity. And --

There are few things less noble than resenting or undermining people for who they are.
— Tom Storm — baker

Not give up their identity, but recognise that this sense of who they were is not the same as who they are. The significance of identity has a temporal relativity that is subject to human ignorance, isolation and exclusion.

So we also need to watch our use of they-language. When we include ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, we recognise our own capacity to make the same errors of judgement. Using ‘they’ seeks to distance our self-awareness from the statements we make. It implies a passive self-righteousness.
— Possibility

How self-righteous, and actively so! — baker

I had a feeling you might interpret this as a judgement of you, but it’s more an understanding of us, and a call to be self-aware. You can take this how you like - just be aware of possible implications.

I do agree that our use of ‘you-language’ implies (not intends) an ‘objective’ judgement of the other based on our own moral perspective, and that using ‘I-language’ instead at least acknowledges the relativity of this perspective. I’m only proposing that we take it a step further, by acknowledging our mutual capacity for anger and blame, for instance.

You assume entirely too much and allow too little room. — baker

You’re reading more judgement in my words than is there. I’ll grant the implication is probably not intentional, but it does present an ‘out’ that we should at least be aware of, just like being aware of the relativity of an implied (not intended) judgement in ‘you-language’ .

When we include ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, we recognise our own capacity to make the same errors of judgement.
— Possibility

But perhaps we think that those might actually not be "errors of judgment" to begin with, but in fact virtues. If anything, the state of the world suggests that anger and blame are virtues, something to strive for. And that we (minority-we) are ninnies to think them vices. — baker

Sure, but then we wouldn’t have any qualms about including ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, would we? When we use ‘we-language’, we’re more likely to refrain from any sense of moral judgement of what we’re describing - any distinction between ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’. An ‘error in judgement’ is recognised as part of human nature. This way we can strive for accuracy instead of ‘goodness’, which is relative.

I guess I'm making an inference. If the person's inclination is to not repay someone for their kindness, then it's possible they lack the kindness to otherwise give their resources. — Tex

Kindness is a gift, not a transaction - not an IOU. You can’t have it both ways - you can’t consider yourself to be generous and also expect to be repaid for it. That’s lending money, not giving it. You need to be honest about this.

Right, but fundamentally a favor was done. Regardless of how it was presented, I don't understand how someone couldn't see it as such. — Tex

No - if you want to give them money and present it as if you expect nothing in return, then it isn’t a favour, it’s a gift. If you want them to see it as a favour, then you need to stop pretending that you’re giving out of the goodness of your heart.

I don’t doubt that you’re heart is in the right place. You want to be kind and generous, but you also want to not be taken advantage of. You just need to understand the difference between a favour and a gift, and be honest with yourself about your intentions.

Why? People generally don't consider it very important to understand others. In fact, they generally prefer to see themselves as the arbiters of the others' reality, they prefer to see themselves as the judges over what is true for another person, esp. concerning the other person's inner life. They make this very clear in their insistence of using you-language. — baker

Yet everyone wants ‘world peace’ - we want an end to war, violence and oppression. We just don’t want to believe we are contributing to it in any way, and we don’t want to be ‘the one to change’. We say the problem is ‘over there’, between ‘those people’, and we label them ‘evil’, when the reality is that we are likely to behave the same way in the same situation. So it’s important for us to genuinely understand ‘their’ situation, by recognising what it would take for us to intend the same behaviour, before we can understand what it would take to change the trajectory.

So we also need to watch our use of they-language. When we include ourselves in what we say about ‘people’, we recognise our own capacity to make the same errors of judgement. Using ‘they’ seeks to distance our self-awareness from the statements we make. It implies a passive self-righteousness.

Have you actually asked them for money?
— Possibility

No, I haven't. I've always believed that if I did that they would give. But now I'm starting to question that supposition. — Tex

Question it based on what? Have they given any indication that they would say no? Or are you assuming this because they haven’t offered? They asked you for some money and you gave it. How exactly have they failed to meet this reciprocal expectation when you haven’t asked them for money?

Good point, but no. I've been damn careful, from the beginning, not to allow this to happen. I've seen too many times that someone will do a favor for someone else and then use that favor to shamefully manipulate the person or the lendee shows too much deference to the lender. I want neither scenario. I hold this person in a higher regard even than myself, so in my mind the power has always been in their favor. — Tex

Interesting. If the power was always in their favour, then it’s likely they got the impression you giving them money was serving some benefit to you, rather than being a favour to them. I don’t think you can really be upset that they didn’t see it as a favour to be reciprocated, when you worked so hard to avoid it being taken as such.

Either you gave the money freely or you did it as a favour. If it was a favour, then I think you need to be honest with yourself about that - and acknowledge that you gave them the wrong impression.

As it happens, I have a brother that hasn't work in almost 15 or so years, who has been living high on the hog for over a decade now, living off the copious amount of money his unemployed Seminole Indian sperm receptacle gets from the Casino supported Commune in Florida for doing nothing other than breathing. He has never offered to help me even when I was homeless, I couldn't care less. — Garrett Travers

Like hell you don’t care. There’s a lot of anger and resentment in your choice of words here.

Have you actually asked them for money? It seems to me that any expectation of reciprocity comes into effect only when you are in the same position as they were: humbled to a point where you would ask for help. It doesn’t seem like you’re there yet.

What you may be expecting is a levelling out of the political landscape between you. The fact that you were in a position to give them money without expecting anything in return made you feel ‘good’ - not because you were doing something ‘good’, but because of the power differential it established between you. That differential has switched, and that’s what bothers you. Otherwise, you’d have no qualms asking them for money if you needed it. Most people don’t realise how much courage and humility it takes to ask someone else to just give you money with no strings attached.

So I don’t think it’s about reciprocity at all. First, forget about the past - the money you’ve given and the windfall they’ve since received - and just accept that you’re now both in a position where you don’t require financial assistance. Be happy for that. Then, trust that if you’re ever in a bind and had to actually ask for money, you can expect this reciprocity from them. Or don’t trust, and just ask them.

There is no such thing as "narrowly focused" on the most complex and sophisticated computational entity in the known universe. Such a "narrow" categorization is not just a reductionist fallacy, but an avoidance of established science in favor of feelings. If your conclusions on such emotions are non predominantly predicated on the assessments provided by cognitive neursoscience, and as much data as you can accrue in the field, then you have no opinion. You're simply just positing thoughts. Furthermore, this statement is completely incoherent. There is no "pre-cognitive" anything in human experience, it's made-up bullshit and a further reduction. "Creative/consolidating relation" describes what appears to be nothing that makes any rational sense. And objects of attention are observed, not created. In other words, only that which exists can be apprehended by the brain in the form of sensory data and analyzed across its astronomically advanced system of networks. This is all complete gibberish. — Garrett Travers

Wow. He doth protest too much, methinks.

Sure, cognition as computation is the best we can get - and that’s fine if computation is all we’re after. I’m not denying that cognition can efficiently process almost all of human experience. Almost. And I get that what it cannot process is arguably not worth your attention. That’s an opinion, and you’re welcome to it. It’s a choice you make to dismiss any aspect of experience that makes no rational sense, just as it’s a choice I make not to. That doesn’t mean I prefer feelings to cognition, or to established science - that’s a false dichotomy. But I maintain that cognition is a narrow focus when it comes to attention - my use of ‘narrow’ being relative to the reality of experience, not to other forms of computation. If cognition were really as comprehensive as you believe, then it shouldn’t need you to come to its rescue against these ‘feelings’. It would stand up to any of the thoughts I’ve posited.

There seems to be more to human attention and more to what exists than what can be apprehended, let alone analysed. None of that would capture your attention, of course - no, it needs to be consolidated into an object for you first. Only then can you observe it as such, as if it was already there. This is a limitation you intentionally impose on how you process experience. Fair enough, uncertainty is scary. But you’re in no position to impose the same limitation on me.

Creativity is ‘making sense’ of reality. It involves awareness of, connection and collaboration with all possible qualitative ideas and available energy as well as logical structure. Feelings aren’t much use to cognition without rationality, but neither are they accurately experienced if we reduce their quality or energy to only what cognition can process - ie. only what is rational. The thing is that quality or energy may exist and even be experienced without any initial sense being ‘made’ of it. This is little more than ‘noise’ that has a quality and/or energy about it. Yes, it’s arguably ‘incoherent’ or ‘gibberish’ in relation to cognition, but it does exist (although it is no-thing). The fact that it makes no rational sense is meaningful in relation to understanding the limitations of human cognition, and its underlying susceptibility to distortions of affect.

But you go ahead and aggressively dismiss it. Use all that cognitive power you have at your disposal. I’m sure that’ll work. It’s not like qualitative relations of energetic improbability ever emerged to consolidate into anything worthwhile, like the universe, life or consciousness...so go ahead and forget I even brought it up...

You mentioned attention and effort. Attention and cognitive effort are central features of many contemporary cognitive theories. These concepts as they are used in cognitive models assume that attention and effort are processes that are themselves conditioned. They use experimental manipulations to attempt to demonstrate this. Phenomenolgosts like Eugene Gendlin and Husserl critique this idea of attention as a kind of spotlight. They instead argue that attention is a creative process. We create what we are attending ro rather than noticing something that was assumed to be already there.
The difference here is between a causative model and an intentional one. Causative models are semi-arbitrary and based on conditioning. They imply the concepts of anger and blame , because these have to do with our experience of others behavior as semi-arbitrary and subject to shaping influences. We’re. it talking about moral condemnation here , just simple irritation and annoyance. Those are enough to lead us to try to ‘forcefully’ reshape attention and effort, rather than recognize that we always act to define and extend our understanding of the world in the most appropriate fashion available to us at the time, given our pepe-existing knowledge. — Joshs

I’m with you here. Cognitive theories, being narrowly focused on cognition, fail to recognise attention and effort as a pre-cognitive, creative/consolidating relation. In creating the object of our attention, we simultaneously consolidate the subject who attends - neither of which can be assumed to be ‘already there’ as such.

Although our needs and feelings , far from being separable from a mitral, rational understanding of the situation , form the very basic of our rationality. Strongly polarized feelings between disputants are manifestations of different paradigms of rationality, different worldviews. — Joshs

Agreed. And when we recognise this, it should be clear that whatever reality may be in itself must include what appears to us irrational.

The other logical possibility is that consciousness is uncreated. — Janus

:up:

We are part of the world of course. But it doesn't seem that the world depends on us, on our perceiving it, in order to exist. Of course to exist in the form in which we (uniquely) perceive, it does depend on us, but even there we also depend on it, or at least that seems most plausible.

I agree that we might think that ultimately, or primordially, experience is prior to the subject-object distinction; but there we would be feigning to dip into the pre-cognitive ocean of being, and I think we can only hint at that, because all we can propositionally say remains firmly in the cognitive realm of subjects and objects.

So, I meant to say that we are affected pre-cognitively, and that 'affect' in this sense signifies some process prior to perception whereby our senses collaborate with the world (as part of, or not separate from, the world, of course) to give rise to sensory phenomena and the conscious and unconscious affects (or responses) we experience in respect of those. — Janus

Ok, so let’s not worry so much about making propositions, then. Let’s understand language as a logical structuring of qualitative ideas relative to affect. Let’s recognise this relativity even in our relation to propositions, rather than taking them on face value, as if subjects and objects exist unaffected. Because only pre-cognitive language structures such as traditional Chinese ideograms exist free from affect. Word concepts do not.

FWIW, I don’t believe this relativity is impossible to navigate, just complex and uncertain. But then, so is life, if we’re honest.

The legal situations are derivations of the intimate interpersonal interactions we experience. Here we can see how blame and anger are remarkably sensitive manifestations of rifts in the subtle and vulnerable bonds of expectation and trust we develop with our families, friends and acquaintances. Why did my spouse cheat on me , why did my friend insult me, why hasn’t my child called me lately? These are deeply intimate , surprising disappointments in our sense of how others think about us. We thought they cared for us, and now they seem to callously reject us. The hinge of anger and blame is the proximity we feel the other has to our needs and feelings. This is what gives anger the fuel to try to influence the other back into the fold, because we believe at some level they are close to their previous caring self and can be coaxed or forced back to that intimacy with us.
Justice, laws and rules retain this structure of hopeful coaxing or forcing. If we look at the cultural history of blame, we see that as our views of the psychology of interpersonal blame evolves, our notion of legal blame evolves in tandem with it. — Joshs

This corresponds to the increase in arbitration and mediation for legal situations regarding harm, disappointment or feelings of rejection.

I am wary of anger used as a tool for interaction - to try to ‘coax or force’ another back into intimacy, for instance. There may be an alternative perspective to what you’ve described here. Feelings of anger are a warning sign that the interaction is flawed. Using anger as a tool in this situation seems not so much a ‘hopeful coaxing’ but expressing a selfish threat to withdraw intimacy - believing our position, our needs and feelings, to be uncompromisingly central to the relationship.

Legal tools such as arbitration or mediation focus on the relation itself or ongoing interaction as central, rather than the ‘needs and feelings’ of one or the other party. That isn’t to say that our needs and feelings have no value, but that they form only one aspect of a broader reality - one in which justice, laws, rules and blame could be considered arbitrary.

Though was this thread talking about anger as a tool for interaction or for a tool for analysis? For instance, seeing an issue like the Israeli-Palestine conflict or the Russian-Ukrainian conflict through the lens of anger and blame? What is the better way? — Judaka

I think the Israeli-Palestine conflict is a clear example of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of blame and anger. What would a win-win situation look like here? Everyone is so focused on the significance of history in such a limited space, they’re ignoring aspects of the present reality. They acknowledge present pain and loss, but what’s not being recognised is the present state of humility. This is why the conflict continues, because both sides focus on past or consolidated pride to avoid a sense of humility in any present or future interaction.

Humility in this sense isn’t self-blame, though - it’s being honest about how far our present reality is from where we expect or prefer it to be, and about the distribution of attention and effort over time required to close the gap. Keeping in mind that we can only intend forward in time, and anything worth doing well involves choosing awareness over ignorance, connection over isolation and collaboration over exclusion.

Better to direct it towards increasing our capacity for awareness, consideration or carein future situations. — Possibility

Blame skeptics like Derk Pereboom make a distinction between forward looking and backward looking blame. Backward looking blame tends to be retributive, whereas forward looking blame aims to minimize future incidents.
I should note that focusing on increasing our care and consideration implies that we believe we were acting carelessly and inconsiderately, which I consider to be forms of anger-blame. — Joshs

Sure, it can imply that - if you’re focusing on consolidating a judgement of past behaviour; backward-looking blame, as you say. But the distribution of attention and effort I’m referring to here is more in line with taking responsibility in future interactions, rather than being morally responsible for past behaviour.

I worry that we may have in our minds differing images of context for anger and blame, at the very least, I can agree that anger and blame are not always high-quality, reliable tools for arbitration. They can be inappropriate and unhelpful. If your argument is that anger and blame are never useful then we disagree. Blame and anger communicate a stern warning, that some behaviour or decision was inappropriate and sometimes there can be some opportunity to rectify things, apologise and correct. Anger can be handled in a measured way and it can be communicated respectfully.

I don't like to talk too much about this kind of subject without context, it is very context dependant. Anger is not always a bad emotion, sometimes people get angry because they care, or it can be used to emphasise a point. Sometimes, anger is a performance, it fulfils some other objective, like showing how you feel. And how it's communicated matters a lot. — Judaka

It seems that you’re reluctant to put aside anger as a useful ‘tool’ for interaction. I do get that, and I’m certainly not saying that anger is a ‘bad’ emotion, because I don’t think those kinds of judgements are useful at all. But I do think it’s inefficient, and often ineffective, as a ‘tool’ for any interaction.

I don’t accept that people get angry simply because they care - there’s more to it than that. I think we get angry because our connection makes us afraid (of pain, loss or humility) and we’re not willing to accept that fear. I also think that if we need to use anger to emphasise a point, then there’s a communication issue somewhere. Likewise, if anger is our go-to method for expressing how we feel, then I think there’s a need to improve awareness, connection or collaboration in how we interact. This is what I mean by anger being useful in self-awareness.

Anger is a warning sign that the interaction is flawed. Feeling it is not the issue - using it as a ‘tool’ on someone else is. Communicating a perceived inappropriateness of behaviour doesn’t require an expression of anger on my part, unless I’m actively refusing to accept any part in the interaction. When I communicate respectfully, it isn’t the anger that I need to communicate, but my awareness and ongoing connection regarding the flawed interaction - along with my willingness to collaborate in repairing it. Blame and anger just make this more difficult, because they keep my attention and effort directed towards what I cannot change, ie. the past, other people’s behaviour or decisions, etc.

Anger and blame can be valuable, I don't condemn them without context. I think that people will disagree, we know this, and we know people are different, thus I think our approach should tolerate difference and handle differences with the utmost grace and respect. When something is unfair or harmful, that's when for things to continue running smoothly, some kind of arbitration is needed. — Judaka

Anger and blame could be valuable only in self-awareness, not in directing towards others. If we believe ourselves righteous in anger towards someone, it’s a sure sign that we don’t understand where they’re coming from. That should give us pause.

Do we really think that attributing blame and directing anger towards someone will repair any damage or prevent future occurrences? Can we predict their response to us that accurately, or are we imposing our assumptions on how they should respond? When something is unfair or harmful, by all means we should take steps to redirect those energies, but I don’t think that can be achieved through blame or anger.

Arbitration is about judgement required to settle a dispute - it’s not about attributing blame, but rather redirecting attention and effort towards seeing that damages are repaired and/or recurrences of unfairness or harm are prevented.

What's to note, nevertheless, is that if you'd been (more) careful, if you'd thought things through, if you'd been just that much more wiser, you could've easily eliminated the uncontrollable variables in the anger-blame equation (Fortuna & other people) and that empowers you (you're in charge of your life, emotions, etc.), but at the same time, that makes you responsible for any calamity that befalls you (you yourself are to blame for your mishaps, small & big). — Agent Smith

I wouldn’t say wholly responsible for any calamity that befalls me, but responsible at least for my part in it. To eliminate blame is to also refrain from self-blame. Mishaps happen, and they make demands on our attention and effort that we didn’t expect and weren’t prepared for. If we could be honest in attributing blame, then we may be just as angry at ourselves as we would be towards others. But even when we blame ourselves, how often do those we love bear the brunt of our self-deprecating anger? And how many cop the anger they supposedly deserve as well as what we should have inflicted on ourselves? Acknowledging our own part in the mishap - our lack of awareness, consideration or care - should eliminate the majority of blame and therefore the anger directed towards others, but it often compounds the anger instead.

Blame is a way of directing our attention and effort towards a determined cause of pain, humility or loss after the event, which is unlikely to reduce future instances. It’s wasted, if you ask me. Better to direct it towards increasing our capacity for awareness, consideration or care in future situations.

Don't you accept that we are affected by the world below the level of our conscious awareness? If you want to say that we construct the world, that each one of us constructs our own worlds, and that we are not affected by anything unconsciously or other than ourselves, that would be pure idealism and then we should know just how we construct the world. But we do not and the idea seems incoherent and absurd. — Janus

Well, that depends on what you consider ‘the world’ to be, as distinct from ‘we’. At what point do we end and the world begins? My point is that affect refers to a relative aspect of energy at the level of potentiality. Language structure insists on a subject-object distinction, describing the relation of ‘affect’ as a verb - but I think this can limit our understanding of what affect is in potentiality. The more we understand the broader scope of affect in potentiality, the more self-consciously we can collaborate in the process.

You say "collaboration with the world" which is pretty much what I've been saying, but then when you claim that we are not affected in the sense of being acted upon by things other than ourselves, you seem to be denying that very collaboration. — Janus

For me, there is a subtle but important qualitative difference between ‘collaborating with’ and ‘being acted upon by’. It goes back to the Tao Te Ching, and the idea of wu-wei, or ‘acting as’. Collaboration refers to a direction of intentionality rather than just effort. It’s about our capacity to anticipate the most efficient and effective directional flow of energy through our ‘being in the world’. So it isn’t that “we should just know how we construct the world”, but that we are at least capable of more accurately understanding how we can participate in the ongoing creative process.

You say that depression may be "more accurately described as an ineffective distribution of attention and effort"; as though it all relies on the willing subject, and I can only say that if you had ever suffered from severe depression you would not say that. Depression can result from "abnormal" brain chemistry, and that fact is uncontroversial. — Janus

But again, I am suggesting that we put aside this subject-object distinction in order to more accurately understand ideas such as affect, reason and value beyond the limitations of language structure or a subjective will. I’m not sure what you’re offended by: there is nothing in my description as it’s written to identify subject in relation to object, so you’re imposing your own assumptions here. ‘Abnormal brain chemistry’ is one way to describe what ‘causes’ depression, but the fact that such a description relies on Big Pharma to ‘fix what’s wrong’ with someone doesn’t sit well with me. Personally, I suspect the growing prevalence of depression has more to do with an evolution of ‘brain chemistry’ (towards greater variability) than any apparent ‘abnormality’ (which is a value judgement), but I’m not really in any position to back this up.

Also I haven't said that affect is nothing but energy. Everything is energy of one kind or another, but it doesn't follow that anything is nothing but energy. — Janus

We are agreed here, at least.

Depression can appear to be a force restraining us, but it, too, may be more accurately described as an ineffective distribution of attention and effort.
— Possibility

Or perhaps it is better understood as a way in which the world appears relevant to us in our darkness. In other words, not some inner constraint on engagement with the world , but a way of being situated in the world that is neither simply due to inner nor outer causes. — Joshs

This works in psychology, sure - and without destroying any illusion of ‘individuality’. So yes, it is affectively ‘better understood’. I was going for accuracy.

For Husserl affect is directed both from the subject side of an intentional experience and from the object side. The object exerts an attractive pull on the subject and the subject turns toward the object. We notice the object when it stands out from a field, and draws our attention. From the side of the subject there is an affective pull also, a drive or striving to know the object better, that is , to anticipate its future appearances.

From both the objective and subjective sides, what is key for Husserl is that the affective meaningfulness of an experience is linked to how similar we can perceive it to be with respect to previous experience. So affect isnt simply a neutral or mechanical
energy, it is inextricably linked with the relevance of objects for a subject — Joshs

Thanks Josh. An interesting spotlight on Husserl. This is what I mean by the complication of a subject-object dichotomy in language use, and the relativity of affect. I don’t consider affect to be mechanical - for me that’s effort. If we dispense with this subject-object dichotomy for a moment, then energy has a neutral possibility only in the context of infinite interconnectedness. Affect is not that, either.

What I think Husserl shows here is that affect is a relative aspect of both subject and object - suggesting that there is more to affect than we can understand by assuming either of these two cognitive positions.

Yes, but what makes attention possible? Husserl argues that after it isn’t just shining a spotlight on something already there, it is a creative act, the making of something. — Joshs

Affect is relative to human experiences of logic and quality. Quantum mechanics makes the most sense to us when effort is logically quantitative and attention is qualitatively practical - but few physicists work across both areas. Rather, they focus on one and take the other as given. Attention, then, is often thought of as the qualitative, intentional aspect of affect - and confined to the domain of psychology. In quantum physics, it is attention that complicates our logically quantitative descriptions of reality with qualitative evidence of entanglement, spin direction and indeterminacy.

I like the idea of attention as a creative impetus - the qualitative value of any perceived relation. What makes it possible, I think, is this idea of qualitative interconnectedness: the mere possibility of a ‘oneness’ to the relational structure of reality.

Right, affect can be considered to be something acting upon us, primordially speaking, even unconsciously. It can also be considered to be a felt impulse or emotion. In the cases where what holds us back is not a negative affect it would seem to be a lack of affect. I would also say that there is a sense in which lack of affect amounts to a force restraining us; think about depression, for example. — Janus

I can see how it would seem that way. But I would argue that ‘affect’ considered as something acting upon us is inaccurate. Affect is part of us, part of our awareness, connection and collaboration with the world. It refers to an ongoing distribution of attention and effort. When what we experience appears to be a ‘lack of affect’, it translates to insufficient attention and/or effort directed towards a particular aspect of experience, rather than a generalised lack. Depression can appear to be a force restraining us, but it, too, may be more accurately described as an ineffective distribution of attention and effort.

This is the problem with affect=energy that I think Astrophel was pointing out. Perhaps take a look at Lisa Feldman Barrett’s How Emotions Are Made.

I stand by what I wrote - but I can see why the argument was made. Phenomenology acknowledges its affected position. Energy = affect when understood from beyond affect.
— Possibility

Doesn't affect feel like energy to us though? Something moves us, and we know from our embodied experience that all movement requires effort (energy); we feel the energy of that movement. What is emotion if not e-motion? — Janus

It’s more than just feeling energy, though. You’re referring to affect as positive energy, but affect is also inclusive of what holds us back, what renders us ignorant or non-responsive - and even this language inaccurately implies a force acting on us, when that isn’t the case. Not just energy, not just emotion, but also the lack thereof; Sometimes movement consists of more than just where effort is directed, but where it isn’t, or where it’s redirected from. Same with attention.

Consider change as a localised 3D relation of energy, effort as a localised 4D relation of energy, and affect as localised 5D relation of energy. It’s a matter of perspective.

An accurate understanding of pleasure/pain, for instance, must take into account the relativity of reason
— Possibility

This one I find curious. Is reason relative? Judgments are, but not in their form, rather in their content. — Astrophel

Kant’s understanding of reason is logic relative to human experience. From our perspective, there’s no reason to consider logic beyond reason, and no real capacity to talk about it. But I would argue that an accurately practical understanding of reality is inclusive of unreasonable logic. It’s a further Copernican turn away from Kant.

I can see your point. ‘Energy’ is a placeholder for the possibility from which affect emerges.
— Possibility

'Affect' in a precognitive phenomenological sense would precisely be energy, since there is no affect without change and no change without energy, so I think you should stick to your guns.. — Janus

I stand by what I wrote - but I can see why the argument was made. Phenomenology acknowledges its affected position. Energy = affect when understood from beyond affect.

Hmmm...but mustn’t I think, in order for there to be thoughts to be aware of? Can’t infer that which has happened. — Mww

Based on what? All you have is your awareness of those thoughts as evidence, and your understanding that thought = evidence of thinking. This does not amount to an awareness of thinking, but an inference. You can infer that which ‘has happened’ beyond your conscious awareness - remember, the awareness of thought and inference of thinking are simultaneous.

True enough, and transposing, we have.....I am aware of the emergence of correlations and connections. But that which correlates and connects is still required. — Mww

This is letting language structure limit understanding. There is an existing possibility of interconnectedness and correlation between all ideas. All that is required is attention and effort directed towards qualities. Correlations and connections refer to potentialities, not actions. The intention of a subject is not required.

This awareness is practical in the sense that it’s temporally located, whereas awareness of thought need not be.
— Possibility

Are you aware of having more than one thought at a time? I submit you are not, because thought is singular and successive, which makes them temporally located, if only in respect to each other. — Mww

But can you be aware of more than one thought at a time? I submit that you can - because once I’m aware of thought, it ceases to be a temporal entity. What I guess I’m trying to say here, though, is that awareness of thought need not be preceded by awareness of the thinking behind it.

This is the ground for moral, as opposed to epistemological, philosophy. Freedom, will, duty, interests, pleasure/pain, imperatives, and so on, are still conceived by understanding, and cognitions related to them are used in discussions about moral philosophy, but the doing of it, the determining of the moral worth of actions, and the moral worthiness of individuals because of them, do not. — Mww

Sorry, you lost me here.

I’m not a fan of moral philosophy as such - I don’t think it’s useful at all for us to try and determine the moral worth of anything but our own intentions. Freedom, will, duty, interests, pleasure/pain, imperative, etc - all of these conceptions exist relative to affect, and so any cognitions related to them are necessarily distorted by this, filling any discussion with relational inaccuracies. You can see it in almost every thread on these topics, despite the best intentions of posters. An accurate understanding of pleasure/pain, for instance, must take into account the relativity of reason, both to ‘the good’ and to affect as limitations to human knowledge, but not to understanding. An accurate discussion of pleasure/pain needs to at least initially refrain from both concept consolidation and judgement - rendering all expressions of feelings valid, worthy. But this is not how most philosophy is done. Reductionist methodology invariably kicks in well before all available information is gathered.

Kant doesn’t say much about good in itself, except to say there is only one of its kind, that being the will. Tough pill to swallow for some, who mistake the goodness of a thing to represent the good in itself. In which case, the will has absolutely no power whatsoever, and consequently, deontological moral philosophy disappears. Those that mistake are the same that joyously wave bye-bye, I’m sure.

In fact, moral philosophy in Kant has more power than the epistemology of pure reason, so he doesn’t prefer pure reason over the good.

“...The superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of reason. (...) Now moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws—for the regulation of our actions—which are deduced from principles entirely a priori....” (A840/B868) — Mww

Acknowledging power or superior position is not the same as personal preference. Kant only critiques practical reason in relation to a ‘good will’, as if the will and the good were a singular entity which gives power to reason. Kant’s understanding of the relationship between reason, the will and the good is distorted by the fixed central position he gives to human experience. It is only when we decentralise this experience and consider a broader understanding of these aspects (beyond the object-subject distinction) that the relationship becomes clearer.

Regardless of moral philosophy, will is the faculty by which a person decides on and initiates action - or more broadly, by which all change is determined and initiated. It consists of three ‘gates’: awareness/ignorance, connection/isolation and collaboration/exclusion.

Energy, quality and logic all influence the capacity of the will. Kant’s idea of a ‘good will’ is the maximal capacity for awareness, connection and collaboration of any one person at any one time. This is highly variable in terms of energy availability, which affects attention and effort. So, any judgement that someone else should (or should not) have acted in a certain way doesn’t take into account any difference in the energy available to a ‘good will’.

A couple of things. One is, energy is not another word for affect. In fact, I don't know what energy is, and neither do physicists beyond something blatantly question begging. Affect designates the emotional and attitudinal and even valuative phenomena in general and this takes one directly to the intuition of a pain or a feeling of contentment and this kind of thing. — Astrophel

I can see your point. ‘Energy’ is a placeholder for the possibility from which affect emerges. I use ‘energy’ precisely because we don’t know what it is, and yet what affect does corresponds to what energy does: designates attention and effort across spacetime interaction. Except energy in physics is free from qualitative valuation, whereas affect is limited by it. So affect, as I see it, is a localised, logical reduction of energy by way of quality.

My first priority to clarity in thinking philosophically is recognize that there is only one authority and that is intuited presence of the world and its objects. Everything there is to talk about is there first. — Astrophel

This is where I tend to depart from traditional Western philosophy: recognising only one authority renders thinking clearer within language constraints, sure - but I find it lacks the accuracy required for wisdom. I prefer accuracy of understanding over clarity of thinking - this makes it difficult to write about my philosophy from a static perspective, granted, but much easier to practice it. I’m working on that.

The good as quality: Okay, but how is this demonstrated in the world? What is the context, that is? We talk about good couches and bad shoes all the time, and the standards are variable: maybe I want uncomfortable shoes (recall the Chinese practice of foot binding). Most think this variability demonstrates a variability in ethics, and this shows ethics has no foundation beyond the vagaries of subjectivity.
But this thinking is absurd. What we really want to know at the basic level is when a person says something is good, what does this mean in a non contingent way, just as we ask about reason what it is in a way that sets aside its incidentals (we are all rational about different things). This requires a transcendental deduction of affectivity. — Astrophel

‘The good’ refers to a localised, logical reduction of quality by way of ‘energy’. Ethics is limited by (relative to) affect: the attention and effort each of us is prepared to designate anywhere at any moment. The Chinese practice of foot binding is painful for the wearer, not so much for the parent who inflicts it, and even less for the future husband who values apperception of its results.

I am afraid I am quite on the opposite end of this from Kant. — Astrophel

I find myself somewhere in between, proposing a triadic model. Kant claims that pure reason has primacy as the structure of reality; you claim the substantiation of reality is affectivity. Both of you then appear to direct humanity towards embodying the good - an impossible task thwarted by this apparent opposition.

But it’s only an opposition if we want it to be. When we view these positions in terms of a triadic model - pure reason (logic), affect (energy) and the good (quality) - then what was a dichotomy is now a stable triadic system in which human experience is capable of embodying (and further purifying our understanding of) each position in turn, providing the necessary checks and balances to human knowledge.

I am thoroughly enjoying your discussion here with Mww, by the way. There’s so much there.

Can I ever think, and be unaware that I think? If not, then when I think I am necessarily, and simultaneously, aware of it. Even granting that as practical self-awareness, it remains that it is only the singular “I” that thinks and is at the same time the very same “I” that is aware of thoughts. — Mww

In a way, yes. When I think what I am aware of is thought and its phenomenal effects. But thought is the result of thinking - when I am aware of thoughts, thinking is inferred. So I predict what that thinking would most likely be, based on existing conceptual structures. Time is not an issue here - all awareness at this five-dimensional cognitive level is simultaneous.

If we’re honest, it is thought and not thinking that we’re aware of in most cases when we say ‘I think’. The ‘I’ that thinks is aware of thoughts, but not directly aware of thinking. When we talk about ‘thinking’ as philosophers, mostly we’re using our existing concepts to substantiate the inference from an awareness of thoughts. Awareness of thinking involves much more than an isolated cognitive system - a more complex and interconnected ‘I’.

By practical (transcendental) self-awareness I’m referring to meditative practices or deep philosophical self-reflection, beyond conceptualisation. This awareness is practical in the sense that it’s temporally located, whereas awareness of thought need not be. We entertain some correlations by thinking (forming connected ideas), integrate plenty of others unexamined, and ignore, isolate or exclude the rest according to affectivity.

Because Kant’s system brackets out this affectivity and strives to isolate the cognitive system, it is largely ignorant of the broader context in which thinking occurs. Hence the question:

What would a thought emerge from, and with what do we recognize it as such? — Mww

Thoughts emerge from correlations and connections between qualitative (non-conceptual) ideas. We recognise thoughts as a form of connected ideas with our capacity for understanding beyond cognition: an awareness that thinking is not the only method for correlating ideas - nor necessarily the best. Kant barely touches on this capacity in CofJ - but in backing away from it reveals his own affect: a personal preference for pure reason over the good. This capacity for human understanding that looks at the world as an embodiment of the Good and the Beautiful - from a position of pure, non-judgemental logic - is Kant’s event horizon.

First of all, I am conscious of my lack of academic rigour in this discussion, so I appreciate your charitable responses, Mww, as well as the direct quotes you provide throughout. They’ve been really helpful.

A thinker is not identical to his thoughts....
— Possibility

In which case, “I think” is an anomaly? A genuine falsehood? If it is not “I” that thinks, or, if it is not thinking that the conception “I” represents, then how is it possible to arrive at conclusions which demand such an unimpeachable origin? If “a thinker is not his thoughts” is a conclusion derived from your own thoughts, in keeping with the truth of the assertion, you are then left with the necessary implication that you are not a thinker. I wonder.....what degree of self-awareness am I missing, such that I do not recognize that this seemingly inescapable subterfuge, is of my own making? — Mww

It isn’t derived from thoughts, but from practical self-awareness - when we can recognise thoughts as they emerge then we understand the ‘I’ that thinks is not identical to the ‘I’ that is aware of thought - but it isn’t true to assert that they are distinct conceptions, only that they are not identical.

Understanding consists of more than what can be asserted, let alone proven.

The content is the synthesis of related schema, but it is the describer that synthesizes. Because it is absurd to suggest schema relate themselves, a rational consciousness in the form of a describer....for lack of a better word.....is absolutely necessary, otherwise the synthesis, the relation of schema to each other, thereby the description itself, never happens. A description is, after all, and for all intents and purposes, merely an empirical cognition. — Mww

Your understanding of describer, schema and description here is limited to mind, with describer elevated to an encompassing rational consciousness. What I’m suggesting here is that this triadic relation extend to include human reason instead of appointing it outside arbiter - an additional Copernican Turn, as it were. The resulting description, more than merely an empirical cognition, would be a five-dimensional ‘geometric figure’ of potentiality, ‘drawn’ as a relation between consciousness and potential schema (within six-dimensional ‘meaning’).

I’m not suggesting schema relate themselves, but that the idea of schema need not be limited by logic. Nor the ideas of describer or description, for that matter. Once we recognise the limitations of human knowledge/potential set out by Kant, we can strive to better understand the reality beyond it - as Copernicus (and then Newton) did with human observation/measurement in relation to time.

I’m not suggesting that describer, description or even schema exist without the other two. Reality is triadic - that’s my point.
— Possibility

While the first is true enough, the second implies the general tripartite human cognitive system is part and parcel of reality. I think this an altogether too loose rendition of the established definitions, myself. I think the empirically real holds with a different qualification than the logically real. If logically valid is substituted for the logically real, the dichotomy becomes false and immediately disappears, and reality indicates merely the naturally real. From which it follows necessarily, that the tripartite human cognitive system, being a metaphysical paradigm, is never found in natural reality. Which leaves the question, how is reality triadic, unanswered. — Mww

It probably is too loose. I’m suggesting that the general tripartite human cognitive system is a model for a similarly triadic system of reality that is inclusive of human cognition, rather than limited by it. I agree that the empirically real (4D) is qualitatively different to the logically real (5D), but the correlation is not all that difficult to navigate as a geometrical schema. You cannot accurately describe the human cognitive system from an assumed rational consciousness within it, just as you cannot accurately describe the solar system from an assumed stationary location within it.

I think that the inaccuracy of Kant’s system comes from assuming a central, immovable position to ‘rational’ human consciousness. I would argue that if we go back and follow a similar process to Kant’s Copernican Turn in light of Darwin’s (temporal) de-centralisation of human experience, it can allow for an alternative reading of Kant. I would suggest that logic is one of three conditions for human understanding (wisdom), alongside natural affect and qualitative relativity. Surely ‘good’ philosophy strives towards this level of wisdom, and is not limited to only what can be logically asserted or proven?

Which is to say, consciousness is other than its content. I think this an unnecessary reduction. A describer that does not describe is a contradiction, and a description that does not arise from a describer, is impossible. Parsimony, and good philosophy, suggests the thinker and his thoughts are, if not identical, than at least indistinguishable. — Mww

A thinker is not identical to his thoughts, and any thinker who is unable to recognise this lacks a degree of self-awareness in my book. But either this is ‘an unnecessary reduction’, or it lacks parsimony - it can’t be both, can it?

A description does not arise wholly from a describer, but consists of the relation between describer and schema. To clarify, I’m not suggesting that describer, description or even schema exist without the other two. Reality is triadic - that’s my point. Any description of reality is in necessary relation to both describer and schema - neither of which are wholly included in that description, or its only source, for that matter.

Kant’s description is purely logical only beyond the fourth moment - beyond judgement, imagination and reason - when describer is pure affect and schema is pure relation. This is where the genius, the artist, resides. FWIW, the TTC proposes a purely logical schema in a relational description, most accurate when the describer is pure affect. This is the where the sage resides.

Taoism isn’t so much a ‘preferred philosophy’ for me as enlightening in relation to Kant. Kant’s CofJ explores the limitations of a purely logical description, where his first critique explored the limitations of a purely logical describer, and his second explored the limitations of a purely logical schema. What he didn’t appear to realise was that it was never a matter of the subject in a dyadic relation to object. Each critique highlighted an error in how we process knowledge, rendering affect/desire and qualitative relation indistinguishable, to some extent, in the name of parsimony.

If these four proofs are true then humanities existence is not a mistake and humanities ability to create meaning from seemingly nothing is also not a mistake. If we exist within reality then we are one part of the blue print of reality and if no event which occurs within reality can be classified as a mistake than our ability to create meaning for our own is existence is not a mistake.

To me this is just a complicated way of saying that by creating meaning for the decisions you make in life you are doing exactly what a human meant to do. — vanzhandz

A mistake is the difference between prediction/knowledge and observation/experience, as attributed to either the prediction or to the observation. Mistakes, like beauty, are in the eye of the beholder. A mistake exists only when either prediction or observation is considered ‘true’.

Humanity’s ability to create meaning from seemingly nothing is a perception of humanity. What we do when we ‘create meaning’ is describe reality as an ongoing potential relationship between knowledge and experience. It’s only ‘nothing’ when either knowledge or experience is considered ‘true’. It’s just ‘mistakes’ viewed at a different level.

What a human is ‘meant to do’, then, is open-ended. How long is a piece of string? Was Hitler doing what a human was meant to do? I don’t think meaning is quite that simple.

Such are the ‘logical’ constraints of language, which positions the reader/observer always outside any description of reality
— Possibility

This is true, but Kantian metaphysics has nothing to do with the logical restraints of language, per se. It is not concerned with the reader/observer, but of the thinker. The logical restraints of reason, now, which has no need of language, is itself sufficient causality for the thinking subject to be the immediate describer of reality, or, in fact, anything at all, hence cannot be outside such descriptions. — Mww

And yet the thinker, even as the immediate describer of reality, is to an extent other than their description. Inclusive reality consists of schema + description + describer. Kant’s describer, the thinking subject, is at times logical, affected and relative. I think the key to his philosophy (in light of the TTC) is to recognise that when we describe a logical reality, we do so from an affected position, using a relative schema. To the extent that we claim a logical position ourselves as describer, our resulting description is also relative, affected. So long as we approach reality with this understanding, then Kant’s philosophy can guide us to think, intend or feel with clarity. But that’s not how most people read Kant.

n Kant, “directional flow of energy” aside, this affect/desire is separable, as affects on the subject, and desires of the subject, differences in principles, origins and manifestations being rather obvious, I should think. The judgements here are aesthetic, concepts relate to each other, the imagination is “...productive...”, practical reason being the logical arbiter. — Mww

Practical reason does seem to be the ‘logical’ arbiter, but only to the extent that humans act logically - we can, but we rarely do, particularly when available attention or effort is limited.

But it seems like you’re quantifying ‘affects’ (effects?) or ‘desires’ as different properties attributable to the subject, where I’ve used ‘affect/desire’ in reference to a directional aspect of experience, as potential energy - attention/effort in a relation. It isn’t so much separable as reducible - alignment with Nature as described in the TTC is a step beyond Kant’s idea of ‘harmony’, recognising affect/desire for what it is: the flow of energy through an empty schema of logical and qualitative relations, of which the reader/observer is a part. Affect has a purposeful absence from the TTC - how we interpret the text, directing the flow of energy (attention/effort) through the schema, is precisely what is missing from that schema in relation to reality: ourselves.

Kant’s schema on the other hand, cannot account for the human limitations of affected, relative logic. It categorises affect as either ‘effects’ or ‘desires’, and reduces the harmony of being at one with Nature to an observed interplay between consolidated subject and object. Such are the ‘logical’ constraints of language, which positions the reader/observer always outside any description of reality (even when the subject is ‘I’). There is no room in Kant’s schema for the affected, relative reader/observer.

‘Directional flow of energy’ aside, indeed.

reliance on the ‘object’ in his third critique.
— Possibility

What ‘object’? — Mww

Nature, art, etc.

The base structure of Kant’s schema is the subject-object relation, with the subject bracketing out sensation, or affect/desire, as if it is irrelevant. Only what can be attributed to the object - either as concept or as aesthetic - is discussed with regard to the ability (of the subject) to make judgements in relation to an object. I would argue that beyond the fourth moment, where the artist or genius refrains from judging, there is no subject-object distinction, only inclusive relation.

The TTC, on the other hand, acknowledges affect/desire as the directional flow of energy through the entire schema, and advocates the disciplined practice of aligning this aspect of ourselves with that of nature in order to understand the Tao.

Our approach to understanding language is our approach to understanding everything - there is a necessary practical or relational aspect which cannot be attributed along subject-object or sensation-cognition lines.

We cannot talk of, or about, a 'thing' that we're at base level incapable of experiencing. It is not an it, it has no 'thinghood'.

Our world, our entire world, is phenomenon. Noumenon in a positive sense isn't anything we have any relation to and as we are here talking about 'noumenon' it is only in the negative sense as a marker for the limitation of our sensible experience (sensible in the terms of how Kant uses the term 'sensible' ... experienced).

If there was noumenon then we wouldn't be able to refer to it or articulate it in any form. Think about it a little. The thing-in-itself cannot be referred to on those terms in any way that makes any sense. It is only our habit of inferring that leads to the belief in some 'otherness' that is beyond our realms of comprehension ... but if some said item is beyond our realm of comprehension then our merely stating the possibility of some item is referring to some item and that is contrary to the said item being 'beyond comprehension'.

We can talk of a square circle and conjure up some image merely by stating it. Stating something gives it authority even though it is a construct based on experience. — I like sushi

I agree that we’re unable to consolidate anything positive about noumenon, but not that we’re incapable of experiencing the limitation ‘in itself’. Sensible human experience and understanding is not limited to language, but by language.

I think when we talk of a ‘square circle’ we’re not really conjuring up any particular image, if we’re honest, but experiencing our limitations with respect to understanding a relation between these two qualities. It’s like an event horizon, the difference between quantitative (relating to something as something other) and qualitative (inclusive relation). There is no way to distinguish a ‘square circle’ from one’s qualitative experience of limitations.

Naming something gives it potentiality in itself, whether quantitative or qualitative, stating the possibility of our understanding it, if not articulating that understanding as something apart from our experience. We are able to refer to ‘noumenon’ in potentiality, but unable to quantify it as something apart from our experience. For many of us, that’s a deal breaker.

That’s my current understanding, anyway.

The Tao is called "non-being" and the multiplicity is called "being." It can't be conceptualized. It can't be spoken. Conceptualizing it is what turns the one into a multiplicity.
— T Clark

I can see some parallels here. Noumena are non-being; it is itself a conception but cannot be conceptualized, which is to say there are no schema represented under it. For that reason, while noumena can be spoken, it is nevertheless, empty, content-less, hence cannot ever be a multiplicity.

Reflecting this on Kantian methodology, which makes explicit all humans reason exactly the same way, does not mean human reason is the only way to know the world, which at least makes room for the logical possibility of noumenal worlds. Understanding “...takes for granted....” the possibility of the logical form, but it is pure reason alone that prevents population of the form by its schema. — Mww

This makes sense to me. Kant’s pure reason demonstrates the limitation of human reason, beyond which is the capacity to differentiate between noumena and ‘ding an sich’. The TTC recognises that this limitation is evident in the structure of language and language use (a la Wittgenstein) - Kant’s attempt to speak about the noumena and Laozi’s attempt to speak about the Tao are employing a schema to effectively describe another schema.

The difference is that Kant is also bound by the pre-Darwinian Western notion that humanity is in a sense ‘super-natural’, so while Laozi strives to include humanity within both his schema and the Tao, Kant cannot but position humanity outside of the noumena, as an entity in relation to it, and to his schema. I think this is evident in a reliance on the ‘object’ in his third critique.

Interesting discussion. We tend to shift almost effortlessly between physical, actual and literal descriptions of reality, and we use language, mathematics and physics to help us navigate. If we understood that we were shifting between dimensional structures of reality, then we might be more careful with how we used these terms.

I recognise that use of the term ’physical’ - in relation to physics - often includes 4D and even 5D universal structures. But when we’re talking philosophy rather than purely physics, and not relying on calculations, then I think it helps to distinguish between dimensional structures for ease of understanding. If you can suggest a more appropriate term to distinguish 3D structures then I’m open to it.

A physical (3D) universe is temporally finite, and any attempt we make to describe it would hypothesise a beginning and an end. An actual (4D) universe, however, appears (in mathematics and physics) to have emerged from (literally) nothing at t=0, even though we recognise its infinite existence. And a literal (5D) universe is ultimately both infinite and nothing, relative to one’s perception of value/potential.

(1) Something from literally nothing certainly seems far-fetched if by ‘literally’ we mean either physically or actually nothing. But literally nothing is a lack of awareness, and all it takes is attention and/or effort directed towards this ‘nothing’ for it to be literally something (value/potential) about an apparent nothing.

(2) An infinite past seems far-fetched if by ‘infinite’ we mean physically infinite. But an actually infinite past is mathematically plausible - zero and infinite being qualitative limitations - even if no evidence would ever exist.

So, while the poll is skewed towards (1) by the term ‘literal’, the unusually high proportion of (2) suggests a misunderstanding of distinctions between physical, actual and literal realities.

I think that philosophy is honing one’s awareness, way of thinking and reductionist methodology, which alone is not sufficient for a commercial transaction. It needs to be paired with a practical skill, whether that be writing, teaching, public speaking, painting or even engineering, which demonstrates its value.

I guess what that means is a philosopher doesn’t get money for philosophy, but rather for what their awareness, way of thinking and practical methodology can bring to a profession, to an art form, to a market or to a company.

So, after criticizing my use of primitive humans as "making a lot of assumptions", you went ahead and made your own -- Men and women likely both fought (or fled) wild animals and invaders to protect themselves, their children, their mate, or anyone whose presence served their narrow interests, whatever they perceived them to be.
I think a double-standard is happening here. Did you know that primitive women gathered berries, while men created tools? Or are you saying I'm just assuming this also? That's written in archaeology. I did not come up with that out of thin air. — L'éléphant

I’m not assuming this occurred, I’m casting doubt on your assumption of a binary model of segregated male and female roles prior to the forming of socio-cultural groups. A female confronted with wild animals or invaders was never going to just stand there and be attacked, no matter how primitive. A female accustomed to this happening is going to have some skills in this area, and be aware of her capacity and the resources available to her. To say that men fought the wild animals out of moral obligation to the weaker sex is debatable - I would argue that humans sometimes fought wild animals and invaders because they were a threat, and anyone with enough strength and skill to defeat them would benefit from doing so. By the same token, anyone who lacked sufficient strength and skill would benefit from trying to hide or flee. Those with enough strength and skill to fight (or enough sense to hide well) survived the encounter, and the fact that the distinction in behaviour generally favoured different sexes was not because of a difference in morality, but rather contributed to later expectations.

Statistically speaking, a group would have a better survival rate if the men fought and the women hid. I’m not going to dispute that. But I don’t think this translates to a ‘naturally’ black and white masculine vs feminine morality. I maintain that any distinction along gender lines is a socio-cultural model based on assumptions.

There is also no evidence to suggest that men were the only ones who created tools. Primitive women also created tools and equipment for various activities, including items for their mate and/or family members to use/wear in the field, just as men probably also ‘gathered’ food and other items on their hunting trips to contribute to the group’s resources. Prior to socially-determined expectations, some women might have preferred to hunt rather than gather, and some men might have preferred a non-violent approach to acquiring food, and they would have developed skills to match. People also contributed where their skills lay, and there were a number of cultures where a primitive acknowledgement of non-binary gender roles did develop into a socially viable model.

There is no double standard, but there is a difference between your binary model - which is black and white and doesn’t allow for variability - and the uncertainty of archaeological evidence. Not all males behaved like ‘men’, and not all females behaved like ‘women’. This is true across the history of humanity, and across most (if not all) animal species. To structure a contemporary model of morality as if they do, would be ignorant at best.

https://theconversation.com/our-ancient-ancestors-may-have-known-more-about-gender-than-we-do-30131

I apologize, if I missed your point. But in the quotation, "striving" was separated from "beyond ourselves". — Gnomon

Not separate in the original post, but ok.

So, apparently you are talking about "Altruism" instead of "Ambition". That un-selfish attitude requires concern or love for others, which tends to be reserved for only those close to Self : "my family", our kind", "our species". Ironically, some humans seem to love their pets more than people...

Since we are supposedly motivated by our "selfish genes", we have to make a conscious choice to extend our self-protective inclinations to those who don't share our genes. That's why almost all religions & philosophies preach Altruism. — Gnomon

There is a lot about Dawkins’ gene-centred theory that I disagree with. Not least of these disagreements is regarding the oversimplified ‘selfish/altruistic’ binary on which it is based. Actions that some might call altruistic, others would argue to be relatively selfish - it depends on the broadness (and dimensionality) of one’s perspective. Dawkins focused on DNA as a three-dimensional structure, reducing the potential of genetic information to this one binary model, and the complexity of four-dimensional life to a single judgement. Simple, straight-forward, no room for uncertainty. And everyone who wished people were easier to understand ate it up.

Reductionist binary theories like this appear credible because they rely on a ‘more vs less’ description of evidence. Humans are statistically more selfish than they are altruistic. Adults are less selfish than infants. We are statisticaly more altruistic towards family members and less altruistic towards strangers. The supporting evidence, described in this way, is literally black and white. Accurate data or graphic representation of the same evidence would be far less convincing. But the digital age is proof that one can build literally any description of reality out of a binary model (except an accurate replication of humanity).

We could allow ourselves to be reduced to the motivations of genetic self-interest, but I think we are so much more than that. Sure, it takes positive attention and increased effort to develop awareness, connection and collaboration beyond a localised appearance of stability, but this pattern is not just in human genes - it’s reflected in the entire evolution of the cosmos - including the attention and effort that enabled the Big Bang, abiogenesis, self-awareness, etc.

In every moment we are invited by the world to increase awareness, connection and collaboration, while our internally stable blueprint would naturally prefer that we ignore, isolate and exclude anything that risks altering its make-up. But our genes fight a losing battle: our genetic consolidation does not extend past our mortal life, as only half the information is passed on. It isn’t our genes that get immortality, then, but the unconsolidated information they contain.

Perhaps you would amend the Golden Rule to "do unto others (even those with different genes) . . ." :cool: — Gnomon

The Golden Rule assumes equality - it shouldn’t need a genetic qualifier. My amendment would be ‘Do unto others as you would have anyone do unto you’. This way we don’t have license to mistreat or neglect those unable to reciprocate.