The difference is really that the former is a normative command while the latter is nothing more than a myth.

In the latter case, there is not a necessary consequence at all. Nature doesn't ordain the killer will suffer anything at all. That's down to the actions and choices of those around him. His treatment is always uncertain. Society has to act against him to suffer anything at all. What results from his killing is not "what must happen," but merely what those around him happen to do.

If the killer is to suffer or be punished, those around him have to choose ethically and exert power over him.

This might not seem to be an important distinction to make, but from the perspective of the mystic, the relation between the personal, or human, mind and "the world" is a subtle and complex subject. In so much as on consideration the mind and world are inseparable, while distinctly seperate. — Punshhh

My approach in this is deliberate. The major point I'm refuting is precisely that distinction. Meaning is infinite. It's not a "human mind" nor a "world mind." Minds are only finite states-- instances of thinking being in existence. Meaning does not need them. The rock is still means a rock regardless of what anyone might think or if anything thinks at all. A human life is still meaningful, no matter how much they might insist such meaning is incoherent. Life does not draw from the infinite and finite for its presence. It is finite and always expresses the infinite. The twin of the finite and infinite are so, but neither is a precondition, foundation or ingredient in the making of life's presence.

I know the mystic hates this-- I'm pointing out they are arguing an incoherence. There is nothing mystical about the infinite. It's what we never are but always what we express. What the mystic professes is ignorance of meaning and ourselves. They proclaim meaning has to be attained when it's really been there all along. A nihilism which is steadfast because people are attached to the idea of being rescued from meaninglessness. For them to simply mean is either unfulfilling (e.g. "but I'll die," "Good won't necessarily be rewarded," etc., etc.) or not enough work (e.g. "You mean we have to nothing to mean?). Meaningless is our own false and poisonous expectation of ourselves.

This is what Wayfarer was reacting against. For him what I'm saying doesn't make sense because I'm arguing meaning (the infinite) is the opposite (i.e. non-mystical, never needs to be attained because it's always expressed) of what he understands. To him I'm literally arguing up is down.

I'm inclined to say that's the point being refuted: the boundary is not placed anywhere upon the world. It's entirely on it's own-- when I speak a catergory, I do not do it through the world in front of me. I am the one speaking. The saying of the catergoy a particular state of me, not any object I'm pointing at.

Boundaries are without being within the outside world. The drawn line is its own, not whatever is underneath it.

I'd say you've got it reversed. The "thing itself" is clearly not temporal. It's true of a thing no matter its point in time. I'm still a "thing itself" now as I was twenty years ago. In this respect, unlike in the temporal, I have not changed at all.

The "thing itself" is a formal principle: the logical relation of the presence of a thing compared to its absence.

A way to summarise all of the above is this: to the degree that nature is a continuum, there are no brute identities in nature. Or less provocatively, to the degree that there are identities in nature, they are constructed and derivative of analogic differences. Nothing is 'equal to' or 'identical to itself', 'in-itself'. — StreetlightX

The telling feature of the "in-itself" is relational. As a concept, it marking the difference between things, between where something belongs and where it does not. It's logic marking how one thing relates to everything else-- it's itself, not any other thing which is its absence. Not even identity itself is of nature.

Nothing is "identical itself" not because the logic is incoherent (i.e. "identical to itself" means nothing or is a contradiction), but rather because "identical to itself" doesn't escape posting a relation.

I think you've more or less said this, but I think it's highlighting cause some appear to because treating the lack of identity in nature the incoherence to the logic of identity. As if, as the idealist are prone to say, the lack of equivalence between logic and nature were to render nature incoherent.

You still misunderstanding radical contingency. It's not an actor on the world. There aren't a set of laws which constrain the world until, at some point, radical contingency acts to make the world "weird." Radical contingency is necessary. It is true regardless of what happens in the world. Anything might happen.

In any instance of the world, whether things stay the same or a constantly changing, radical contingency is true. In the moments where the expression of the world fits the "laws" we know, radical contingency is just as true as when the world breaks those "laws."-- the actual world is one of many possible states. Radical contingency is the dissolving of determining "laws," not of states of the world with logic expression. It has no impact on how our discourse refers.

It's not clear even what we mean by moment, in any case. A phenomenological moment cannot be a dimensionless 'point instant'; so what is a moment, and what are its boundaries? Wouldn't a phenomenological moment 'contain' both past and present, insofar as we conceive it at all? I mean, if a moment is not a dimensionless point, or boundary, if it has duration; then some parts of it must be prior to, and anticipatory of, other parts, which would mean it is like a microcosm of 'macroscopic' time embodying past, present and future. This would mean there is no pure present to our experience at all, even though when we think about it, it seems as though there must be. — John

I'd say the dimensionless nature of the present is exactly why my argument applies. A "phenomenological moment" can be as simple as recalling the colour red or as complex as remembering an entire text. Our "moment of memory" often refers to many linked experiences because we are recalling complex events involving the meaning of more than one experience.

All the relevant meanings of experience get subsumed into that "moment of memory," which is the difference between knowing and not. Let's say I'm trying to tell the whole story of Macbeth. I memorise every word so I can tell it exactly. If this "moment of memory" does not occur again, I have lost the knowledge. I won't tell the story exactly. All it would take to wipe out the knowledge was for me not to have the "moment of memory." Lose the "phenomenological moment" and the knowledge will not exist.

Yet, any memory is but one moment of experience. All the "build-up" of memory is given in an instance of experience. The story of the world is not given outside time, but within one moment, no matter how much study or memory it involves. A moment which renders us without knowledge and understanding if it ceases to occur (see Alzheimer's Disease).

Radical contingency is not in conflict with anything you've stated there. If the world behaves in a similar way, then that's what it does. If the sun rises every morning, than that's what it does. The same is true of any instance of similar events.

Unrestrained possibility does not prevent the world staying "the same." Indeed, part of the point of radical contingency is the world just might stay the same. Repeated sunrises are possible states.

Any regularities we observe are still expressed-- gravity isn't different or changed becasue something else was possible-- but they are just a function of states themselves, rather than a constraining force which sits outside them. That things are themselves is not dependent on a basic nature which forces them to be what they are. It's a feature of a thing itself-- things will be (e.g. similar events occurring regularly) until they are no longer (a different possible outcome occurs).

This is not just unique like one process is unique from another, but it is different in its apparent nature in that it has its "what it's likeness" that is leftover and is not explained where other physical processes do not have this explanatory gap. It is in causality (or may be the ground of causality if you think that), like other physical processes, but how it is that this mental stuff exists once other processes are in play, is not explained. Why the genie? What is this "stuff" other than saying that it is a state of existence. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. It's state unique to any other-- it is "what it's likeness": the existence of being aware which is not captured in any description. This is the "stuff" other than just being a state of existence. It's a "what it's likeness" rather than a rock or limb.

Being a "what it's likeness," which is not captured in any description, IS how the state is distinct and unique. It doesn't need to be anything else.

That makes sense. Molecules become the sensation of red, that does not make sense other than positing a dualism of mental stuff that is simply not explained as to why it is entailed from molecules when all other stuff is not. — schopenhauer1

No... that's the strawman again. Molecules do not become the sensation of red. Certain instances of molecules generate a new state (consciousness) which is not molecules.

So,if radical contingency were the case this would mean that there are really no laws of nature at all , and it would mean that things just happen to behave the way they seem to for no reason at all. If this were true then the only necessity, as Meillassoux argues in After Finitude would be contingency. But, then we would have no way of knowing how often nature changes its behavior radically. If nature is not necessarily stable at all, then all the words in all the texts from what we think is history might be changing all the time, and our memories might be changing all the time, and even the past itself might change. In that case we could have no warrant to claim anything at all about anything at all; that was the kind of point I was making. I hope this clarifies it. — John

Behaviour isn't radical contingency. That anything might happen doesn't say anything about what exists-- we can't use it as warrant for knowledge. Knowledge is NOT formed by a warrant saying: "Anything else is impossible."

Nature is perfectly stable, within each state itself. That's how we know. In the awareness the sun rises, we know about the sun rising. Radical contingency is not a challenge to knowledge. It's a refutation of the idea states of the world (and so knowledge of them) are derived from outside the state itself.

To me it seems like individual denoting expressions are considered the problem. When we make a statement denoting an individual, we draw them up in reference to our own statememt. I say, "by identity, you are The Great Whatever who posts on The Philosophy Forum, " as if my statement of identity gave you as a brute fact.

But do you need my statement to be? What is no-one claimed that "by identity" you were The Great Whatever, would you somehow cease to exist?

"By identity" is more or less rhetorical. We appeal to it to defend a particular way of thinking or speaking, as if your very existence depended upon us saying: "You are the Great Whatever who posts on The Philosophy Forum." It's a postering for asserting a particular understanding of you, not a respect or description of you as an individual.

I just find it strange that BLM makes a concerted effort to dissociate itself from ALL white people, regardless of class, educational background, or any other relevant issue that could possibly make the 'movement' more sympathetic, at least to poor and marginalized white people. The spokespeople that I've read or listened to do this very aggressively too, bludgeoning white people (again, ALL white people) for being the beneficiaries of some ubiquitous 'privilege' floating around them that they apparently can neither fathom nor appreciate. And for poor white folk struggling to afford the basic necessities of life, this seems bizarre -- and then, to make matters worse, even suggesting how strange or disconnected from reality it is results in loud cries of " RACIST!!!', apparently for questioning the dogmatic narrative. — Erik

The point is to avoid the equivocation of what's happening to black people with others, so allowing it to just be passed of as "an issue which affects anyone." When that happens, awareness of what's happening to black people gets lost.

If someone raises just how much of an impact actions of the police have on the black community, it will frequently get dismiss as "just crime" or "just poverty," in a way that undermines efforts to address the issue-- it all becomes part of the endemic problems of "crime" and "poverty" which are seen to have no solution, nothing to do with our major institutions and the specific people who suffer in these instance.

So it is not that a poor white person will necessary be better off or be less impacted by police action (sometimes they suffer just as badly or worse than a poor black person), but rather that, in the case of this issue (the black community in relation to the police), it is about how a black person life is affected.

If we ignore this, if we try to say it the same for anyone else, we are ignoring black people are affected in these instances. We are burying that they are the one's harmed in these instances. (usually, to the effect of saying there is no problem with how black people are treated in society).

I'd agree. Undesirable men have never got what they wanted, not even when men were economic providers and heads of family.

But I'm talking more on the level of an appealing fiction. In an idea of what what are supposed to get or status we are meant to have.

The social promise of power though, to their group (wanting men) over another (women, whether they keep wanting or not), can be attractive even to those who never attain it.

To me this seems to reflect the alt-right to its foundation. Not merely on respect to positions of women and men sometimes expressed, but across the board-- it wants a social authority, a promise of who gets to enact power over others, not countered or restricted by pathetic concerns such as individual's rights, respect of agency, democracy, equality, etc.,etc.

I'd say power is a much better description in this context. It is the power of the man which is protected-- his wife cannot leave him, cannot be without him, cannot partake in sexual relations with anyone but him, etc.,etc. Society gives him the right to have what he wants (her) for the remainder of his life.

For the angry undesirable man, I think this idea is quite powerful. If society were to simultaneously demand life-long partnerships and stop and roll back women's rights to one degree of another, he would (seemingly) have a chance. He might become desirable, either as an economic or a local authority figure. Then, if he does find someone, society would proclaim he will have her for so longs he wants.

The embarrassing thing is the is/ought distinction is exactly what you are (supposedly) describing here: that values are not states of the world.

They are never given by the mere fact someone thinks them. Or than many people belief them. Rather they are a logic which is given irrespective of what exists, which is how values and ethics are still binding, even when people don't enact them or agree with them.

The "transcendent" nature of values destroys your essentialist line of argument.

Sexual purity and virginity are important values in all religions again - what is to be done in cases of impurity is a social custom and is different. — Agustino

At the level you argue this, the popularity of them throughout history, they are only social customs. Just because a people believe certain values, it doesn't mean they are true. You are making the pathetic sort of argument as the individualistic Westerners who proclaim an action is right becasue the happen to think so.

No, rather dualists are saying that sensation, imagination, understanding, etc. etc. are not the same as physical processes because the sensation of "red" is not the same as the wavelength hitting rods and cones UNLESS it IS the same (pace panpsychism). Rather dualists (which I personally do not identify with), will say that mental stuff is tied with physical stuff but is not the same. Again, I am not arguing this, just stating some of its ideas. — schopenhauer1

This is a strawman.

Under emergence sensation is not the same as a wavelength hitting rods and cones. Rods and light are only objects involved in the causation of experience. Experience itself is a different state. A "physical state of the world" which is experience-- mental stuff is a physical state of the world itself.

For emergence, mental stuff is physical stuff, just not the same physical stuff as bodies and their environment (e.g. rods, cones and light). Experience is a unique existing state.

If this is the case, emergentists are essentially dualists, and then they are one step away from unintentionally saying that there is this mystic mental stuff that is part of existence. — schopenhauer1

In the sense you are thinking, yes. Emergenists have (at least) a dual-aspect monism. Mental stuff is consciousness. Other states never are. The mind and body are always distinct, but part of the same realm. (existence, causality).

The emergentist isn't one step away from saying that mental stuff is part of existence. They claim it outright. Existing experiences emerge out of non-conscious objects. The presence of experience in the world is the intention of their entire position.

Here the only thing you get wrong is the "mystical." Since experience is an existing state, there is nothing strange about it's presence as a unique object. To be more than non-concious states is what the existence of experience entails. There is no "mystery." The uniqueness of consciousness is its nature. If consciousness exists, that's what we get.

I think that last paragraph speaks to classical liberalism misunderstanding of identity. People are never seperate to the identity and culture they express-- their culture they partake in always defines them.

To be a citizen of country, the with same rights, includes that personal and cultural identity, assuming that person is considered part of the country and considers themselves belonging to that society. In reading identity and culture as separate to society, the classical misunderstands the role of identity and how it may be in conflict with society.

The result is absurd situations, like mentioned in this thread, where acts like condemning ISIS are treated as some measure of just how well people fit.

Saying whether ISIS is terrible isn't are measure of how well a person's indentity and culture fit with our society. It's just postering to make people in the West feel a bit better.

Every time there is an attack, we hear the same bluster about how Muslims are meant to be condemning it, as if somehow such public declarations in the West were a solution to the schism in culture between the West and Radical Islam.

The issues of identity and culture run far deeper. Here the problem is not how much Radical Islam is condemned in the Western media. It's about the relationship of people's identity and culture and our society.

This obsession with condemntion points scoring is, and many on the Left recognise this, just an excuse to vilfy Muslims. It's not Radical Islam and the people who followed who are the problem, but rather any Muslim at all, for not doing enough to stop (supposedly) members of their own community, for (supposedly) Islam is always a culture and identity seperate to our society.

But this forgets that ISIS and Radical Islam is not the community of many Muslims. For many Muslims, Islam is part of their lives and identity within Western culture. They are actually with us, not ISIS. Stopping Radical Islam doesn't, in principle, fall on them anymore than it does on us, for they no more share it values than we do.

It's insidious. Not only does it vilfy Muslims, but it prevents us from making the distinction between Muslims who are a part of our society (with their identity and culture) and the Radical Islam which will never fit. It quite literally hindering the very thing, an Islam together with the values of the West, which it supposedly wants so badly.

The "silliness"(if we are to call it that) of panpsychism is insisting consciousness emerges out of all existing states. It's a question of over quoting the number of existing states of consciousness, not an issue with a lack of explanation of "mental stuff."

It really says little, if anything about what mental stuff is other than the strangest most unique property in the universe- one that allows for all other properties to be known, that gives sensation, that allows for thought, imagination, and the other cognitive abilities that animals have and even gives us the ability to understand all other properties is simply like a particle or a force or any other physical process. The otherness of consciousness is not taken serious. Where panpsychists might overmine this idea, emergentists deflate it.. — schopenhauer1

Precisely. The emergentist is the one that respects the "otherness" of consciousness. For them it is enough for mental stuff to be a unique property of the universe.

Sensation, imagination, understanding, etc.,etc., why would we insist that consciousness was anything else? If you call recognising consciousness as a unique property expressed by some states the world "deflating it," the emergenist is certainly guilty. For them consciousness doesn't have to be anything more-- there's nothing more about to describe or explain.

It's the dualist who doesn't recognise consciousness as unique. They are always insisting it is more than the existence of sensation, imagination, understanding, etc.,etc., as if consciousness needed to be something else.

Dualism is reductionist. The emergentist says: "Hey, I found these unique states of the world. They are awareness, sensation, imagination and understanding, etc.,etc." How does the dualist respond? By suggesting the unique state of consciousness is not enough for consciousness, as if consciousness had to be defined by some other sort of presence. The dualist does not take the otherness of consciousness seriously. They suppose there is some way to make it disappear, to reduce it to something else, at which point we will have a "full account of consciousness."

Sartre is a bit of a miserable one. He’s acutely aware of our existential nothingness. Whatever we are is only a meaning insisted upon by ourselves and others, so we can’t appeal to any essential nature to ground who we are. Any existing form is horrific because it cannot overcome out freedom and satiate our desire of it.

Everything in world is dissatisfactory because we can never possess the other to define them how we wish. Perhaps worse, we cannot be possessed by others, such that responsibility for our definition is handed off to someone else. We are always expecting people and ourselves to be something they’re not, always restless because our existential nothingness means we never get what we desire or become who we want.

In a somewhat ironic twist, Sartre is a man burdened by his desires and the gumption to seek them out, his freedom. He can’t settle for anything but existential nothingness because something else would mean settling for a performance in the world. He refuses to perform because he wants something more than the performance. To be a waiter, whether good or bad, for any amount of time just isn’t enough. The same is true of what anyone might be. We might always have our freedom, but it is a hollow life. Our desires are always turned against our existence— to love one is not enough, nor is it enough to love three, not even loving one hundred will be a satisfactory choice. Our deepest desire is to be more than our choices, to avoid choice and responsibility for ourselves.

Sartrean philosophy (especially the early, maybe less so in later stuff) is characterised by a fundamental disrespect for “freedom.” If all we have is choice, our own decision to perform, what then can be more satisfying than giving the performance we want? Choice needn’t always be a burden. If it is what people are seeking to do with their freedom, what greater expression our freedom could there be?

If I choose to be a good waiter, and you choose me to have a good waiter, we both perform and everyone gets what they want, despite our existential nothingness. My choice is not always a burden on you (i.e. contrary to your freedom) and vice versa. If I willing choose to be a waiter, you don’t have to go around telling me “You must be a waiter. You are not free to choose otherwise.” in some attempt to force me into an inauthentic life.

The freedom and choice of Sartrean turns in on itself. If we are responsible for ourselves, this includes are actions, thoughts and understanding of one another. We get to choose our performances. One of the options we may choose is a performance that complements others, such our lives are authentic not only in that we understand our own freedom, but also in contentment with choices we make.

Sartre is too pessimistic about human relationships. Not becasue they aren’t frequently exploitative or characterised by expectations which deny the freedom of oneself and others, but rather because this is not always true. Sometimes people’s choices amount to relationships which are a respect of each others choices.

That makes no sense. I get that "emergence means the presence of a new a different state". But it does not follow that non-conscious never BECOMES conscious.. You just said that there is a presence of a new state- presumably the very thing (consciousness) that does not "become". Those are two opposing ideas. One that non-conscious does not become conscious and one where new states come from previous states. — schopenhauer1

I know that what’s dualism holds, but emergence rejects the primacy of consciousness.

Since consciousness is a new state of the world, it is never the states prior to it. The cause of consciousness can never be the emergent state of consciousness. Instead of “becoming,” where previously non-conscious things become conscious, there is only “emergence” of new states which were never there beforehand.

So it does follow that the non-conscious will never become conscious. My body will never be my experience. The non-conscious states which preceded my experience can never be a state of of awareness— if it were otherwise, it would not be “non-conscious.”

This also holds for all levels of panpsychism where consciousness is emergent. Consider a brick. Does it have states of awareness? Is the object of a brick a generator of consciousness like the human body? If so, the brick is in the same boat as us. Its body will never be its experience. The same is true of atoms. And so on and so on, for any non-conscious object there might be. If an object is “non-conscious,” it cannot “become conscious” because that would mean it was a different (conscious) object entirely.

Emergence entails that a new state (consciousness) is never the prior state (non-conscious).

Dualism cannot gasp this idea because it begins with the primacy of consciousness. The subject (be it a human, brick or atom), is first and foremost a being of awareness. It can’t consider, for example, that I was originally two cells with no experience at all. If I was given without consciousness at any point, the given states would simply not be me (at least that’s how the story goes).

This is why dualism read emergence as a question of “becoming.” To maintain the primacy of consciousness, the “non-conscious” must have really been conscious all along. Any object which causes consciousness, therefore, must retroactively “become” an entity of consciousness (despite the contradiction). It’s the only way to avoid entities existing prior to and outside their own conscious states.

I just do not get how physical things beget consciousness, which is the only thing we know which constructs the very world where things emerge in the first place. Prior to this, physical things are "being" or "doing their thing" if you will. But what is this mental "stuff" that is "what it's like to be something" otherwise known as experience? — schopenhauer1

That's the primacy of consciousness which the emergent account rejects. Under emergent consciousness, there is no "construction" by consciousness. Our world is not made be consciousness at all. Some states of the world are consciousness. In some instances we might say a conscious state is involved in a casual relationship, but that's it. Otherwise consciousness means nothing for the world.

The "mental stuff" is the existence of a conscious state. "What is it like" is searching for the being of consciousness-- not descriptions of "red," but the existence of being aware of "red." As such this has no description because any description is just words. No matter how I describe experience (even if it's in the first person), it will still only be a description. My telling of the red I saw will never be my seeing of red.

Part of the emergence account is the acceptance that the "mental stuff" or "what is it like" has no description. In "material objects (i.e. things observed in the world)", it has no form. It's it own thing-- experiences which exist. We can't get any closer than such pointers in language. The being of experience is felt, not described.

You are arguing:

1. Experience doesn't make sense in the same realm of bodies and other objects.

2. It is not bodies or any other object.

3. As a result, the accounts which say conciousness emerged are unsatisfactory because they don't say how the non-conscious turned into the conscious.

4. To have a successful account of conciousness, we need experience to be its own formal cause. Experience must always be present to begat following experiences. This avoids the problem of the non-conscious turning into the conscious.

My points are:

1. It is true experiences cannot be bodies (you are right in point 2. )

2. However, this truth does not impact on accounts of emergence because they don't equate experiences with bodies-- bodies are the different state that conciousness emerges from.

3. Emergence means the presence of a new and different state, not that bodies are experience. Under emergence, the non-conscious never becomes the conscious.

4. Thus, the major charge leveled against emergence is false. It never entails non-conscious states turning into conscious states. Emergence is constituted new states of consciousness following states of body.

5. Experiences are, therefore, "physical" (a state of the world caused by other states of the world) but are not bodies. The requirement of all objects to have consciousness is lifted. "Physical" experiences are there own state, rather than being equivalent to the processes of body.

6. Emergence is constituted by new distinct "physical" experiences following on "physical" bodies which are not experience.

The point of emergence is that experience is not always so. New states of consciousness appear out of previous states which are not consciousness.

If one rejects that the conscious can come out of the non-conscious, then they consider emergence impossible.

7. Semiotic theory holds the account of emergence. New states which are consciousness appear out of those which are not. Experience's place in triad is a particular state of the world with causal relationships to different states of the world. It not always there, but when it is, it is always itself.

My qualia is part of my existence. We can't discuss someone's qualia without talking about a part of the world which is them. It is unique. There no other state of the world is my qualia.

By definition the scientist and robot do not possess equivalent hardware. One produces their quale of blue when given the pill, the other does not. The difference is already within their existence.

You ask what could bring about the difference, but we already know: a human body with the pill produced the scientist's blue quale, while in the case of the robot body, there was no production of quale.

That's the difference. The existence of quale as a result of an environment of objects.

I agree. What you say about radical contingency is true: anything in the world might have been at anytime. Nothing is ruled out bar logical contradiction. Logic precludes nothing-- that's the point. If you want to describe the world, you have to do it in terms of the states themselves, not what supposedly "must be" because of how we think the world works at one time.

The point is there is no such thing as "substantive, actual or physical" possibility. It's all logical.

To say I might turn into a tiger tomorrow involves the world no more or less than saying the sun will rise. Both are just states of the world which express a particular logical meaning. "Actual possibility" is just an attempt to restrict our understanding of what's possible to a particular theory we have. It's to misunderstand that justification of claims is given by possibility.

Why is it absurd to think I could turn into a tiger? Not because it's impossible. The reason we reject such a proposition is because it doesn't fit with what we observed humans do. In the actual world, we've not documented cases of a human turning into a tiger, so we (rightly) dismiss the idea humans will.

The possibility it might occur just doesn't have anything to do with the justification for rejecting the idea.

Indeed.

God and Christ are possible states of the world. Most "supernatural" beliefs are. All most do is propose an existing force which acts upon the world in powerful ways. Even afterlives (really, they are just more life in a different place) are possible.

But this does this mean they are actual? You act like these possibilities amount to some justification to say a claim is true. As if, for example, the fact that Zeus is a possible state means we cannot be steadfast in pointing out our observed world falsifies the presence of Zeus?

If Zeus is defined as a powerful being sitting at the top of a mountain, and we find nothing at the top of that mountain, that form of Zeus is shown not to exist. The fact Zeus was possible does nothing to help the claim he exists. Just because something is possible doesn't make it true. The same applies to any "absurd" belief.

To go for radical contingency is to throw most of human discourse in the dustbin; history loses all its sense, because even the past might change. — John

Only if you make the mistake of equating possibility with actuality. No history is lost because that something might have happened doesn't mean it did. The only human discourse lost is essentialism-- that some logical principle dictates the world must be a certain form.

Ah, I see what you mean.

How the universe works could have changed back and forth any number of times. Under radical contingency, what defines each state is the state itself, not any principle or story. Anything could have happened at any time. This is what makes racial contingency different to other approaches. There is no principle or story which sets what the world "must be."

The Big Bang has no foundation. We can't tell how the world might have been different in the times we haven't observed. For all we know the universe might have collapsed back and then exploded again within the given time interval. Maybe it did so eleventy billion times. If no trace was left, we won't know about it. So long as a event fits with what we have observed, any past event might have been.

A foundation is irrelevant. Theories work on the basis of being consistent with actual observed states, not what possibly could have happened. Necessity and possibility are meaningless within the context of saying whether a theory works or not.

Theories also work insofar as they fit the observed world. Let's say gravity reversed direction for a time. Our observed world shows that it must have all come back together again to a form which fits with the story of the Big Bang and its "invariant law" of gravity (assuming it doesn't get falsified).

The trouble with the "invariant" stories is not their accuracy. Most are accurate to point-- even spontaneous generation of maggots, which fits if all you've observed is a clean steak and a maggot ridden steak. It's how "invariant" stories close off possibility which is the problem, how they specify the world "must work" one particular way without taking into consideration what happens in the world.

The entire premise of your argument is that my qualia (my being) can be given in someone else (their being).

Supposedly, the virtual reality generator can render my presence exactly, create a repeated instance of my being. This is incoherent. Even if you copy everything about me, it will still be a different person than I. Creating a copy of any part of me, whether my body or qualia, is impossible.

Ehh, given Pierre's clarification, don't worry about it. He's not arguing radical contingency-- more like a "fuzzy" metaphysic dependent on what exactly you are interested in.

I'm talking about something else entirely.

In regard to db's and PN's belief in "radical contingency" would this mean that whether anything exists at all is also radically contingent? In any case nothing is not really nothing, right? It is not the complete absence we usually try to imagine, but rather the absence of anything we could know about; even though we try to grasp it by referring to it as "quantum foam" or whatever. — John

Just about the opposite. The point of radical contingency is logic (or "laws") do not constrain the world. States of the world are defined in-themsleves, so possible presence can't be discounted by how some instances of the world might be. We might wake tomorrow to find "different laws" in place-- nearby masses might start repelling each other; we could find ourselves floating off into space tomorrow morning.

Such alternative possibilities bring specific aspects to the world. If we know nearby masses repel each other, then it precludes the gravity we know and we understand something about how the alternative world works. A state of existence which is an absence is defined.

So "nothing existing at all" amounts to the absence of any other state someone might think of. It's itself, an existing absence and is knowable to us-- though never actually known using its presence because it has no people within it.

While the existence of anything is radical contingent, existence is necessary. One of the possibilities is actualised and so there is always something which may be known.

]The logic that seems to govern the formation of the elements, and the combination of elements to form compounds, seems to be very strictly invariant. Can we conceive any systematic way in which reality might have been totally different, with a whole range of totally different elements, and hence compounds?

Perhaps there might have been no gravity, and therefore no formation of stars and planets, solar systems and galaxies; meaning that no elements (at least beyond hydrogen?) would have formed either. But to reiterate the question, given that we imagine that gravity would exist in all possible worlds; is it actually possible that the elements might have different? — John

This is rejected under radical contingency. Formation of elements is a question of the elements themselves. No element necessarily behaves or is formed in a particular way. Tomorrow, we might wake up to pure gold running from our noses. Radical contingency means not just that our world needn't be, but that any part of our world needn't work the way it does now. The only restriction is logical contradiction and incoherence.

We might have had no gravity, but had planets in a different way. Perhaps all sort of various elements might have appeared at the centre of existing individual planets which had "popped into being." Maybe all the complex elements were part of the planet all along. It's entirely possible the compounds and elements could have been different.

That's incoherent. Any other person or instance virtual reality is not my experience. Even if the replicate my ideas and experiences exactly, they will not be me.

Knowing what it's like to be me is possible-- that only takes someone have an experience which is understanding of what I feel or think. We have such experiences all the time.

But they will never BE me. This is not in some immaterial "soul sense", but in a worldly material one. My existing experiences will never be anyone else's. Contary to what the history of idealism and substance dualism would have us believe, my identity is a question of the world, not some separate realm irrelevant to its meaning.

Such reasoning is a category error. The identity of qualia is a logical one, not one of causality. My qualia cannot by anyone else by definition.

If that were true, my experiences would have to be someone else. Not in the sense of thinking or feeling the same (that's perfectly possible), but in the sense of the logical object defined as me (I) being the logical object of somebody else (not-I). Even mistakes in understanding oneself can't get around this.

Let's say I mistake my experience for someone else, such that the thoughts and feelings "out there" are really mine. If that's true, I've merely misunderstood myself. What I thought was "not-I" was "I" all along. No-one else has the Being of my qualia.

Still missing my point. The mistake of standard modal logic is to slide from actuality to possibility. To treat the actual world as if it's the same as the possible one-- creating confusion like over Paris in this thread. When someone tries to talk about actual Paris (e.g. as Mongrel has), it tries to suggest that actual Paris doesn't necessarily mean anything, that it is merely possible world.

Supposedly, Mongrel is wrong for suggesting actual Paris necessarily means the capital of France, as actual Paris is (supposedly) also only a possible world.

My point is standard model logic has confused the presence of the actual world for the possible one. There is a possible world in which France is the capital of Paris, but it is not given in actuality of Paris. Even is the meaning of the actual world is the same as this possible one, the possible one is still only logic.

Thus, even though Paris being the capital of France is a possible world, it is also true that actual Paris necessarily means the capital of France (until such time as that state of the world changes).

Hence the actuality of P doesn't preclude the possibility of not-P — Pierre-Normand

Indeed. I am talking about the relationship of necessity though. That the actuality/necessity of P (Paris exists as the capital of France) does not preclude the possibility of Paris being (or not being) the capital. The possible worlds (possibility) are true no matter what is necessary (actual).

Not everything that is actual is necessary. — Pierre-Normand

So this claim is too weak. Everything which is actual (necessary) has a true possible world which corresponds to it. The necessity of existence-- "if X is exists, then X must be"-- is not opposed or in conflict with possibility. Every state of the world is merely one possible outcome. Not even necessity of every actual state ( "if X is exists, then X must be") can overcome possibility. For states of the world to have logical necessity ("X is true anywhere, no matter what exists") is incoherent.

Precisely. The question is considered incoherent. There is no relevant answer. It's a waste to ask it.

Experiences aren't generated separate to the triad monism. They are part of it. The "hard problem" misunderstands consciousness. It thinks it something separate to the world, outside its formal cause (from a semiotic theory perspective), so it just misses the boat completely in its analysis of experiences and the world.

Naked primal experience in the world just isn't a problem. In the sense the dualists means, it really does come out of nothing. Dasein emerged out of the absence of dasein (e.g. in terms of the dasein, "nothing" ). Experience doesn't have a formal cause separate to the world. That's what emergence means.

From a dualist perceptive (i.e. experience has a formal cause separate to the rest of the world), emergence isn't "unexplained," it's impossible. No account of consciousness works because the dualist considers it be outside and separate to the things that exist ( "body").

My point is actuality doesn't contain possibility. If we are talking about an actual elephant, then we cannot say: "being [that] mammal doesn't equal being an elephant."

The issue with the standard modal approach is not in confusing possibility with actuality, it is in confusing actuality with possibility. The necessity of actual state is treated as if it is only possible.

To say otherwise is a contradiction. If is is possible I may turn myself into a tiger tomorrow, then the world may work differently than how it does now. The "law" cannot be pre-determinstic. What I am depends on how I exist (e.g. human or tiger), not on the logical expression of how we think the world must work.

If it is impossible for me to turn into a tiger, there can be no possibility of me turning into a tiger (whether we call it "logical" or "actual" ).

I didn't say that forms expressed in actuality were not also a possible world. I merely said that possibility does not equal actuality. Any possible world is, by definition, possible. This includes one with expression of the things in the actual world.

The basic axiom of many modal logic is "what is actual is possible." But that's the problem. It equates actuality with possibility, as if they we're the same. The issue is not saying that possibility is actuality, but rather that actuality is possibility.

They are not. The possible world where Paris is the capital is not the actual world where Paris is the capital, despite them expressing the same form. One is what might be. The other is what is.

If you ask me if it's possible that I may have left my keys in the car, and I reply that it is indeed possible, I am certainly not implying that it isn't actual -- that it is merely an unactualized possibility -- but rather that it might me the case. — Pierre-Normand

The issue is when you have left you keys in the car. For using the "actual is possible" axiom, it results in saying: "It's actual my keys are in the car. It's only possible. They might not be."

This is not true.

There is no difference between those two. Both are logical possibilities. Each is a possible state of the world. Turning myself into a tiger is no less a possible state of the world than responding to this post. The apparent absurdity of the former claim doesn't make it merely logical in contrast to actuality of the latter.

"Natural" law is a lie. It's merely a misreading of our current theories about the world as pre-deterministic.

Your are more right than you are giving yourself credit for here.

Paris is the capital of France is a fully analytic sense. If we are talking about our Paris, our language, then it is by definition the capital of France. We can't speak our language without this being true. Within our language about our world, it's necessary that Paris is the capital of France.

Actual possibility is an incoherence. Possibility is, by definition, not an actual state. We can't have X which exists as maybe X or distinct state of Y. For X to Y is a contradiction. If it is true, I made this post, then there no possibility that making his post is not making this post.

All possibilities are logical. Some are just expressions of particular existing states-- e.g. a six sided die having six possible outcomes.

Yes, but that doesn't mean is is in conflict with possibility. Modern forms of determinism frequently drop (and rightly so) pre-determinism. Necessity is only a question of actually-- if X exist, then X must exist. Possibility remains throughout. For any necessarily state of actuality, there is the possibility something else could have been.

I already said.

Are social systems and individuals such that individuals particular ethnic group is denied opportunities, has the agency disrespected, their property taken, their freedom of movement removed to a greater extent than another ethnic group? If so, there is a racism system and individuals present. Is this true of US society with respect to back people. Yes, so it is a racist.

My position is only confusing for those who have not understand what racism is, for those who think it is about some specific intention which exist separately to the social system and people's lives. You are ignoring the standard of measurement I've given. I've given it in pretty much every post I've made to you here.

"everything is racist". — VagabondSpectre

That was never claimed. Society and individuals being racist doesn't mean it's everywhere. It doesn't preclude back people being treated justly by the police or other social organisation. All it means is that there is much racism is our society embedded much deeper than just bashing someone up because they are black. Not "everything," just many instances.

It's the nature of mind/body dualism. Since the mind is considered a different realm to the body, what mind/body dualism cannot take seriously is the existence of conciousness. If conciousness were existing, then it would be of the same realm as bodies and there would by no opposed dualism.

The mind/body dualist rejection of existing qualia makes perfect sense when you consider their metaphysics say experience must have nothing to do with the world.

Quaila belongs by definition. I am my experience, not yours or anyone else's. You can never access my quaila no matter how much you feel or think like me. It's MY Being and cannot be anyone else's. That's what it means to exist as being of experience.

We have the full account of conciousness in the world everyone has been searching for; each conciousness, each instance of qualia, in-itself. We don't need brains or homunculi.

The mind/body dualist cannot accept this though, for it dissolves their dualism and the "hard problem."