I'm saying that not though. Just the opposite in fact: my point is that classification is a state of existence (i.e. not estranged from reality, an equal partner in reality with every other state) which distinct from other states of the world. I'm pointing out an existing state of classification is not a state of biology. Existence of classification is a different state of reality which shares are world with, for example, biological trait. The former is not a description of the latter.

Reality, existing biological traits and acts of classification, is not as the practitioners of the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. you) think and would have us believe. For something to be classified in some way don't necessarily mean anything about it. All it means is, for the moment, that particular people place it under a certain category. Whatever the concurrent nature of the object in question, it isn't described in the category.

If you want to describe other states of the world and causality, you need to actually talk about them (e.g. this person has the biological trait of a penis, the actions of this person resulted from their body doing this, etc.,etc.).

Trying to describe what someone MUST be merely through a category (e.g. this person must be male since they have a penis, this person must have penis because they are male) is both an error (humans are a contingent state of existence: our existence is never logically necessary) and ignores doing the relevant work (i.e. actually examining the world to check what traits someone has or how they are classified). It doesn't cut it. It is anti-scientific. Instead of observing the world and describing what it is, it involves prescribing what someone must be no matter what is happening in the world.

That's a category error and a strawman. No-one has suggested any form of biological alteration, delusion about the body or that we are anything but our biology and nature. The point is how we categorise is its own particular state, an outcome of nature (ours and the environment), which is not any particular biological trait. Biology and nature aren't dictators of what we are. We don't sit outside ourselves necessitating what we are. Our biology and nature is ourself, including the states of our social interactions and experience.

Here the point has nothing to do with altering or ignoring biology. It is about recognising that acts of social categorisation are not any other state of ourselves. This point is about the meaning of categories, about avoiding the error of equivocating the separate states of a biological trait (e.g a penis) and the act of categorising someone (e.g. classing someone as "male").

What is the motivation to "do something"? The assumption is.... — schopenhauer1

I think it's the opposite.

The motivation is really nothing at all. Motivation cannot be separated form doing the action. It doesn't take any from between thinking banquet an action and performing it. There can't be no pre-existing reason to take any action. You are either doing and motivated or you are not. When someone is motivated, there is no reason to do anything, nothing to be obtained, for one is already where they want to be in that moment. Instead of any sort of assumption or plan of a worthwhile end, there is just a person acting.

It isn't about new or old categories. The point is, rather, about what constitutes a category and how people belong to them. What is at stake is not any particular category, but rather understanding that our categorisation of ourselves and others is its one state of existence, as opposed to a feature or description of someone's biology or "human nature."

The world always make sense. Sense has never been at stake because classification is a different act to description. Each classification is its own language game. They all work. Since classification doesn't describe states of the world, there is no limit to sense of classification. Anyone can be, for example, classified as "male." It is merely a question of who someone is using the category for at the time. It is all question of "ought" not "is." When we classify, we are not describing what someone is or does, but rather specifying a category by which they ought to be understood.

"Bending the world" to a social consensus has not the point nor has it been attempted. Classification is its own state, a way of thinking and acting which exists concurrently with everything else. It is a state separate to both existence of an object and the existence of someone describing an object.

Unless, you know, the world, states of existence (which uses of language are), are finite and arbitrary*....

*(as per QM and radical contingency).

You are trying to maintain the fantasy here. You are the one suggesting there must be a logical ideal from which the world necessarily results.

That's a strawman. I was referring only to classification not being about "reality" in the sense they aren't descriptions of an object of the world, such as a person's biology, what crime someone has committed or someone's test scores.

To be classified as "male" is not a description of someone having a penis. To be proclaimed a "murderer" is not description of an act of killing. To be given a grade of A is not a description of one's correct answers in a test. Any of those classifications may be given to someone who does not exist in the manner that many would (foolishly) think is necessarily implied by the classification. Each of these classifications is a different to description. We use them as shorthand to imply someone about a person we haven't actually described, it index them to a meaning we think they ought to have in society, to proclaim there significance about a person we haven't described often in the service of achieving an ethical goal rather than what is true. In reality, they are nothing more than where we have categorised someone. Description of a person who actually exists in the implied way is absent. There is no standard of "accurately describe the object" to meet with a classification.

Our social classifications are most certainly not separate from reality in the sense belonging to the set of what exists or is true. Social classifications are existing acts. They are material states, just as our acts of eating breakfast, walking to the store or listening to music are. Physical states of the world, the same as any other (i.e. a states of existence). They constitute people having a particular understanding of others, they result in people taking particular acts towards others because of their classification or social standing, they form the presence of one set of outcomes for people as opposed to any other. Social consensus is a state of the world. It is physical in kind, like any other state of the world.

You are missing that the linguistic and empirical contexts involve states of the world. You are treating the "independent" objects, the things-in-themsleves, as if they are separate from the linguistic context (what may be spoken about) and the empirical context (what may be observed). They are not.

That which cannot be verification (i.e. the object, as opposed to experience of an object) is NOT outside the linguistic or empirical realm, but rather within in it, which is how our experience provide understanding and verification of any state of existence. Some meanings expressed by that which is never verification (the car) is are the SAME as an linguistically or empirical context (the perception of a car).

Feelings, classifications, social standing, and perception. No reality, though. — Pneumenon

In a sense, yes. And that is the problem with the accusation of ignoring reality. Classification is not any sort of object we are describing. There is no “reality” we are meeting when placing someone in a category. We are performing an indexical association, not describing a state of the world. The placement of someone in a category, even the “normal” categories, is not a description of any object we observe or can pick-up. There is no standard of “reality” to meet. To ask the question: “Is are classification accurate to reality?” does not make any sense. It isn’t doing this sort of descriptive work at any point. At this level, there is never any reality to our classifications, including the "normal" ones, and there never will be.

Unfortunately though, this is not what you mean. What you mean is that feelings, classifications, social standing and perception have no place in accounting our social reality, despite the fact they constitute our social existence. A position which either seeks to equivocate descriptions of social reality with something else or views them as irrelevant to analysing and talking about the world. Either way, it results in an abject failure to understand our social relationship, understanding of each other and how these interact to affect our states of experience. It seeks to ignore elements we must be interested in if we are to give an accurate account of our social relationships.

What results is a profoundly ignorant position which simultaneously treats the fictions of our classifications as if they were objects in the world (e.g. someone being classified as "male"= a body with a penis), while dismissing the existing states of our social interaction (feelings, acts of classification , social standing, perceptions) as irrelevant to giving an account of our social interactions. It is not only deeply unethical (ignoring how our social practices defined how others are treated), but is, with respect to giving descriptions of what is happening in society, anti-scientific, as it precludes talking about the exact states one needs to if they are to describe our existing social interactions.

I didn't say that we need to speak of the empirical and linguistic context. I said that the empirical and linguistic context is what makes our talk of other things – like the chair in the next room – appropriate. — Michael

But its not. We need more. In this case, as the language is about the world (and of the world), we need the worldly context. We need, in the world, the existence of language which talks about something in the world. What is at stake is more than the definition of language, for than what constitutes a statement which means.

You are missing the critical description that the empirical and linguistic context is worldly.

Does this state of the world transcend verification? Realism requires "yes" and anti-realism requires "no". — Michael

This question is a misstep. No state transcends verification. It is possible to verify any state subject to empirical verification.

But it is also true that states, even known states (e.g. the rising sun tomorrow), frequently are unverified. So in the sense that states of the world are frequently unconfirmed, they do "transcend" verification.

All cinnamon buns are giraffes. If you answer in the negative, it will hurt my feelings. — Pneumenon

That's an ugly strawman of dubious ethical intent.

The point was about how we categorise, not what any object was. We may, indeed, think of cinnamon buns under the category of giraffes.

This is entirely possible and it doesn't change either cinnamon buns nor giraffes at all. More critically, it doesn't even change our understanding of cinnamon buns and giraffes as distinct things, assuming we only alter the category we use of the object, rather than the understanding of the object itself.

So there is no "madness" at stake here, no ignoring what the world is in favour of some personal fantasy world. There is only the category we are classing someone under and whether we are respecting how they feel they ought to be classified.

In answering negative, I would not merely be hurting your feelings. I would be disrespecting you own sense of the world, of what classification you belonged to, of what you were named.

I would, Judith Butler, be classifying you under the category "queer theorist" no matter how much you thought or felt you were Pneumenon who belonged to the brigade of post-structuralist nonsense stompers. I would be calling out to the rest of society to do so too and, in response to your protests you didn't belong to these categories, to treat you as a delusional denying of human nature.

I would hurt not only your feelings, but through the actions of others, through what the thought of you for claiming you are classified as "Pneumenon" rather than "Judith Butler," your social standing, perception of you mental facilities and affect what other think you are capable of.

There is an ethical question and cost far beyond merely someone getting upset here.

You've outright claimed it here:

The truth of "there is a chair in the next room" is (wholly) determined by linguistic conventions and the empirical contexts in which language is put to use. Seems like anti-realism in a nutshell. — Michael

Here you are saying that, for a chair to be in the next room, all we need is for someone to speak of the relevant empirical and linguistic context. Supposedly, the "semantic" is enough to define the truth.

But it's not. We may have a person who speaks of the empirical context of the chair, but not a chair. The use of language may not talk about the world, even profess that semantic meaning. Equally, their could be a chair in the next riot which no one is speaking about.

The truth of "there is a chair in the next room" is NOT (wholly) determined by linguistic conventions at all. It takes a state of the world for that statement to be true. One which is not given by the language alone. For "there is a chair in the next room" to be a true statement, there needs to be relevant state of the world and, specifically, a language which talks about that state of the world. There is more to the truth condition of "there is a chair in the next room" than whether someone utters words with that meaning.

Yeah, and you've been wrong countless times...

But crucially, misunderstanding of direct realism aside,with respect to understanding language, you are still making the split between the world and language. You are treating it is if language doesn't talk about the world by its definition (i.e. it's first and foremost only semantic), as if we could have language which talks about the world which was in the first instance, only semantic.

So you accept that there are truth-conditions. That was the point.


I'm not claiming that being "really true" is nonsensical. I'm claiming that being "really true" as something independent of whether or not it is appropriate, given the empirical context and the rules of our language-game, to predicate truth of it is nonsensical. — Michael

But that's the problem your approach. You fail to understand how language is of the world, that awareness of the truth condition is embedded within language, such that the standard or "really true" never make sense. Any knowledge of a truth condition is given in a person's language. Their can be no "verification" of this knowledge from outside their language. The standard of "really true" doesn't make sense because any instance of empirical confirmation is found within how is thinking or speaking. Any justification of "really true" is merely within a person's own language and experience. It doesn't get outside their experience, their judgement, to demonstrate what is true free of the "taint" of their perception. Things themselves, which may be around when not perceived, are of a nature as spoken by the appropriate language game and that which is seen in empirical observation.

And because of this position you are strawmanning the (direct) realists. They've never asserted that things are independent of language games and empirical contexts. Indeed, their point is this is never true: things of the world are as they are perceived, as they are appropriately spoken about in language.

This is completely mistaken. My point was that it is no more nonsensical to claim "cars can't blink" or "truth is not verification-transcendent" than to claim "people can't fly". — Michael

The problem isn't claiming cars can't blink. On can do that perfectly well, and be right or wrong, depending what type of blinking someone is talking about. Rather, the problem with the question you are posing, which ignores that people know the truth, which views knowledge as a question of "Proof outside your language" rather than a matter of language embedded in the world which says something true.

The point is not about the creation of category. It is the fact that it is created by us, irrespective of its causal origin. Whether a category originates from "biology" and "culture," to speak in the crude terms of the nature/nurture debate (the answer is, of course, always BOTH in any instance, as every moment of human life is biology responding to a present environment), are categorisation is merely cultural (which is to say an existing aspect of human understanding and culture, rather than the necessary nature of any person).

When it comes to the questions of the ethics of categorisation, this understanding is critical. Not because creating any category is necessary any good, but rather because it enables someone to understand what the use of a category is, allowing them to avoid the naturalistic fallacy that any person must belong to any category because of some other trait they possess.

This seems inconsistent with your claim that "In other words, we learn to predicate truth of propositions in the same way learn to predicate color of things. By learning in what circumstances it is normally considered appropriate to make such predications." Surely the circumstances in which it is (in)appropriate to predicate truth of a statement is a truth-condition? It is because of these circumstances that the claim "X is true" is the right (or wrong) thing to say. — Michael

But the understanding of the conditions which amount to a statement being true aren't separate to that.

In the you are using it, there is no act of verification. The person who knows "X is true" doesn't need some separate thing verifying it is "really true." They just need the understanding the condition in question is true.

The idea truth conditions can or cannot be recognised is nonsensical because, in any situation where truth is known, where someone knows about a truth condition, they have recognised the truth condition by definition.

I know, for example, that it is true I am writing this post. The question of whether or not a recognise this truth condition is moot. Given my knowledge, my understanding, I must. I can't know: "Willow is writing this post" is a true statement if I haven't recognised the truth condition in question.

You are making the very distinction, and asking for the event thing, the support for something being "really true," which you are claiming is nonsensical.

Or is it the same and you will maintain your "not even wrong" position and neither claim "people can fly" nor claim "people can't fly"? — Michael

The problem is the question in the first place. You are asking someone who knows (analogous to the truth condition of a statement) the answer to that question (e.g. people can't fly), whether it is true people can or can't fly. And then when the person states the know people can't fly, you are ignoring their knowledge and asking the question again. (e.g. "Ah, but I need "verification" you know people can't fly. We still don't know whether people can fly or not. Please show me people not flying is "really true" ).

But Stoicism is in no way realistic -- its goal is sagelike perfection and its suggestions involve no practical action. It also produces no worthwhile results, in that reading about Stoicism or trying to practice it will not actually resolve your life's major problems. — TheGreatWhatever

Is it not merely suggesting that its practise is worthwhile?

Seems to me the Stoic is trying to create future states (the practice of Stoicism) which are present instead of various states of pain. Whether you are counting this as a resolution of pain or merely distraction from it, I don't think it matters. Either way, any underlying problems remain (e.g. death, work, suffering). Stoicism isn't about solving any problems at all.

But then I don't think that matters to the Stoic. There goal is to do something worthwhile, do something which makes them feel good, do something which resolves/distracts from the pain for a moment or three. They aren't really interested in Stoicism solving their problems.

There is more to it than that though. What we are is its own state, with its own particular description, not merely the description of the prior interactions which lead to an outcome.

In the context of social relations, where understanding is transmitted through labels and categories, this aspect is actually critical to how we identify people and communicate about them. Our understanding of what category or label someone belongs under is defined in the description we make of them.

Gender categories, for example, are "performed" because they are a descriptive act on our part. It is our act of describing someone as belonging to a particular category or label which is the social environment of someone being understood that way. Regardless of the cause of these categories, there presence is an act of our discourse, a performance of ourselves, rather than a prior interaction which has nothing to do with what we are doing. The category of "male" and "female" is the existence of us speaking and thinking a certain way about people, rather than the presence of any prior state of particular biological trait.

In this context, prior states of interaction don't actually describe the state in question. To say that a particular behaviour, trait or act of classification is caused by various interacting forces (e.g. atoms, people, desires, etc.,etc.) leaves out the caused state in question.

If we say, for example, that the categories of "male" and "female" have arisen due to a combination of various biological and environmental forces, it doesn't actually point out how those categories are the existence of our discourse. It leaves out understanding of what is happening in the moment, leaving us unable to distinguish between the existence of our discourse and something in the world. We end-up, for example, with the false impression that it is logically impossible for someone to be understood under a particular label or category because of their biological traits.

We never were anything more, at any time. The issue is that so many misunderstand, many of the "scientific" persuasion, what this means. It does NOT mean that everything is caused by culture, in the sense of the nature/nurture debate. Rather, it means that any state of our community is always "constructed" out by its own presence: it is there because it exists instead of something else. Here "cultural construction" refers not to a case, by rather to the presence of some manner of existing, as it's presence over something else is what formed the present situation.

With respect to our "performances," it is not their origin or cause which matters, but rather that they exist instead of another state which might have been. Here performance is not about playing out a "fake" role per se, but rather about the absence of a nature outside ourselves: the absence of a force which necessitates any state of our existence.

And it's here where the distinction between realist and anti-realist is made; the anti-realist argues that the correctness of using statements is determined by the things we see and the things we say and the things we think whereas the realist argues that the correctness of using (some) statements (e.g. "there is a chair in the next room") is determined by something else (something verification-transcendent). — Michael

This is absurd because statements aren't made outside of the context of our experience. If we are asking about the correctness of a statement, we are always dealing with what we experience. The distinction you are worried about doesn't get off the ground in the first place.

A realist arguing a statement is true because a chair exists in the next room doesn't suggest a truth maker outside what we think and say. Indeed, it is just the opposite: if we are dealing with a true statement, then they entire point is we have said something about the world. The realist argues that truthmakers, the existence of state itself, which someone is talking about in language, is that which we are thinking and talking about.

I may be wrong, but in fact, I think no one else reading this thread follows. If anyone does, please clarify for me, or for anyone else who doesn't understand, what TGW means. — Agustino

Pain cannot be fought. At least that is my reading. The dishonesty of the stoic is in presenting a solution to pain. Nothing helps with pain. If there is pain, there is no means by which to endure it or mitigate it. It must be cut-off entirely. It must not exist.

Since people can't do anything about pain, any suggestion of a "solution" to pain is merely platitude which is ignoring how much pain hurts. So the grieving man is, indeed, making no error. His life hurts exactly as he feels. He is in pain and so nothing he does can solve the problem. A maxim he shouldn't be in pain because it is a waste of his time won't help with his pain at all. If his pain is to be solved, it must cease to exist.

The problem is in trying to distinguish between "pain" and an "attitude to pain." Pain is a feeling and so is someone attitude in a moment. One cannot take the attitude pain is not really painful. The tornado is a tragedy and no amount of insisting it is best to move on with life will change that. The "attitude to pain" is retroactive dishonesty about what happened. It lies about how bad the moment of pain was /is.

People can get to a point where a pain is no longer there or is replaced by a different one (e.g. obsession and despair over a dead loved one replaced by occasional events of sadness). This, however, is a matter of an absence of pain or a different one. No "dulling" of a pain occurred. No instance of pain has become "lesser."

Ok TGW, so you think we can ALWAYS prevent getting hit by tornadoes and all tragedies in our life? If not, then what are we to do when we can't prevent it? — Agustino

Nothing. The question doesn't make sense. Sometimes there is pain we can do nothing about and tragedies we cannot prevent. There is no answer. Not even anti-natalism can help here because the people affected by the tragedy are already born. Sometimes there is nothing we can do to stop getting hurt.

Partly. That more or less works as a convoluted description of the interaction between our experiences and community, to create a particular culture and an individual's ideas and reactions to the world.

I like to be more succinct and direct when addressing erroneous claims of vapidness though. It helps people get over the idea that Butler's arguments are nothing more than a random collection of fancy words doing nothing more than trying to sound important.

Your performance is noted. I'm interested to see what show the body in its environment puts on tomorrow night.

Of course it's not. You're addressing the classical problems, and one of the most prominent classical problems is regarding the correspondence notion of truth and the account of reference where words "stand in" for other (often non-experiential, non-conceptual, non-linguistic) things — Michael

This is an encapsulation of the separation between language and the world you are still holding. The point is this “classical” problem has never been an issue. It only arose because people ignore what language does and what the world is.

Words have never “stood” in for things in the world. They have only ever talked about them. “Correspondence/coherence” between words and the world has only ever meant that someone words are speaking about something which exists. It has never been about replacing states of existence. Just talking about them.

Things are only non-linguistic, non-experiential and non-conceptual in the sense that they are different states of existence to experiences, language and concepts we have about them.

A rock, for example, is non-linguistic, non-experiential and non-conceptual in that the object is not the existence of our language, concept or experience of the rock(i.e. the difference between an existing object and language about the object).

The rock, however, still falls in the domain of the language, concepts and experience. We may talk about it, think about it and experience it. In terms of language, concepts and experience, the object of the rock is significant. Just because things aren’t language, doesn’t mean they have no significance in language. The resolution of the realist/anti-realist debate comes in rejecting the separation between language and the world, while at the same time regaining the differences between language and the things the talk about. The “classical problem” is cut-off before it even begins

(and this is also the reason for direct realism: the unexperienced rock exists as it would be experienced, for it has its significance in experience, concepts and language, even as it is distinct from those states of experience of the rock- which is why it is an unknown rock).

I didn't say that (only) parts of language fall within the domain of the world. I said that (only) parts of the world fall within the domain of language. Not every "state of the world" is language-use.

When I say that parts of the world don't fall within the domain of language I am saying that there are things in the world which aren't words or gestures or other examples of language-use. When I talk about a chair I am not talking about language. — Michael

The problem is this is misleading. It creates the sense of separation between your language and the world which isn't there. When you talk about a chair, you are still speaking language and as such the world (the chair) is in the domain of language.

No doubt there are things which aren't language use, but this instance of speech is not one of them. When you talk about a chair, you are speaking language and what you are talking about (in this case a chair) falls within the domain of language (things spoken about in language).

I haven't said anything like this. What I've said is that one can distinguish between language and its subject matter without invoking metaphysics. The word "chair" and the chair are defined as different things. In making this distinction I'm not treating language and the world as belonging to separate ontological realms. Both the word "chair" and the chair are real things in the real world. — Michael

Indeed, but the relevant question here is what constitutes the discintion between two existing states. A metaphysical argument is not need to make the distinction, but that doesn't mean the distinction has nothing to with existence. In pointing out the distinction, you are identifying to different states of the world. You are pointing to a rock (language) and a tree (chair) and saying: "There is an existing rock (language). There is an existing tree (chair)."

One cannot distinguish between the two states without invoking a description of what exists. The distinction, what you are talking about, is about the world rather than just language. It is not merely "semantic." And talking only in semantics (e.g. "chair" does not mean "language speaking about chair" ) will never draw this distinction between things in the world, for it only talks about what language can logically mean (i.e. semantics is metaphysics ). We might not need metaphysics to draw the distinction between two states of existence, but that doesn't mean we are only making a semantic discintion.

In splitting the discintion in terms of "semantics" and "metaphysics" you have created to realms which aren't relevant to it. The discintion in question is pointing out states of the world. It is neither semantic nor metaphysical. It doesn't even make sense to ask the question: "Do we need to argue semantics or metaphysics to draw this distinction?" The discintion, what the language is talking about, is of the world. You are ignoring this so long as you envision the distinction as a question of using semantics or metaphysics.

The language or "chair" and the chair aren't merely defined as different things (semantics), they exist as different things.

The former (semantic) discintion only identifies that the meaning of language about a chair and a chair are different. It doesn't actually point out the difference between two states of existence. It fails to point out the difference between the presence of someone speaking about a chair and the presence of the chair they are speaking about. It doesn't talk about any state of existence at all.

The very discintion you are drawing there is one between two things in the world. You write on the former and sit on the latter in the world. In saying the word "chair" is not a chair, you are making, in the terms we are using, an ontological distinction: pointing out the difference between two states of existence.

You cannot bring-up a "semantic" distinction before this ontological one because talk about existence required to describe the distinction between the state of existence of the language "chair" and the state of the chair. If you only bring-up a "semantic" discintion, one which is only relevant to the "realm of language," you fail to talk about the difference of the two states of the world.

Suggesting language is of some other "realm" is, indeed, not required. It is a grievous error in fact; a position which commits one to ignore the significant of language in the world.

You are, however, insisting on making this distinction of language as another realm. At every turn you are trying to insist that the distinction of the world you are describing (i.e about existing states, talking about something with ontological significance) is merely semantic, as if your description was in some realm outside existence (ontology) and had nothing to do with it, as if what you are saying wasn't talking about the world. Just about every single discussion we've had on this topic has you proclaiming your language doesn't need to be about the world (i.e. only semantic), even though it is both of the world and is actually talking about it (and so, by definition, is about "ontology" ).

StreetlightX's point is you have already assumed language ("Hey, its only semantic. Distinction in the world is unnecessary" ) is of a separate realm and so you are completely missing the worldly nature of language.

The point is distinction in the world (i.e. "of ontology") is necessary. Not in the sense of a "foundation," as if language needed something outside itself to ground its meaning, but rather as a feature of language itself. Language which draws distinction between things in the world, such as instance of language and what those talk about, is saying something about what exists. One cannot have language which is only of the "semantic" realm. Such different realms are not only unnecessary, but are impossible by the nature of language itself. Language was of the world from it emergence and is always contained within this sole realm.

I don't see how saying that parts of the world fall within the domain of language and that parts of the world fall within the domain of not-language is any more problematic than saying that parts of the world fall within the domain of games and that parts of the world fall within the domain of not-games. And I don't see how the former is merely "lip service" just as I don't see how the latter would be "lip service". — Michael

This is the very discintion, between the "realm" of the world and the "realm" of language, which you are supposedly proclaiming is unnecessary. Here you insist must be made.

Parts of language don't fall into the domain of the world. It all does. Any use of language is a state of the world. Parts of the world don't sit outside the domain of the language either. We may use language to talk about any part of the world.

But that involves more than a semantic distinction. It's a distinction between different states of the world. In pointing out states of language are not what language talks about, one is drawing a distinction between two different things in the world. One is is talking about two different forms of ontology, not merely a difference in what words mean.

This is patently false. Schopenhauer is in fact stating that the Platonic idea of women is as he describes it. It doesn't follow that every women is, by logical necessity, like that. However, it does follow, that there will be a tendency for women to be like that. But this does not enable one to "know" a priori what a particular representation of the Platonic idea of women (a particular woman) is like. Why? Because representations fail to match the Platonic idea - they are merely distorted shadows of it. — Agustino

Indeed. And that's what constitutes the naturalistic fallacy. People are never Platonic idea(l)s. No human ever is. A Platonic idea(l) of a person has nothing to with any existing person at all. It is nothing more than a value, an expectation, an idea of what someone (in this case do), do "by their nature," while completely ignoring their nature (as states of existence are never the Platonic idea(l)).

The Platonic idea(l) of women is no description of women. No woman is like it because any woman, by definition, is an existing state rather than a Platonic idea(l). But that's the problem. It means that Platonic idea(l)s are useless with respect to describing people who exist. In terms of understanding the nature of people, the Platonic idea(l) gives nothing.

So... to apply the Platonic idea(l) to the question of understanding any existing person (in this case women) is incoherent. It is a contradiction. It attempts to say that a Platonic idea(l) tells us something about someone even though that's exactly what it can never do, as an existing thing never amounts to the Platonic idea(l). People aren't even distorted shadows of Platonic idea(l)s.

Thus, this Platonic idea(l) of women is, rather than any sort of description of living women, nothing more than as excuse to reveal in the idea men a geniuses over women. It is concerned not with talking about living women, but rather enshrining a sense of what women are, what they can do, what they are meant to be. It is deep-rooted sexism rather than honest description of the world. It is the practice of setting an assumption about the nature of women in discourse, which automatically applied without any consideration of an existing woman (whether they be a genius or not). It is actually an understanding of what women are and are meant to do masquerading, simultaneously, as non-description (Platonic idea(l)) and description ("but I'm just describing how women geniuses are rare" ).

I never said that that's all they ought to do, and neither did Schopenhauer as a matter of fact... — Agustino

darthbarracuda is a little too kind here. You are committing a textbook naturalistic fallacy here. You didn't say it was women ought to do. Instead you (and Schopenhauer) used a discourse of generalisation to set-up a particular set of expectations and ideas surrounding what women do. What you (and Schopenhauer) are doing here is not making scientific observation (e.g. most prominent philosophers are men), but rather misusing a scientific observation to proclaim people with specific traits (men and women) are "naturally" something irrespective of there existence, such that all we need to "know" a person of that group is this "logically necessary" nature.

He merely means to say that such would be an abnormality in Nature, not the general trend. He has justified his points, if you actually spent your time reading the two texts, by explaining how they fit in with our biological evolution. Women evolved to fulfill different roles than men: therefore they are better at some things, and inferior at others. — Agustino

This is the naturalistic fallacy in all its ugliness. It states that people (in this case intelligent women), who are the result of human biological evolution, are "abnormal," are against the nature evolved humans. Despite the fact those intelligent women are a product of human evolution and so are just as "natural" or "normal" as any other person.

It is not only anti-scientific, but also a deep-seated understanding about what men and women are "meant to be." The intelligent women is considered "abnormal," a failure of human nature, because she doesn't fit (supposedly) what human women are mean to be.

Interesting, especially because this would seem to imply that the difference between language and reality is "merely" linguistic. Does this instance of self-reference do anything interesting? I have some ideas, but if you have anything to say, I'd like to hear it first. — Pneumenon

For me the critical aspect is dropping the idea of "deriving." All the controversy about the meaning of language pivots on the idea of "deriving" what language means or references.

Supposedly, there aspect of our world which enables language to mean and refer, which then allows us to infer what language means from outside language. Using "chair" to talk about the object I'm sitting on, for example, is thought to need some sort of outside support, or else we are left with a "mystery" of what language means and how we speak about anything with language. The problem of "mystery" is created entirely by taking the assumption language is derived.

In a critical sense, the difference between language and reality is linguistic. It means that, by it definition, our language talks about reality. "Chair" means and refers to a specific instance of the world. And we (who use the language) know it does and can talk about it. "Mystery" is nonsensical. We have language and we know what it means. Language is its own state of the world (i.e. not "derived") and it, as an existing state, it talks about reality (making all of reality and its differences "linguistic" ) .

I don't think the classical problems are simply regarding how to 'bridge' the 'divide' between language and reality but between, for example, the string of symbols "chair" and the thing upon which I'm sat. I think it obvious that language is an "instance" of reality (which I assume just means that language is a real thing that really happens) but less clear is how this "instance" relates to some other (often very specific) "instance". — Michael

The problem is the "how" is entirely absence. When we use language, nothing manifests which specifies now word is talking about a particular thing. It is always already embedded within the language. If I use the string of symbols "chair" to talk about something, what I reference is already contained in my language use. In this usage of "chair," I understand what the string "chair" is talking about, and so does anyone else who is using the same language as me. No bridge exists. Asking what it looks like will always come-up empty because it isn't there. One is asking for a description the treasure chest as it appears in an empty room, which is a futile question of contradiction.

In succinct terms, there is no relation. A use of language exists and someone either knows what it talking about (they make use of it) or they do not (they do no know what the language is saying).

The point is correspondence between language doesn't matter to realism because, as realism is metaphysical, whether or not any use of language (in the world) corresponds makes no difference. What we say in the world doesn't have to match what is there for realism to obtain. All that's at stake with "correspondence" is whether or not someone knows what exists. It serves no purpose in the realism of metaphysics.

Indeed, realist metaphysics are, in this sense, anti-correspondence because the "match" between the world and spoken in words (that is language in the world) is both irrelevant to them and contrary to what the position of realism argues. The entire point of realism is things are given in themselves: they don't need anyone to speak about them, any experience to "correspond" to them, to be.

The debate between the realist and anti-realist or idealist on the basis of "correspondence" begins with entirely the wrong assumption: that language use is outside the use of language, such that it is required for the metaphysical point that things are given in-themselves. What the anti-realist does, and quite a number of realists do, in this debate is assume the unexperienced must have significance in their language. Despite the fact the entire point of something being unknown is that it is outside the language which is used at the time.

Noting the worldly nature of language undoes this mistake. When we realise that language is a question of a state of the world, rather than that which makes existence possible, we let go of the idea that language is required for something to exist. We can say, for example, that is something unknown, which IF we had language which talked about it, we could say what it is. But at present (noting one's language in the world), we don't have language which talks about it, so we can't say what it is.

The problem with the shallow realist/anti-realist debate is both argue their position using a known states state example, as they are trying to demonstrate something known, either as an example of the world which exists without experience (the realist) or as the failure of our descriptions to get outside language (anti-realist). Both fail to examine the most critical point, what we don't know, and how it relates to language. As a result the realist is left grasping for a unknown world within language, while the anti-realist is stuck denying the unknown world can possibly be significant in language (which is blatantly false: events we don't know have meaning in language all the time. Indeed, that's what an "unknown" is. Here the argument of the anti-realist turns back on itself: if anything which affects us, anything which we MAY talk about, is within only language, how then can unknowns- which can become known by their definition- be impossible to capture in language? The anti-realist position makes all unknowns meaningless, for there is nothing to say or learn about them).

I’m pointing out the error remains even with knowledge of “profound insight.” To know the world is full of suffering or that Will cannot eliminate itself doesn’t constitute the non-existence of Will. Someone could know all about those, could have all the knowledge spoken in Schopenhauer'd philosophy, yet be present with the ego of Will. People need more than “profound knowledge” to be without Will.

“Philosophically,” that is to say in terms of metaphysics, of logic, of the infinite, there is indeed nothing to say about the absence of Will. The problem is that “philosophy” is not the limit of description. We can talk about more than the metaphysical. Our knowledge is about more than just the meaning of logic. Sometimes we know stuff about the world, about states of existence, about finite, about the subject.

If we are taking about a person who is not burned with Will, we are describing the state of a subject. Metaphysics says exactly nothing about the subject of our description. Description seems impossible only because Schopenhauer is looking in the wrong place. Instead or raising what matters to description the absence of Will is the subject, he continue to talk only in the “profound insights” of metaphysics, missing it is in description of the subject where we can describe or show what it means to live without the ego of Will.

Rather than the end of philosophy and the beginning of mysticism, it is the end of metaphysics and the beginning of THE WORLD. As such the absence of Will is not incompatible with philosophy at all. The scope of philosophy is wider than merely questions of describing logic. It is also about asking questions about our descriptions of the world and interrogating how these relate to what is true. Our philosophy may dabble in the context of describing these states or help bring us to a point which allows us to in a specific way.

“Mysticism,” in so far as we are talking about it here (e.g. "rapture," "ecstasy," "illumination," or "union" ) is the confusion of THE WORLD (e.g. the state of ourselves which, in Spinozian terms, is our “Love of God” ) for metaphysics, such that people consider themselves to be defined by Will: as if there person is defined by some logical, metaphysical precept (God, PSR,etc.etc), as opposed to themselves as a state of the world. They say: “I am because of God” when, really, they are just themselves.

The absence of Will is actually the affirmation of oneself, whatever that state might be at the time, rather than the reduction of the subject and the world to nothing. The presence of this may be unstated. Or we may talk about about it, such that we describe that someone exists having rejected Will and is not burdened with the desperation to be something they are not. Shop. gets somewhat close to this. In realising the absence of Will is not defined metaphysically, that we must be “nothing” in those terms to be absent Will, he is right. The problem, however, is he doesn’t carry through to consider knowledge of the world. He limits our descriptions of the world and Will to metaphysics and so misses out on detailing so much knowledge, even to the point of suggesting it is impossible. Like the mystic traditions before (and after) him, he confuses talking about the world for talking about metaphysics. He says: “I am (or perhaps, "Everything) because of Will” when, actually, he (everything) has only ever been himself (itself).

We can’t specify “what it takes” to eliminate Will because, in all cases, it’s defined by the given individual being absent Will. Describing someone taking an action isn’t enough to tell whether to not this has been achieved. The best description we can give is to point out someone no longer has Will, the state in-itself, and trust that are description is an accurate reflection of their thoughts and feelings (just as we do with any other situation go out states of experience). In this respect Shop. is correct not to prescribe on any particular behaviour or ethical position. No suggestion of how to act can define the absence of Will.

However… this does not mean Schopenhauer doesn’t specify a “must.” He does, with respect to the goals of understanding suffering and eliminating Will, as if people must do these things to understand the nature of life and avoid existing with the restlessness of Will. Reaching these goals, he argues, must be achieved through specific practices (e.g. worrying about suffering, fighting suffering, eliminating desire, etc.,etc.), despite the fact it isn’t true at all. In the process, he completely fails to describe what it takes to live without Will and advocate people hold beliefs which fail to describe such a life.

What the deuce does this even mean? I think Schopenhauer does damn fine job of accepting suffering for it is, i.e. something intrinsically undesirable as an end in itself. What else do you have in mind here? — Thorongil

Something undesirable that CANNOT be escaped, altered or fought. If suffering is to be avoided, it must not exist. There is no struggle to turn suffering into the absence of suffering. When suffering is present, it is a state of the world we are powerless to change. Schopenhauer hasn't taken this step. He still viewing states of suffering as something to struggle against, as if we can somehow manipulate them into states lesser suffering or states absent of suffering.

And what - you're saying this is a state of boredom? Is that what you think he fails to understand? If so, then you have misunderstood what the denial of the will entails. The ego, as a mere phantasm of the will, dissolves when the will is dissolved, so there is no one to be bored, no one to suffer while the will is being denied. — Thorongil

Not boredom per se, it could be any restless state (e.g. boredom, pain, sadness, etc., etc. any time someone gets trapped Willing to be something the are not). I am saying that Schopenhauer doesn't understand what it means to be free of restlessness, to have eliminated Will. He fails to describe such a state and, as a consequence, his philosophy fails to pass on knowledge of what it entails.

How does one acquire this knowledge? The simplest, most common, and most tragic way is through suffering, which either over time or through some particularly excruciating event, slowly erodes, chips away at, or detonates the inborn error that we exist to be happy (having our desires be fulfilled) and that one need only affirm one's will to be so. Then a set of choices presents itself: 1) denial of the realization, resulting in the strengthening of the delusion, 2) suicide, or 3) the path of asceticism. — Thorongil

He is wrong though. Acquiring knowledge doesn't define the absence of Will. Someone could know everything yet still miss out on the critical change in their own outlook which is the denial of Will. This is what I mean about his philosophy trying to force the elimination of Will from within Will. Schopenhauer begins with an ego towards ending suffering and restlessness and remains there. He still thinks what he Wills (no more restlessness, though knowledge, through suicide, through asceticism) is the solution to eliminating Will. Schopenhauer might know Will cannot be eliminated by the Will, but he nevertheless argues it must be and offers that as THE solution to restlessness.

Critically, this makes his philosophy ineffective at doing what it is supposed to. Knowledge can often trigger a new state someone. Describing what it means to escape restlessness would help many people come to exist in a new state without the burden of Will. Schopenhauer philosophy actually fails to do this. Instead he offers a series moment of Willing, of merely searching for that which will resolve restlessness (maybe suicide? maybe asceticism?), in response to knowledge of suffering. He might say what required (the elimination of Will), but he neither shows it nor practices it within his own philosophy.

I'm not entirely sure he would say this, but even if he did, I'm very curious as to what difference it makes. Basically, the full import of your criticism, which has been put so forcefully, is still lost on me. — Thorongil

The difference it makes in whether or not suffering is recognised for what it is: something which cannot be "fixed," which cannot be "muted," which is not "coped" with under any circumstance.

Schopenhauer philosophy still treats suffering as if it is a problem to be fixed. It Wills the absence of Will from within Will. We can only make the choice, Schopenhauer says, between delusion (absence of knowledge), suicide or asceticism, in an attempt to fix the suffering of our lives. Instead of accepting suffering for what it is, and then asking how we might exist without suffering, Schopenhauer imagines we must fight ourselves (e.g. suffering) from within ourselves (e.g. turn suffering into non-suffering), as if we could Will the elimination of Will and were not bound to the identity of ourselves at a given time.

Schopenhauer would concur. But the will cannot be eliminated by force, by means of its own objectifications. It requires being blown out, like a candle, from within, as a completely free choice. — Thorongil

I know. My point was that his own philosophy works against this by proposing "restlessness" as THE feature of life. Within his understanding of suffering, he is still treating it as if it is something which can be captured and fought, something with which people "cope with."

He never says eliminating suffering is easygoing. But there is an inner, ineradicable calm, even in the midst of great suffering or boredom, by those who have tasted the denial of the will, which enables them to overcome the blows of life battering them from without. — Thorongil

And that's the problem. The absence of suffering is the easiest thing when it happens. One has nothing to do. They just are. Will demands nothing of them, no matter what they might be doing in a moment, for there is none. Schopenhauer's philosophy fails to understanding this, characterising avoiding suffering as if it is a desperate battle we are constantly fighting, as if we would resolve suffering by being "restless." The way his philosophy handles Will is to try and force it out by means of its own objections. In doing so he considers this the means to eliminate Will (even though it doesn't) and ends-up advocates for people to exist in this form of "restlessness."

I don't think rooting language back in the world again will help. You'll just get more dumb correlationist paradoxes. I think it would be better to work through language's logic from the inside, ironically, until it can be systematically untangled, and allow the world to collapse with it. No more realism or naturalism then. — The Great Whatever

The problem is that's exactly what language can never do. Since language is always distinct from what it talks about (e.g. my talk about the apple is never the apple), it is incapable to work through language "from the inside" because, in every instance, language is always outside what it talks about, including its own instances.

In any situation where I use language to analyse an instance of language, I am outside the instance of language I am analysing. I'm locked out. There is no way I can get in. I can't turn my language of analysis into the language I am talking about. Telling people (including myself) about one of my experiences is never the same as living it. The "inside" language is impossible.

I'd say that the way language is supposed to work, it pretends to have a kind of transcendental function that circumscribes the limits of the world — The Great Whatever

Seems to me this is an error formed out of failing to consider how language is of the world. The "limit of the world" is only suggested to be the role of language, if we ignore the fact that each instance of language is one particular use which talks about one tiny part.

If the worldly nature of language is understood, this mistake is avoided. Let's say I have language which talks about the tree. Is this language the limit of the world? No. Is it the limit of the tree? No. It is merely a specific instance of language (a state of the world) which talks about something. Any instance of language does not put a limit on the world (including anything it talks about). It merely talks about something.

Pessimists don't want to have to deal with the flux in the first place. The fact that we are given a deficit in order to get out of is not a good situation. Whether the program to "get out" be the "indifference" of Stoicism, self-help, alcohol, or any other coping mechanism, the fact is, there was a deficit to cope with in the first place. Rather than choose a program (or no program, which is still a program of sorts), Philosophical Pessimists rebel against the fact that any program must be heeded at all. Again, it is probably about temperaments. More optimistic-types might relish the challenges, deprivations, hardships, etc. — schopenhauer1

Do you not see the irony here? What is this "pessimism" but a "coping mechanism?" A program of restlessness which is instituted to feel better about the flux which is impossible to deal with. These pessimists might say they don't want to deal with the flux, but that is really what they are interested in doing the most. Anything to draw attention to the abject failure to deal with suffering- "Hurt, be restless, for life will never be without suffering" they say. In no uncertain terms this pessimist thinks: "There is a deficit we have to cope with." They fail to understanding coping is exactly what is impossible.

It really amounts to, I would argue, a failure of pessimism. Instead of, deep down, knowing there is nothing which can save us, that the flux of life is doomed to suffering, it still holds onto the "optimist" illusion there is some action we take to "cope" with it. For a "pessimistic" position, it sure is afraid of stating how the deficits of life cannot possibly be "coped" with.

I think that Schopenhauer's description of restlessness is one of his best points. The emptiness one feels and the constant-goal seeking rings very true to the human experience. If anything, it may produce less anxiety to know there is relatively famous thinker out there that not only feels similarly but states the ideas so eloquently. I don't know anyone who reads Schopenhauer who feels an extra source of anxiety from his idea of Will. If anything, it makes people calmer to understand there might be an abstract model that is describing what is going on. Now, in one respect I can see what you are saying- the idea that there is an escape from the suffering might be a pipe dream (like Nirvana, heaven, utopia, etc.). However, that doesn't necessarily cause anxiety. You either except his conclusion like @Thorongil apparently does and go with it (live more ascetically in the hope that this calms the Will), or one does not. If one does not, one simply admires some of the author's main points without accepting the conclusion. Again, no anxiety need be involved in evaluating Schopenhauer's claims. This seems like a strawman or a misconception at the least. — schopenhauer1

Oh, it does reduce anxiety in that sense. To see oneself describe is often relaxing- at least one knows what problem is, even if it isn’t resolved. My point, however, is Schopenhauer’s seeks to maintain restlessness, as if the ignitible of suffering in life meant we obligated to be restless.

When I talk about Schopenhauer’s philosophy causing anxiety, I am talking about it failure to conceive of life as anything but restlessness. It is incapable offering people philosophical understanding which mutes or resolves anxiety about what happens next in life. Instead of redirecting us to think of life in terms of its existence in the moment, it traps us in the cycle of worrying about what goals to find.

In the absence of restlessness, there is no goal seeking. When someone is where they ought to be in a moment, they have their goal, they know what they are doing. To seek a goal is irrelevant because they already have one. And they, as much as they need to, completing or working towards it in the given moment. They need to get nothing because, for that moment, they have everything they require. Suffering included, for as horrible as it might be, it has been accepted (despite being unwanted and horribly painful) until such time as it passes. The suffering which is beating oneself-up about failing to escape suffering is avoided.

The entire point of Schopenhauer’s philosophy works against understanding this. It is so desperate for the pipe dream (sufferingless life) it fails to accept suffering, while also advocating for a form of suffering ( “life is always restless” ) which is frequently avoidable.

My problem is with Schopenhauer’s main points because they tell falsehoods about the world and the relationship of life to suffering. It speaks a falsehood about suffering, suggesting it is something which can be “dealt with,” even though that’s exactly what’s impossible with suffering (and why its so terrible). It misunderstands Will, mistaking it for something to calm, when it is actually needs eliminating entirely.

(and this why the argument to live ascetically fails so often. Sometimes that calms or eliminates the Will, if one is constantly feeling pressured by a hedonistic lifestyle, to a point where stepping back offer respite from restlessness. Many other times though, it just makes someone bored, resisted or frustrated- an action which generates Will- as it denies the goal that have, meaning the go into “seeking mode” as they need to find it again).

Neuroscientists that study perception are fundamentally wrong about the way we perceive, while people who have more or less convinced themselves from the armchair that perception works another way are right? An interesting problem. Though of course, there will be citations of scientists who believe in 'embodied theories' (again, whatever that means [not much I wager]) and direct realism and so on. But that would be a risky gambit, since then the defense would buy into the logic of the argument, and the minute the consensus is revealed to be genuinely in favor of indirect realism among scientists, the direct realist is left with egg on his face. Though who knows, maybe he would just entrench again. — The Great Whatever

The issue is that the (indirect realist) neuroscientists are asking the wrong question. It is not that they are wrong about how experiences are caused (they are right about that), but rather they do not address what an instance of perception IS.

Direct realism is talking about what it means to perceive an object: that in instances of perception, someone is aware of an object in the world (what is interacting with their body, to produce their present experience) as it exists. The point is to draw the distinction which actually defines the perception of an object (as opposed to merely having an experience).

If objects are not what appears in experience, then nothing is perceived. Anything experienced is merely a creation of an unknown something. No outside object has been perceived. I just have my generated experience and it has no ties to anything I have perceived. An experience, for example, cannot be caused by a ball hitting someone arm, for both those objects are merely a created experience. The effect of objects on the body lost, for any we experiences become a secondary effect of an unknown system (it can't be our body and environment, as both of those are things we are aware of in experience) which generates our experience. Indirect realism is incoherent with embodied causes to experiences and perception of any causal object.

That is, after all, why people tend to use science to prove realism over idealism, is it not? So it then seems to be a bit hypocritical for the direct realist to ignore this when arguing with the indirect realist. — Michael

Science doesn't actually perform that task. Realism is a metaphysical position (i.e. about logic) and is shown through the demonstrations of other positions being logically incoherent, not through the presence of any observed empirical state.

Using observed empirical states doesn't work because at no point does it grant us access to unobserved states of the world. We can't use it to demonstrate the existence of unobserved states. The idealist or anti-realist can always pull the "in a moment of experience" argument to support the coherence of their position with science.