What gives this particular idea (whatever that is really) anything more that solves the problem of suffering or is of extreme ethical import? — schopenhauer1

Nothing. The point is not that it can solved. Rather the point is: the expectation it will be solved is nonsensical and only makes us needlessly anxious. It is to desire a fantasy world which will never be. Better to direct our attention towards mitigating suffering and enjoying the moments we are given respite from it. Pining for a suffering-less world which we will never (worse, a world we know we will never have; to expect a world without suffering is our own wilful ignorance about life) have only results in more suffering than there need be.

Something can be worthwhile extrinsically, as an efficient cause of a good. It's not hard to see why ethics would relate interestingly to pleasure in this way. — The Great Whatever

The problem is an effect is never given without its cause. In an instance of a pleasure causing action, there is no way to separate performing that action and obtaining the pleasure.

So to consider the action only "extrinsically" important is to miss a most critical aspect. There is no question of judgement to be made. You don't have any sort of choice whereby you get to measure whether it is valuable to take the pleasurable action or not. If this is instance of pleasure matters, so must the taking of the action. Both must matter for themselves. That is to say, it is important that each of the states exists. Good is not some justification, some excuse for doing something. It is a state of being. It is about existing, about acting, in some way.

I do not think Schopenhauer meant by restless that we are anxious for a future event, but that each moment in time we are never fully satisfied or satisfied for long. He did recognize brief moments of satisfaction (happiness/contentment) from achieving a goal, but then the lacking feeling continues. — Schopenhauer

I know that. The stuff about anxiety about future events was directed at your argument about impingement on lives resulting from the mental, physical, social, and situational circumstances, at what you were supposing we had on-top of the necessary suffering as argued by Schopenhauer1.

The problem with Schopenhauer's argument is the restless doesn't continue. New states of restlessness emerge. Each state of restlessness is a new state of existence, rather than a continuation of some infinite necessary foundation of life. The lacking feeling does not continue. It merely, sometimes, even frequently, exists. And then it, frequently, passes out of existence, to be replaced by a state absent restlessness (and not just in response to achieving goals. Sometimes people are just found without restlessness at a particular time). Then that will pass, maybe bring a new state of restlessness. And so on and so forth. What Schopenhauer fails to recognise is that states of restlessness are also brief moments, fleeting and contingent states of existence, which pass not only in death but also in life.

I'm not sure I understand. One chooses to jump or not to jump. One's choice determines the act. Once one has chosen, one has acted and there is no choice any more. There is indeed only one act; one cannot jump and not jump. One has faith, or one does not. — unenlightened

My point is that such an argument makes faith empty as an account of action. You didn't live your life because of faith, you just lived it. You acted. That's it.

You've seemingly indicated that faith is about something more than just what action you take, but here you are treating it as equivalent: merely calling your lived life, your actions, "faith."

I have in the back of my mind a situation I was in recently that you may have heard about, where I remained faithful without much belief for some time. In that case my faith kept me from jumping (metaphorically) until the (metaphorical) rope was well and truly cut. — unenlightened

When I talk about trust, this is what I mean. You remained "faithful," you trusted that things would turn out successfully, even though you believed otherwise. This was so, right up until the moment that a particular action was taken, at which point your faith had finally ebbed away.

Rather than being an account of the action in question - which is actually independent of whether or not you had faith (you could have taken the action you did, but still thought things would turn out successfully. You could have lost all trust but decided otherwise to what you did), faith is actually an expression that, for the moment, you have trust in something.

And that's the ignorance of the argument. We are not always deprived. More critically, we are not necessarily deprived. It is counter to the world. A falsehood.

No matter how much suffering the world is (and there is inevitably a ton), the contingent nature of the world, of our lives, means we still experience things like joy, happiness and contentment. We are not always lacking something. Sometimes we are content with the present. Even in instances where there is something we want, we are sometimes content: happy to exist, waiting for it, until its time comes. We do not necessarily suffer. Nor do particular states of the world always impinge upon the individual. I'm happy to wait until my birthday to get my birthday present. I'm not restless with thoughts that I must have it now, even if it is something that I want.

@unenlightened

I think that's what they are taking issue with. How can the action someone takes be or not be? It's a contradiction.

To me "faith," at least here, seems more like an expression of trust towards some way of acting opposed to the action itself- I will and think and/or act like this no matter what. It's an expression also given independently of action.

The first time bungee jumper might insist, up until the point of the jump, that they were going to jump no matter what, that they had "faith" the would be safe (even if someone cut the cord), only to be overcome with fear and refuse the jump when the time came.

I don't think anyone takes seriously the idea that life is not full of suffering. What may be more disturbing to people is, having realized this, coming to understand that they approve of life in spite of this, and therefore approve of other people's suffering, as well as forcing that suffering on further generations, perhaps in perpetuity. In other words, their ideals are internally inconsistent, which causes a Socratic pain: they nominally 'don't want people to suffer,' but deep down there is a very real sense in which they do want that. — Great Whatever

I don't think it is a question of thinking as life absent suffering. What strikes me about many people is not that they actively proclaim nobody suffers with any seriousness, but rather that their minds are frequently filled with other thighs and feelings. It's more a question of not recognising the presence of suffering because you are too busy doing something else. The distress at noting the inevitability of suffering seems to a morning for a time when someone was so caught-up with other ideas they didn't notice. In their heart, they wish the world was just made-up of joy, like they perceived for am moment in the past.

Ha. I doubt they even work on that level. They're just dumb phrases. It's like Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. Nobody 'loves' McDonalds. That's just something they say in the commercials. Likewise with the aphorisms about suffering. — Great Whatever

That certainly worked on me. Reading "Ba da ba ba ba, I'm lovin' it. " was nice. The saying consumed my mind for couple of seconds and I thought of nothing else. Suffering become invisible for a moment.

Nobody loves McDonalds. But then that's not what is at stake. What matters here is not a representational point (what does "loving McDonalds (or life)"even mean? It is an all together meaningless statement). Rather it is the act of "Ba da ba ba, I'm lovin'it" itself: the making of or hearing of the statement, which pushes aside all other thoughts, including those about suffering, to give a brief moment without any anxiety about anything. Moment where suffering becomes invisible, where anyone can take a break from the pain of worrying about it. That's is something just about everyone loves.

Schopenhauer's vision is closer to the reality of the human condition which takes into account the restless nature of the human psyche, the deprivation of contentment that motivates us all, and the contingent nature of existence impinging upon us. The contingent nature of reality along with our own inner restless nature is closer to what is going on. — schopenhauer1

And that's what Schopenhauer gets so wrong. Such a condition only applies to those with a restless nature, to those who fear "becoming," who get riddled with anxiety about what is to come, who try to hold the future before its in reach. He is offering justifications, apologetics, for why every life must necessarily be restless, rather than seeing each individual for what they are. The contingent nature of life, the passing and emergence of restlessness and dissatisfaction, at different times, in different people, is what exactly he cannot abide, for it would ruin his explanation of life as necessary suffering. Schopenhauer, in the end, denies nature, life as it exists, because he is more interested in suffering being logically necessitated than he is in describing living people (even considering the fact they will, invariably, encounter some instance of suffering in their life).

For Schopenhauer, the suffering of life is not enough. He wants suffering to be infinite, as a demonstration of how life consuming it ought to be.

Yes, I agree. What they're doing is, I often feel, a bad way of doing philosophy as well as a bad way of doing art. — jamalrob

At this point I feel like saying: "It's art Jam, but not as you know it." The comparison to life through reference is apt. When we seek to define art, we are ultimately decreeing what expression in objects is worthwhile, we are stating what meaning in conjunction with a created object deserves to live, and which is so empty of value it is best it is wiped out.

Conceptual art is, I would argue, fruitful in many ways. It is just it can be difficult to get into from a position of art criticism, as everyone worries too much about what art is meant to be saying. Interestingly, the professed focus of conceptual art ends to shoot itself in the foot here. Successful conceptual are is actually about the object as much as anything else.

The reason conceptual artists don't "just write a book" is because they are interested in the intersection of meaning with an object. What the object does, that it is there, associated with the particular meaning of the idea, is the point. Worthwhile expression found in the moment meaning is expressed with an object, with no need for any denoting representation. An act of making and association, of stacking boxes on top of each other and proclaiming it explores the rigid complexity of growing garden, is all it takes. It's an object in a moment of expression. And this is worthwhile having. It is a pure concern for moment of an object and an associated expression.

To fully appreciate conceptual art, one actually has to turn away from the supposed idea and back to the object. Not only does it draw attention to what is actually important to conceptual art (meaning and THIS object, together, NOW), but it also points towards the aesthetics pleasures to be found in conceptual art. Once the object is granted primary place, it presence and everything which goes with it (i.e. looks, colours, smells,etc., etc.) becomes of value. There can't be the relevant intersection of meaning and object without the object. To give-up anything about the object is to destroy the celebrated moment of the work. If we stick a chair on display, it isn't a question of: "The chair is pretty because of X (e.g. design or craftsmanship)," rather is only "The chair is pretty" by existing in this context as itself. The chair doesn't need to say anything in particular or need anything more. It is valuable, is art, by it merely being object in a moment of expressing meaning.

Well, that sounds like you are agreeing with my distinction. When I say "immediate," I mean that there is no transport to the "realm of ideas" via representation itself, what is shown in such work doesn't denote any particular idea at all. Perhaps "immediate"wasn't the best choice of words.

I agree representational art is "immediate" in the sense of it immediately puts one in the space or a represented meaning. There I was just using the world to point out the absence of the layer of representational meaning in non-representational work.

We weren't talking about such a situation though. My point is why discovering the inevitability of suffering in life is upsetting for those who understand it to be joyful.

Moreover, those dumb aphorisms aren't a description of anyone's life, joyful or not. They constitute a normative demand for people to put-up with suffering and make the most of whatever joy they experience. As if either of those ideas make sense or are even possible. Someone experiencing joy isn't worried about ensuring they make the most of it. Joy is felt, not meticulously planned to be productive as possible. And suffering, well, it is constituted by feeling horrible such that people want to get away from it as soon as possible. People put-up with annoyances, not suffering.

These dumb aphorisms sometimes work as a distraction from suffering, but that's really all they are. On occasion someone might, for example, find "solace" in the idea of "suffering making you appreciate the good," but all that's doing is building a moment of respite in the present. It doesn't actually undo any suffering of the past or make any suffering in the future go away. But then that's all people want in many instance: anything to forget the despair of suffering for a moment. Often the need to feel better in the moment outweighs any concern for accurate description of suffering.

To my mind "love" is the problem there. It is always an after-the-moment abstraction used to assert that something is important. People don't "love" life per se. Meaning and enjoyment is found in friends, family, eating, laughing, pleasure, creating, joy, drawing a picture, colouring in a book, hearing music, eating raspberries, etc., etc., etc. To compare life with the immediate visceral experience of "suffering" is just unfair.

The tension is not so much in that people love violence (most people don't to a large extent), but rather in that they cannot have what they want without the presence of suffering and violence. I can't have my cricket team and spin bowling without life. To have the joy I do (even when we lose), myself and others need to live. Some suffering or violence will, in the end, result in these lives. No matter how much I don't want it to, or how good my life happens to be, what I want can't be given without suffering.

Here, the problem is not so much cognitive dissonance: one can easily own the idea that what they want results in the suffering of others. It isn't that hard. Even antinatalists do this frequently, in recognising that there is no way to end everyone without causing horrible suffering, such that we ought to put-up with some suffering in life, even though we have ways to eliminate it all quickly if we really tried (Nuke everything).

What is upsetting is, rather, the destruction of the idea that life can be without a horrible cost. It is depressing to find out that the idea you had, that life is wonderful, to a point that it is always a joyful experience worth seeking, is wrong. It is not prescribing suffering for others which is upsetting (no-one really does this in the context in which we are talking; I did not chose that you would live or that you wouldn't die, as of today), but rather coming into the knowledge that there is no life without suffering. With such knowledge, you know that the joy of life will never overcome its suffering, even if you happen to have it almost constantly. It is the mourning of a "perfect" world which someone believed in, but which never existed.

Isn't that a reflection of how much people love life? For those to whom life does not matter, then the end is of no consequence - wholly beneficial even, if it results in an improved world (no suffering).

On the other hand, for those who love life, who are interested in living it, the idea of suffering cannot be avoided - except in death - and is nothing but depressing. In their heart, they would know that what they love so much just means misery for others and themselves.

Would you be happy knowing that what you wanted (life) meant the necessary suffering of yourself and others? And that there was no way to have what you want without suffering?

If "modern art" includes the paintings you linked, the impressionists, and the symbolists, then I can say I do like modern art. Whatever one uses to call the predominant forms of "art" after about 1920 is what I am almost universally repelled by. Is there a term for that or is it just "conceptual art" as you mentioned above? — Thorongil

I think you are most concerned about the lack of representation in art more than anything. Seems to me you want you art to say something, to look like something, to show us something of the world, even if it is highly stylised. The sense I get from your posts here is: "If art is not trying to clearly show meaning, through representation built by the artist, what is the point? How can something without such work, such effort towards promoting and showing a standard of perfection, by worth anything at all?"

In this respect, the earlier comparison of your approach to art as similar to Kant is misplaced (as much as I agree with the idea Kant is a dry stick in the mud who sucks the life out of everything, and that such criticism could also be applied to abstract expressionism, it's the lack of stated perfection which you struggle with in non-representation art). You hate non-representation art precisely because of how is an anti-thesis of a Kantian approach. Non-representation art functions in a very immediate sense; it is not about displaying some obvious or clear representation through the painstaking work of the artist towards perfection, but rather living the moment of the artwork itself. It is a celebration of not seeking more than the immediate affect of a work.

Appreciating Duchamp's Urinal, for example, has nothing to do with a message it shows in representation. It's all about the beauty of the object itself (if one would call it that), of experiencing its shape and environmental position, and other meanings (e.g. what constitute "Art") which are associated with it but (critically) are not found in the representation of the work. It seems to me it is this (very anti-Kantian) lack of normative prescription which you despise about "modern art."

What is art meant to be saying? Non-representational art tends to say: "Nothing in particular. This art is not for demonstrating any valued state of "perfection" in representation. It isn't a showing of any sort of better life we are meant to aspire to. Everything is (for the given art work) already "perfect." Nothing needs to be changed or made better."

(it isn't a coincidence that our art criticism mirrors the philosophical shift away from the Nihilism of theism - "we need the perfection of God for life to be worthwhile"- to the idea of life being valuable in-itself- "What does my red and orange blotch need to say? Nothing. It is worthwhile just being its own thing).

As such, I don't think it is "modern," "conceptual" or even "abstract expressionism" which you despise (though works labeled as such may more frequently be non-representational in nature). Many works which fall into those categories have some sort of representation to them. It's the expanding of art from a painstakingly and laboriously constructed demonstration of what we should aspire to, to a more accessible moment which is wholly worthwhile in itself.

That makes no sense. The "realist"position is incoherent because the truth of "the tree exists" is both defined independently of language (what is required for the true statement "the tree exists" may be regardless of whether it is spoken about) and only within it (as a true statement cannot be made in the absence of language).

Similarly, the "anti-realist" position is incoherent because the true of "the tree exists" is both defined only with language (as language is required for a statement to be made) and without it (as the tree may exist regardless of whether it is spoken about).

One can accept that a tree is defined as a member of the category that excludes experience, conception, and language whilst also accepting that the statement "the tree exists" is dependent on experience, conception, and language (e.g. if one adopts the coherence theory of truth). That's why one can be an anti-realist whilst maintaining a logical (or, rather, semantic) distinction between trees and "trees". — Michael

Here you've switched subjects. You are no longer discussing whether or not states of existence are dependent on language and the relationship of this to true statements. Nor do you make any comment on the distinction between states of the world and language which talks about them.

Now you are talking about merely the existence of the statement "the tree exists," as opposed to the truth "the tree exists." The realist completely agrees the statement "the tree exists" is of experience, conception, and language. One cannot have statement without language.

But that makes no sense because, if we are talking about an existing tree, there is no "anti-realist" or "realist" option. An existing tree is the same, a state of the world, regardless of whether we think it is dependent of experience or not. To be realist or anti-realist about an existing tree is incoherent.

No doubt people use the "realist" and "anti-realist" distinction, in some cases, as a shorthand for the distinction between "existing state (e.g. a tree)" and "logic and fictions (e.g. morality)," but this distinction no longer makes sense if we are talking about an existing tree. How could an existing tree possibly be anything other than a state of the world? It can't be. It is incoherent to apply the question: "Is it an existing state (realism) or a point of logic (anti-realism)?" in that situation.

If it is about definitions, then there is more than language going on. If definitions are involve, then there is a question of logic. Someone doesn't understand a meaning or a relevant distinction.

You are still confusing realism (things are defined in themselves) with empirical claims ( a "squiloople exists" ). They are different claims. No-one is "a realist about X." Realism is a metaphysical position (i.e. logic) not a position on empirical states.

To "be realist about X" doesn't make because, for any state of the world, it is the same regardless of one metaphysical stance. The tree in front of you is the same regardless of whether you hold a realist position or an anti-realist position. There is no discintion make in an empirical state to define someone as "a realist about X" or an "anti-realist about X."

That a thing is defined on its own terms, rather than whether it is spoken or thought about, IS realist metaphysics. It is not semantics at all. What is at stake is a logical point about how states are defined, not some meaning quibble over what to call something.

To be a realist is to say that the existence of state X is defined on its own terms, rather than if it is thought or spoken about. The "truth of X" being defined "independent of experiences, concepts, and linguistic conventions" only extends to the fact that, for any state, the world which is needed for a true statement isn't required for the state to exist.

A chair can exist (what is required for someone to be able to make a true statement about a chair) whether or not anyone thinks or speaks about it. What we talk about when we make statements of truth (e.g. "X is true" ) doesn't need to be though or spoken about to exist. This is what "independence" means here. There isn't something extra, something outside the reach of language, required to define what's true. That's only the meaning (which may stated in language) of the state in question.

Indeed, but the question here is not merely whether you make such a distinction, but whether the dependence claim of anti-realism is tenable.

To make the distinction between a thing and language which talks about it, on its own, does not identify a commitment to whether or not things exist independently of experience. One certainly draw that distinction without proclaiming themselves to be a realist. Such lack of comment can even be thought of as enough to make anti-realism consistent with the distinction. If one just says: "Well, I am an anti-realist" and then points to their act of distinguishing language form what language talks about, then it does appear the two positions are compatible. One can certainly think of themselves as an anti-relaist while still making the distinction in question.

But I'm not interested in whether one can believe this. I concerned about whether it makes sense. And it doesn't. In the drawing of the distinction between lounge and the things it talks about, each state is defined on its own terms, not whether it is thought or spoken about. Nothing is depedent on being thought of spoken about.

Anti-realism is incoherent given this position. Not because, somehow, it is impossible for someone to make the discintion between language and what it talks about, while also holding themselves to be an anti-realist. Rather it is because there is a contradiction between the claim of anti-realism (the existence of meaningful things defined by experience) and a world where language is distinct from what it talks about.

And yet you accuse me of mistakenly holding this "independence" from the distinction, as if "independence" meant something other than language and things talked about being their own states of existence.

How am I preaching to the choir when the choir is singing the exact opposite of my position?

You are making the same mistake as Michael: thinking that "independence" means "outside language." It doesn't. Rather it specifies that, as language is a distinct state of existence from any state talked about, the presence of a thing does not require someone to speak or think about it.

The ontological status of a thing (e.g. Frodo) and language (e.g. "Frodo" ) IS the logical distinction between subject and sentence. It is pointing out that there are two states of existence in a situation of statement which talks about a state of the world and state of the world. In this case, since we are talking about a situation in which a statement is being made about a state of the world, that X and "X" distinction is pointing out the ontological independence of the state of the world from the language which talks about it.

To be a realist about Frodo is to say that Frodo exists in the world (in a manner independent of language and thoughts). That's why nobody is a realist about Frodo. Frodo is ontologically dependent on what we say and think about him, hence why everybody is an anti-realist about Frodo. — Michael

Nope. That is to understand Frodo to exist in the world. It is an empirical claim, not the position of realism. The existence of Frodo is most certainly not dependent on what we say or think about him. Since any existing Frodo is distinct from the language which talks about him (they are different states of existence), an existing Frodo will be - regardless of whether someone talks or thinks about him.

From the point of view of philosophy, ethics will always look like a dictatorship or reason because we, in the act of philosophising about ethics, turn ethics into a project of "rational" prescription. Even if we assert we ought to follow our passion, we have captured the notion of human action in distant thoughts and set out a system of rules people are supposed to follow.

Ethical action, however, has a wider reach. People may behave ethically on instinct. Not everyone has to think about a set of rules and describe specially what ought to be done in a situation to behave ethically. Indeed, it could be said that, in most instances, such thinking is not used when making decisions and taking ethical action. In the moment of action, we frequently lack the time to consider the thesis of an upcoming action in philosophical terms. Philosophy of ethics is almost useless when it comes to ethical action. Our actions are what matters in such a context, not whether we theoretically know what ought to be done. Usually, we sort of rely on our almost automatic reactions in responding to a situation.

The "dictatorship of reason" is only useful in the sense it acts as an influence to how we treat to the world in terms of action. It can influence us to produce certain habits of behaviour when it comes down to making decisions. We use it to change our behaviour from a distance. By setting-up our values a certain way, the "dictatorship of reason" can produce people who think and respond to the world in more ethical ways. That's what philosophy of ethics tries to do.

You think it does, but it doesn't. The logical distinction between language and what language talks about IS the distinction between "Frodo" (language) and Frodo (state of the world). Realist ontology is nothing more than this logical distinction. In holding position, one takes Frodo to be a ontologically independent person. Frodo is not experience of Frodo or language about Frodo. Frodo is different state of the world (i.e. ontologically independent of) to language which talks about Frodo.

Anti-realism is not capable of accepting this logical distinction. It denies Frodo is ontologically independent (i.e. a different state of existence) to the language "Frodo."

(critically, this is not an empirical claim. In making this distinction, we are not making an argument that Frodo exists in the world. Just that Frodo ( or any given existing state) is necessarily distinct from "Frodo" (or any language which talks about a given existing state) ).

Realism is the position that things are not dependent on experience. States of the world (e.g. an existing chair) are defined independently of experience (i.e. someone talking, thinking, seeing, touching, etc.,etc. chair). The ontology of metaphysical realism is: things don't need need to be experienced to exist.

Anti-realism holds the opposite. It equivocates the existence of a thing with the presence of experience of the thing. It treats language as if it is the things the language talks about. Don't have the experience of a chair? Then it doesn't exist.

Realist ontology IS the distinction between experience (including language) and things experienced (including what language talks about).

Being an empirically verifiable thing in the world is irrelevant to disquotationalism. That would be a different account of truth. — Yahadreas

Indeed. Or rather an account of what exists rather than of "truth." Disquotationalism points out a logical relationship between statements and the world-i.e. if someone is talking about an existing chair, then a chair exists in the world.

Somehow you've got the the absurd conclusion disquotationalism is giving a description of the empirical world and that this is supposedly what the realist is arguing. It is not.

Disquotationalism is the identification of a logical point and it is on these logical grounds that realism is supported; whenever there is something to talk about, logically, is a state distinct from any language which talks about it. Things are not defined by experience of the thing. They are given in themselves.

Here the realist is not making an empirical point (e.g. a chair exists) but a logical one. Regardless of what empirical states there are, language which talks about a state of the world is distinct from the thing it talks about: no matter what exists, realism obtains.

The actual problem with TGW's argument is asking entirely the wrong question. Language isn't a question of validation. It's a question of existence. Uses of language are things which say something. In there presence, there is no question of "justification" nor describing what that particular use of language is doing. Language is not a question go "proving" or "demonstrating" a statement is correct. One merely speaks a statement which has meaning. Whether one makes the correct description, whether in the sense of accuracy or the speaking of statement, is a different question entirely.

Langauge does, indeed, not "validate" anything. To be a meaning spoken or thought doesn't justify any argument as correct.

"Description" is, in fact, "non-linguistic" in that it is not merely a use of language which consists a person understanding something. A use of language has to trigger a particular response in an individual to actually grant them an understanding of a thing, and so form a "description" in language. All language "leads" people to understand. This is what description in language entails. The language is, after all, never the state it describes.

With this the inability of language to describe is dissolved. Since language is the trigger for an individual have experiences, it is no longer the "distant" vessel which must fail to capture what it is like to experience, for it is actually triggering experience. Someone can, for example, use words to describe their emotions and trigger the same feelings in another person. Words can give us the insight of what it means to be another person. There is no "first person"/ "third person" split which renders language incapable of description.

TGW's argument is making a mockery of what language is and does. The "negative thesis of anti-realism" entirely ignores what language is: an existing thing, a "positive" state, which talks about something else, whether rightly or wrongly.

The underlying issue is he thinks reference is a question of "being correct" of "describing the real world." It's not. Statements of falsehood reference all the time. If a say: "TheWillowOfDarkness is the president of the US," my statement still refers to me, even though it is mistaken. TGW is actually correct that reference has nothing to do with describing what is real or not. To say: "this language refers to X" is never enough. It doesn't actually point out whether a statement is true. All it does is say language talked about something.

TGW has reversed to key point of the realist argument. For the realist, language does not prop-up reality. The necessary relationship between realism and reference isn't defined on the basis of language. Rather, it is the reverse: that there are no things to talk about without realism. It is question of things, on the distinction of what is talked about from language, which the realist makes their case on.

If what we talk about is distinct form state of language, then there is more to the world than our language, our discourse. States of the world are defined not on whether they are experienced (i.e. thought about, talked, about), but rather in themselves, regardless of whether anyone thinks or talks about them in any way.

We may actually say nothing outside the car and petrol is required. That's true. Such a description merely doesn't tell you anything more about how the petrol and car interact. It merely fails to describe what you want to know.

With reference it is here we need to ask the hard question. When you demand a description of "how" reference works, what are you requesting to know? In the case of the car and petrol what you want to know is obvious: the way the petrol interacts with the car, the mechanical ad chemical system, which functions to move the car. Where are the analogous moving parts and chemical interactions in presence of reference though? There is nothing to be found. At no point are we waiting for a use of language to be engage reference by the burning of fuel and spinning of wheels. Each use of language that references does of by its definition. There is nothing more about it for us to know.

Your reasoning on this is backwards again. The "mind independent" things aren't language independent. That's how we talk about them. What matters to reference is not what language is capable of talking about (language can talk about anything), but rather the distinction between the state of language and the state which language talks about.

Reference is defined in how an instance of language which talks about something is not the thing spoken about. Language "references" because it is a state distinct form what it talks about. Reference is one state (language) pointing to another (what is talked about in language). It doesn't happen just in language. It happens in the world.

The necessary relationship between reference and realism is not a question of "explaining" reference. Reference doesn't need explaining. That's just what language does: it talks about other states. Reference and realism go together, instead, because the mention of something in language does not define its existence. It is because talks of something is separate to the state which is spoken about.

The former does not define the latter. So there is no extra "metaphysical connection" which ties language to the states it talks about (language, itself, is that connection: it needs nothing else). Realism is, instead, necessary because a state talked about is a different in empirical terms to the state of language. Reference doesn't require an extra "metaphysical connection" (i.e. logical) outside language.

Rather it constituted by the difference between an empirical state (the language used) and either an empirical state (in the case of someone talking about a state of the world) or a logical meaning (in the case of imagined worlds).

Hello all. Good job everyone. I'm trying to think of posters who haven't been mentioned yet and the only one I've come-up with is The Great Whatever. Are his antics still considered too much to put-up with?