What is the difference between the information encoded in DNA and the information encoded in a statement? — tom

Statements (as signs) are essentially conceptual/inferential in nature, whereas DNA (even if it be a sign in some sense) is not.

I wouldn't classify DNA as a statement.

No, there weren't. But that there needed to be intelligent life doesn't mean that there needs to be. — Sapientia

Correct me if I am wrong, but you seem to be admitting (at least) that there could not have been any statements had there not been any intelligent life, but why? In your view, what is it exactly about intelligent life that makes the existence of statements possible?

Do you think that there needs to be? If so, I wonder why. — Sapientia

Yes I do, mostly because I subscribe to the notion that statements are sign relations that require one or more minds as fundament in order to be instantiated.

Oh, and hi @theorem! — Wayfarer

Hi!

My view: truth is mind-dependent, because it is the predicate of a proposition. Propositions are true, or not true, and whether they are, or are not, is a matter of judgement, and judgement is by a mind. — Wayfarer

That's pretty much my view as well.

But there's another point - a mathematical proof, for example, may be 'mind-independent' in one sense - that is, it is not dependent on being grasped by this or that mind; it's not a matter of convention as to whether it is true or no; so in that sense, it is 'mind-independent'. — Wayfarer

Right. Basically (and as you rightly point out) mathematics is objective and public while yet remaining entirely in the order of intelligible being. This conclusion will seem counter-intuitive to the modern sensibility, but if we reject the Cartesian division of being into the mutually exclusive categories of res cogitans (subjective) and res extensa (objective) along with the Lockean analysis of sense perception it perhaps becomes bit more tractable.

This type of understanding actually tends towards 'objective idealism', that there is a rational or intelligible order, which is grasped though the intellect ('nous'); which I think is a strong underlying strain in the history of Western philosophy, until Hegel, but it's objective reality is now contested, due to the fact that physicalism generally rejects the idea of an 'intelligible order' (which is, however, still preserved in schools such as Feser's 'Aristotlean-Thomism'.) — Wayfarer

Agreed, though I'm not sure it's entirely fair to lay the blame at the feet of "physicalism". It's one thing to point out the failures of physicalism, quite another to propose a viable alternative. Critics of physicalism (such as Nagel, Chalmers, et al.) are notorious for coming up short in regards to the latter. But to your point in regards Feser, I think we are starting to see a bit of a resurgence of classical Aristotelian thought within the academic community, both within metaphysics and within the sciences. I think that the realization that Aristotle's hylemorphic metaphysics can (more or less) be cleanly separated from his erroneous physics is finally starting to take root within the modern mind. It will be interesting to see what happens in the coming decades.

No, that's not my understanding. — Sapientia

Ok.

Facts, statements, truth, the world... none of that seems mind-dependent in the relevant sense, namely that there can't be one without the other. — Sapientia

I don’t yet know how you define any of those terms ("fact", "statement", "truth", "world") so it’s hard to evaluate your claim at this point, but at face value I’d tend to take issue with the claim that statements (for instance) are mind-independent, so perhaps we can start there. To bring this intuition out more clearly I’ll pose the following question and see where it takes us:

1. Were any statements ever made prior to the emergence of intelligent life in the universe?

The way in which you answer this question should help provide some insight into your theory of statements and, hopefully, help drive the discussion forward.

If truth is here understood by you as some kind of correspondence between mind and world, then it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that truth is mind-dependent (in the sense that there could not be any truths if there were no minds).

That said, I haven't fully digested the above discussion, so please excuse me if this has already been addressed by you.