The only logical options, at least if we're realists on universals, is that there is one universal per property or that there are more than one universal per property, right? — Terrapin Station

Okay, but I have not been able to find anyone else who puts it that way.

Again, I wasn't saying anything about "kinds of entities." — Terrapin Station

I realize that, but I also know that you believe that there is only one kind of real entity. The whole debate is over whether there is at least one other kind of real entity.

Anyway, why do you think that a realist on universals would say that there is more than one universal of a specific property? — Terrapin Station

The problem I am having is not with saying that there is one universal of a specific property, it is with saying that a universal is a singularity (or a singular). My sense is that the latter term has a very specific technical meaning in these kinds of discussions, such that a universal cannot be a singular(ity), any more than it can be a particular or an individual. However, as I keep saying, the distinctions among singular(ity), particular, and individual are fuzzy to me, as well as those between universal and general.

So far, I have yet to find a realist who affirms (in so many words) that universals are singularities; just William of Ockham, the arch-nominalist. I suspect that a realist would object to any diagram that does not clearly distinguish a universal from a particular as two distinct kinds of entities. That is the point, really - universals have a different mode of being from particulars. It still seems to me that someone who recognizes only one mode of being - concrete existence - is a nominalist by default.

Again, I also need some clarification on universal vs. general and singular vs. particular vs. individual. Any thoughts on that?

As far as I can tell, you are just restating your nominalist position, which is not helpful. My understanding is that a realist would say that a universal is not a "thing" at all, and certainly not a singularity or a concrete particular. I am looking for a neutral explanation of the terminology.

Thanks, but it looks like Armstrong never uses the term "singular," and only mentions "general" and "individual" a handful of times. I am still wondering exactly what you meant when you claimed that "universals are singularities," because again, my understanding is that a universal/general cannot be a singular/particular/individual (and vice-versa). I would also like to get a better handle on what (if anything) differentiates universal vs. general and singular vs. particular vs. individual.

That is not my current understanding, although I am trying to do some reading up on this whole topic. Can you (or anyone else) suggest a good resource (preferably online) that clearly defines and distinguishes all of the relevant metaphysical terminology - universal, general, singular, particular, individual, etc.?

The hard thought to think here is that generality - in this case climactic regularities - are themselves singularities ... — StreetlightX

It is hard for me to think this because it is contradictory, at least as I currently understand the two terms. That which is general - including all processes and regularities - cannot be singular, and vice-versa. If everything is truly singular, then nothing is truly general.

But this is natural, because you do not believe in immaterial causes, such as the free will. So until you release this prejudice, final cause will remain inherently incomprehensible, as a cause posterior to the effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

I do believe in immaterial causes, such as the free will, so that prejudice is not an issue for me. Nevertheless, it seems incontrovertible that the end is always subsequent to the means by which it is achieved - it is a state of affairs in the future. This is really all that I have been trying to point out. As I said before, "effect" implies efficient cause, and I agree with you that an efficient cause cannot be posterior to its effect; however, I still contend that it can be simultaneous.

There is no necessary association there. It is habitual usage which has made you believe that purpose is necessarily associated with intelligent willfulness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who said anything about "necessary association"? How else do we define a word, except in accordance with its "habitual usage"?

I am talking about the process that produces snowflakes. How can it be singular if it is the same everywhere? How can "a bunch of dust particles floating around in the right atmospheric conditions" occur in more than one place and at more than one time, if this situation is always just a collection of singulars? What enables us to predict the formation of snowflakes before it happens?

In these cases, universality does not explain why the soap bubble or the snowflake looks like it does: rather one must explain the universality of both in terms of the (singular) processes which give rise to them. — StreetlightX

But what explains the surprising fact that those (supposedly singular) processes are the same for all soap bubbles and snowflakes?

"End" in this sense means "the thing one seeks to attain". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it means "that for the sake of which the hammer comes into existence."

Don't dissuade yourself from understanding by referring to preconceived notions that may or may not be relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good advice - for both of us.

Do you realize that anything done for a purpose is done with intention? — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends on exactly what you mean by "purpose" and "intention." I associate both of those terms with intelligent willfulness and agency. In that sense, seeds do not "seek" anything, and birds and bees do not have "purposes" even though their nests and hives indeed have final causes.

... universals do not explain, but must themselves be explained. — StreetlightX

Would you mind unpacking this a bit more? What does it mean for universals to explain? What does it mean for universals to be explained? On what basis would we ascertain which of these is the more appropriate pursuit? Surprising facts are what call for explanations, so we either hypothesize universals to explain certain surprising facts, or we need another hypothesis to explain the surprising fact of universals. Which do you advocate, and why?

,

As I understand it, everything is a particular to a physicalist, because the only mode of being is actual existence.

Now explain that to aletheist. Aletheist thinks that the act of driving nails is the cause of the hammer. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have suggested that driving nails is the final cause of the hammer, the end for the sake of which the hammer exists, which is subsequent to the making of the hammer as a means to that end. Final causes cannot be confined to human desires or intentions, because things that have nothing to do with humans have them - teeth, seeds, balls, etc. - and they are likewise subsequent to the coming-into-existence of those things.

We can measure how much mass or energy things have. — darthbarracuda

I gather that those are considered particular properties that each individual thing has, not universal properties that multiple things have.

I am not a physicalist, so I can only continue to speculate. My guess is that mass-energy is not considered a (universal) property in the same way that existence is not considered a predicate.

As I understand it, a physicalist would say that those terms denote concepts, which are nothing more than (physical) brain states.

Sorry, I meant matter in the broad modern sense that includes energy and space-time. The point is that the physicalist denies the reality of non-material forms.

Matter can only be part of the explanation, there has to be a Form as well. Neither can exist without the other. — darthbarracuda

This is precisely what a (conventional) physicalist denies. You are imposing either Platonism or Aristotelian hylomorphism, and then trying to shoehorn physicalism into it. But a physicalist maintains that matter is the entire explanation, and that there are no (non-material) forms; the shoe does not fit.

When will he be healthy if he walks about right now? In the future - not instantaneously, and certainly not in the past. The final cause (being healthy) is subsequent to the effect (walking about).

Edit: Of course, "effect" implies efficient causation, and thus is a bit of a misnomer when talking about a final cause. Perhaps it would be clearer to say instead that the end (being healthy) is subsequent to the means (walking about).

Let's review the exchange, just for the record.

If x+y=a and y=mx+b, then x=(a-b)/(m+1) and y=(ma+b)/(m+1), no matter how we define x, y, a, b, and m. — aletheist

m= -1 — Jeremiah

Then a=b, while x and y are any two numbers that add up to a (or b). — aletheist

That does not follow. if a-b is zero then x = 0 in x=(a-b)/(m+1) — Jeremiah

No, you already set m=-1; so if a-b=0, then x=0/0 (undefined). Again, go back to the original equations, which become x+y=a and x+y=b. — aletheist

That is not what I said, I said if a-b = 0, not if a-b = 0 and m=1 = 0. — Jeremiah

You gave no indication of withdrawing your initial stipulation that m=-1. If a-b=0, then indeed x=0 for any value of m other than -1; and y=a=b, so it is still the case that x+y=a=b.

None of this is relevant to the thread topic, but I felt the need to defend my algebraic acumen. The real problem is our failure to communicate.

... explain to me how the act of driving nails could possibly cause the existence of the hammer. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reason why I made the hammer was so that I could drive the nails. That future outcome - not my mere desire for it - is the final cause of the hammer. See also what just posted.

This concept of final cause is integral to the concept of free will ... — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the will has nothing to do with it. Again, the final cause of teeth is biting and chewing food; do all animals with teeth have free will? The final cause of a dropped object is coming to rest on the ground.

It's not instantaneous though, that's why there is a need for the concept of "acceleration". The motion of one object is not instantaneously transferred to the other object. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are conflating motion (or velocity) with acceleration. The velocity is zero when the first thing acts with constant force on the second thing, but the instantaneous acceleration - the rate of change of the velocity - is not.

Go back to math class, anything divided by zero is undefined. — Jeremiah

Go back to the original equations, set m=-1, and see what happens. In this case, undefined simply means indeterminate, since any pair of values for x and y that add up to a (or b) will work.

That does not follow. if a-b is zero then x = 0 in x=(a-b)/(m+1) — Jeremiah

No, you already set m=-1; so if a-b=0, then x=0/0 (undefined). Again, go back to the original equations, which become x+y=a and x+y=b.

If you were trying to prove you can move undefined variables around, I suppose so. — Jeremiah

I was not trying to "prove" anything. I was simply showing how both deductive logic and algebra are about the relations among the terms, not their contents.

m= -1 — Jeremiah

Then a=b, while x and y are any two numbers that add up to a (or b).

I am sorry but that is not so ... — Jeremiah

What is not so? Everything in my last post is undeniably true, unless you reject simple deductive logic and basic algebra.

... if that was, then we'd have one equation to measure every thing. — Jeremiah

Who said anything about measuring? Again, I am talking about the rules of logic and algebra, which are content-neutral.

This means nothing if A and B are not defined. — Jeremiah

It makes absolutely no difference whether or how A and B are defined. If you believe that if A then B, and you believe A, then it is rational for you to believe B, and irrational for you to deny B. If x+y=a and y=mx+b, then x=(a-b)/(m+1) and y=(ma+b)/(m+1), no matter how we define x, y, a, b, and m.

You did not link your statement about "unprovable hypotheticals" to any particular post, so how am I supposed to discern the specific reference? I have not asked you to accept any beliefs, except this one:

Given that if A then B, and I believe A, then it is rational for me to believe B; in fact, it would be irrational for me not to believe B. — aletheist

Regarding Pascal's Wager, we seem to agree that it does not warrant belief in the existence/reality of God; but we apparently disagree about why this is the case.

Is it rational to just believe any assumption that pops into your head? — Jeremiah

No one is suggesting an affirmative answer to this question.

Still an unprovable hypotheticals, and my dispute is accepting it as beliefs. — Jeremiah

To what are you referring here as "unprovable hypotheticals"? What beliefs do you think you are being asked to accept?

Does accepting the money mean I have to give up my core beliefs and accept an absurdity as true? — Jeremiah

Not according to the scenario as presented; you are imposing an additional assumption. "Free money" presumably means no such (or any other) strings attached.

There is a difference between logic and reason, and the post is about what is rational. — Jeremiah

Given that if A then B, and I believe A, then it is rational for me to believe B; in fact, it would be irrational for me not to believe B. However, if I do not believe A, then I can draw no conclusion from the information given about whether it would be rational for me to believe B. All of this goes for any propositions that we assign to A and B; their content is irrelevant to the logic.

Are you working on bumping up your comment count? You know that you can edit a post after submitting it, rather than just adding another one (or two or three), right?

Given that if A then B, suppose A; therefore, B. Do you disagree? My point was strictly a matter of formal logic, but you seem to be hung up on the details of the specific propositions involved. No one is asking you to believe B if you reject A.

Disputing how? The hypothetical is stipulative; given that we only have two options, and that one will always have an equal or better outcome, there can be no doubt that it is the rational choice. The problem is that we actually have more than two options and no objective way to evaluate which will have the best outcome, so there is no definitively rational choice in the absence of additional information. What am I missing?

Agree or disagree?

How about reading the rest of my post?

... trying reading everything a person posted. — Jeremiah

Who has time for that? Lighten up, I was just attempting to inject a little humor; I even included a smiley in an effort to make that clear. Here, let me do it again ... :D

Not one person here can address the fact it is unfalsifiable, all they can do is play games? — Jeremiah

Just because a proposed supposition is unfalsifiable does not render it useless. Philosophers invent absurd scenarios "for the sake of argument" all the time. If we knew that we only had two options, A1 and A2, and that "the worst outcome associated with A1 is at least as good as the best outcome associated with A2," then obviously the rational choice is A1. However, as many have pointed out, in the actual world there are considerably more than two options - all the different concepts of God, for one thing - and the outcomes associated with them are far from certain.

So the issue is not that the hypothesis is imaginary - which technically is true of all retroductive conjectures - but that it is unfalsifiable; i.e., it does not have experiential consequences that we can explicate deductively and then evaluate inductively. Thanks for clarifying.

Algebra is hypothetical until it is applied. — Cavacava

All mathematics is hypothetical. Sometimes we use it to model reality.

The problem with your argument is that is a completely imaginary hypothetical. — Jeremiah

Is there any other kind? :D

I am not trying to sell you (or anyone else) anything, just doing my best to answer the question posed by the thread title. If you cannot accept the reality of anything except spatio-temporal existence, then realism about universals is obviously not for you.

It is contradictory to think that the cause of something is posterior in time to that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

This begs the question; what we are discussing is precisely whether a cause must always be temporally prior to its effect. You cannot just resolve the debate by stipulating a definition of "cause" that requires it to precede its effect.

It is called "final" cause because we are referring to the desired "end", having the nails pounded. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. My whole point is to call attention to the fact that when I make the hammer, its final cause is something in the future, not the present or the past.

No, I don't think force causes anything. "Force" refers to the power which one thing exerts on another thing. It is conceptual. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough; force is a concept that we have created to represent the phenomenon that results in acceleration of a mass.

One thing causes the acceleration of another thing ... — Metaphysician Undercover

And this happens instantaneously. There is no gap in time between the action of the first thing and the acceleration of the second thing. The cause and its effect are simultaneous.