So there are moral stances that someone couldn't interpret as duty-oriented if they wanted to?

I would not consider them moral stances, but if someone else wants to, they can but they need to show how a moral stance is not duty oriented.
Could you provide an example ?

: I accept that there are things I ought/ought not to do. I try to understand what those things are and why they are. And then I try to live and act in accord(ance) with those things.

Well you are pretty close to kantian except Kant wants an individual to prioritize and perform his duties considering the hypothesis if everyone was to do the same.Well in your case, you are in fact making a moral choice when you consider yourself to be just performing a job.

In your first example, it's all about justice, not this malefactor or that lawyer. The defense lawyer owes to justice the best defense he can provide. That's his duty and his job. Analogously it's a surgeon's business and duty to slice his patients open. Or a mechanic's to take your car apart.

Well this isn't the first time l have asked this question, maybe in other variant forms.A lot of the people were concerned and would refrain from performing the job in such sensitive cases. Despite calling the question nonsensical, you have answered it, or even taken a certain stance, i.e you have given priority over the duty of a lawyer, which you didn't argue for.I actually did argue for it and l would favour your point of view but you cannot term the question as nonsense.You can call it stupid but seriously this is the attitude of the general public towards philosophy.If you ever ask someone at random in the street, "Is killing wrong ?", they wouldn't take you seriously.

Simply because it emphasizes the act rather then the consequence.It is different from consequentialism.
I'm just discussing an aspect of Kantian ethics which has clearly shaped our society, nothing new or funny.
The main topic which usually follows the discussion of duty/obligation is the rules which have to followed when considering a conflict.

What do you consider as duties ?
Well can you illuminate us about justice in the context of case 1 ?

Really interesting. But we will have trouble obtaining universal moral values , for example ( taking away an innocent life is evil ) as we can argue the goals of a certain individual require that.Consider the case when armies meet in the battlefield, every soldier is innocent but suddenly the duty of a soilder takes precedence over all other duties.But if we were to take different goals, we will have great trouble justifying which goal is better.

The closest Kant got to it was distinguishing duties as
between perfect and imperfect duties. A perfect duty, such as the duty not to lie, always holds true; an imperfect duty, such as the duty to give to charity, can be made flexible and applied in particular time and place.
We can talk about the " perfect " duties, I think this is a weak point.

Then, in modern mathematics a convergent sum of an uncountable set of terms is perfectly normal.

I wasn't objecting to a countable set, but to an uncountable set.
Nevertheless both are infinite sets.

There is something called nuclear mass defect, where the whole is not equal to parts, the total mass of the parts is greater than mass of the whole after fission.
But that is because the binding energy is converted to mass, if l am not wrong.

Well if you consider every particles to have weight as property, photons dont.
If you are using the term weight strictly, in space we can be weightless.

OK, but I don't understand what's your point here.

I am terrible at explaining things but at same time I am wondering which one is that which you dont understand.
Can you quote it.

if you don't allow the existence of infinite sets, you have to treat segments as a different kind of thing than a set of points.

But in the galois field, they treat the segment made of points but don't use infinite sets, the one mentioned in the article.Can you send me any article,book recommendations that make your position clear to me cause l may be confusing your point here, I hope not.

I think our discussion will verge on civil laws here, the main argument against that would take the form of slippery slope argument.We cannot allow people to take laws into their hands and simultaneously be the judge and the executioner.This opens the door to more harm than good.

I would disagree since duties can be confronted by other constraints such as health,finance,weather etc.
It is really rare to have a moral dilemma from these obstacles.
I actually wanted to know why moral dilemma exist and how can we clarify about them.

I think this is a very important observation which you have made, i.e distinguishing morality and ethics.

Morals are the social, cultural and religious beliefs or values of an individual or group which tells us what is right or wrong. They are the rules and standards made by the society or culture which is to be followed by us while deciding what is right.

Ethics work as a guiding principle as to decide what is good or bad. They are the standards which govern the life of a person. Ethics is also known as moral philosophy. Some ethical principles are

I think we should be concerned with ethics since they are generally more difficult, abstract and uniform over different societies.
I think it would be better if we clear up what we mean by each of these terms to avoid mixing them up.

. Morals has unimaginable combinations of truths

.
I disagree with this statement.I do not believe that moral statements to be proposition as we cannot apply truth value condition to them such as true or false, for example "murder is wrong" expresses either an attitude or a custom but we cannot regard the statement as true.I would regard it is an emotion, similar to statements like "I said am angry".This theory or idea is called emotivism.I believe you would have seen it somewhere.

I remember reading about Wittgenstein's efforts to understand Godel and his incompleteness theorem, Wittgenstein used, as usual, a dialectical approach, like a child, and wrote his thoughts in his notebook. After seeing this, Godel exclaimed: "Has Wittgenstein lost his mind?!" :D But I don't think that we should see Wittgenstein's remarks neither as an affirmation nor as a rejection of the theorem.

If l can recall Wittgensteins remarks

I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: “I have constructed a proposition (I will use ‘P’ to designate it) in Russell’s symbolism, and by means of certain definitions and transformations it can be so interpreted that it says ‘P is not provable in Russell’s system’. Must I not say that this proposition on the one hand is true, and on the other hand is unprovable? For suppose it were false; then it is true that it is provable. And that surely cannot be! And if it is proved, then it is proved that is not provable. Thus it can only be true, but unprovable.”

My humble take on this is, what is wittgenstein saying by using the word true, is he equating provable with true.He tried in the following quotations to dismantle the incompleteness theorem.

Just as we can ask, “ ‘Provable’ in what system?,” so we must also ask, “ ‘True’ in what system?” “True in Russell’s system” means, as was said, proved in Russell’s system, and “false” in Russell’s system means the opposite has been proved in Russell’s system.—Now, what does your “suppose it is false” mean? In the Russell sense it means, “suppose the opposite is been proved in Russell’s system”; if that is your assumption you will now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable. And by “this interpretation” I understand the translation into this English sentence.—If you assume that the proposition is provable in Russell’s system, that means it is true in the Russell sense, and the interpretation “P is not provable” again has to be given up. If you assume that the proposition is true in the Russell sense, the same thing follows. Further: if the proposition is supposed to be false in some other than the Russell sense, then it does not contradict this for it to be proved in Russell’s system.

He clearly states the proposition "P is not provable has to be given up ".

Current situation in mathematics is that to prove stuff, a mathematician must make clear what system and what axioms are going to be employed. A theorem that is proved in one system, might be disproved or be not provable in another, and I think that most mathematicians have stopped trying to conform maths to reality, seeing their science as a game.

I don't think mathematicians have to conform to anything besides their own system of axioms and wittgenstein was strictly.I see this as a great merit and clearly ethics or metaphysics do not have such groundwork to support/prove their proposition.There is certainty in a system, it would be absurd to compare two "games" with different rules.Bertrand Russell wrote somewhere that all the worlds must conform and be according to mathematical truths, but the project failed as mathematics wasn't what they thought it was.
( even Kant made this mistake when he did not consider non euclidean geometry ).

So I see that Wittgenstein took tractarian objects as an auxilliary hypothesis, like those used in philosophy of science, dark matter, for example: "we don't know what/how they are, but we are certain that they exist, we hope that future examination will give us more insight into these". But of course Wittgenstein was forced later to drop all talk about elementary propositions, and objects too, I suppose. (a picture held us captive)

Auxiliary hypothesis can mean two things, either he was not clear in what they meant or rather it didn't matter what they referred to.Either way, it creates problems as we go further on reading tractatus.They are central to tractatus and the picture theory.

I think that the logical positivists paid no attention to the last few pages of the Tractatus, treating them as mere nonsense, as if they outright discarded it. Which is why I said "uninterpreted", but yes of course, you can say "misinterpreted" as well. So either "complete (and flawed)" or "incomplete", logically it makes no difference anyway, the difference is only a psychological one, it is what it is, like they say.

They did but could not make anything out of it, those propositions were central to wittgenstein refuting his earlier philosophy.I think wittgenstein was trying to show the inexpressible but he was forced to express it in the end, which led to confusion.He even referred to it as a ladder which must be discarded.

Whereas in physics, we are at a standstill, with all these tens or hundres of interpretations of quantum mechanics flying around, each giving its own view of how things stand, the physical reality I mean. So pretty uncertain there, not to mention the uncertainty principle.

Well let's not exaggerate the number of interpretations to a hundred, the standard one is clearly copanhagen one, but l believe physicists are clearly not impressed with philosophy these days sadly and they would rather not discuss what wave function refers to in the real world but simply its function,uses,applications in the mathematical framework of quantum physics.Uncertainity principle can be applied to real life examples such as electrons but they are deeply rooted in mathematics.I am against scientism and do not believe it can describe the world completely.
Infact wittgenstein was really critical of it and he suggested that natural laws and the physical phenomenon are not synonymous and we can imagine a different set of system, which have different set of natural laws and each describe the world with the same accuracy.
When I quoted science and mathematics, I wanted to demonstrate that, these fields have sorted themselves out as correction was possible but ethics and metaphysics cannot be sorted out, their problems are merely nonsense and they do not need an answer as the problems vanish once we understand the confusion.

I am unfamiliar with C programming and l would feel comfortable to relate a similar problem in applied mathematics, sometimes in mathematical modeling, where the constraints even as small as the number 7 can be treated as infinity as from 7 and onwards, the program gives the maximum output.I think the axiom of choice is similar to the Euclids parallel axiom, they should be used or ommited depending on the situation.
Btw, I have a question regarding algorithm, I read somewhere Von Nueman saying that it is impossible to have an algorithm that can strictly generate random numbers.Is there even such a thing as a strictly random number.

If you want to reconcile geometrical objects with only finite sets, this approach has been used.To quote from the article mentioned below,

distinction between a field such as R and a Galois field. In the latter, given the multiplicative neutral element 1, there is a prime number p such that p⋅1=0. p is called the characteristic of the field. It can be shown that if p is the characteristic of a field, then it must have pn elements, for some natural number n. In addition Galois fields are the only finite fields

Further more if the galois field has characteristic 3, then 2+1=0.
There is a problem in this theory, in that x=-y cannot be thought of as a straight line but ( it is ).
I hope we can discuss this article, to make arguements move forward in the thread.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/geometry-finitism/supplement.html

$\sum_{n=1}^{n=infinity}$ $\frac{-1^n}{n}$ , as you can see in this series we have not indexed the set using negative numbers, and l think the series will not be well defined if we do not restrict R to natural numbers.( countable )

$\sum_{n=1}^{n=\infty}$ $\frac{-1^n}{n}$

$\sum_{i=1}^{i=n}$ $\frac{-1^n}{n}$

Cool

In every case the series (convergent or not) is made of a countable set of 1-dimensional segments of non zero measure. You add segments to obtain a segment, not points.

~~Mephist~~
I agree that we add segments to obtain a segment, however l have two questions :
1.If the segment is not made up of points, is it a non zero measure or something else ? ( I tend toward your view )
2.Can a divergent series be obtained from an uncountable set, ( I think it can be ) but can a convergent series be obtained from a uncountable set ? ( A sum that is definite must have a fundamental difference to a divergent one )

I think it is reasonable to take segments and point as different cause we can remove the paradox of infinite points or the use of uncountable set of points.

No wonder Wittgenstein was suicidal.
My goodness, you tried to tear me into pieces.
Since we are talking about earlier Wittgenstein, this was before Godel came with his incompleteness theorem which by the way, Wittgenstein rejected even in the latter days.He couldn't have meant that when he wrote back then but you can take his wordings differently to get the accurate interpretation.What I meant by certainty was a relative certainty in science compared to absolute uncertainty in ethics,metaphysics ( these 2 ).If you look at Wittgensteins mathematical philosophy, he considered them to be tautologies which do not belong to this world.

Tbh, it was a complete intrepretation but it had flaws too.
There are countless ways to read the Tractatus, I dont think any viewpoint is totally wrong.There are flaws and advantages.Can you explain how it is incomplete.

On the last point, the tractatus talks of states of affairs which are essentially all the possible combinations of objects, and the possibility is written in the objects themselves.We get the picture theory from it and in my opinion, the picture theory favours taking objects as tangible things for lack of better word.He describes somewhere that we cannot think of a geometrical object without space to further elucidate his picture theory.
How old are you btw, it seems you are older than me.
If you want to know about my last statement you can check this out.

http://wab.uib.no/agora/tools/alws/collection-6-issue-1-article-32.annotate

Russell had the heart to win the fight while Nietzsche had a mental breakdown upon seeing a horse being beaten.
But Russell was good at seducing too and lived a vibrant married life.
Nevertheless the ideas of Nietzsche can be twisted and turn into nazi propaganda, so his ideas were way more powerful than Russell's. He was also an atheist who did not ramble on about disproving God all the time but also discussed the problems which will rise if society forgets God.Russell was too cocky to see any social problems,he was more on the autistic side when it came to philosophy.

There is an infinite possibility of line segments with different lengths but if we were to join them, we would never complete the task(if we add ever increasing lengths), an infinite convergent series sum is a different mathematical object compared to an infinite divergent series as we can have well defined results for earlier one.Some philosopher use the term potential infinity which always refers to a finite quantity in any instant of time therefore the term is misleading.I think sometimes a geometrical object does not correspond to the arithmetical results we obtain.
I Think the case with vectors in 3d is the same,we can say the norm of the vector containing the sum of all unit vectors in different directions (unlimited ) will be zero, but if we can argue consider the collections of and infinite amount of vectors in opposite direction to each other, however the resultant norm cannot be determined.Similar case arises in series.
The measure of Cantor set is zero and that requires the existence of an infinite set.
Can you clarify on the representations of geometrical objects using an infinite set, I think finite sets suffice.
The behaviour of uncountable infinite set gives bizzare results as mentioned above.
If we adopt a non platonic view of mathematics, and on basis of that, we cannot justify infinity.Infinity can be idealized but we can never point to it in the universe.
Hilberts paradise I guess welcomes it.
Pardon my ignorance.

Tractatus is really austere and it is truly a work of art like a sculpture, Wittgenstein left the crystallized part and when l first read Tractatus, I was baffled and only after Knowing that Ramsey and Russell had difficulties understanding it.It had to be the work of a genius and l was comforted.

Btw, Wittgenstein tries to solve Russell's paradox in the middle of tractatus, he tries to say instead of writing f(f(x)) we should write F(u) : u =f(x) , and if l am not wrong his reasoning is similar to Russell's theory of types in that the argument which the function y=f(x) can take cannot be of same order as the function, so in order to have an argument of first order, we need a function of higher order y'=F(u).But I certainly believe he did not approve Russell's solution and he cannot repeat the same thing, I must have missed something.

I would like to read some poetry, as I did back then when the Viena Circle troubled me, and misunderstood all l had said or perhaps what l had not said.

But we can still have certainty in the knowledge of mathematics and science according to logical positivists.
This movement has died but it is nevertheless an intrepretion of tractatus.
The limits of the world are anything other than these two, as they go into the the region beyond logic and language, such as ethics and metaphysics.
But this is only possible if we regard objects as something we experience.

To be honest and fair, I have not understood a single sentence written by the the questioner.