@schopenhauer1

I will take this into account, thanks. Even if it is not math per se, his use of geometric proof and wanting to have an intellectual love of god indicates a preference for logic-related ways of internalizing nature (and thus being "blessed"). — schopenhauer1

It is very likely that Spinoza thought of the geometrical method as simply the best way to convey his philosophy - not that this was necessarily how his philosophy was conceived. But he did think that this was the best way to teach it to other people. Just like Schopenhauer said about his own philosophy - Spinoza's philosophy is a single thought, which requires going through all his propositions etc. in order to understand it.

I'm not sure I quite get this the way you phrased it. The Will does not care for the individual, and I think that is Schopenhauer's point. Since it care not one bit for individual suffering, one must try to deny it, as that is the root of the suffering in his model. — schopenhauer1

And my point is that a priori, there is no reason that the Will should care about the suffering of the individual. You seem to think that it would be better if the Will did care, or more, that it is somehow tragic that the Will doesn't care. I'm saying that your demand/desire for the Will to care is nonsensical - we are not that important, we are specks of dust.

I don't see how understanding that we are one part of a bigger whole solves much of the suffering more than reading a good book about science satisfies us that we learned something new. — schopenhauer1

It's not that which saves - but rather Spinoza's therapy of the emotions which diminishes ego-centrism and develops a love for the world which makes the self see itself as the production of Nature - Nature is more "the self" than the self itself is. Thus, when Nature chooses to destroy the self - the self loves this, for through its death, the triumph of Nature shows itself.

I don't think that's correct, no. The determination of truth differs from the criteria of truth. Determination of truth deals with method -- epistemology. The criteria of truth is the necessary and suffucient conditions which make some truth-bearer true. So we might say, for instance, that those conditions are 1) A statement corresponds to a state of affairs, and thereby be a correspondence theorist about truth.

But how we determine what is true would differ from this. Truth is correspondence, but our epistemology may be empiricist, and largely borrowing from scientific practice.

The criteria of truth is more along the lines of asking "What is the metaphysics of truth?" -- and if we are consistent correspondence theorists [using the above briefly stated theory of correspondence], so it seems to me, then our theory of truth must either be not-true [perhaps not truth-apt], or it must correspond to a state of affairs.

But just because truth, in this scenario, must correspond to a state of affairs that wouldn't mean that this is how we check to see if truth corresponds to a state of affairs. If we are empricists then I'm not sure that you could do so -- you would have to conclude, to be consistent, that though the theory of truth corresponds to some state of affairs that there was no way to check said state of affairs, and so we don't know -- since justification is based on empricism [how we come to determine truth] -- that this is the case.

See the difference? — Moliere

Yes, but you're employing "criterion of truth" in an entirely different sense from me. Here's what I've been meaning by it all through-out: http://www.iep.utm.edu/criterio/ . Epicurus for example, (since I know you are an Epicurean), held that sense experience is the criterion of truth. I thought you meant the same thing by criterion of truth, so that's why I got confused.

The stoics thought logic was valuable unto itself — Moliere

False, just check out Epictetus who emphasises the difference between philosophical discourse and philosophical practice.

It is as if, in the area of the exercise of assent, we were surrounded by representations, some of them "objective" and others not, and we did not want to distinguish between them, but preferred to read treatises with titles like On Comprehension ! How does this come about? The reason is that we have never carried out our reading or our writing in such a way that, when it comes to action, we could use the representations we receive in a way consonant with nature; instead, we are content when we have learned what is said to us, and can explain it to others; when we can analyse syllogisms and examine hypothetical arguments — Epictetus

Epictetus shows that the only justification for reading theoretical treatises [...] is so that, in concrete situations, we can act in conformity with mankind's rational nature — Pierre Hadot

Most of Ancient Philosophy did theoretical philosophy in order to lead to a specific way of life - of course there are a few exceptions like the Aristotelians. Epicurus was by far not the only one.

Because, based on experience, and upon reflection, it's clear to me that passions are what primarily influence what we prioritise in these sort of situations. Hence, if I'm especially empathetic, charitable, generous, altruistic, then I'll likely prioritise helping others, whereas if I'm significantly less so, and am more self-interested, then I'll likely prioritise my own interests above those of others. — Sapientia

@SapientiaDo you think this necessarily has to be so? I mean, would you say that reason cannot influence the priority of passions? One cannot change one's passions?

I imagine here, he would think that contemplating geometric proofs, hypothetical chess games, and working on a new proof for advanced mathematical branches are our salvation and way into realizing "blessedness". — schopenhauer1

I think you should read Spinoza's letter 12 (http://www.sacred-texts.com/phi/spinoza/corr/corr27.htm) :p Spinoza does not have a very good view of pure mathematics:

Whence it is clearly to be seen, that measure, time, and number, are merely modes of thinking, or, rather, of imagining . It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that all, who have endeavoured to understand the course of nature by means of such notions, and without fully understanding even them, have entangled themselves so wondrously, that they have at last only been able to extricate themselves by breaking through every rule and admitting absurdities even of the grossest kind — Spinoza

However, a main difference I see is Schopenhauer's ability to take into account the intractable nature of suffering- that as long as we are alive, there is very little we can do to get around it. Life's eventual realities will confront us. We must seek goals while alive, this will lead to suffering in terms of the journey to obtain the goals, as well as the fact that we are "lacking" in the first place. When we get our goals, we quickly succumb to a sort of existential angst that reflects the instrumentality of existence in terms of the constant need to keep ourselves alive, comfortable, and entertained. Time presses on us and we feel its affects in our need for need and our existential angst when reflected on life itself without anything in particular to strive for. Schopenhauer's understanding is closer to home, it is the life we actually live, not a philosopher's dream of pure intellectual devotion. Schopenhauer's vision is closer to the reality of the human condition which takes into account the restless nature of the human psyche, the deprivation of contentment that motivates us all, and the contingent nature of existence impinging upon us. The contingent nature of reality along with our own inner restless nature is closer to what is going on. — schopenhauer1

I see Spinoza accounting for suffering just as well - humans, as finite modes of nature, are bound to be destroyed in the end and replaced. But their death is the source of the birth of new modes - it is new life. In Spinoza, the suffering of the individual is necessary for the good of the whole. Once it is realised that it is the "eternal decree of God", one can becomes detached from one's selfish ego-centrism, and one realises that, sub specie aeternitatis, one is eternal - the present carries within it all the past and all the future.

Schopenhauer's vision of reality doesn't take into account the whole, except from an anthropocentric point of view -> the Will must be denied by the individual because it brings suffering to him. But why should the whole care about the suffering of the individual in the first place? -> Although this latter is a bit of a facile reading - if I am to be charitable I would say Schopenhauer meant to say that the denial-of-the-will is really being most true to the Will as noumenon :p

Okay, fair enough. Regarding your definition, on a personal note, it's too vague for me. I can't touch it. What's identity in terms of ability and location, in relation to other, etc.? That sounds like something that would slip through one's fingers. Whereas when I think of the self according to my definition as the cumulation of desires, thoughts, beliefs, tendencies, etc. it feels like something I can touch. But that's me! :)

Kind of shocking... Hope that you still post from time to time though! I enjoy some of your posts! :)

But the same holds for your beliefs no? Once you have grown a self, (note you aren't born with a self), individual beliefs are, to a smaller or greater extent, caused by your "self" which is the larger framework of all your beliefs, etc. So this "self" determines via parts of it (a certain set of beliefs for example) another part of it (a belief in God for example).

I'm not sure how to best describe my "self", but I understand my "self" as identity, in terms of ability and location, in relation to other, and probably in other ways. I am a subject, an agent, a human, a person, I am Sapientia. I am here, in England, at this point in time. I think, feel, act, etc.

You say that it's not really a question of choice, but that's where the controversy lies, so it's all about choice. — Sapientia

See the question of "having" choice is the wrong way to put it no? If the self is the framework of your beliefs, tendencies, desires, thoughts, physical body, etc. then it follows that this "self" determines, via parts of it, other parts of it, and therefore plays an active role in whatever will become of it. There is no "free will", but there most certainly is freedom - and freedom is being self-determined, meaning that your actions end up depending much more on internal determinations than external ones.

I don't remember where it comes from, but there is a distinction I like between belief and faith. Belief, that this bridge will support my weight, say, may range from a 'possibly' to a 'probably' to a 'certainly'. Faith is stepping onto the bridge and crossing the chasm. Faith remains a choice even if belief is determined by experience. Thus I do not much believe in justice, seeing little of it, but I try to be faithful to it nonetheless. — unenlightened

Interesting... so one may have faith even if they don't believe so long as they step on the bridge and cross?

But where does choice fit in here? It seems it's been overlooked. I no more choose my desires than I choose my beliefs. I can choose to attempt to change my beliefs, but whether or not they actually change seems outside of my control. I can largely control my actions, but I seem to have very little control - if any - over my beliefs. — Sapientia

@Sapientia Choice of whom? What is this "self" which you say is doing the choosing? It's not really a question of choice, since you are the framework formed by your current desires/beliefs, etc. As such, these things are not separate from you. But this framework, your self, exerts a top-down causality on individual beliefs and desires, similarly to the way a crowd of people exerts a top-down causality on an individual within the crowd. In this way, you have power over individual beliefs and can change them by making use of other beliefs/desires/thoughts that are already part of you. In this way, you are effectively changing and determining yourself.

Ok, well I say that they're not me, but are perhaps part of me. — Sapientia

So if they are part of you, and they cause some single belief of yours to change, does it not follow that you have caused part of your belief to change through that desire that is part of you?

I strongly disagree. If by "we", you mean the bleeding heart masses, then yes, you're right. But "rational"? That prioritisation has more to do with the heart then the head. Reason is the slave of the passions - to quote Hume — Sapientia

Well I believe Hume was wrong. What makes you think Hume was right?

Wow. Seriously? — Sapientia

Hmmm yes, quite serious :p ... Philosophy should do ethics, not morality.

Well make your question more specific. I can't even begin to answer such a large question without going into what is meant by self, desire, and causality, something that would take pages upon pages of writing. So narrow down to something more specific please. As for attacking a strawman - I attacked nothing, merely pinpointed that you're using a different definition than I am.

I'm not sure I'd say that because "my" desires (at least partially) determined my belief, that I (at least partially) determined my belief. In what sense are these desires even mine? — Sapientia

Precisely my point. You ask in what way they are even yours. I say that it is no question of being yours. They are you.

If the self is a combinatorial product of 'chance' then how can this fragmented, random 'self' make sense of/pinpoint or 'see' that which you dub 'reality' (I assume you are a determinist and/or physicalist since you claim reality is an objective, stable entity which can be known)? — Sentient

I fail to follow what the self being created, fragmented, and random has to do with perception or understanding - the "self" is a construct, which means that it exists "in the past" as it were, while perception and understanding exist in the present. The "self" is the bundle of desires/beliefs, etc that one identifies with. To see "reality" means to attend to perception directly, without overlaying your "self" (ie. desires, beliefs, etc.) over it.

Clearly the issue between us is one of definition. You merely define your "self" as something above and beyond your body, your thoughts, your desires, etc. So, just like Hume, you're left with your "self" being nothing. So of course your "self" can't cause anything. You don't even have one under that definition.

Try CBT. You will see that with practice you can alter even your most fundamental beliefs. No better proof than this.

Let me first note that I include anti-natalists and ascetics when I speak of pessimists. It seems to me that one motive for their general temperament is the feeling of being a traveler in a foreign land, or worse, a prisoner in a foreign land depending on how it is determined. — Thorongil

This is a passion Thorongil. Just like the optimists, these pessimists are governed by their passions. They don't see the world as it really is, but through the prism of their own feelings. They see the world with tinted glasses, and then they rationalise this seeing saying that it is because they really are, (transcendentally or in spirit, or bla bla) from a different country that they feel this way, instead of realising that they think as they do because they feel as they do. Another instance where feeling determines thought, instead of the other way around. Isn't it a pity that you diagnose the optimists so well for seeing the world through tinted glasses, and yet fail to see that the pessimists also see the world through the prism of their own feelings? The only thing which is different between the two is the tint of the glasses...

To them, the very inconceivableness of their existence, not to mention its origin and fate after death, is reason enough to refrain from leaving any deep footprints. — Thorongil

They only talk of a "fate after death" because they have rationalised their feeling of not belonging to mean something which it doesn't. There's no reason to rationalise that feeling. You feel that way, but why must the fact you feel that way really mean something about the world, and not about you?

Who honestly knows the full repercussions of our actions during our brief stay in this strange and often inhospitable world? In light of this ignorance, who could bring a child into it or more generally acquiesce to the direction of the crowd? They know scarcely any more than you do about why they're here. — Thorongil

The question is non-sensical once you realise that your "self", sub specie durationis, is a combinatorial product, and just like other such products, it comes into existence fortuitously, and goes out of existence just as fortuitously. So if you accept that, then why ask the question?

Your whole post attempts to be an apologetic. And just like all apologists, it seems you feel the need to justify why pessimists feel as they do. But do pessimists first justify and then feel, or do they first feel and later justify? Post-fact rationalisations are a cognitive bias which prevents you from seeing the causal link as it really is: from your feelings to your reasons instead of from your reasons to your feelings.

A free man is neither pessimist nor optimist. He sees the world as it is. He is a seer; doesn't stamp himself all over the world.

It cannot be that I self-cause the beliefs that I have, for this would mean they sprang from nothing and have no reason for their existence. — Thorongil

Well it depends Thorongil. Just like Hume/Kant/Schopenhauer, you have emptied the "I" of all possible constituents in the world. Why? Because for you, the I is the sustainer of the world. Sure, I don't disagree transcendentally, but that's not the "I" that I was referring to. What I'm referring to as "I" includes your body, your set of beliefs, your desires, etc. This "I", which is the entire framework of all of that, plays a causal role. For example, your desire to transcend the world, that certainly plays a causal role in whatever you do or believe. When your internal resources play a greater role in determining your behaviour than external forces, we say that you are "self-determined". Therein lies your freedom.

But you are not born with such a self. Men are not born free (one of Spinoza's many great insights). Such a self is built, in time. Your self is made and created to a large degree by society, and the environment you grew in. Here is what Hume didn't see. This is where you get an ought from an is. Because your "self" is generated and sustained by your community, you owe much to that community, simply because it is somehow more "you" than you are. It is the cause that is responsible ultimately for your freedom.

Only after you have developed a self can it become independent - and it does so, when your behavior becomes governed by your internal resources much more than by circumstance. Freedom is as difficult as it is rare.

Could you expand on what you mean by that? And what, precisely, is our role in the determination of our beliefs? — Thorongil

To the first question. It is one thing to be determined to do something by causes (some of which are internal), and it is another thing to be destined to do something. When you are destined to do something you don't play a causal role - causes of any kind cannot alter the outcome, because it is your destiny. What is our role in the determination of our beliefs? The current beliefs, our desires, our physical body, etc. guide our perception and navigation through the world, and we interpret whatever happens to us through them. New beliefs, changes of belief, etc. all happen within this framework that we call "I". This framework, via top-down causality, determines (in some of us to a large degree) what we believe, how our beliefs change, etc. Imagine a street full of people going along in two different lanes, in two opposing directions. If you want to go say right, then you join the lane where people are all heading right, because otherwise you'd not be able to go right - you'd crash in others. That's how a system can play a top-down causal role on its parts. That is what you do as well in your life.

@Thorongil

I would say that it is at least not certain whether I can choose my beliefs or not. — Thorongil

Choosing your beliefs doesn't have to be so black and white. Maybe you can't choose freely in any circumstance - some beliefs are forced on you. But can you influence at least some of the beliefs you have? Even a Spinozist would be forced to admit that you can, since you yourself are part of the causal chain that will determine what your beliefs are. For a Kantian/Schopenhaurian it's even easier - freedom is of the noumenal, not of the phenomenal, hence the choice remains free sub specie aeternitatis. And ... nothing is certain - certainty is incoherent. I don't even understand what it would mean for something to be certain other than perceiving everything all at once - which is impossible - the view from everywhere :p .

If I cannot, then it makes no difference whether I ought to make the leap of faith, as these philosophers argue, for I have no control over whether I do or not.

Not having complete control is different from having no control. If you want to argue that you have no control, you dig yourself too deep to ever get out. If you have no control over any of your beliefs, then there is not point to study philosophy. Just stop. You have no control over what you believe anyway. If you have no control over what you believe there is no point in talking about it. Just be silent.

However, I would go further and argue that doxastic determinism is true, though at present only by means of an appeal to personal experience. I have never felt that what I believed in was in any way up to me. True, I have witnessed my beliefs change over time, but I could not honestly tell you why they did. One would like to think they did because I became convinced from certain arguments, but what exactly causes me to be convinced of said arguments in the first place?

Sure, determinism (including doxastic) is true, pace Spinoza, but it doesn't follow that you have no control over what you believe. You do have control, but it's a limited kind of control. You're only one of the factors that determines what your beliefs will be - there are many others external of you which also come in to make the determination happen. The fact that you have never been able to take all factors into account - because probably you don't know them - does not mean that you haven't also been a factor. You don't know the cause, because knowing the cause of your beliefs changing involves knowing all the factors which merge into what is the cause. But you certainly know part of the cause.

As for why arguments, of any kind, convince you - there can be many causes coming into play. It can be due to your past experience, it can be due to your thought pattern, it can be due to what you want to be true, it can be due to reason, etc. An argument doesn't have to be true to convince you. It will convince you if it's not true so long as it agrees with your passions. If it is true, the argument may convince you because it agrees with your passions (in which case you are accidentally convinced, and you may become unconvinced) or because it agrees with your reason (in which case you remain convinced - your conviction is stable).

It can't be because they are truth, since we are often convinced by the false more often than not.

Hasty generalisation - just because the false convinces you many times does not mean that the true never convinces you.

What else is it? I suppose, then, one might assume doxastic determinism to be true in the absence of any coherent explanation for how doxastic voluntarism could be true. I welcome anyone to provide me with one, though.

Yes, sure, let's assume it to be true, but it doesn't help you in anyway. The position you really want to put forward to help you in your argument is doxastic FATALISM. Our beliefs may all be determined, but, surely, we also play a causal role in that determination - therefore there is a degree of freedom that we have by merely being causal agents. Doxastic fatalism on the other hand - that digs the hole too deep, and you can't climb out. If that is true, then you can consider none of your beliefs to be true, not even the belief in doxastic fatalism, because that too, you have been determined to believe in by factors entirely outside of your control and/or influence.

Sure, I'll reply when you make it! :)

Your first post in this thread is great Mongrel! Thanks! :D (we really need internal replies lol)

I agree that "truth is true" has a tautologous feel to it. Similarly so with reason being reasonable. And I don't disagree that the statements don't tell us much about their subject matter. But I would still say that truth is true, and that reason is reasonable.

I don't think reason judges between values, but that reason judges simpliciter -- and that judgment requires a normative standard by which to judge and is, therefore, at least partially a value. (I'm not committed one way or the other on whether or not reason is or isn't a value) I don't see why a value cannot be a criteria for values, though, or why the criteria for truth cannot be true. I would expect the criteria for truth to be true. (I've not always thought this, but I've changed my position). And I would expect to be drawn to certain values based on what I already care about. — Moliere

Things are determined to be true in reference to the criteria for truth, correct? But if the criteria of truth is itself true, how has that been determined? In reference to itself? That is merely begging the question. In reference to another criterion? The criterion of truth of the criterion of truth? So on ad infinitum, so that in the end we never have a criterion of truth which is true? See Moliere it doesn't matter what you would say. Reason determines that this is an irrational idea, regardless of the fact that you choose to say it, believe it, or whatever. The fact that you expect the criterion of truth to be true says something about you, not about how things really are.

The only argument in the above being: All Normative standards are values. Judgment requires a normative standard. Therefore, judgment requires values. — Moliere

Who says Reason cannot determine a normative standard given our nature and the nature of the world?

Also, I agree that the good is not "what seems to work for us" -- I stated that this is how one finds the good, not that this is what it is to be good. — Moliere

It seems to me that being drugged the whole day is good. So therefore, :s I am on my way towards finding the good? Because seriously, there are people for whom it seems that staying in a drugged state is the best thing. But we know that such languishing is not good. Therefore "what seems to work for us" seems to be quite a bad method for finding the good in this circumstance. Methods for finding the good must be objective, and not tainted by our cognitive biases and subjectivity.

Perhaps you are one of the lucky few who can, through reason, see the form of the good. Well, I am not. So what am I to do with this theory, then? — Moliere

You can identify the good through pure reason too. It just takes reflection and a certain mindfulness to detach yourself from how you would feel about something, and instead determine how things really are. How should human beings really behave given such and such a human nature and such and such a world? If a human being was really conscious of his/her nature, and the nature of the world, how would they behave? What would they do? That is why ethics comes after metaphysics (the study of the world in the broadest context), physics (as per Epicurus/Lucretius, the study of the world and of ourselves from a physical point of view), and epistemology (the study of our cognitive faculties). If you answer these questions before, ethics becomes a matter of pure reason, pace Spinoza.

Maybe it's just a terminological disagreement. I would just say that the romantic is following the ethic of a romanticism. That is the type of person they are. And, sure, the romantic is good in accord with what the romantic cares about. But not in accord with what the Epicurean cares about. But does this make him against ethics? I wouldn't say so. — Moliere

The romantic may be following the ethic of romanticism. So what? The question here is, should he? Is that the best thing for him? You seem to say yes. I seem to say that there may be some desires/potentials within him that would be truer to his nature and (s)he is not aware of them for example.

When I used "against ethics", I meant against the ethical tradition. Epicurus, Epictetus, Spinoza, et al. develop very very similar ethics (especially in practice); they are all based on a dictatorship of Reason, and the differences come from a different conception of man and his place in the world. The stoics think that one should control one's passions, the Epicureans that one should minimise one's desires. Is that really that different? One achieves it by being tense, and watching every single moment to make sure that no immorality enters their mind, and the other achieves it by desiring little, and relaxing into the bossom of the existence. But these stances are all developed from overall conceptions of the world; they are developed by pure reason.

In this reading, the romantic is "against ethics" precisely because his ethics isn't one based on the dictatorship of Reason - Epicurus, Spinoza, Epictetus, etc. are pure reason (or very close to it).

There's a balance to be found I think. Sure, I would love to live unrestrained, and uninhibited. Wosret to the max! -- but prudence, and care for consequence gets in the way, and probably should. The premise is still framed in terms of suffering and joy. Perhaps the sages are wrong, and there is more suffering in domestication and sublimation, and more joy in Dionysian thrills. The ideal, the good that I've been taught, and enchants me is irrespective of my own suffering and joy. One does good, high quality behaviors, which are pro-social (read moral), because they are high quality, and pro-social behavior regardless of how much personal suffering or joy they engender. When meeting conventions is insufferable for you, and the conventions are unjust, there are pro-social means of reproach.

Everyone has a rebellious streak, and wish to do what isn't permitted, at least in play, but most care too much about social ties, and consequences to become too uppity, and although there may be great joys to be attained in the most anti-social of behaviors, this in no way entices me. — Wosret

Fair points! :) Don't know much what to say, as there's not much I disagree with lol :p

Great topic! :)

I have had two main issues in this life. One is a dental problem. Basically, I cannot eat on my back teeth - they do not touch each other, and there is a very large gap left when I close my mouth. The gap is huge - probably 2+cm - well huge in dentistry terms. It's large enough such that when a dentist sees me, they're like "*gasp* that can't be true, just close your mouth properly" ... and I'm like "Ummm... that's proper!" LOL :p . Some dentists have told me that you don't even see examples like me even in the textbooks lol. Anyway, I tried to fix it for about 8 years with all sorts of orthodontic treatments. They failed. So then, they wanted me to do a jaw surgery which can reposition the mandibula and close the mal-occlusion. I never wanted to, even though literarily all dentists I went to wanted me to. Finally I found a dentist who was willing to look into innovative alternatives. We ended up making ceramic extensions for all those back teeth which needed them. I can eat properly now. It's uncertain whether or not this can be a final solution. But I'm satisfied. I have defied the expectations for over 5 years with them already, never got a single cavity, even though I'm considered to be at a "high risk". Hell, never got a single cavity in my entire life... go figure...

As in how it affected me? Well not that much. Basically for a large part of the time I couldn't eat properly - it hurt to eat, because I had to bring my jaw forward to force the back teeth to touch together, which put a lot of stress on my mandibular joints (ultimately, if it kept going like that, they would wear out, and the pain would apparently become intolerable, or so I'm told lol). Now it doesn't hurt to eat, but I have adapted as well. Knowing my weakness, I tend to eat lots of soft stuff. Very little meat, don't like eating crunchy, hard things, which put a lot of stress on my mandibular joints. If you're at risk like me, you've gotta compensate for that increase of risk, by decreasing the stress applied to your weak part. As for aesthetics... well, none of this is visible. If I hadn't told you, you'd think my teeth were completely normal. When I smile, it seems like everything is normal, you never see the back teeth. Even some of my girlfriends didn't know... I mean can you believe that? Now with the extensions, it's like some cool antiques that I show people like - see? that's what I have in my mouth! And then watch their reactions lol. Day to day, it bothers me exactly 0 nowadays. It's perfect!

The other issue, I've been diagnosed with quite a few psychiatric conditions in the past, in my late teens. Now in my middle twenties, I never go to the psychiatrist - I've ditched them - and my symptoms and conditions are basically non-existent. I was diagnosed with Depression, Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Hypochondria, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder along the years. I used to take anti-depressants, anti-psychotics, and anxiety medication. I also got addicted to some of them (hell I took medication you were supposed to take for maximum 2 months for 6 months!). Now I never take any. I've stopped, it's been a few years already. How did I do it? Philosophy, mindfulness, sports. But philosophy has probably been the most essential out of the three. I mean, to me, it's normal to be worried about all sorts of absurd things - we are never taught how to think. I mean, when I wasn't a philosopher - I would wonder - why shouldn't I be worried that the sun will not rise tomorrow? I mean that's a possibility no? At least on a logical level? Why shouldn't I be worried that I have cancer? I mean it's possible - there are many young people out there with such life-threatening illnesses. How do I know I am not one of them? These are all meaningless questions for psychiatrists - they are just a symptom. They are also meaningless questions for me now - but that is because I understand what it is for a question to be meaningful, I understand when something is irrational. I know the criteria that can be used to judge these things. "Normal" people don't know the criteria most often. They just accidentally behave in a manner which is rational. So when they see someone behaving otherwise (irrationally) - they can't understand it. Because in truth - they themselves are not rational - they are just faking it out of habit. They are totally incapable to specify more geometrico (pace Spinoza lol) why it is irrational to think these things. Once I understood - I gained my freedom. And anyone can - provided they're willing to work and sweat for their salvation.

I would say that reason is judgmental. When one judges, one uses normative standards to judge. And so, given that reason is judgmental, reason must use normative standards, and therefore requires values. Is reason a value itself? I'm not sure. We could say it is, I suppose. It seems that we value reason. But I wouldn't go so far as to say that all ethical values are determined by reason.

I would say that truth can itself be true. In fact, it would be strange to say that truth is not true. It would be like saying good is not good.

Similarly to truth, going right back to the point, reason is, itself, quite reasonable. It is self-consistent -- and if we care for reason, then reason is the sort of standard which we gravitate towards. Reason presupposes reason by its own standards of judgment. — Moliere

To say that truth is true is a tautology; same as reason is reasonable. It's an empty, vacuous statement. Reason cannot be a value itself, and I have already outlined why. Reason is, as you say, that which judges between values. That which judges between values cannot itself be a value, simply because it is the criteria which decides what is and is not a value in the first place. The criteria for values cannot itself be a value, the same way the criteria for truth cannot itself be true (that is why there is no infinite regress on the criterion of truth question; we stop where we have no more reason to go on asking, pace Wittgenstein).

I would say that my meta-ethics are relativistic, yes. But that's still different from "anything goes", all the same. I would say, given what I've said so far, that nothing is good a priori -- but we can come to find the good by believing, testing, and seeing what seems to work for us. Perhaps all ethics are relative to a context -- but that does not then mean that anything goes. In a certain context, perhaps only one thing goes. — Moliere

Well my phrase "anything goes" is taken from Paul Feyerabend, so take it like he used it for science. Sure, it depends on context, but that doesn't contradict that, on the largest scale, "anything goes". And I disagree that the good is "what seems to work for us". The good has nothing to do with human idiosyncrasies - as such it is, and can be determined, by pure reason, pace Spinoza. That most of us have difficulty determining it, that many of us cannot see it, that many of us don't perceive it as good - that is all irrelevant; afterall,

all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare — Spinoza

.

Perhaps the master believes in chasing a lover, as you note, or perhaps the master believes in joy. These two masters won't persuade one another. There is no argument to be had between them. But, similarly, they won't be hesitant either. The ebb and flow and originality of every moment won't overcome them with indecision. — Moliere

The fact that each bird speaks its own language is not to say that there aren't great commonalities between the two in practice (such as between Epicureanism and Stoicism for example).

De Rerum Natura - Lucretius (re-reading this, greatly enjoying it!)

Anything goes not in terms of you personally (you have your own ethics), but in terms of human beings generally. It seems to me your (meta-ethical) position is quite relativistic (although maybe I'm wrong).

What I mean by "ethics presuppose themselves" is only that you can't prove an ethical system. You can reasonably reflect upon various ethical stances, beliefs, systems, or attitudes -- but you can't prove one or the other to yourself. You have to try them out to get a feel for them. And, as we see, some ethical beliefs will appeal to someone's intuitive reason more than others. The process is a good one, but it doesn't prove any ethical stance. Rather, upon coming to believe in an ethic the ethic becomes more reasonable in accord with its own values of judgment [insofar that we are dealing with a consistent ethic, at least]. — Moliere

But you can't "prove" anything, nor do you need to. The whole idea of "proof" is meaningless in the first place.

This is only natural. This is what I mean -- you have found these to be strong from a rational point of view[a value posited by which you can then evaluate other values]. You come from somewhere and discover the strengths of your ethics. — Moliere

I fail to see a "value" posited here. Reason cannot be a value, since reason is that which determines what is and is not a value in this case. (just like the criteria for truth, cannot be true itself; it would be a category error to say it is true).

@Michael Maybe (well quite possibly) he was referring to my (as well as Marchesk's) replies in his other thread :)

This ignores Camus' use of "Absurd" which is what @darthbarracuda was referring to through the word. To wit:

"The Absurd is the confrontation of the irrational (the world) and the wild longing for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart"

Notice that the arguments cannot be valid under this definition of absurd. The fact that man's constitution (longings) cannot be satisfied by the world does not necessarily have anything to do with God. Therefore the existence/non-existence of God plays no role in the Absurdity of life. It's a question that is decided by our nature vs the nature of the world

Moral obligation? Morality has nothing to do with philosophy, and everything to do with religion... Ethics is merely Reason's demands. But they don't have to be followed. Virtue is its own reward. There is no obligation in ethics.

Faith is a response to the lack of global meaning. Suicide is also a response to that. Resistance to it (ie making your own meaning), that is what makes the situation (life) become absurd (it has no meaning, and yet behold, you have a meaning). So it's not the Absurd per say that faith is a response to. Camus states that to maintain the Absurd, one must resist it lucidly. The fact that we value our life, despite the fact that it is meaningless for the Universe - that is the Absurd.

So nothing - just that one helps people, while the other one is just interesting for you (and maybe others too). If we had to prioritise one, we'd prioritise the one that provides help. That is the rational thing to do. But of course both of them can exist, and people can choose what they want to get engaged in! :)

Well Epicurus taught me that I should not be concerned about such hard to attain bodily pleasures. Peace of mind is the real good. So I think this God needs some lessons too :s (lol just joking :p )

Read that as "choosing to live without faith" (ie lucidly, without self-delusions).

Well Camus' Absurd does not depend on whether there is a God or not. Even if there is a God - life is still absurd - perhaps even more absurd that way lol. A God up there in the skies, concerned about how and when I masturbate - gosh, if that ain't absurd, I don't know what is.

Ahhh finally! Something about suicides, absurdity, nihilism, etc. :D

Well in the first "argument" the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise (I thought it should be premises anyway...). Therefore it's a non-sequitur. In the second "argument" - fuck - that's also a non-sequitur, unless you add the premise that "life isn't absurd", in which case it is tautologically true (iff the premises are true, which of course they're not) :s

Anyway, welcome to the forums! :)

But are there are justifications for philosophy? Other reasons why one pursues philosophy, or other ends philosophy should pursue? — Moliere

@MoliereWell I agree wholeheartedly with Epicurus - philosophy is a therapy for the soul. I mean yes, there are others, who are by nature healthy, without realising it, and are not too concerned by the question of how to live a good life. They do not comprehend what makes them live a good life - they do so accidentally. But nevertheless, they live a good life, and hence are not interested in philosophy as a therapy. However, they may be interested in philosophy as some sort of mental gymnastic, a way to play with ideas and concepts, to discover new thoughts, etc. Up to them, but I don't think that that's what the purpose of philosophy should be. Sure, it can be used that way too, but it's main purpose should be to cure people of their ills. Why? Because this latter purpose provides actual help, and can make our communal life much better, and hence must have priority.

Other people are not even aware that they don't live a good life. The question never even comes into their mind what makes for a good life. They are just so completely engulfed by their passions that they never step back from themselves to see the world as it really is. Many of them won't even know what philosophy does.

As for why we don't like the medical model in today's society? Well, it's because we have developed an obsession with equality. We all want to be equals. It is, as Nietzsche would put it, a slave morality, wherein the weak, who are the majority, seek to make everyone like them, and respond with anger and hatred whenever someone appears their superior. In today's world it can't be tolerated to hear someone say "I know, you must listen to me to achieve freedom". No, we want all to be equal. The blind to lead the blind. No authorities... we can't stand authorities anymore. We can't stand being lectured anymore. We can't stand having to respect superior knowledge. We barely stand respecting positions of authority like policemen... just imagine... your friend having superior knowledge to you... how outrageous that would be.

We have started mass producing everything... even intelligence. All the Universities of the world, throwing out thousands upon thousands of graduates every year. So many people with degrees... but a hundread people with degrees today probably aren't worth as much (don't have as much knowledge as) one person with a degree 200 years ago. Intelligence cannot be mass produced; it takes time to develop, and in this society, we want to produce workers as fast as possible, people who can get things done, not people who truly know. Everything studied in University is so superficial. I mean do you really think you can study a subject with a history of thousands of years in detail in 4 years, while also having time for long vacations, partying, etc.? Of course not!

Imagine telling your wife "studying Nature is important, as it teaches us how to live a better life... you should study with me too... let's go watch the swans by the river" - it won't take long until she rolls over her eyes, and is like "Yeah yeah yeah... Another time". If not to you, then at least to her friends. Why? Not because she doesn't like it. She doesn't know if she will like it or not. If she would be forced to do it, it's very likely she'd end up liking it. But never being forced to, she'll never agree to it. She just can't see that it would have value to her. Also, she'll hate the fact that you're implying her life isn't good - hell, to live a BETTER life? I mean is something really wrong with life now? :s What are you really implying there? And who the hell are you to decide what a good life is for her anyway? You think you have some superior knowledge??

People have such weak, sensitive egos nowadays, that Nietzsche wasn't too far off in diagnosing our modern society. Personally, if I see someone with superior knowledge in something I want to learn, I go to them, and beg them to teach me. And if they refuse, I'm not upset or angry. I know I am their inferior, and it is only their grace if they want to teach me anything - they don't have to.

Respect for your outroduction @unenlightened ! :)

I wonder if the new owners of PF ever took into account what would happen if the community moved...

"Well, it seems to me that you are willing to call quite a few people idiots: Epictetus, Seneca, Spinoza, Epicurus, etc." You are right -- reckless accusation on my part. But...

Philosophers live in service to Reason. Of course they are going to laud, honor, and praise it, and give it pride of place. They aren't going to rise and say "Amen" when Freud says that man is not master of his own house.

Agustino, I want to continue this but I've got to turn off the computer and get on with some pressing tasks, and won't be able to get back to this until Thursday night or Friday. In the meantime, one could do much, much, much worse than believing in reason. — Bitter Crank

Well not all philosophers live in the service of Reason - I doubt Kierkegaard, Shestov, et al. would agree for example. Some philosophers have also stated that man is not master of his own house. The point is BC - that while the house named "Of Human Bondage" is very large and has many entrances, there is also another house, named "Of Human Freedom" - small is the gate and narrow is the road that leads unto it ;)

I think all ethics presuppose themselves. So if you are a romantic then romanticism will just "appear right". Similarly, Epicurean values will just "appear right" if you are an Epicurean.

All ethics are questionable in this fashion. But I would hazard to guess that they are only questionable in light of another ethical stance. You have to complete the question "What if. . . ?", and propose another value, as you did in the OP.

I don't believe this is where a dictatorship of reason establishes itself. We can reason about ethics, but to reason about ethics is to bring in much more than pure reason, or any sort of notion like that. Our emotions are part of our reasoning about morality or ethics. Without emotions we are morally inept. Without any sense of reason we are equally so. They are interdependent upon one another, ethically speaking. — Moliere

I disagree about all ethics presupposing themselves. That is just another ethic - the ethic of anything goes. Reason, and its ascendancy within an individual can and does differentiate between ethical theories. I see this in myself. The more I live, the more I see elements of truth in many ethical systems I study. Some more reasonable than the others, none is perfect. But a few are excellent guides, as they can subsume elements from other ethical theories under themselves. I have found pyrrhonism, epicureanism and stoicism in particular to be quite strong from a rational point of view. Epicureanism and stoicism, are for example, in practice, not even that far from each other; just different theoretical frameworks.

And when we reason about ethics, we reason about what our emotions ought to be in particular circumstances, not what they are. Since we can influence our emotions using our thoughts, it is only a matter of learning how to do this to determine ourselves to have those emotions in those particular circumstances. If you bring in emotions to your ethical reasoning, then you are merely rationalising some already pre-conceived ideals. Post fact rationalisations have no place in philosophy. Therefore ethics should be (hey, this is meta-ethics now :s ) a matter of pure reason once we have extracted sufficient knowledge from the natural world - if it is not, then it's ad hoc - it means nothing.