Heidegger thought metaphysics begins with the question of why anything exists at all - or the question of Being. That there is a distinction between that which is, and Being as such, is what I feel is what makes it so powerful to me when Leibniz wrote: — darthbarracuda

I'm not too familiar with Heidegger, but what you attribute to him here accords well with my position. Leibniz lurks in the background of my thoughts on the question you're responding to, as I've come to sense that his version of the principle of sufficient reason might be superior to Schopenhauer's, and Leibniz's version, of course, leads pretty straight forwardly to theism.

I reject the notion that the divine, if it exists, would be something that we can come to "know" in such a way that we can express it using the vocabulary of the everyday. — darthbarracuda

I concur. But recall that the pre-modern philosophers you speak of made a distinction between knowing what and knowing that something is. We cannot know God's essence but we can know that he exists, they would say.

Yet a religious belief based on rationalist proofs is hardly religious at all, because it lacks the risk of faith. Before the modern era, demonstrations of God's existence were meant to get people on the path of faith, not establish without a doubt that God exists, because that would jeopardize faith — darthbarracuda

I'm not sure I agree here. Another Scholastic distinction is between the preambles of the faith and the articles of the faith. The existence of God was thought to be a preamble of the faith, and so capable of rational demonstration. The articles of faith, however, do require faith, for they are revealed truths, that is, truths that do not contradict reason but cannot be arrived at by reason, such as the Trinity.

Materialists would agree with the bolded part. — Marchesk

They would, but Berkeley naturally wouldn't hold that they exist as matter. There is a reason why Berkeley called his position "immaterialism" not "idealism," though I think he's clearly an idealist of some kind.

Those seem like poor reasons to me. What philosopher doesn't rehash the ideas of his predecessors? What philosopher is without poor arguments? If you've discovered the fount of wisdom himself somewhere in the history of philosophy, I would ask that you point him out to me and tell me why others have not seen his infallibility.

Or you could just give me a brief summary of Berkeley's arguments for God. — Marchesk

I just got done telling you I don't have one to give and don't have the time to go and do that properly. I mean, you could try Google and find something like this: http://faculty.bsc.edu/bmyers/BerkeleyGod.htm . But I'm not in a position to assess those presentations' accuracy. The second argument in the link might be what you and John have in mind, but not the first, at least.

If you don't think of him as much of an authority, then my appeal to him will be meaningless to you, that is true. I don't know why you would think that, though.

You can't expect others to go read material in the middle of a discussion. — Marchesk

Yes, but I in turn can expect that philosophers one hasn't read won't be rejected.

Well, Schopenhauer regarded Berkeley's idealism as more or less capable of standing on its own, while dispensing with God.

You seem intent on making me do your work for you. My comment was an attempt to persuade you to go read Berkeley himself and examine his arguments, as I myself don't have the time, or really the interest, to do so at present. I just don't recall that God is "invoked" or assumed to exist, as you suggest.

So, how else does the question make sense in the absence of that presupposition? — Agustino

I don't understand the question.

Fair enough, I did get that impression from part of your post. — Agustino

You might also have gotten it from its title.

Are you saying you reject a position you haven't actually read anything about?

But they do disagree fundamentally about what an experience is. — Marchesk

Right, that's why I said, in the last sentence you neglected to quote, "They disagree about how it is supplied and how it ought to be described."

A caricature and a strawman are two entirely different things. — Pseudonym

So they are, but I took your admission to be a polite way of describing your attempt to strawman my position, which you did in fact do.

If you conclude that a being is 'necessary' — Pseudonym

I do not conclude this. You asked what one possible answer to my question could be. I gave you one.

In other words why is the necessary being necessary? — Pseudonym

The question is incoherent.

In other words, speaking of 'the data of experience' is not a 'neutral' starting point that can then be treated, as though in a second, unrelated step, in either a 'materialist' or 'idealist' manner. — StreetlightX

I'm not sure I agree. The starting point of idealism and materialism could be the same and yet not be neutral, so I'm not sure why "neutrality" is the problem. I would, of course, agree that one's epistemology tends to inform one's metaphysic, but it need not. An epistemological idealist need not be committed to ontological idealism, for example.

In any case, I suppose I would be of the opinion that the fault line with respect to experience is not as deep as both sides like to make it out to be. The primary reason for this, again, is that neither side objects to the existence of the content of experience. They disagree about how it is supplied and how it ought to be described.

Invoking God to make idealism work because of epistemological concerns over unperceived objects is hugely inconsistent. — Marchesk

Berkeley, for one, does not do that, though. He provides arguments.

Theism relies on faith — Harry Hindu

Some forms of it might, but not all. Fideism has never been theism's most common expression, at least among philosophers and theologians.

It seems to me that the dichotomy is false and idealists and materialists are arguing over nothing. — Harry Hindu

Yes, I tend to agree, as this was the point I tried making.

Well then boy, I think you need to grow some subtlety. — Janus

Oh no, I've already passed that stage of development. My subtlety is so immense, I often need a crane to hoist it.

I think Thorongil meant "the more important question is not what objects are, but why they exist." We are not responsible for the reason of a thing's existence (excluding the obvious man-made stuff).

[...]
— Michael

I didn't mean "reason" in these sense of "purpose". I meant it in the sense of "cause"/"explanation". — Michael

Correct.

On the one hand, "what are they ultimately composed of" makes no sense because I don't see what import (if any) this has. — Agustino

My dear friend, this was effectively the point I was making.

you presuppose that there exists something outside of this "everything" that can be pointed to as an answer to the why question — Agustino

I presuppose no such thing. The question could be meaningless, in which case there is no such thing.

Do you mean human experience? — prothero

I mean this.

I was caricaturing the idealist position you prefer for rhetorical effect, you'll see it has no influence whatsoever on my line of argument, which you've ignored in favour of the easier target. — Pseudonym

So you admit to strawmanning my position. Besides being thoroughly unnecessary, you ought also to have expected my disinclination to address whatever line of argument you think you've presented thereafter.

How do you avoid the infinite regress? — Pseudonym

With respect to what? A necessary being by definition avoids it, a point you seem incapable of acknowledging for whatever reason.

What does it mean "why" objects are? — Agustino

"... the "why" question deals with the reason for there being objects of experience at all as opposed to the question of what they are ultimately composed of."

The existence of any particular thing may be contingent; but this is not the same as to say that the existence of anything at all is contingent. — Janus

Sounds like a distinction without a difference to me.

The problem is that if objects exist in God; then that is a mind-independent existence — Janus

No it's not. They exist outside of my mind, true (which is why Berkeleyanism isn't solipsism), but they still exist in a mind, namely, the mind of God.

we still can find meaning in life — Moliere

"Find" doesn't make sense in the world you posit. Meaning must rather be created. But the meaning we can create isn't proportional to, and doesn't fit, what the desires of the heart demand.

Why is up to us. — Banno

I don't think so.

Okay. Now you've provided a comment, not an objection or a request for explanation.

I'm tempted to say no, because I don't know what it would mean for you to understand it, not knowing you. I think it was fairly self-evident what I meant. In any case, the "why" question deals with the reason for there being objects of experience at all as opposed to the question of what they are ultimately composed of.

For someone who is not even certain that the universe really exists outside your own head, you seem to know an awful lot about 'things'. — Pseudonym

Strawman. I neither said nor suggested any such thing. In fact, if you read the OP, I said exactly the reverse of what you impute of me here.

Phenomenalism is interesting, but I don't think there can be an answer to the question you pose, given the claim phenomenalism makes, as you define it. So I would say you fall into the nihilism camp.

A universe of things is by definition unnecessary, inasmuch as "things" are finite, contingent, and causally dependent on each other and "a universe" is just the sum total of such things.

A necessary being.

I've enjoyed reading your posts in this thread and elsewhere. Some of what you say here reminds me of the following recent speech by W.L. Craig I saw, which might be relevant to the thread:

Also we should remember Berkeley’s original aphorism was esse est percipe, to be is to be perceived. The word ‘exist’ doesn’t come into it. — Wayfarer

Wayfarer is quite right here, which is why the following statement misses the point about idealism:

if the object didn't exist, our present experience wouldn't be the way it is — gurugeorge

Idealists do not dispute the existence of objects, they simply give a unique answer to the question of what objects are. Instead of being a collection of mind-independent bits of physical matter, the idealist will say that objects of experience depend upon the mind for their content (an epistemological claim) or that they are ideas in the mind, whether my mind, other people's, or God's (an ontological claim). The idealist, in other words, is not committed to the notion that our knowledge of objects is illusory, i.e. unreal. They are real, but their reality is in some sense dependent on the mental or composed of the mental.

Thinkers about thinking.

My thoughts as well. I would say Shapiro is better read in philosophy than Peterson, especially political philosophy. I like them both in certain doses and on certain topics.

It exists, but it isn't due to evil, patriarchal, sexist males, as the common media and feminist narrative asserts.

Lol, great video!

Holy hypocrisy, batman!

I conclude that both socially tolerant behavior and hatred plus a tendency towards violent behavior comes out of the matrix of human interaction and experience in a child's life long before adulthood. Home, parents, school, playground, peer groups, and social interactions are the source of prejudicial attitudes, willingness to discriminate against others, and to perform acts of violence against others. — Bitter Crank

I concur. The old Jesuit motto is true: "Give me a child until he is seven and I will give you the man."

Incidentally, you look a bit like Schopenhauer in your most recent avatar.

No.