People suffer, some way or another. Therefore, there should be no more people. There are people, now. That is their misfortune; ideally, they shouldn't be alive, but it's wrong to kill them (and end their suffering).

Is this anti-natalism? — Ciceronianus the White

I think so, yes.

If God exists — MysticMonist

This question needs to be addressed first, because if God does exist, then there must be an explanation for evil, whether we know what that is or not. Put another way, if God exists, then whatever arguments from evil that purport to show that God does not exist must necessarily be wrong. The way this debate is waged puts the cart before the horse.

What does prevent it is preventing birth. — schopenhauer1

The whole point of his argument, as I see it, is that this result is best achieved by the people who agree with this statement having children. Otherwise, all the anti-natalists will die off and so with them their ideas. Maybe a few people will stumble upon it haphazardly, as has always happened, but if you really care about human beings ceasing to procreate entirely, you need a more permanent movement, and a permanent movement requires raising families according to those ideals.

It would seem to me to that what is being claimed (once the nonexistent people are out of the picture) is that people shouldn't have children, ever. Of course, that statement will require justification — Ciceronianus the White

Correct. There are actually several arguments in favor of anti-natalism, and I would classify them into three categories: those from hedonic asymmetry, those from consent, and those from misanthropy. I myself no longer think these arguments work, which is why I'm no longer an anti-natalist.

Would it be--because if people have children, there will be more people? Why, though, would that be a bad thing--something which shouldn't take place? Because it's a bad thing to be a person? I don't know. — Ciceronianus the White

Well, according to one argument, it's because there will be more pain and suffering. We therefore have a duty not to procreate to prevent this needless pain and suffering. The underlying premise here is that negative utilitarianism is true.

Why is this one off limits but others not? Again, this is another way to shut down any thought on it before it enters the world of debate to begin with. — schopenhauer1

It's clearly not off limits. We're discussing it here and now, while Benatar and others have published books and articles on it in the academy. My concern is that you seem to think that anyone who has bothered to think about this topic must come to the same conclusion as you have.

As you know, I've cooled on anti-natalism, so if my responses are perceived to be of a similar temperature, it's mostly because I don't like the subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, implication that I and others who come to a different conclusion haven't seriously thought about the topic.

He will just respond by saying that creating human life and continuing to live once alive are separate issues. He will say that suicide is difficult to perform because we're hardwired for living and even immoral because it causes suffering for friends and family.

So are you saying it is? What's your claim that it is or is not? — schopenhauer1

Don't shift this onto me! This is precisely what I was asking you!

This is meant to disparage the inquirer by making them think that their question is not worthy for serious consideration — schopenhauer1

And if they claim to have good reasons for believing that it is, what then?

How are we to know that these are just effective deceptions or misdirections that sophisticated societies have used to disarm the existential question-asker from engaging in questions that would lead to despair? — schopenhauer1

How are we to know that they're not?

It could be a useful meme that has effectively shifted people's questions away from existence itself so that they forget it as a topic of legitimacy and focus on details so that society can keep on moving forward without leading to feelings of angst. — schopenhauer1

Or it could not be. Making these apparently rhetorical statements doesn't relieve you of the burden of having to justify them.

I would count myself as a bit of a Platonist.

Judging a woman's appearance? You sexist bigot!

Yet another person who wants to tell a woman what to do with her own body...

Amazing. — creativesoul

"Who are you to tell me what I do with my body?"

Nah.

Hear hear. But the framework relies on honesty and respect for facts. And it is documented beyond all possibility of question that Trump has no respect for facts. — Wayfarer

More binary banalities. The fact is that Trump sometimes lies and sometimes tells the truth.

A good partner is [insert platitude], [platitude], and [platitude].

How anyone can defend this man, boggles the mind, I regret to say. — Wayfarer

You're too caught up in binary thinking. People can defend him when he's right and criticize him when he's wrong. Human beings are more nuanced than simply good vs. evil, especially politicians.

Damn right, I overestimated the intelligence of the US electorate. — Wayfarer

And this is why you'll never understand why he was elected.

Accusing the media of misrepresenting his words, and then misrepresenting his own words by leaving out the key part that the media was condemning. — Michael

About which he's still not wrong. Many sides were to blame. This controversy has fast become a farce:

I took a week off from the milieu of political insanity to go out amongst the normals and chalk up another huge trial victory, and when I got back I was stunned - stunned! - to find that a consensus had formed that Nazis are bad. Beforehand, I had no idea where the establishment stood on Nazis, but now it's crystal clear. They hate Nazis because Nazis are bad. Everyone from CNN to Mitt Romney hates Nazis. I couldn't be prouder of an establishment that takes that kind of tough stand. They're going to hate Nazis, and they don't care whose jack-booted toes they step on!

I also learned that if you hate Nazis for being bad, you're not allowed to hate anybody else who’s also bad, because Nazis are so bad that you have to devote all your hating capacity to hating Nazis such that there's no room left to hate anybody else. Those hammer and sickle flag-carrying Communists? Well, you must love the Nazis if you hate them, because you have got to hate the Nazis with all your mind and all your heart since, as we learned this week, Nazis are bad. I'm so glad that our moral betters have this all figured out.

We seem to have circled back around to the thread's topic, all without my prompting. Well done, gentlemen.

So rather than arguing about whether 'Christianity is better than Buddhism' — Wayfarer

I have a question on this point: are you opposed to arguing about not just whether one religion is "better" than another, but whether one religion possesses the fullness of truth?

As I distinguished in my OP, there is obviously truth in religion, but the more interesting and important question, for me, is whether any particular religion is true. The comparative approach is drearily academic. It has no existential import, and it leads nowhere, since there is no such thing as "religion in general" to convert to. There are only religions, plural. A neutral observer, such as myself, can notice and appreciate the similarities between religions, but this doesn't affect my life one iota. It merely adds to the pile of facts that I know, leaving unfulfilled the yearning for wisdom, which is more than simply knowing a set of facts.

Whatever else religions may be, they are surely wisdom traditions, vehicles not simply for the accumulation of bland, discursive knowledge, but for personal transformation and for better states of knowledge. It doesn't seem possible to experience these things without being on the inside of a religion. But the desire for them can't be made the primary reason one converts to a religion. That reason ought to be because it is true. Unless one is reasonably confident of the latter, then attempting to experience the former will be impossible whether inside or out. On the inside, one would be forced to lie, and on the outside, one would be forced to coldly appropriate. Either way, the cognitive dissonance would be too great to give one any peace, which, in part, is precisely what one is seeking. This is why the search for whether any religion is true ought to come first and the search for similarities between religions second, which in fact will follow as a matter of course from the first.

Well, I was only explicating what the Catechism passage says. I myself am undecided on whether the end can ever justify the means. Most of the time, I don't think it can, but I am well aware of the famous objection about telling a lie to save someone, a version of which you have presented above.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the end never justifies the means, I might invoke the principle of double effect once again to respond to your example. This means that it is the pedophile who is the cause of his being lied to, not the person who lied. An ordinary lie is freely told to deceive the innocent, and is thus wrong, but a lie told to a pedophile when a child's life is on the line is not freely told and not told to an innocent person, but to a criminal.

No, intention to do good justifies the means — Janus

But you could be mistaken about what the good is.

Lying in circumstances like that is not "objectively bad" at all, it is good — Janus

So, the end justifies the means?

I'm just clarifying. Now, to return to your question, you asked if it was possible to have a good intention and produce a terrible result. I agreed, but it assumes two things. First, it assumes that the good intention alone is what results in the action. It need not. To show why, let's take the example the Catechism uses from your link:

A good intention (for example, that of helping one's neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just

Here what we have is a conflict of intentions, which we might also call a conflict between different orders of volition (in the Augustinian sense). One intends to do something objectively good, helping one's neighbor, by means of something objectively bad, lying. But what is lying if not intending to deceive? Thus, one intends to do good by intending at the same time to do bad, which is contradictory and therefore unjustified. Put differently, one wills to do good as one's long term goal (first order volition) by willing the bad in the present (second order volition). So no, I don't think anything you or the Catechism says conflicts with my position.

Second, it assumes that "terrible" means "immoral." It need not. Remember that I distinguished between immoral and tragic actions. I agreed with your question because "terrible" can mean "tragic" and I took it to mean this.

And not the person?

Right, so in that case, intention alone wouldn't be sufficient to decide on good or evil, no? — Agustino

To decide what?

Those links don't exactly help in settling the claim you made. I would want an official church document of some kind.

Well don't you think it's possible to have a good intention, and - for example - because of lack of knowledge produce a terrible result? — Agustino

Of course.

In that case, would your good intention (say - your desire to save someone from death) morally excuse the results you have produced? — Agustino

They would morally excuse the individual performing the action.

Yeah, of course, I agree there is an objective good, HOWEVER, my point is that in striving to reach for that objective good you may fall into something that is immoral, due to various factors. That would still count as a sin. — Agustino

What makes something immoral? If you reply by saying, "that which is contrary to God," as one of the other forum's posts you linked says, then that assumes the truth of theism, which I have not done in this particular conversation.

Because they want to die, they know it doesn't matter that they carry ID or pay for a truck with their own credit cards.

You are aware that this is not the position of either the Roman Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox church with regards to morality right? — Agustino

No. Show me.

There are many problems with the view that good and evil are mere matters of simple intention. For example, what if someone authentically thinks that killing you will do you good because it would send you to heaven for example? If they try and kill you, then they intend to do good (even if they're wrong) no? According to you, they have done nothing wrong (morally) by killing you, since they intended to do good. — Agustino

No, examples like these don't affect my position. One can be mistaken about what constitutes a good intention, such that even if one thinks that one's intentions are good, they may not be.

There is a saying out there - "the road to hell is paved with good intentions". — Agustino

An asinine saying. If good intentions lead one to hell, then do bad intentions lead one to heaven? If they were truly good, they couldn't lead one to hell.

If the intellect thinks X is good, then the will will pursue X. But that judgement can be mistaken, so the will can pursue evil while intending to pursue good. Thus, mere intention is not sufficient to give an account for morality. — Agustino

You've partially made my point here. To finish it, I would add that the fact that one can be mistaken about the good doesn't mean there isn't the objectively good for one to intend.

If the stone is as blameworthy as the individual who - by negligence - drops a hammer onto his co-worker's head, based on what considerations do we put one in prison, and we don't do anything to the other? — Agustino

I literally just answered a previous iteration of this question. In fact, your post quotes the answer I gave you.

An intriguing mystery. But then, why do terrorists rent cars/vans/trucks using their own credit cards? Why don't they steal somebody else's card first? This would frustrate and slow down the investigation. Too much trouble? Are car/van/truck rental agencies so fastidious about IDs? — Bitter Crank

They're planning on dying in the process, otherwise they don't receive the rewards of martyrdom.

So then O:) - a stone that falls from the rooftop on someone's head has "simple" blame? :D — Agustino

Yes, in the sense of being the cause of the event. The stone is responsible for it, but it isn't morally responsible, clearly.

Do you hold that there are situations when we should imprison people based on factors that are NOT also immoral in nature? — Agustino

I think there may be prudential and admonitory reasons for prison sentences in the absence of moral culpability. However, I also think such sentences can be gratuitous as forms of punishment. I would probably prefer sentences of community service or some form of charitable work instead.

Having answered your question, I still feel it's a red herring and would like us to stick to the topic at hand.

Can a stone be blameworthy? Can an animal be blameworthy? Or is it only moral agents that can be blameworthy? — Agustino

I distinguished between moral blame, which is to assign moral responsibility, and simply blame, which is to assign causal responsibility.

Why else do you think we sentence people to prison if they accidentally - say while building a house - kill a co-worker? That is a barbaric practice that we should eliminate or what? — Agustino

This question doesn't affect my position at all, so I ignored it. I'm here to defend what I take to be moral, not what qualifies as imprisonment-worthy.

Why is the American Education System Failing? — Anonymys

Bad parenting and anti-intellectual sub-cultures.

If I leave my child on the side of the balcony while I go grab a beer from the fridge, and my child unknowingly pushes him/herself over the edge and dies, then I am morally blameworthy for that — Agustino

Blameworthy and negligent, yes, undoubtedly, but not morally so. I'm still missing the reason why it is the latter.

o say that there are evils one can commit without intending to commit them is to understand that intention isn't the only factor at play. Yes it is a factor, a very important one, but not the only one. Why else do you think we sentence people to prison if they accidentally - say while building a house - kill a co-worker? That is a barbaric practice that we should eliminate or what? — Agustino

The problem is that your position is arbitrary. How do we determine which factor is the one to use to confer moral blame in a given scenario?

because a world without that freedom would be horrible beyond imagination — Mariner

Out of curiosity, why?

Basically it tells me that I have no moral blame if - say - I forget the gas on and there's a big explosion and many people die. — Agustino

Correct. I see nothing absurd about this. You are at fault, may have to pay damages, etc, but not morally at fault. If there was no malicious intent to kill people, then you've done nothing morally wrong.

I say to you, Agustino, that if you and I were building a house, and you accidentally slipped while holding an electric saw that then flew out of your hands and wounded me in some way, I would hold you responsible, but not morally responsible. I would demand nothing of you. I wouldn't say that you had committed evil. I wouldn't say that you yourself are evil. I would simply say, "It's okay, Agustino, I know you didn't intend to hurt me. I'm sorry you tripped, which caused me to be wounded. Think nothing of it."

To be held morally responsible for things one doesn't intend is an inversion of justice and precisely what postmodernist leftists peddle all the time. It is to be guilty before proven innocent. To say that there are evils one can commit without intending to commit them is to make everyone a moral monster. The only logical conclusion is to isolate oneself in a grass hut, far away from the material consumption and human interaction that cannot but implicate one in evil without one intending to. That is the only way to be moral on your account.

It doesn't follow that the action is not immoral, since that would be simply to presuppose that morality consists in not intending evil. — Agustino

But I think it does. Remember that I asked you why you chose the criteria you did, to which you merely repeated yourself. If you get to presuppose your position, then I get to presuppose mine.

So if I am the cause of it, how am I not morally to blame for it if I could have stopped myself from being the cause of it for one? — Agustino

Because being the cause of something isn't the same as to be morally blameworthy. That ought to be a simple distinction to understand.

It's not the same at all. In one case you're dealing with a moral agent who has, amongst other things, a capacity for intention, and in the other case you're dealing with an inanimate object that has no capacity for intention (or internal states for that matter) whatsoever. — Agustino

The lack of intent is the same. An even occurred due to an intentless action in both cases.

Then in what sense am I to blame? — Agustino

In the sense that you are the cause of it.

Is that inanimate object a moral agent? — Agustino

It doesn't matter. The lack of intent is the same in both cases.

so let's see - if we're in a chemical laboratory, and due to my negligence I forget the gas on after I leave, and there is a big explosion later killing many people, have I done no wrong because I didn't intend to? — Agustino

Correct. You are to blame for the action, but not morally to blame. If an inanimate object caused the explosion, has it done wrong? Like you, it never intended to cause the explosion.

In some situations it is (virtually) impossible to avoid wrongdoing though. It's just how life is. — Agustino

This is excellent fodder for the anti-natalist.

Fine. I still disagree. If you kill someone but don't intend to, I wouldn't say that you've committed wrongdoing. There's a difference between wrongdoing and tragedy.

One thing I don't like about your position is that it makes it impossible not to commit wrongdoing. In my view, it creates more wrongdoing than there actually is in the world.

It's a combination of intention, consequences, internal state of the one who performs the action and the context. — Agustino

Why?

Whether someone causes their own death by being an assailant in a case where they are killed by their intended victim obviously depends on whether you assume that the victim has a choice about whether to defend themselves or not. — Janus

Assuming he does, then if he chooses to fend off his attacker and in so doing happens to kill him, despite not intending to, then he had the right to. That is to say, it was not wrong for him to do so.