Human industry has managed to meet concerns of great importance (e.g. famine, disease) in the past, overcome them or controlled them. Pessimism says always that "this challenge is different". Either that or that human society, rather than improving, is on a long-slope, general, downward trend. I don't find support for either contention.

The risk is real. The potential for avoidance is what I am optimistic about.

Pessimistic hellscapes, like those of Erlich, just don't play out. He is more confident of his predictions than he ought to be.

Optimism oughtn't downplay the risk of the challenges we face, climate change being one large dark cloud on the horizon. That cloud comes with plenty of unknowns and we are best served when we deal with those risks rationally, scientifically, positively and in a non-partisan fashion.

As to the population curve, we are not herds of antelope. The reduction in fecundity, both in the industrialized world as well as the developing world, reflects an ability of humans to act individually and locally, in dealing with global stressors. Failing to respect the rationality of the individual, bringing top down solutions (e.g. China), rather than approaching it from bottom-up and giving families the tools to manage procreative desires against financial burdens, spells problem.

Shouting "population bomb" for the 3rd or 4th time just doesn't carry the same weight, especially in light of the birth dearth that industrialized nations like Japan are facing.

I take load-bearing measures of the Earth with respect to population, when paired with a pessimistic klaxon, with a grain of salt. The developed world may have to curb its consumption, but I'm not convinced our ability to extract efficiencies from resource usage in our environment will hit an insurmountable barrier before we dynamically adjust our population to the limits of our resources. If it were not leveling off, globally, I might be more concerned that our web of signals and responses was catastrophically misaligned as it applies to altering our behavior vis-a-vis population growth.

“I cannot think the question of responsibility alone, in isolation from the other. If I do, I have taken myself out of the mode of address (being addressed as well as addressing the other) in which the problem of responsibility first emerges” (Butler, Giving An Account of Oneself) — StreetlightX

I read this and I become confused by the term 'the other'.

Is this other agent an agent in singular or does the other reflect the 'other' in toto?

Responsibility is tri-partite:
- My responsibility (e.g. an obligation or prohibition)
- to the other (e.g. a contractual partner, my child, other drivers)
- due to the other (a system of control -- legal/criminal, contractual, social, moral)

For as Butler notes, responsibility is ultimately relational: it is only in relation to another that one is responsible, accountable, for what one has said and done. There would be no ‘problem of responsibility’ without the relation to the other. But the other, as other, as an-other agency, is precisely what, or rather who, I am not in control of. It is in the face of the other that I am responsible, and the other is that who exceeds my mastery over things. — StreetlightX

Maybe Butler makes this clear but the quote above doesn't resolve, for me, the scope of 'other'.

From a review by Chris Lumberg:

The second assumption is that when a subject dependent on other subjects attempts to give an account of itself, it does so within a structure of address. A subject makes a claim for itself only in the presence of others—an account of oneself both aims at the self but also simultaneously aims at presenting the self to another.

When Butler discusses "being addressed as well as addressing the other" is that another (one) subject or is it the "other subjects" (the whole of the other) the first subject is dependent on?

Maybe this is clear to other readers here. It is not obvious to me.

The prostitution of the commerce clause ended any pretense of federalism. It’s DC’s ( congress’s) plenary instrument for making all things it’s own business.

Oh, wait....there’s those right-wing hobgoblins who sit on the bench and dare to curtail, like platonic guardians, the abuses of the commerce clause (e.g. US v. Lopez). Not to mention their haste to jurisprudentially trumpet the Tenth Amendment. “Damn states-righters” is what they must be, KKK types hiding in plain view wearing those black-as-white robes.

Or maybe they just don’t trust the federal government.

Incidentally, the incorporation of the BOR ( most of it) via the 14A was less a manifestation of federalism being eroded than it was a legal angle by defendants to challenge state prosecutions and abuses of civil rights. John Bingham, author of the 14a, envisioned his section 1 clause as a way to accomplish precisely that-granting civil rights protections to all men ( especially blacks, then still de facto slaves, despite the 13A.) — Reshuffle

My posts on this thread are meant to understand perspectives on the evolution of our state. I respect the principles of federalism in as much as a tendency towards a monolithic state with increasing power vested at the center lacks a certain 'ethical efficiency', measured as how the set of obligations and prohibitions map to the customs and standards of the region and group of people under its jurisdiction.

Federalism, from this perspective and as an ideal, respects standards and customs distinct to regions and groups of people (states) and is reflected by variance within constitution and law. As an additional benefit, the avoidance of a monolithic governance structure insulates against political 'disease' analogously to genetic variation protecting against blight in trees.

I don't intend to demean your passion on the topic. For me, however, I limit my topics of inquiry on this forum to those that I can consider dispassionately. I prefer not to raise my objections over things like Kelo v. New London as that is recent and, for me, is as much visceral as cerebral. I'm trying to consider the philosophy of the matter more than the politics of it. Treating the changes we experience as the moving of tectonic plates.

Perhaps this is the natural evolution of governance, a hierarchy tending to the concentration of power at its center, rather than its distribution to the nodes. — JosephS

If we look at the trend of our governance over centuries, where is it leading?

Within our federal government, it appears the judiciary absorbs power as the legislative diminishes. The judiciary, however, sees Originalism gaining ascendancy. In as much as originalism, as opposed to a living constitution, ostensibly binds the court more narrowly to the text, it can be perceived as a smaller and shallower ripple countervailing the ascendant power of the courts.

Do we see any larger waves on the horizon or is the cementing of federal power better perceived as a one-way crystallization of hierarchy -- a sedimentary, unyielding compression?

Thank you for your references to John Bingham. I will look up his name.

That’s akin to holocaust denial, like denying that the founding fathers were slave holders. You don’t have to buy it. It’s a fact. — Noah Te Stroete

I disagree.

I can't see this conversation leading anywhere useful.

An article arguing for the repeal of the 17th here.

I don't take the premise cited (in the article) for the ratification of the 17th Amendment on faith any more than I buy the argument of those opposed to the EC that it was the tool of slave holders. Finding (via Google searches) historians that share evidence without regard for an agenda is not a trivial thing.

My apologies for making the question opaque.

I appreciate federalism for a certain liberty (allowing each state to vary its obligations and prohibitions to the interests of its citizens) but also for the experimental component (50 'petri dishes' to suss out a more effective solution to governance).

There seems to be a trend away from federalism in this country. The Incorporation of the Bill of Rights is perhaps the more obvious of my two examples. The 17th Amendment, to my mind, also erodes the premise of the state as a sovereign territory. Prior to learning of the history of the 17th Amendment and how Senators used to be elected, it did seem to curious to me that we had two houses, whose members were both elected directly by the People.

My question was along the lines of whether a movement to repeal the 17th Amendment has ever gained any momentum. My suspicion is that the structure that existed prior to the 17th can never be regenerated, if only because the direct election represents a power that the People will never give up.

Perhaps this is the natural evolution of governance, a hierarchy tending to the concentration of power at its center, rather than its distribution to the nodes.

Time for you to start posting your sources. — tim wood

Tim,

I appreciate your input on this thread.

A question for you if you have insight on the topic. The 17th Amendment gave us popular vote for the US Senate. Like the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, via the 14th Amendment, binding states, it appears to me that the 17th reflects an erosion of federalism. Is there any evidence of any countervailing force? Do you see any evidence of a counter to this trend?

Ridicule is a natural human response to those things perceived as absurd. That I won't (or at least I try really hard not to) can't be considered a constraint on others. Ridicule (as opposed to threat) should be expected by anyone who would publicly present themselves on topics philosophical, spiritual or political.

I don't hold an opinion about Deepak Chopra and his reflections on quantum mechanics. I do, however, find value when a scientist who I've read and value responds to the claims of a Chopra or a Penrose (this is not in any way to say I find any commonality between the two -- only that I'm aware of attacks on Penrose's thoughts on quantum effects relation to consciousness).

It is a means for a layman to prioritize how much of our limited time is spent reading an author.

For the current discussion, I find your comments and those of @Janus in agreement with those of mine, but I'm open to splicing the space of the conversation to give @S a region where I can at least understand (while not sharing) his perspective.

Is there any means to find common ground in this forum's dispute by distinguishing between those characteristics of the divine that might overlap with something, at least in theory, testable, with those things outside of science's reach. Say, for example:

Historical claims, examples:
- virgin birth
- 2 of every species aboard a ship

Non-historical claims:
- Individual judgment upon death
- God as author of directive to be good to others
- God as first cause

Neither the former not the latter should insulate those who hold them from ridicule, but if we're talking about the tool of ridicule, the former provides a more expansive tool chest. The latter doesn't insulate one from ridicule but simply that those who would ridicule it might accept that its profile provides a smaller exposure to attack.

I have no intention of attacking anyone's icons, but consider the current dispute one might be sharpened and refined by considering the nature of the dispute.

http://daviddfriedman.com/The_Machinery_of_Freedom_.pdf

For more detailed discussions of property rights and how they are generated and allocated, especially in relation to criminality, the best treatment is Rothbard's:

https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty_0.pdf — Virgo Avalytikh

Thank you for this. You'd mentioned these two authors in a previous thread and I put them on my reading list. Having them available via pdf is preferable to having to go to Amazon.

Thanks. I'm just a data analyst with an interest in philosophy.

Just something that I've mulled over a few times in my head without any validation one way or another.

Wasn't sure if there was a confounding epistemological principle that I had missed.

Basically, that to believe X pre-supposes:
- the capability to hold a concept
- the ability to parse the concept X
- the consideration of the parsed concept

A couple of corollaries, if you will, to this are:
- A rock is not an atheist as it is not capable of conceptualization
- A newborn is neither theist, atheist, nor agnostic as these all require the conceptualization of the proposition that 'there exist(s) a god(s)'

Or have I taken it too far?

Your language skills are rather poor, Janus. "I neither believe nor disbelieve" excludes both. Both can't be excluded. If you exlcue "I believe" then you necessarily don't believe. If you exlcude "I don't believe" then you necessarily believe. You exclude both. You are really just mincing words now, because you are cornered, and you can't fight your way out of your stated self-contradiction. — god must be atheist

The example I'm considering is the proposition "There is currently a man wearing a hat standing at 10th and 1st in New York City".

Is it not possible to neither believe nor disbelieve this proposition? Which is to say that it I've parsed it and contemplated it, but don't adhere to the truth or falsity of the proposition. I am agnostic on the proposition.

I'm with @Noah Te Stroete (I think) in that in withholding my judgment on this proposition I can neither be accused of believing nor of disbelieving it.

I seriously have to explain to you what science is a standard for?! Hard pass. — DingoJones

Not a surprise, then, that you the find the topic "simple".

Again, this subjective experience you reference multiple times — DingoJones

But they are not all subjective in the same way. Trying to find the contours of your standard.

I have this inkling that some astronomers believed in the existence of extra-solar planets in 1980. I don't really have an issue considering that a scientific belief, even though evidence for it was not yet accepted.

I cannot believe I exhibit subjective self awareness? This is the most basic, singular certainty anyone can have, it has zero need of the scientific method. Terrible example for you to use here. — DingoJones

But can you demonstrate it? What objective evidence can you present that you are self-aware?

Also you keep on talking about rights but say nothing about obligations. — Be Kind

The whole topic is premised on an obligation that I referenced in my the first post.

What is my duty to the individual and how does my duty impact how we deal with that person when they are an adult? To say they can vote for change does not provide much solace to somehow who has an unpopular, but deeply held, conviction on how they want to order their life -- and their objection that they didn't agree to put this conviction up to a popular vote cannot be easily dismissed. — JosephS

I wouldn't contend that fair is equivalent to reasonable in all contexts. Fair is closer to equitable. I'm more of the mind, vis-a-vis this topic, that exacting fairness to the individual, assuming we can come up with some standard, may not be reasonable to implement.

In any event, this was more a thought experiment on a topic that was raised for me some time ago. I meant it as a straw dog to knock down. I'm content that that was achieved to my satisfaction.

If science is your standard, you cannot believe in god — DingoJones

I don't know what you intend by having science as a standard (a standard for what).

Perhaps you can help delineate it in the following way.
Which, if any, of the following are compatible with your stance

If science is your standard
- you cannot believe that you exhibit subjective self-awareness
- you cannot believe that extra-terrestrial intelligence exists
- you cannot believe that blue is a nice color
- you cannot believe that you love your child

In comparing it to a chess game, as @Anthony does, a concern arises that we may be heading towards a local maxima (using some metric or analog to progress), that nevertheless ends in overall failure (extinction).

This happens in chess when you accept a gambit from your opponent that leads to a lost position.

Is an assessment of "progress" forever contingent?

Forgoing the subjective vs. objective angle, our look-a-head is forever limited.
Perhaps this was already included in the last sentence of the post from @Anthony

Necessity

But how do you get that agreement? If I didn't agree to allow others to take action against me just in case I rape someone, what do we do? You're saying that absent my agreement to let others take action against me, you'd prohibit that action against me. — Terrapin Station

Taken as a first premise, that minimal constraint involves not interfering when an agreement exists. In absence of an agreement, all force necessary to mitigate the violation of rights is permissible.

So, yes, applying a universal precept, A may take action against B to stop or prevent B from acting against C. That B took action against C without agreement is basis for A's action. There's a circularity that needs to accounted for. If B is acting against C because C took action against D (without agreement), then A may not take action against B.

This doesn't pretend to deal with edge cases, such as if B's actions against C (to stop action against D) are excessive. Who defines excessive? But, again, the counter would be that we have international treaties that have been used to manage these sorts of situations. In looking at how we deal with international issues, diplomacy and action are as much about politics as principle.

That might be an objection in and of itself. That within the confines of legal code, we obtain consistency in rules whereas having, for n different independent interacting parties, (n/2)*(n-1) sets of rules [and this only for looking at parties pair-wise], is unworkable not just in practice, but in principle.

That can't work for similar reasons. If we have 100 people and they find 100 different things fair, what do we do? You can't have a functioning, interactive society if each person is effectively their own country and there's no overarching "international" law. If Country Joe thinks it's fair to rape Country Jane, but Country Jane doesn't think that's fair, what do we do? — Terrapin Station

3. Rules that one person may find fair another person might not find fair.
4. A person has a right to live under the set of rules that they find fair.
5. Since rules of governance are rules between people, that right is a right of negotiation. — JosephS

I don't disagree that it's fundamentally unworkable. As to your objections, though, if I were arguing against you I might mention that we already have international treaties and if country A attacks country B force by other countries is an option to bring country A in line.

The underlying premise (it's not anarchy) is that absent agreement, action taken by one individual against another is de facto prohibited. The threat of force by other members of the community of individuals is what prevents Joe from doing what he will to Jane.

Thank you. While I was under the impression there was a position among some of our Founding Fathers that the Constitution ought to be re-ratified every 20 years, I had never read this particular letter.

Interesting stuff:

The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have been started either on this or our side of[1] the water. Yet it is a question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental principles of every government. The course of reflection in which we are immersed here on the elementary principles of society has presented this question to my mind; and that no such obligation can be so transmitted I think very capable of proof. — Thomas Jefferson

In reading the letter, I'm unclear as to how it succeeds in what it aims -- "that no such obligation can be so transmitted I think very capable of proof"

1. What is your definition for fairness. And why it is only narrowly applied in this argument?
2. What do you think is the objective of a nation/country/government ?
3. Your conclusion was that a man should not just be able to create his own nation but should also get a land to do that? How did you get there from the fact that he should be able to negotiate the rules he wish to follow? I'm trying to think of some suppressed premises that will make this argument reasonable but I can't think of any. — Be Kind

1. A human is born with a citizenship.
2. A citizen has a set of rules he need to follow
3. Rules that one person may find fair another person might not find fair.
4. A person has a right to live under the set of rules that they find fair.
5. Since rules of governance are rules between people, that right is a right of negotiation.
6. It is unethical to force someone to live under rules that they did not have an opportunity to negotiate.
Therefore, it is unethical to not give a person (adult) an opportunity to create a sovereign territory and negotiate rules of governance with bordering territories. — JosephS

1. With respect to your question about fairness, my response is that fairness is essentially subjective (see point 3 above). I'm not sure by what you mean by "narrowly applied". The larger point is to respect others' subjective application of fairness to the extent that they are granted an opportunity to negotiate how they will interact with others (governance).
2. I've always thought the preamble to the Constitution provided a good, if wordy, summary of why our government exists (ideally):
- a union of people with common interest
- to provide for a common defense
- to promote the general welfare
- to defend the liberty of those individuals within its jurisdiction
To answer your question, however, (any) government's objective could be many other things - for one, to control and exert power over people to serve the interests of a few. At the most abstract, government organizes people and controls territory.
3. The conclusion reflects an ideal in much the same way that just governance derives from and is a grant from the People. As to that ideal, I may well object and say, "Baloney. Power (including government authority) is and always has been the exercise of a few over the many. Classical liberal ideals are a paean to some heretofore unwitnessed reality, a fantasy used to mollify the sheep to their betters." The position put forward reflects a norm on how people ought to act towards one another.

Looking to Locke and others who wrote around the period of the founding of the US, we find a whole host of ideals bandied about that were leveraged by the people that wrote the US Constitution.

Those ideals include a general freedom of individuals from restraint. This freedom isn't categorical. Your free action is often my harm. The ideals and the contours of the rights and legitimate restraints found their way into our common document of governance.

Echoes of the extension of those ideals can be found in Virginia Wolfe -- "A Room of One's Own"

We are already granted a limited right to negotiate the rules we are to follow. We must persuade many to change rules. What I discuss here is expanding that grant to its logical extent and the barriers to it. The most obvious of those barriers is providing someone land that they may separate from our country violates the territorial integrity of our country. The will to permit it flies against thousands of years of human development. Territorial separation in human history is the subject of war, not of peace.

So, yes, it's absurd. But does it make any sense to the general concern that I didn't agree to the rules found within the Constitution? Therefore, binding me to it is wrong. I imagine an argument, not mine, that the next wave is not one of constituting government, of collecting people to a common form of control, but of letting them go, of freeing them to their own sphere of influence.

My response to this is "sounds hokey. you don't always get what you want". Is there a better response?

1. A human is born with a citizenship.
2. A citizen has a set of rules he need to follow
3. Every person have to have the right to chose their own set of rules they want to follow
4. Not having the right to chose the set of rules you want follow is unethical.
Therefore is unethical to get a citizenship at birth? — Be Kind

Let me modify that slightly. Just as a point of clarification, governance only applies when we talk about more than one person. If I'm on the Earth all by myself, governance doesn't make sense. So whether it about the relationship between citizens and their government or between governments, governance deals with interpersonal (or intergovernmental) questions.

When we talk about rules it can be the rules that the government establishes for a citizen or the rules that governments establish as part of their interaction with other governments. For instance, treaties involve rules between governments.

1. A human is born with a citizenship.
2. A citizen has a set of rules he need to follow
3. Rules that one person may find fair another person might not find fair.
4. A person has a right to live under the set of rules that they find fair.
5. Since rules of governance are rules between people, that right is a right of negotiation.
6. It is unethical to force someone to live under rules that they did not have an opportunity to negotiate.
Therefore, it is unethical to not give a person (adult) an opportunity to create a sovereign territory and negotiate rules of governance with bordering territories.

Assume for the time being that 'negotiation' means what it says and that both parties come ready to treat the other equitably and are motivated to come to an accord. What other issues exist here?

What software do you use to create your videos? That must take quite some time. The voice-over is relaxing :-)

If we limit ourselves to a sample of 10 instances, in 8 cases the credible witness's testimony would align with ground truth (in a justifiable way, say, by witnessing the car) - "John's car is brown".

Of the remaining 2, half would mistakenly associate a green car and the other a brown car. In 9 instances the witness would claim "John's car is brown", one of which would be "fortunate".

floccinaucinihilipilification (meaning/value, what's the difference)

I like to entertain the idea that if dark energy consigns this universe to an ever increasing, ever diluted space that at some point, after trillions upon trillions of years, after planets and molecules have been ripped apart, that the universe will pass some critical density threshold where actuality will pass into potentiality. It will drift out of time and pass, as it were, into legend. The universe will no longer exist.

Just a figment of my imagination, but it makes me content to consider it.

[In retrospect this whole line of thinking is flawed]

Let me ask you if this isn't an alternative formulation of your replacement of JTB with JB.

If I consider you a credible witness and you tell me John's car is brown because you saw a brown car parked in his driveway but it turns out that was his sister's car but John's car really is brown - Do I know John's car is brown? — T Clark

Assign a factor to the epistemological reliability of your credible witness? God's validated word is 1.0, your credible witness is given a prior of .8. The contention then is that your state of knowledge of this fact is, itself, approx. .8.

Knowledge doesn't mean anything except in the context of a necessary decision. — T Clark

In as much as the meaning of knowledge derives from our ability to model and predict the world based on the accuracy of propositions derived from knowledge, knowledge is a measure of the correlation between claims and reality.

John's car is indeed brown and in some other world, his sister's is green. Your knowledge that "John's car is green" remains at .8 until additional information modifies your repository of knowledge or the credibility of the proposition. Truth is correlative of the combined reliability factors involved in a proposition.

Explanatory issues such as those in your first example, while confounding to a discrete model of knowledge, are expressed as true positives in a continuous model while integrating uncertainty in justification. We can actually calculate how many of those true positives are "fortunate" (true, but only by chance). If we know cars only come in green and brown (equally likely), there is a 10% chance (1-.8)*.5 that the match to truth is "fortunate".

Isn't a continuous model of knowledge more intuitive to our understanding of how we know?
When I think I know something (but am not sure) I will hedge my bet or say "Yeah...maybe".

An idea that I'm throwing out here as a possible resolution to claim 1, below.

Strikes me as even less reasonable after I applied a little more formatting to my thoughts at the request of @Be Kind

More than anything, I'd like to know if there is a practical response to claim 1.

Assumptions:
No governance model is ideal for all contexts and for all persons
A liberal/libertarian commitment to minimal constraint to the individual in how they govern themselves.
An individual right of association in how contracts between parties are negotiated.

Claims:
1. Individuals born to a model of governance that they did not accede to are unethically imposed upon by the expectations of the jurisdictional authority (e.g. taxation, popular representation, conscription)
2. Popular representation is insufficient to resolve concerns that deeply held convictions are at the mercy of a majoritarian decision whose authoritative justification has not been accepted by the individual
3. Freedom of emigration is insufficient to resolve the ethical concerns of (1) due to constraints over immigration, naturalization and governance model selection
4. Our ethical duty to one another implies elimination of unnecessary constraints over self-governance
5. Claims 1, 2, 3 and 4 may be responded to by supporting independence of adults from the prevailing jurisdiction
5a. In cases where independence is claimed, negotiation between the independent party and the surrounding jurisdictions determines obligations in action (follow the law) and contracts (pay for utilities, education, law enforcement)
5b. Unless territory in some fashion figures with independence, being an independent individual will mean little as there will be no jurisdiction to distinguish legal authority (with the possible exception of laws regarding bodily autonomy). This territory could be property/land owned prior to independence. However, as many 18-year-olds don't have property or land, independence will not mean much.

Lots of problems are peeking out at me:
In 5a there is an expectation that the independent party follow the law of the surrounding jurisdiction which is effectively the same obligation as the citizen, but without representation. I suppose you can be secure in your home, but it doesn't help when you need to go to work or to the store. It's little solace that you are able to negotiate the terms of the agreement when the other party has all the power. You still have to conform to the laws borne of a governance model you didn't agree to. It is only those who are able to negotiate in number that may resolve the imbalance.

The flip-side of this is that since we are dealing with little fiefdoms with their own rules, a group of independent territories that are group-wise contiguous could match their laws to their interests and choose to avoid the surrounding jurisdiction. The federalist ideal of '50 petri dishes' finds an even more granular application of this principle as mutating blobs of legal conformity merge and divide at scales below that of even a county or township.

Dealing with a bad neighbor would be a nightmare. How does one deal with a sovereign state that turns his stereo up to 11? If that sovereign state is suitably independent (they or friendly neighbors have all the resources they need), what lever is available to deal with anti-social behavior?

How does an individual physically travelling this web of territories manage the legal risks?

As a civilized society we don't let people die on the street due to lack of food, shelter or medical attention. How does a social safety net even apply among sovereign states?

Equal protection, due process and anti-discrimination are just a few principles that might be shed by the superseding principle of a right of association and contracts that don't conform.

The examples of Jim Jones and Rwanda suggests a need for an overarching treaty around human rights. This seems to violate the very premise on which this whole scheme was conceived if it does not support an opt out by the independent individual.

Isn't this really just a more cumbersome and less efficient means of arriving at what we currently have, with all of the negatives and a whole host of additional complication?

I'll give it a go. Give me a bit.

Divorce.

Christian divorce, in the sense of the Roman Catholic Church.

1. Marriage is a sanctity, and it ought to last until the death of at least one of the two partners.
2. Except when the pope approves annulment.
3. and Except when there is no consummation of marriage.
4. Except annulment can't be obtained for many otherwise reasonable causes (such as incompatibility).
5. Except when annulment can't be obtained despite a great wish for it, the couple can divorce in civil court and potentially live in sin with a different partner (or with bunch of different partners, in sequence or concurrently with many)
6. Except living in sin is an unforgivable sin,with grave consequences in the afterlife.
7. Except when one does not mind selling his soul to the devil. for him to take the seller's soul captive for all eternity.
8. Except in the case when the Lord, the Devil, Hell, etc. don't exist at all. — god must be atheist

I missed your reply to this thread as I was travelling.

I'm trying to interpret this in the way I've been thinking about it as nested reversals.

Outside of 1 (0) is:
X is permitted to marry

I interpret 1 as:
X is prohibited divorce

2 as:
X is permitted divorce in cases of annulment (no children, false commitment, ...)

3 as (I'm struggling here):
X is prohibited divorce in cases of annulment where there is consummation of marriage.
I'm struggling because I would think that this would also be excluded from 2.
"cases of annulment where there is consummation of marriage" seems contradictory.

If I look at it as a venn, the set of acts (3) is disjoint from the set of acts (2).

I'm trying to understand 2 as potential causes for annulment where 3 would be a disqualifying act.

And then 4 talks about prohibition:
"4. Except annulment can't be obtained for many otherwise reasonable causes (such as incompatibility)."

An alternative analysis is that 2 and 3 are intended not as nested but as joint condition for permission (one shell rather than 2). Now 4 (which is this analysis 3) is a prohibition, as expected.

I'm going to stop there rather than deal in potential interpretation you didn't intend.

If I'm missing something or am not applying the rules of the game fairly, let me know.

I have learned something in the intervening day and that is that I initially misinterpreted your use of the word 'mystery'. I found your claim that consciousness wasn't mysterious a facile expression.

What I gather now is that your use of the term is rather more nuanced that mine. I don't accede to the contours that you (or Alan Watts) would give it, but I respect that you've considered what is and is not a 'mystery' longer than I have.

I will continue to use the term in the way I have and will continue to group the nature of consciousness into things mysterious, but will look into how Alan Watts would have us use it.

Anyway, never mind. We seem to have taken this as far as we can. — T Clark

I agree.

It's not just word play. It has significant consequences. If you call something a mystery, you treat it differently than if it were just unknown. I think it was Alan Watts who said that what we call mysteries are parts of ourselves that we're not aware of. That makes a lot of sense to me. If you want to mix your personal mysteries in with science and philosophy, that's fine, but it undermines the credibility of your argument. — T Clark

I disagree.

We have an idea of various animals that might have it. Again, it's unknown, not mysterious.
— T Clark
I can live with unknown as the adjective. — Coben

Indeed. Any further argument devolves into dictionaries and word play -- boring.

Imbued within the word 'mystery' is some sense of wonder which I accept as personal.
If someone can live without mysteries, more power to them. I choose not to.

Thank you for this perspective. I have not read Rovelli. I will look him up.

I find I can best describe it as the interaction of potentiality. — Possibility

I very much like this response, perhaps because it appeals to me intellectually.

Are there any authors that you would recommend that have put meat on the bones of this? I'm talking about something accessible to a non-researcher.

Science is full of subjects that are under study but which are not fully understood. Consciousness is one of those. It's not a "mystery," it's a subject that requires further study. I think an understanding of consciousness seems to be much more important than it really is because it is so close to home for all of us. It is right at the heart of how we see ourselves. Things that are about us seem more significant. We want to believe our innermost, intimate experiences are mysterious. — T Clark

Subjects of inquiry are mysteries to a greater or lesser extent (dark matter is both a mystery and an inquiry requiring further study) and, as the dominant species on the planet, what humans consider mysteries bears disproportionate weight to the judgment (dogs have neither science nor philosophy to provide their input).

And it is a mystery because, as opposed to -- gravity, economics, sociology or psychology -- our self awareness resists an explanatory reduction. 10th graders can talk about the inverse square law of attraction, the law of supply and demand and how racism arises from human tribalism. Could any explain consciousness short of reflecting on the brain as its seat and its role in our sense of individual identity?

It's not as if we haven't been studying it for a while. That this inquiry is so significant to our individual identity supports rather than undermines its status as a great mystery.

Is there an architecture that can be pointed to that, when instantiated, ticks off the boxes of what we consider conscious at a human level of awareness? When we can explain what is and is not self aware, we will have made progress to resolving the mystery.

The nature of consciousness is a scientific question - a matter of fact. People are working on it and have had success. Consciousness is no great mystery.
Morality is a matter of human value and preference. No amount of study will come up with a definitive statement.
As for God, I think that's a funny mixture of both fact and metaphysics.
I guess ditto for the afterlife. — T Clark

Consciousness is no great mystery?

I'm trying to interpret this in a way which is not grossly misspoken.

I understand that there have been efforts to de-emphasize the nature of consciousness (qualia), suggesting that it is illusory. I am not a researcher in the field but have an abiding interest in the topic and looking to my personal library have books I own and read (pop science all) from Dennett, Ramachandran, Pinker, Churchland, Tononi, LeDoux and Penrose. Now, as a layman, I find it very hard to swallow that all of these words (and so many more) have been written regarding a topic which is 'no great mystery'.

Is there a means to interpret your glib reflection on the topic that would jibe with my experience that it is one of, if not the, central mysteries of human existence?

I have objections to your other mentions in my quote, but want to understand the context of your first claim. I'm wondering if there has been some breakthrough that I'm unaware of or if there is a context for your statement that makes my appreciation and yours mutually compatible.