This is where your ideas run into some problems. With cognitive dissonance, we know that people do not like conflicting ideas and seek to somehow resolve internal mental conflicts. However, the odd thing is that people take the path of least psychological resistence, which is why cognitive dissonance is associated with people in cult-like environments clearly ignoring obvious facts that falsify their beliefs.

As such, if theism and atheism were purely about emotional reasons, you should not encounter a lot of atheists who said the once believed in a god but really wish their god exists. For example, the gay person who believes theism faces a conflict:

1) I like God, and wish to continue following God.

2) I am gay and wish to have romantic relationships.

3) God condemns being actively gay.

One of these beliefs has to go in order to eliminate cognitive dissonance. The least intrusive one is eliminating 3). There is nothing in theism that states being gay is wrong; this is just an aspect of major religions, but this can be dismissed much in the same way the treatment of gender can be dismissed, and no one has to follow these religions to be a theist. The person gets all the spiritual benefits and can express their romantic and sexual desires.

This, of course, does happen, but it is not as prevenlant as you would need in order to reduce the question of theism to pure desire and emotion. Again, the reasons for any belief are much more complex and vary from person to person. We can talk about mechanisms that people share and reasons people give, but saying, "The belief in proposition x is explained fully by reason y," is faulty.

To add onto further remarks relating to the topic at hand:

The desire for some type of god concept requires that we put some value into it. In order for us to desire the good, the good has to be desirable. I was reading Bertrand Russell a few days ago and, while discussing relationships and love, described the following scenario:

You are on a boat near the coast during a sunny day. You appreciate the beauty of the coast and enjoy the pleasure you derive out of the view. As such, you desire the coast. This is one part of love. However, if the boat hits the rock in rough waters and you find yourself in the ocean, your desire for the coast becomes something different. The coast now becomes an object of desire of an entirely different nature: safety. The previous desire and appreciation for the coast is now entirely gone, now only concerned with what the coast can offer us: relief from fear and the knowledge of safety.

When we desire certain things, like a friend or a partner, we can desire both of these aspects (practically all relationships have them), but the one built primarily on safety seems problematic. Imagine that I have no friends and I desire a friend. The question to ask is: when I am looking for a friend, am I searching for someone to "protect" (validate) me or am I finding someone whose personality and company I enjoy? In other words, do I actually want a friend, a unique individual whom I relate to, or do I want someone to entertain me, comfort me whenever I feel down, and effectively serve as an echo chamber for my thoughts and ideas?

I turn this notion to God. Do I want God to exist? I do not know. On one hand, I want certain things that a god concept traditionally offers (of course, logically speaking, most of these things do not automatically follow from the philosophical conception of the classical theistic god, but that is beside the point). So, in a sense, I want God to exist. But do I really want God to exist, or I am I just projecting a being that serves my desires? Immortality? Inner peace? Purpose on a cosmic scale? Alleviation of guilt? The notion that everything will turn out alright in the end, no matter how bad it gets? A permanent and always present being who is always there so I am never alone? I get all of this and more from theism. This is nice, but perhaps too nice- nice in the way it would be nice if everyone loved me, entertained me, knew how great I was, and had their lives revolve around my own. It is the desire to be coddled. While there is nothing inherently wrong with this desire and being coddled from time to time is probably important to us, being coddled constantly seems off to me.

I will say this: you will probably not find a way to fully eliminate Cartesian levels of skepticism. There will always be room for doubt. The question is whether we need to have no room for doubt in order to claim knowledge.

And yet they ignore this perfectly reasonable option and become theists and atheists. What is the cause of this? Are theists a cowardly bunch afraid of death or are they idealistic dreamers with a poor grasp on reality? Are atheists fiercely independent thinkers or do they hate what god has to say about their, say, sexual preferences?

What is the root cause of atheism/theism? — TheMadFool

First, I never said that the only rational option was to embrace agnosticism. There are different positions within peer disagreement, and only some of the stronger conciliatory views (when faced with peer disagreement, the correction option is to suspend judgement or somehow meet in the middle, so to speak) require us to abandon our beliefs. Everyone has a different life, and from the viewpoint of specific person, it may be epistemically justified to hold a position. People can be justified in believing false ideas, depending on their circumstances. Even when it comes to equal peers who have studied the issue, there is one notion to keep in mind: good epistemic reasons may not be convincing epistemic reasons. Telling the conspiracy theorist who thinks the world is run by space lizards that their ideas have no good evidence behind them will probably not convince the person, but the criticism is still valid. People, even the best of us, make mistakes in their judgement. As such, there may be situations where one peer is right and knows the opposing peer is in error, but the evidence against the opposing peer will not convince them. Telling a person that their argument for or against the existence of a particular god is based more in psychological and emotional appeal, and not so much in logic, evidence, and reason, will probably not be very convincing to the person, even if that person is highly intelligent and otherwise might be good at philosophy.

Second, you are effectively asking the question: "why do certain people believe what they believe?" We would be broadbrushing atheists and theists if we said their reasons for belief were x,y, and z. People hold various beliefs for a variety of reasons. The reasoning of one theist can be vastly different from another theist. One atheist may put stock into the problem of evil, while another atheist thinks the problem of evil is not a problem at all, but thinks of god concepts as being empty and without actual support. Some might believe on purely psychological reasons, while others may have arguments that have convinced them to believe their position. To me, the question is like asking: why do some people support Republican policies while others support Democratic policies? The reasons are so varied that the answer is: the same reasons people believe a bunch of different things.

First, the pragmatic perspective: whether you like it or not, practically all of our knowledge is fallible. You can either a) curl up in a ball and do nothing, or b) accept this and place your epistemology on pragmatic grounds.

Second, the whole "certainty is a necessary condition for knowledge" thing is highly questionable. I suggest looking into actual epistemologists and what they have had to say.

I have heard this before. I think a way of looking at it is that where Christian fundamentalists and the like failed to overcome their moderate Christian contemporaries and secular thinkers in Europe, the Muslim fundamentalists succeeded.

Obvisouly theism and atheism can't be explained in terms of rationality. It's like two people put in the exact same environment (our world) and one sees God and the other doesn't. Clearly the fault is not in logic. I want to know if perhaps desire has a role in this. — TheMadFool

While I understand and sympathize with your viewpoint of two people disagreeing about a given topic is odd (one of my interests is the philosophy of peer disagreement), two people disagreeing, in and of itself, is not a problem. Think of the number of conspiracy theories, science denialism, and other positions that are clearly false. People who are otherwise rational and capable believe these things. You can be talking with someone who appears completely rational and who has track record of giving out good advice and judgement, and suddenly it turns out that they believe vaccines cause autism and such. Just because there are people who believe the world is run by the Illuminati or space lizards does not mean the positions on those topics are without logic, or that the positions are of equal epistemic value. Disagreement is par for the course.

As I said, religion is like politics: it is a deeply pervasive aspect of our reality and most people's lives. Because people have a lot of investment into their position, beliefs related to religion are they most prone to psychological barriers. Most people do not actually look into the subject with any intellectual rigor or even attempt to make an effort to question their ideas beyond the most basic and bare way, the intellectual equivalent of Google's old "I'm feeling lucky" button. Furthermore, both sides have reasons to doubt the other. Within the Christian perspective, there are Bible verses that indicate that people who deny God after understanding the topic are lying to themselves. I am sure you can find similiar passages in the Quran. On the flip side, some theists indicate that their faith takes precedence over reason; that when a philosophical line of thought conflicts with their already held positions, the line of thought must be in error.

Even if there is valid peer (two equals with the same evidence and capabilities) disagreement and we assume that it is not rationally possible to have one peer be justified while his disagreeing equal is wrong, the correct response would be for both sides to suspend judgement. In other words, if the theist-atheist divide cannot be resolved by known and valid epistemic means, the correct response is agnosticism on all parties involved.

There's something about God that impels us to abandon our rationality - it becomes an exception to the rule of evidence based worldviews. — TheMadFool

That is debatable, especially the more specific and complex the particular conception of god that is being used. Theists may have evidence and reasons to back them up, and their opponents will have reasons to back their position up. Certain god concepts are just less likely to be true than others because they are less coherent, conflict with reality, and have no supporting evidence. Some god concepts are actually much better than others. The issue of "conclusion" in regards to god concepts is twofold: one, we cannot even agree what "God" is, and two, we are talking about a being who draws criticism by being so incomprehensible that is next to impossible even discuss in any meaningful way.

The reason that most people get irrational when discussing god concepts and related topics is that the parties involved have a lot of psychological baggage and investment into the subject. People who are ignostic, apathetic to the discussion, or possess a conception of god that really has no impact on their lives really do not really participate that much beyond fleeting curiosity. Most theists have belief systems that go beyond just the philosophical notion of the god of classical theism; people's whose entire lives are built around a particular god. Atheists (at least the ones who are active in the discussion) are usually ex-theists or people who have to deal with theists regularly: they have made specific life claims relating to certain gods, often in direct contest to their ex-god. As such, we have a recipe for a lot of angry and shouting people. The only thing that even compares is possibly politics. Though, I'm sure that some people have philosophical topics that they love or hate just as much as some people love or hate the philosophy of religion.

What do you mean by "God"?

The only thing that I can imagine is the Trump HQ is supposed to be the GOP website or maybe the email subscription people signed up for during the election campaign on his campaign website. This seems odd because it is pretty brazen. I can easily imagine some third party supporter doing this. Until specifics are given on who this is supposed to be by, there is no way to verify its authenticity.

It is not really about political ideology, it is about political methodology. The method being used not really that complex. The survey is not really a survey about gathering attitudes towards President Trump and his policies among Republicans who subscribed to the GOP newsletter. The "survey" might as well as been a "show your support button," because that is what it is. The choice is obviously a false one and the "survey" is designed to be that way. The political methodology is not gaining information, but reinforcing and garnering support. The fervent supporter gets reminded of Donald Trump, how they like him, and how foolish (in the person's view) the opposition is while getting to participate and voluntarily reinforce their beliefs. The second "option" also serves the purpose of eliminating doubt. If you are a Republican who does not really support Trump or are a Trump supporter who is questioning his actions or some of his policies (i.e. a sizable portion of Republicans), the false choice is meant to create an "us versus them" mentality. Either you are with us (Donald Trump and his closest allies) or you are with them (Democrats and their lies). By seeing the choice, doubters are reminded of the thing they probably dislike more than Trump: the opposition. Thus, they are more likely to assent to Donald Trump because even if they do not like him, at least he is not like the Democrats.

There is nothing about the methodology described above that prevents its use by any political, religious, or social ideology. I can easily imagine the Democratic party (or any left-leaning organization) doing the same thing with the choices: either "I stand with the Democratic party" or "I believe fascist Republicans and Faux News." The reason why I do not consider the question "fascist" is because it is not explicitly argue for any of the major hallmarks of fascism or even for some of its warning signs. It is not trying to stoke nationalism or trying to argue for removing checks and balances within the government. The questionnaire is just more of the same type of "survey" seen before.

I would call it strong arming doubters and using a political language usually reserved for obviously-biased news sites and political groups with an agenda and an audience that will agree with whatever you put forth. I would not call it fascism. To me, fascism is using explicit state (or party) power to silence opposition and specifically trying to reduce checks on power in order to use aforementioned power. But a politician using loaded language his clout and position to espouse rhetoric and garner up his voting base? Business as usual.

Calling it fascism is both incorrect in and, in the current political climate, pragmatically useless. Calls of fascism have a very real chance of turning people off in the same way the above "survey" will only turn off people who do not already agree with it.

Because no one has ever postulated that, maybe, humans are not free in the traditional libertarian sense of freedom, or that this type of freedom is actually irrelevant to us.

I generally do not like comparing people's intelligence as a whole, but like to compartmentalize it. Even then, it is usually just becomes "the guy I agree with more is better than the guy I do not like." For example, my intuition says Jefferson, but this is just my base perceptions of the two men. It has nothing to do with anything resembling the actual positions of the two men.

Why bother, both with philosophy and life in general?

With philosophy, I do not think that there is any headway to be made. Outside of specific arguments and the occasional viewpoint being shown to be indefensible, and formal logic, it is highly questionable whether philosophy has made any progress at all. Every single development or new way of looking at things just opens up another can of worms of arguments, counter-arguments, and further developments and new ways of looking at things. At this point, philosophy is more like a game. There is no established criteria to determine whether we are right or wrong in any topic, so we just kind of throw arguments at one another. We can't actually take action regarding most of our arguments in the real world because they lack the epistemic weight in the sphere of public opinion. This, of course, assumes we could ever get over the psychological barriers and hurdles in ourselves and others. As such, there seems to be an absurdity to it all.

Life in general seems absurd. But I think that point has been discussed and everyone knows that song and dance.

Within philosophy proper:

1. I third the notion about psuedoscience and mysticism. It is rather annoying. As an extension to that:

2. Most of the time skepticism is brought up. It is appropriate in certain conversations, but it is annoying when people use it as a conversation stopper, especially when the arguments are no longer favoring them.

3. Compatibilism within free will and moral responsibility. I openly admit that my response is probably not as rational and justified on it, but I just do not like it.

So if he knew it was good to create, why didn't he create before he did? — Thorongil

I might be assuming an incorrect theory of time, but time might be thought of as a measurement of causation and movement. If there is no movement or causation, time does not exist. Therefore, God's first act of creation would cause time to come into being. As such, there is no time before God moves and God's first "movement", so to speak, could easily have been creation or the causally and logically necessary steps in order to create our world.

If he always ever created, then, once again, in what sense is he free? — Thorongil

I am a little confused by what you are saying here, but based on my understanding of the question:

We could always say that God does not have free will like we do. I believe Kant went down this line of thought. Because God is, by the very nature of God, perfectly good, he will always do the good option. Whether this means God is somehow logically compelled to do good or always just chooses to do good because of his nature is irrelevant.

God's knowledge that Jane will buy the red car does not entail that Jane will necessarily buy the red car, such that buying the blue motorcycle instead is impossible. The latter is thus still an alternate possibility, and Jane freely chooses to buy the red car (in the libertarian sense), rather than being (deterministically) compelled to do so. — aletheist

Something seems off about this. Then again, most things regarding the existence of free will seem off to me, so what do I know.

I would say there is a third option that people in this debate rarely talk about: that it could be better had God not created us or anything at all. The framing of your question is such that it makes God create either way, it's just a matter of what he creates. Well, I don't think we can assume that. If God was free to create, why did he choose to do so? — Thorongil

I guess I can add that to the list of assumptions made by the free will defense.

Per the IEP article on "Foreknowledge and Free Will," "Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized and remedied, the problem evaporates." — aletheist

Please explain, in your own words, the modal logic and how the problem of divine foreknowledge I presented is solved.

Keep in mind that the people who write these articles are philosophers and thinkers who already have opinions on the topic. Appealing to a IEP article, I guess I can show that the evidential problem of evil escapes criticism.

But is it not true that genetic defects which would normally kill certain individuals are now becoming more present in the species as a whole as those with genetic defects are becoming able to bear children with those same defects. Even though at the moment these defects may form a minority, the number of people with genetic diseases is rising, particularly through the advent of non-uteral birth. — Javants

So long as those traits do not negatively affect chances of reproduction within a specific environment, they will not be selected against by evolutionary mechanisms. By extension, the genes and behaviors that produce those traits will not be selected against. The fact that more people have diabetes today because of medical technologies does not mean we have somehow prevented "natural" evolution, but, rather, that we have changed the environment the species lives in, thus changing which traits are positive, neutral, or negative.

Normally, knowledge does not have any metaphysical import. However, with God, this would not apply. God's omniscience is always there. The propositions God knows are not gain reflexively via observation; God simply knows all true propositions. Anything below God must adhere to the truth value of these propositions, including God's creations. God's foreknowledge does not directly cause Jane's actions like the force of gravity does. However, when God knows "At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle," it is the same as saying "At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will" is true. Because it is true, this means that when t1 roles around, Jane must buy a red car. Jane cannot do otherwise because if Jane were to buy a blue motorcycle, she would violate known and established truth that God already knows. In other words, what propositions God knows to be true must come about because of the very absolute and definitive nature of omniscience.

Which goes to the question of why God created Lucifer in the first place. — Marchesk

This is actually an issue with your argument. The theist does not need to be committed to the existence of Lucifer or believe the common tales surrounding Lucifer. You are attacking a specific subset of theists only, but not the tri-omni god of classical theism.

Is free will supposed to be something that God cannot know about in advance? That would seem to place a limit on omniscience, and God knowing or existing through all points in time. That God is subject to time like created beings are. — Marchesk

There is the issue of divine foreknowledge: Before time starts (t0), God knows all things, per omniscience. At t0, God knows the following proposition: At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will. The proposition "At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will" must be true. t1 roles around and Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will. However, did Jane actually have free will? Jane, in order to have free will, must have the ability to do otherwise; in this case, Jane must have the ability to have bought a blue motorcycle instead of a red car. But how could she have done otherwise at t1 when, at t0, God knows the outcome? "At t1, Jane buys a red car instead of a blue motorcycle using her free will" must occur because if it does not, God would be wrong, an impossibility. Because Jane must buy a red car at t1, she cannot have free will, as she cannot do otherwise.

How we should respond to this issue is debatable. Some say that it shows an inherent problem of the concept of omniscience. Some say that this issue is resolvable such that both God's foreknowledge and human freedom can be preserved. Open theists solve the issue by saying that it is impossible for God to know these facts. In other words, God cannot know what free agents will do with their free will because it is impossible for God to do this, much like it is impossible for God to create a rock so heavy God cannot lift it.

That is an interesting question. So God plays dice with free will? — Marchesk

Again, there is a lot to be discussed about this: how much God can know if God does not know free willed actions. For example, it would have to be the case that God cannot gain knowledge via deduction about free will decisions because it would result in the same issue as before. This, of course, assumes that there is not another way to resolve the problem of divine foreknowledge.

The free will defense is highly questionable for a number of reasons.

First, it rests on three key points:

1) Libertarian free will exists.

2) Libertarian free will is, in some way, a necessary condition for moral responsibility.

3) Libertarian free will and moral responsibility are always worthwhile and outweigh the negatives it produces.

All three are questionable, especially the first two points.

Second, there is always the possible world that J.L. Mackie describes: beings who, through their own free will, always choose to do good. If Mackie's world is possible and God can create this possible world, then the free will defense fails. I know the response is to say God cannot actually create this world and that it is up to the agents within the world to make it happen, but I do not see how, without claiming that God cannot have foreknowledge of the actions of free creatures, one can avoid God's ability to foresee which possible world contains no moral evil and create that world. There is an interesting discussion, one that I have never personally seen discussed, about God's responsibilities and morality if God cannot know the actions of free agents ahead of time, as God effectively would be creating the world blind.

Third, the free will defense, at best, can only explain evils caused by human agents. Free will might be able to work for the logical problem of evil in this regard, but unless you want to commit to a metaphysical reality in which every natural disaster is the result of decisions made by angelic beings, then natural evil and evils that are not the result of guilty agents creates problems.

Not to an extent. Why and how is there a continuum? Natural and unnatural are mutually exclusive categories. You are either natural or unnatural. Why should I believe otherwise, beyond just as a way of talking about separating human activity from nonhuman activity (a separation that does not actually exist)?

Why are beavers altering their environment to suit their needs natural while humans altering their environment to suit their needs unnatural? Humans produce much more complex results and mix their materials in much more novel ways, but the core principle is the same. The beaver just uses one medium to alter its environment and is more simple than a concrete dam. However, the human is much smarter than the beaver and uses its intelligence to create a vastly more complex dam.

Animals and plants create tons of things that would not exist in their absence. The atmosphere creates hundreds of things that would not exist in its absence.

I guess bird nests are unnatural, coral reefs are unnatural, and everything that atmosphere permits is also unnatural.

I believe the natural/unnatural distinction can be useful and may work in certain contexts when discussing certain topics. Evolution is not one of them: the human ability to rearrange and form matter in useful ways is probably one of our primary evolutionary advantages.

Okay, also, is the problem of evil being presented the logical one (God's existence is incompatible with evil; God and evil are like square and circle and cannot be put together) or the evidential one (evil provides such a case against God that we are justified in saying God does not exist, though we leave the possibility of God open)?

Could we define "free will"?

This sounds like someone who does not understand evolution and is also broad brushing the capabilities of everyone who does not like to wear a seat belt or wear a helmet.

1) Evolution would occur anyway, as people who refuse to wear seat belts and helmets would be selected against.

2) It takes one possible trait (prefers not to wear seat belt or helmet) and amplifies that to regard people as stupid. These people might be more "fit" for survival in every way, but this is not included in your model.

3) The natural/unnatural distinction between human societies and nature out there is false.

I do think you might have an interesting point. Your argument might work if it is further developed as a way to make some theists drop the type of counterargument you presented without further explanation on part of the theist.

However, two issues:

1) It appears, intuitively, easier to imagine how things could have been worse then better. It is very easy to create plans that involve the entire population of earth that make things horrible. It is much harder to create a plan that turns out good.

2) The skeptical theist can accept that both criticisms are valid. Remember that the problem of evil is a positive argument against the existence of God. One only needs to provide a defense against the argument. It needs to show the problem is evil argument, however formulated, is somehow invalid or unsound. The skeptical theist presenting the skeptical response probably has other reasons to believe God exists, so any potential explantion or way to get around the argument without creating problems for their beliefs are fine, including accepting the argument you presented.

I quite specifically stated the truth of the pessimist position is irrelevant of the one presenting the argument. Even if no one claimed they supported the argument, the argument would still hold ground on its own merits and would have to be dealt with as such.

When I said I argee with WhiskeyWhiskers, I was also agreeing to the notion of you playing chess with yourself. You do not deal with people's specific arguments, but use replies as a spring board to continue arguing your point.

Providing a statistic simply to provide a statistic, while acknowledging that there is no reason to ascribe the value given, is problematic and effectively is making up numbers. It's like me saying there is no way to find out the genders of forum users, so I have different categories and assign them all the same value.

A rose has its thorns and yet the blossoms are beautiful to behold. Evaluating a rose soley on the basis of its pain-inducing thorns is a morbidly constricted worldview. It ignores the other significant side of the coin viz. happiness. In rational analysis it is mandatory to understand the whole issue to have any chance of a fair and reasonable evaluation. Since pessimistic philosophies obviously fail in this deparment by unduly focussing on suffering, I consider them as irrational. — TheMadFool

Assuming pessimist philosophers have never considered pleasure in their thinking is folly.

There's a simple but effective reply to such a POV - that most people are content with what life has to offer, the clearest indication of which is the absence of mass suicides. Of course one could say that this is because people haven't given much thought to the issue and thus go on living their lives despite the immense amount of suffering. My reply to this is that it is not a lack of deliberation on the issue. If it were that then there should be a conspicuous absence of pessimists. Yet, we seem pessimistic people happily selling their philosophy to the world. As you can see, pessimistic philosophy is self-contradictory and so, is irrational. — TheMadFool

While I do think there may be something to this line of thought, I do not particularly find it a good reply.

First, regardless of the actions of pessimist philosophers, their arguments and ideas stand and fall by their own merits. Even if someone's philosophy argues that you should commit suicide, the fact that the proponent has not committed suicide is unrelated to the argument. To say it does is to commit the ad hominem fallacy; the merits of the pessimists' arguments ultimately fall on the arguments themselves, not the pessimists presenting them. This, of course, assumes all pessimist philosophers argue for suicide, which they may not.

Second, bringing the opinions and positions of the masses is not exactly good. Appealing to the masses is not a very good argument. If the vast majority of people, regardless of their qualifications or actual arguments on the subject, believe that "x is true," then it does not follow that "x is true". People may be bad at evaluating the quality of their lives or they may have an incorrect view of reality.

Survival for survival's sake is pointless. What makes survival worth it? That is the question. I also agree with much of WhiskeyWhiskers said.

Well, then that makes antinatalism irrational.

Necessary things cannot be avoided, as is the case. It then becomes irrational to think it shouldn't exist. — TheMadFool

The antinatalist thinks suffering is not necessary; we could simply cease to exist.

The entire point behind antinatalism (and pessimistic philosophy in general) is that suffering is necessary and, more importantly, it is not worth it. As pointed out, mere survival for survival's sake is pointless. We want existence to go somewhere. If there is no really worthwhile goal to go towards or something that makes the suffering worth it, then there is something there. However, the pessimist says that life is not worth it and that, at a fundemental level, nothing can change this fact. If you do not challenge this assumption, then you are not dealing with the pessimist.

You then didn't understand Littlewood's law, which arbitrarily defines miracles as one in a million and just meant to show how we should not be surprised when statistically unlikely events occur. Jesus' miracles, even if they can be assigned statistical numbers, would be so astronomically large to occur that we should not expect to see them. More importantly, we cannot assign statistically value because the occurrence of the event is entirely dependent on an all-powerful and all-knowing being who we have no reason to believe will ever create another miracle. In short, we have good reason to believe that Jesus' like miracles are not based on statistics, but careful planning by God.

Notice how we shifted from trying to validate the gambler's fallacy to defending something else entirely. I'm sure the second your interpretation of Littlewood's law is shown faulty, you will shift to some other topic or back to defending your erroneous view on fallacies.

If you shouldn't see an inordinate number of heads then it is reasonable to expect a tail to even out the outcomes.

So, it is reasonable to expect a tail to even out the outcomes — TheMadFool

This is the gambler's fallacy. You believe the 50/50 chance ratio is some magical causal power that the universe must equal out. It is not. A single coin flip is 50/50 heads or tails. Every coin flip has the same chance of being either heads or tails. Previous coin flips have no causal bearing on the outcome of the next coin flip. Therefore, if we flip a fair coin and it lands heads 100 times prior, the likelihood of the 101st coin flip landing heads or tails is still 50 percent each. The reason it seems odd to us is we believe statistically unlikely things will not happen, so the next coin flip will prevent an even less likely event from occurring (Littlewood's law and various other thought experiments explain why this is not the case).

Littlewood's law refers to the type of "miracles" of unlikely chances. It is meant to explain why things that are unlikely are not really miraculous as people think. It is not really a proof or a law per se, but more of a rule-of-thumb thought experiment to illustrate a point: when someone survives an unlikely scenario or something really wonderful occurs, these are not really special, but to be expected. We noticed the woman who survived falling while skydiving out of a plane with a defective parachute. We notice this extremely unlikely event and might call it "miraculous", but, given probability, there would eventually be a person who survives a fall at an extreme height. So, while from the perspective of the surviving individual and others around them, the event is "miraculous," the individual just happened to be the inevitable one is a million, so to speak.

Jesus' miracles are not just unlikely chances- they are things that defy the laws of nature. Their explanation is divine intervention from an all-powerful and all-knowing being. If their origin is literally naturally impossible, you could never apply statistics to the situation.

Firstly I'm happy that you more or less agree with me regarding the nature of the gambler's fallacy - that it isn't fallacious over large observational data showing biased data points. — TheMadFool

I do disagree. The gambler's fallacy is a fallacy in thought: you either committed a fallacy or you did not. If you believe that the tenth dice roll will be a six because the nine previous rolls did not have a six yet, you have committed the gambler's fallacy. If you run three three experiments with a sample size of 1000 showing with the dice is biased against rolling a six, then you are not committing any fallacy, but showing a causal connection. You are not doing anything remotely like the gambler's fallacy: making an unwarranted statement based off a belief that theoretical statistics equal out in practice, especially in the near future of a small sample size.

It's akin to saying that the straw-man fallacy is not always fallacious because, sometimes, people actually engage their opponent's arguments. The straw-man is a fallacy. You either engage in it or you do not. The fact that some people engage actual arguments does not validate the straw-man fallacy or show that it is not always fallacious; they are no longer committing a straw-man fallacy.

Simply put, your argument is nonsensical. Based off of other arguments you put forth on the site, this is just another case of you wanting a conclusion to be true and trying to dress up your justification with poor logic.

Your example of someone asking about a biased coin actually removes the gambler's fallacy. The fallacy occurs when people assume that statistics will even out in the near future or that because one thing has happened a lot, the other option must occur. The gambler's fallacy only occurs when the original set-up is fair or that there is no causal reason to create an unexpected spread. If we do a bunch of large scale tests and find that a particular coin is biased, then believing the coin is biased towards one side or the other is not fallacious; it is using experimentation and probability analysis to find a statistically significant outcome.

In other words, you commit the gambler's fallacy when, based on a small sample of an unlikely or repeated outcome, you believe the universe will equal out the probability in the immediate future. If you run multiple, largely-sized tests and find that a particular outcome keeps on occurring in a statistically significant manner, you are establishing a causal link. The only wiggle room is exactly where the line is to be drawn between small and large sample sizes, but we have statistical methods, given a particular confidence level and confidence internal, that should tell us how many samples we should need. Of course, there is always the problem of getting an incredibly unlikely occurrence of error, but there is always the possibility of error in practically all things, so bringing that up does not create problems.

Even if I accept the idea there is a large grey area between small and large sample sizes, you still might be committing the fallacy within the questionable area and are definitely doing so within the small sample size region. You are problematic in multiple areas. You assume miracles (not just statistically unlikely events, but a disruption of the natural order) actually have occurred. You commit the gambler's fallacy by saying we are due for events to happen if we assume so statistical occurrence of miracles. The entire argument you present is effectively a diversion: the line of reasoning you argue for does not even apply in the case of miracles. Even if we believe miracles have occurred, we have no reason to believe they occur again at all, especially with any frequency.

I scanned through the first link and it honestly just reads like a brief historical account of various positions throughout philosophy. I do not know what your theory is. As Hanover stated, we need something more specific.

The problem is that the bodies of those usually seen as male and the bodies of those usually seen as female are different. Men will simply have more muscle mass than women even though all athletes may be equally dedicated to their sports. Simply put, you cannot remove the separation because the genders are not equal when it comes to biology.

Regarding transgenderism in sports, I have no idea on how to handle this: I have no idea how the body interacts with hormones at various stages in development. For example, a transgendered woman who transitioned in their mid-twenties will probably have a different body than a cisgendered woman of the same age.

Why not try to help others? Look, there is nothing stopping us from living horrid lives beyond our own internal conscience and the external force others can put on us. But if the idea of living a selfish life bothers you, then do not live one.

Also, I wonder what exactly you qualify as change. Whatever it is, it requires you actually put work into it; there are very few people who are able to change things by just presenting an argument and those few have positions in academia or law that they worked hard towards. The goal is not to revolutionize the world single-handedly with nothing but the desire to see revolution- the goal is to change things.