A fair point. Would It be fair to say then that the anchor points lie in cognition and the language used to describe cognition? — Mark Dennis
I think one would have to define anchor points first(?). Similarly:
Daniel Dennett identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia.[2] According to these, qualia are:
1.ineffable ; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any means other than direct experience.
2.intrinsic ; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.
3.private ; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
4.directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale.
Were certain Qualia of Kants mind doomed to become pure abstract the moment he died or do his writings retain the anchor points to our anchored abstractions of Kants mind and thoroughly preserve the Qualia of his mind? — Mark Dennis
I'm thinking in terms of Kant's Transcendental philosophy there, because I don't think he really parsed abstracts or Qualia, only in the a priori/noumenal sense, otherwise he stuck pretty much with our phenomenal sense of understanding:
Kant's investigations in the Transcendental Logic lead him to conclude that the understanding and reason can only legitimately be applied to things as they appear phenomenally to us in experience. What things are in themselves as being noumenal, independent of our cognition, remains limited by what is known through phenomenal experience.
Kant gives two expositions of space and time: metaphysical and transcendental. The metaphysical expositions of space and time are concerned with clarifying how those intuitions are known independently of experience. The transcendental expositions attempt to show how the metaphysical conclusions might be applied to enrich our understanding.
...time is a pure a priori intuition that renders mathematics possible. Time is not a concept, since otherwise it would merely conform to formal logical analysis (and therefore, to the principle of non-contradiction). However, time makes it possible to deviate from the principle of non-contradiction: indeed, it is possible to say that A and non-A are in the same spatial location if one considers them in different times, and a sufficient alteration between states were to occur (A32/B48).
Time and space cannot thus be regarded as existing in themselves. They are a priori forms of sensible intuition.
According to Schopenhauer's essay, Kant's three main merits are as follows:
-The distinction of the phenomenon from the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) The intellect mediates between things and knowledge
-A priori knowledge is separate from a posteriori knowledge
-The ideal and the real are diverse from each other
Mark, those are just some talking points about Kant's views on our so-called limits of knowledge. Unless I'm missing something (which is entirely possible) I don't think he really explored much relative to abstracts.
For instance, we don't know the nature of existing things (nature of our existence in general) but rather, we just experience them. However, we can feel through our intuition (synthetic a priori judgements) that abstracts must/might have a real existence. Otherwise, in this context of discussion, he only felt there were things existing a priori, like the concept of noumena. My interpretation is, I think the only thing he thought was abstract was the concept of unknowable noumena.
So back to your question, if you take known a priori qualities, or the so-called nature of mathematics/music for example, what kind of existence is that? Here are some possible choices:
1. purely abstract
2. metaphysical abstract
3. cosmological abstract
4. universal abstract (universal languages-math/music)
5. physical abstract (through the ability to describe physics)
6. cognitive abstract (our consciousness)
and so on...
That's how I'm interpreting part of your questions. The logic of language is another topic of course...