If matter itself (consciousness) has an atomic structure such as neurons, protons, and electrons, etc. and at some point their description can only be accurately articulated through mathematical structures, that would suggest that consciousness is an abstract entity. — 3017amen
The very idea of “matter” is itself undefined, and itself comes out of the human being. So to say consciousness is matter is like saying x is y. We have no idea about either. — Xtrix
What is life science? — tim wood
hard questions. I'll end my mad ramblings here. :) — Manuel
what is "consciousness"? This thread presumably takes these things for granted. If we don't give even a tentative definition, it's hard to know what we're really talking about. — Xtrix
But then again, I'm not clear on what the term even mea — jgill
It would seem to go beyond reasoning. — jgill
) What is your round for supposing that your experiences are made of anything? — tim wood
Some say experience and feelings are the clearest way to truth, but I need rational analysis.’
He thus equates metaphysics with ‘rational analysis.’ — Joshs
Time is essentially the experience of change within our experiences/memory. In essence, Mind is Time. — MondoR
Ya know......just because we can ask a question, doesn’t mean we should. — Mww
And why does everything have to have a “nature”? Nature of this, nature of that.....why can’t it be just whatever we think of it? Which is, when it comes right down to it, exactly what it is anyway. — Mww
Why do? — MondoR
Hmm. Question: do you need that? — tim wood
Simply put, I guess, mathematics is the science developed by reason out of the category of “quantity”, in response to observations in the world. If the categories are part of our innate rational constitution, as transcendental philosophy stipulates, then the ground of mathematical structures resides in us naturally. — Mww
But if mathematical structures describe the nature of the universe — 3017amen
We don’t know that they do; we only know they describe the universe in such a way the universe becomes comprehensible to us, strictly given the kind of intelligence we are. — Mww
Mathematical structures, while a priori for their construction, lend themselves intuitively to phenomenal representation for their reality. — Mww
Noumena, on the other hand, as products of the understanding, hence are only discursive constructs, can never be intuitive, hence never phenomena, hence never represented in the human world of objects. — Mww
Not sure Kant used those terms together, but I guess a truth derived under transcendental conditions would be a transcendental truth. — Mww
the very concept of “event” immediately invokes an ordering of time, insofar as any perceived event follows from some antecedent event related to it, then the a priori synthetical principle of cause and effect, relative to any perception, is established as universally necessary, hence true because its negation contradicts experience, re: it is impossible to perceive the same thing for all time, therefore every perception is conditioned by successions in time, that condition being an antecedent event that is necessarily its cause. — Mww
But in that the effect is nothing without the cause, the effect as effect is lost. All that remains is undifferentiated wetness — Gregory
It is a truth, insofar as its negation is a contradiction. — Mww
category (relation, schema: causality/dependence), and second, it is transcendental because it relates to concepts in general and from which other a priori cognitions become possible. — Mww
consciousness, they are not; it is reason alone from which such judgements arise. — Mww
From this, it follows such judgements are not learned; they are given — Mww
Ok...the proposition does not derive from pure reason, any proposition being merely an expression derived from antecedent cognitions. That all events have a cause is a principle of pure reason, nonetheless. Can we say that much is true? — Mww
but rather, it is us that sometimes may not know what to ask science to tell us and, possibly, it is us that doesn’t accept what science has to say. — Mww
You know, from a Kantian point of view, science only tells of a thing, what a human asks. If we don’t know a thing as it is in itself, but only as our sensibility presents it to us, what could we direct science toward, other than the representations sensibility gives us? In effect, we are asking science to justify our interpretation of the world, rather than inform us with direct evidence of the world as it is in itself. — Mww
1. Is it true that, for Kant, the assertion of the existence of things-in-themselves is made according to a purely analytic judgment?
2. Do, for Kant, appearances and things-in-themselves constitute two separate kinds/levels of existence? In other words, is it true that an object must exist as appearance along with things-in-themselves, or, rather, an object-as-appearance can exist only as the thing-in-itself? — Sentience
It is likely that wondering and the sense of mysteries led to most of the developments in civilisation, not just philosophy and religion, but the emergence of the arts and sciences. — Jack Cummins
I am inclined to think it acts as a general motivational factor in leading people to unique and creative solutions to all kinds of problems. — Jack Cummins
All the philosophers have been thinking about the truth. But thinking about the truth is an impossibility. Either you know it, or you don't. If you know it, there is no need to think about it. If you don't, then how can you think about it? — Anand-Haqq
I think that too many people have inflated egos, and this probably extends to people with a whole variety of beliefs and ideas — Jack Cummins
However, unfortunately some people can be just as dogmatic in philosophical argument as the ones who are dogmatic in fundamentalist religion. — Jack Cummins