Philosophy, at least originally, was about life. It was about gaining wisdom to live a better life, accomplish the right things, and be a good citizen. My philosophical interests are very much in this direction. In addition to being interested in philosophy of life, I'm also interested in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science and philosophy of religion. I believe all of these areas of study can help me build a better philosophy of life. — Ron Cram

I very much relate and agree.

For better or worse, though, I do think that existence as a whole is absurd. I think the times we live in are part of that. I imagine the philosophers from centuries who expected technology and the ideology of freedom to transform the world into a paradise.
That's harder to imagine now. It's pretty clear that personal freedom, plenty of food, and working toilets isn't enough to make us wise- at least as a species. Individually we can get better at life (or go completely to hell). I don't claim to be wise myself, though I feel less unwise than I was at 25 (which isn't saying much). I look at the problems of the world and see my own contradictions writ large. I think that seeings one's own greed-fear-vanity-sloth-lust-superstition helps with something like realism. But it's an expensive point of honor. It's more fun to melt into a group of righteous fixers and blamers. To oversimplify the problem so that it's just one political issue. And so on.

I think ancient philosophers could see the world as a immortal system of wheels. They could take pleasure in feeling outside of time and its disasters. Different types of government would come and go, but the earth and humanity would abide forever.

These days we feel the finitude and fragility of the world itself. Our pop culture is suffused with disaster and surreal conspiracies. We live in our screens, a society of the spectacle indeed. Many of our careers are absurd. We make things we don't believe in, if we make anything at all. We go into debt to buy things we can't afford to live up to impossible images of glamour. We can sort-of squint at find a system of wheels, but this is just human nature. And human nature is so dymamic and technological that it's hard to believe we've grasped eternal human nature.

Indeed, we can now mess with our own genetic code. I don't know if their are serious, radical efforts in this direction. Such efforts could lead to disaster and misery. But it's pretty much the only thing I can imagine that would really change the game. We could make ourselves semi-immortal, change our character, etc., which would change the world. I doubt it will happen in my lifetime. It will likely enough never happen.

Anyway, that leaves me with some blend of stoicism, epicureanism, cynicism, existenialism, humanism, etc., etc. Eat well, exercise, maybe buy some land and build a tiny house, work at something I believe in. Die well at a good moment if possible. Tho more likely by being run over by an Amazon Prime truck.

But that doesn't change the fact that when we see a brick go through a window, we are observing the glass break the window. — Ron Cram

It is however conceivable that a normal brick would just pass through a normal window without damaging it. Afterwards, we would no longer consider the brick and the window normal, and we would scramble for some kind of explanation. But the point is that we can't 'rationalistically' deduce that the brick will damage the window. Pure reason is helpless here.

We will of course expect it. We'll have 'laws' of physics that assure us of it. But these 'laws' are themselves the same kind of expectation codified in an exacter quantitative language. In short, there seems to be no 'pure' reason that we should even expect the glass to be damaged. Our expectation is 'irrational' in this specific sense. From what you've written so far, I have the sense that you aren't seeing the strange problem of induction as I do. Yet this is one of the reasons Hume is great.

This is a very interesting topic. If you are interested, I will provide you with some book titles. — Ron Cram

Thanks for the links, but I'd prefer to hear your thoughts on topic, or paraphrases from those sources. After all, I think Hume destroyed the metaphysical foundations of science. Or showed that science never had one. Which revealed that science never needed one, though it's natural for philosophers to step in and try to invent one.

What Hume did or rather simply revealed was radical. Our sanity itself is without a metaphysical foundation. Pure reason on its own can tell me nothing about the world. Not even that its bad to step off of cliffs. Nor that all men are mortal. It's true that deduction can help us use a more general pattern in a concrete case, but our trust that that general pattern will persist is 'blind' human prejudice --and yet sanity itself.

I like Popper, but is Popper really any help here?

The best we can say of a hypothesis is that up to now it has been able to show its worth, and that it has been more successful than other hypotheses although, in principle, it can never be justified, verified, or even shown to be probable. — Popper

What matter that a hypothesis has shown its worth up to now? How do we infer that it is therefore more likely to show its worth in the future? Why shouldn't a falsified hypothesis become valuable again?

To be clear, I believe in my heart like we all must that nature is uniform. And the falsifiability as a criterion has a value independent of this one issue. My point is that I haven't seen the problem of induction solved metaphysically. And I can't imagine a solution. Obviously the problem of induction is not a practical problem in the sense that we actually need a solution. Though I can imagine a rationalistic souls being tormented by it. The rest of us can be delighted and shocked by it. And do as we have done, after all.

Why do massive objects cause the spacetime continuum to warp? We don't know and so there is room for a deeper theory than Einstein's. — Ron Cram

I agree. And then after we have that deeper theory there will still be room for a yet deeper theory. I think we agree that the most general patterns we have must therefore be true for no reason. The alternative seems to be 'because God,' which only draws a smiley face on the issue.

Science doesn't need deductive justification. Let that sink in. — Ron Cram

You are preaching to the choir. And isn't it you who are concerned with a proof of the external world? A deductive enterprise which you claim is somehow needed? What convinces human beings is the power that gives them what they want. I think we are fundamentally empirical beings. Deduction is an elite taste. I like mathematical proofs personally, but I don't think the proofs are what convince most people. Show them lots of examples and they will generalize (often ignoring counterexamples.)

But this is why I suggest that Hume is (counter-intuitively perhaps) pro-science. If the knowledge we use all of the time in the real world has no deductive foundation, that's a demotion of deduction and not an impossible demotion of our wordly knowledge. The bookish philosopher is shown in a new, unflattering light when we realize that deduction is secondary tool. We have to go outside and try things to see how the world works. And all of our theories are works-so-far conjectures.

Not true. We can and do observe causation. We observe the transfer of kinetic energy when one pool ball strikes another. We observe causation when we observe the flame consume the match. We observe causation when we observe a brick shatter a window. There is nearly an endless supply of these simple examples. — Ron Cram

I think you are missing something important here. It is conceivable that the brick will bounce off the window. Of course we don't expect that to happen, but we can't prove that because bricks usually smash through windows that they will always do so. Yet we can't help expecting them to do so. So the question is whether and how causality is anything more than such expectations.

Or we can think of the half-life of some radioactive element. We fit curves to data points and calculate parameters again and again until we decide that the element has a 'nature' that we can count on in the future. But the silent assumption is that nature is uniform, that the past determines the future. I know of no non-circular and therefore genuine proof of this. Yet I can't help expecting the future to be like the past, all other things being equal. I'm just that kind of monkey, it seems. (Which is again applying the principle, which is implicit perhaps in the concepts of human nature and nature itself.)

I would say that nobody needed a proof before Hume asked for one. Once people were stumped, the proof became necessary which is why I'm publishing one next year. — Ron Cram

Is 'need' the right word here? Such a proof would be the clever solution of a chess problem. Except chess problems are more beautiful, since they are posed in a exact language. Philosophical 'proofs' can't be the 'math' they hope to emulate. Language is a slimy, smoking beast. The 'solution' to all such philosophical chess problems is perhaps to face this ugly beast and suffer the resulting paradigm change. Because language is a slimy, smoking beast, I can't pseudo-mathematically prove to you that it's like that. I can hint at an 'experience of language,' but that is misleadingly mystical sounding.

As long as someone is locked into 'the game' on a gut-level, they're dead to the examples (which other famous philosophers have already provided.) So I won't go into it. What I'm talking about isn't science, but it's the kind of realization that increases a persons respect for engineering at least.

Science is much more than a "useful best guess" because it results in useful products and medicines that improve and lengthen our lives and also gives us new facts about which we can philosophize. — Ron Cram

I love science, just to be clear. We agree on 'useful.' I say 'best guess' because I trust the products of science, without experiencing these products as final or beyond revision.

Philosophy is important for a vast number of reasons, — Ron Cram

I'd say that philosophy was important. I mean certain classic texts in the genre had real impact. I don't think philosophy proper continues to be all that important to the culture as a whole. Of course people are hot and bothered about politics (understandably), and philosophy appears within those heated discussions in a cruder form. But careful thought at the level of the good philosophy texts doesn't move the masses.

Offer the average person a proof that the world exists and they might think you are crazy. While I think philosophy at its best is about as good as it gets, bad philosophy is sub-normal. Thanks to the internet, I've seen how often the manic street preacher wears the robes of the philosopher. There's usually no way to put some magic world-saving system of philosophical words to the test. If there were, that'd pretty much be science. So philosophy attracts self-important Thinkers who don't need funding for equipment and can't be pinned down enough to be refuted (in their own eyes.) Personally I think we all do this to some degree when it comes to 'spiritual' issues. It's occasionally depressing to be 'realistic,' and I sometimes envy those with a mission and a message. ' The problem is X, and the solution is Y.'

For me the problems are X,Y, and Z, and no grand solution is apparent. I can offer trivialities like eat healthy food, don't waste your money on stupid sh*t, try not to need so much, seek employment that's fulfilling, blah blah blah. I think this is good advice for those who generally want to survive, but I see no master plan that makes that comfortable survival important to strangers. And I see no grand purpose for the species. And the problems I see in the world are (to me) manifestations of the opposed forces in my own 'soul', while for a different type of personality the world's problems are the result of a conspiracy of the bads, who of course are other-than the diagnostician.

I confess, that was quite a digression. But I think it gets to the issue behind the issue --the evangelist versus the morose (critical) philosopher -- who is also the laughing philosopher when the brain chemistry is right.

Philosophy will never progress out of its current darkness until Hume is seen as entirely refuted. — Ron Cram

A line like this helps me understand why you dislike Hume so much. I get the impression that you think philosophy is...still important. Yet I think you agree that nobody needs an OCD proof of the external world. To be sure our modern isolated personalities will look for gurus from Deepak Chopra to Dr. Phil to Jordan Peterson to Zizek. More creative (and arrogant?) personalities will present themselves as new and improved gurus, offering some homebrew of traditional religion and philosophy proper and quantum woo and psychoanalysis and pop culture and the left-wing, right-wing, broken-wing buzzwords of the twitter-verse.

Philosophy forums are both fun and sad that way. The modern atomized personality with its minimal shared culture wanders in a smoky maze with ten thousand prophets for profit who don't agree.

You had such a vision of the street
As the street hardly understands — Eliot

This vision or my own morose perspective is one more option that can be packaged and sold as tomorrow's post-spiritual-but-spiritual bestseller. I suspect that there are lots of people out there who don't make much noise (what's the point?) and yet take science for a useful best guess and philosophy as a bag of tricks that might be good for this or that situation. And as an amusing zoo of vivid personalities who think they've finally got it right.

A rational person would not request a proof. The request is irrational. — Ron Cram

I agree, using 'rational' in the ordinary way. We are radically embedded in a world that we share with others. Only philosophers in love with a strange game pretend otherwise, and yet they do so to impress one another. Perhaps most 'high-level' human behavior is other-directed. I want to impress people, get paid by people. I think in the language of my tribe. If my private journal is discovered, it is mostly intelligible by others in the tribe.

If we let ourselves see this embeddedness in the world (which is painful in the context of our fantasies of autonomy), then many 'problems' of philosophy just dissolve. They are like chess problems, but less pure and beautiful given the 'organic' nature of language.

Why is Hume not openly mocked in philosophy texts for saying "these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature?" — Ron Cram

I agree that science has progressed, but I think you are missing the point. There's a tendency to explain things in terms of basic principles which themselves remain unexplained. Sometimes we find a more general theory or set of concepts that offer an explanation, but now this more general theory is true for no reason (or seems true enough for now for no reason.)

The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer — Hume

Do you see what nonsense this is? There is currently strong tension between the disciplines of science and philosophy at the university. This tension, I believe, is largely the result of Hume's followers being irrationally skeptical and anti-science — Ron Cram

I find it implausible that 'Hume's followers' are anti-science. Instead I see Hume as a scientist's philosopher. I read him as anti-religious and anti-dogmatic. Consider the part you left out:

..as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of [our ignorance] — Hume

To me this is the ghost of Socrates.

I dare say, Athenians, that someone among you will reply, "Why is this, Socrates, and what is the origin of these accusations of you: for there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All this great fame and talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, why this is, as we should be sorry to judge hastily of you." Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavor to explain to you the origin of this name of "wise," and of this evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, such wisdom as is attainable by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom, which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit, and will tell you about my wisdom - whether I have any, and of what sort - and that witness shall be the god of Delphi. You must have known Chaerephon; he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether - as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt - he asked the oracle to tell him whether there was anyone wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself, but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of this story.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After a long consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, "Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest." Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed to him - his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination - and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself; and I went and tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is - for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another, who had still higher philosophical pretensions, and my conclusion was exactly the same. I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him. — Socrates/Plato

Anyway, Hume goes with science like ketchup with hamburgers. Yet he also sees that science has no deductive justification, which is fascinating. We are 'irrationally rational' Pavlovian dogs. Skepticism is not our problem. Instead human beings are eager to sit at the feet of this or that guru with a few big words in his mouth --because those words tickle their bellies right.

read section 119 closely) — Ron Cram

By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.

It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.
— Hume

I agree with Hume that no argument can prove that there is an external world. I also agree that no argument can prove that the sun will rise tomorrow. For me the point is about the limits of deduction. We aren't essentially deductive creatures. Custom, habit, experience rule. If we think of rationality in terms of mathematical proofs, then we just aren't (primarily) rational creatures. Our most important knowledge has no deductive foundation. If B follows A with regularity, we like to say that A causes B. But we can't prove the necessity. And indeed we human beings are often fooled.

But even though Hume convinced himself and me of this, we both kept on believing 'irrationally' that the sun wasn't a dream and that yes indeed it would rise tomorrow. I say 'irrationally' and yet acting on patterns in our experience for our benefit is also rationality itself. The point is that we can't get by on pure reason. If we can't find proofs for external world or the uniformity of nature, that's OK. We don't need them. We can't help believing in such things. Its what we are.

That said, I'd still like to hear any proof you have that there is an external world. Since I never doubted that there was, I'm really interested in how you navigate around Hume's suspicion that there can be no such proof.

Circling back to the OP, I think the 'problem of induction' was the kind of advance you were asking about. And that's just one great idea. You mention Kant being inspired by Hume. Indeed. Assuming that you like Kant, that also evidence of Hume's significance.

Anyway, I'll stop here with one more great quote, one with which I completely agree.

It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it. — Hume

Rather than get lost in details, I'll try to focus the issue. I don't think Hume doubted the existence of the external world. His 'ruling passion' was a love of literary fame. If you read his own brief description of his life (written as it was ending), you'll see that he was a man of the world.

https://davidhume.org/texts/mol/

Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it. — Hume

I think one ought to read this line anti-metaphysically and even anti-philosophically if philosophy is understood in its abstruse and ridiculous aspect. Nature is indeed too strong for our merely theoretical doubts. When such doubts aren't just toys for the exhibition of cleverness and creativity, they are perhaps useful against positive metaphysical assertions (theological confusions, etc.)

The idea that one should bother with a proof of the external world strikes me as absurd. Only a person in the grip of madness doubts the external world, and they might as well doubt the legitimacy of a complicated 'proof' of this world as well. So I think we agree that doubting the external world is just ridiculous. But I think we disagree on what kind of chap Hume was.

To me this would apply to any position on truth: correspondance, identity, pragmatic... — Coben

Fair point. I agree. Or at least once the 'big' issues are settled (usually stuff about virtue and vice), the little issues are toys. Of course the big issues can stop being settled. Point being that philosophy for me is 'really' about who I should be, who I should trust, things like that.

In fact, I tend to look at truth in a few ways. I am eclectic and ad hoc. — Coben

Same here.

But where it is important I think, is that the pragmatic approach is more likely to allow one to practice na idea over time to see if it works, rather than deciding yes, this is true so I will apply it. I think this is much more useful, lol, than not allowing this. Now of course someone with a correspondance truth model can do this, but I think they are much less likely to. — Coben

I find that plausible. And what I know of Willy James suggests that he was solid, a good face on the movement. I think you are touching on personality types and which philosophies they tend to embrace. I do agree that the correspondence model is something like the default position. So it's going to be tempting for closed minds. Still, despite its problems, I'd still vote it the least worst choice. Those problems, after all, are usually only problems in the 'mud' and not in everyday life.

I think there is an inherent humilty in pragmatic approaches, and it is more exploratory. — Coben

I think you are generally right. I have, however, seen a few pragmatists who are wrapped up in pragmatist jargon. And they can be arrogant. Clearly that has nothing to do with you. I'm just saying that some folks into anti-realism come off surprisingly evangelical. Personally I think it's hard to do philosophy and avoid implying that some kind of truth exists. How interested are we in the mere opinion of strangers? Admittedly there are some ridiculous or untrustworthy opinions that might be worth hearing for entertainment value, but you know what I mean. We want to learn about reality to act and speak more effectively/successfully. (I trust you'll agree.)

I think facts are processes that do things, not things that are true. — Coben

I find pragmatism fascinating. I am attracted to its attempt to get the truck out of the mud. For my $, too much philosophy is just verbal disputes. But I find the flight from truth a little too metaphysical and problematical.

To me, in your quote above, you are suggesting that ...you think it is true that...facts are processes that do things, not things that are true. If you don't believe that facts exist in that particular way, then why embrace pragmatism? Is it useful to believe that it is useful to believe whatever is useful to believe? It all strikes me as a bit circular. I'd prefer to say something like: it seems to true to me that we'd do better to argue about stuff that matters and look at whether this or that issue is really just a matter of terminological preference.

Sometimes I think pragmatism can't resist wading back in to the mud as a kind of liberator. For me the 'mud' is something like a game that you can only win by abandoning the sunk cost. On the bright side, a wallow in the mud is a kind of inoculation against a talking that doesn't pay off. Or maybe it's a fun game like chess but we should be advancing our career, etc., but can't let go of the fantasy that a certain kind of talk is Serious.

The kind of necessity proper to mathematical demonstrations cannot be transferred to philosophy. For another, it suggests that there is an activity that is distinctively proper to metaphysics, and the tool for that activity is natural (as opposed to formal) language. — Jack-N

That sounds right. And we can also question just how formal mathematical demonstrations are. Of course they are relatively formal, but I venture that they also speak to and depend upon spatial and numerical intuition -- a compact language that is easy to parse with the eyes but not radically different from English, for instance. This isn't to deny that some math is extremely formal, but then our reasoning about this extremely formal math will depend on intuition. Sans application and/or aesthetics, it's hard to understand why a human being would bother.

But even without those experiments, don't you instinctively feel that a falling boulder is dangerous? If you saw a boulder rolling quickly down a hill, wouldn't you want to get out of the way? Of course you would! Ask yourself why! You know the boulder moving quickly has force and energy and would do you great damage. — Ron Cram

I agree that we would move out of the way. We would be afraid. Call it instinct. A big noisy thing coming at us scares us out of its path. But how does this apply to the Hume I know? I take it as a given that we act on perceived regularities in experience. We expect them to continue, without being able to justify it deductively. To me that's the fascinating part. 'Pure' reason is mostly impotent. Science has an 'irrational' (non-deductive) ground. This chair will continue to hold me, I think, because it has so far. If I look for the logic in that, it leaps away from me --though the temptation is a circular argument that assumes the very uniformity of nature that it wants to prove. 'The future will resemble the past, because in the past the future resembled the past. ' To see that there is no argument for this instinctual expectation is not to quench this expectation (which is impossible.) Instead it leaves a central faculty of the mind mysterious to that same mind.

Anyway, one more passage on Hume's sensible skepticism.

But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them.
...
There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are commonly still diffident in their determinations: and if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner. — Hume

I cannot grasp why anyone would think Hume a good philosopher or would claim that he has advanced knowledge. — Ron Cram

I suggest reading An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

Here's a passage on causation.

54. The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature—such as the descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it. It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phaenomena, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind, that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men, in such difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature. But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny a little farther, immediately perceive that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like Connexion between them. — Hume

Here's something on the external world.

118. It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.

It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.

But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent. — Hume

In short, we see the table, but the table isn't in our so-called mind. Its image or representation is.

Here is Hume on skepticism.

There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.

It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations. — Hume

I think of Hume as a sensible, serious guy.

It is, as Schrodinger has remarked, a miracle that in spite of the baffling complexity of the world, certain regularities in the events could be discovered. — alcontali

What do you think of this objection? A miracle is a violation of regularity and is therefore only visible against a background of regularity. So to me there's something strange in Schrodinger's remark. Still it is strange in some strange sense that there is a world here in the first place. But what makes this experience of the strangeness of the world possible? I'd guess it's our ability to imagine there not being a world. It also seems related to our ability to question the cause of God or whatever is supposed to save us from infinite regress in our explanations.

However, it is important to point out that the mathematical formulation of the physicist's often crude experience leads in an uncanny number of cases to an amazingly accurate description of a large class of phenomena. This shows that the mathematical language has more to commend it than being the only language which we can speak; it shows that it is, in a very real sense, the correct language. — alcontali

Interesting that Schrodinger uses accuracy to argue for mathematics being the correct language. His metric for correctness is itself mathematical.

The real, physical world or any connection to it, is not a legitimate subject in mathematics. People who are interested in the real, physical world should rather seek answers in physics or other scientific disciplines, because mathematics is not about that. — alcontali

I take this as a very 'pure math' position. What do you make of the fact that most math is not pure? I don't just mean science. I mean everyday life. What kind of tip should I leave? How many eggs are left in the fridge? How many more miles can I get with that needle close to E?

I'm not at all against pure-math, just to be clear. But consider the history of calculus. Applications came before rigorous axiomatic theory. Consider also how important intuition is learning math. Even pure mathematicians don't write out complete, formal proofs. They appeal to one another's intuition, and I think most of them aren't formalists at heart.

It says that according Plato "love is rational because it is always directed toward true beauty.True beauty is not something your see or feel. Rather, you come to know it exists by doing philosophy -- that is, by thinking about it". — Sameer

I understand Plato in terms of something like 'projection.' As you get older and switch this love target for that one (and so on), you become more aware that people are something like screens for our fantasies for them. And we are screens for their fantasies.

As we experience this projection as projection on a gut level, it affords us more detachment than before. But it comes at the cost of no longer believing in Her.

Have you ever regretted taking the red pill — Jimmy

In low moods, yes. In low low moods, yes yes. But the red pill offers good things too. It mixes well with other less metaphorical drugs. It also mixes well with creative inspiration, having a project. It does not mix well with certain other situations.

I associate the red pill in this context with reading lots of charismatic thinkers and then...

There is a link to a pdf by Graff, which is a paper he wrote about the fact that academia has an unjustified culture of obtuse and obfuscatory communication styles. — removedmembershiprc

I read most of that paper. It itself has that academic smell. Not much is said, but it's puffed up with allusions and quotations. I find the same smell in lots of journalism these days. It's as if most of the work goes into signaling that the author is a particular kind of trustworthy, educated chap. What is the word for it? Depersonalized? Bogus?

I think there is a lot of value in a sort of "blue collar philosophy," where the object is clearly communicating ideas in ways which are in line with the common patterns of communication. The objective being transferring information to another person, who very well could be a lay person or a non-specialist, as opposed to posturing as a deeply intellectual savant. — removedmembershiprc

I like where you are going. Let's be fair to the other side, though. I've been personally frustrated by acquaintances who pose as interested in Big Questions who nevertheless don't read anything. Unless a person naturally lives in the conceptual realm (which is to say has a passion for getting it right), they probably won't read themselves 'up' to the level of good, relatively current conversation.

Having given the other side its due, I still think that plenty of 'intellectual' writing is lost in the mirror.

Good point about the rationals that would be left out. And thanks for absorbing my feedback in a good spirit. (I like that you know programming. I'm working on becoming a better programmer. )

Imagine what the regular expression accepts, are expressions like this:

{
{1.2323,343.3333}
,{344.2,0,34343.444,6454.6444}
,{2323.11,834.33}
,{}
,{5 12.1,99.343433}
}

So, it only accepts sets, the members of which must be sets themselves, and these member sets must only contain real numbers.

So, it only accepts elements from the power set of real numbers. (Correct?) — alcontali

What occurs to me is that you only have rational numbers in your sets. Moreover all the subsets of R (actually of Q in this case) are finite, albeit arbitrarily large. How will you represent irrational numbers with a finite number of symbols, especially those that aren't computable? And how will you represent infinite subsets of R?

Another argument: the strings of finite length over a finite alphabet are countably infinite. It's not hard to write a program that spits them out one at a time. So any subset of those strings is at most countably infinite.