Irreducible Complexity It is a substantive difference as the reductionist is claiming that a system is simply constituted of its events while the holist adds that, collectively, those events result in a generalised state of constraint. A global property emerges that restricts those events by becoming their history, their context. — apokrisis
Yes. This is very close to, or the same as, a view that I've often held implicitly, so thanks for fleshing it out. This is also the reason that Mr. Irreductionist responds the way he does, by appealing to the history of each particle and its interactions with others.
I voted substantive mainly because you seem to have ruled it out by setting up the idea that an ecosystem is equivalent to a bunch of billiard balls. — unenlightened
Granted, but notice Mr. Irreductionist's counter: "What, exactly, are you explaining?" If you want to, you could pursue that line and say that viewing the whole system as a bunch of particles just doesn't do what you need it to do. Whether that makes it into a methodological disagreement is up to you.
's comment is also along the lines of Mr. Irreductionist's counter.
On my understanding, a true Irreductionist (of whom I'd say I am one, except that I resist accepting labels, especially 'ism' ones) denies that, even in theory, our experiences could be explained solely in terms of interactions of particles. — andrewk
Right. I think it may be helpful - for you and other people - to view the exchange in the OP
dialectically. Mr. Irreductionist's counter that the whole thing telescopes out is a means of trying for a reductio against Mr. Reductionist, while accepting some of his premises, and occurs at the point in the dialectic where you would expect such a thing. Mr. Irreductionist's final counter, that Mr. Reductionist is no longer explaining the same thing, is a case of following this line of reasoning toward something like what you say here.
But does the true irreductionist deny that all out experiences (and for that matter all our explanations) could be the result of interactions of particles? — Janus
This is an interesting question. I would ask what is meant by
result here. It seems odd to say that our experiences are "caused" by the interactions of particles. That looks like it would lead to epiphenomenalism, because if particles are the cause and experiences are the effect, then particles and experiences aren't the same thing, but one is caused and determined wholly by the other. Perhaps you can reply that this misses the point, because you're just saying that the particles must be there for the experiences to be there. But is that reductionism?
Thanks for the responses, everyone. Digging this discussion so far.