The example I gave you fits exactly to your specs, so what is the problem with it?

My 3. and 4. are hardware, yours software.

Make up your mind, is it the software or the hardware that you think is important?

Hardware. The first sentence you quoted does not contradict that.

I have been debating that with @Possibility on another thread, but we are currently stuck at "information". Once we clear that hurdle, we'll debate knowledge then get to le piece de resistance, 'wisdom'.

People do not understand information is anything and everything because information has no inherent meaning. Meaning is always given to information by some agent interpreting that information / signal / pattern, against some background context or grounding, so the same word can have different meanings in different languages or in different sentences, for example.

Understanding information means to put it in some context, to ground it, decode it, or to unzip it, if you will, so the same information can be understood differently by different people. Knowledge then should simply be ‘stored understanding’.

Wisdom I'd say has to do with intuition and prediction, but in any case, taking your definition, I still do not see how it could apply to qualia. Where is the contact point?

It looks like we understand each other, and even agree, but then I do not get why would you describe my question as "stating the obvious" when I think I am asking exactly the same thing what you earlier stated is "more interesting and non-trivial". I actually do not see there are two distinct interpretations on the question of the existence of colors.

Because nobody knows how to implement 2 and 5, or even if it's possible to do so.

Not known is 'what' to implement, so 'how' is not even a question yet. But what I am suggesting here is both what and how to implement, and relevant part is hardware configuration, not software modules.

c. We actually see colors, but they are properties of our visual system, not the objects or environment itself, although they are related to the reflectivity of electromagnetic radiation in the visible range.

Properties of our visual system. What kind of property, measured in what units, described in terms of what: charge, magnetism, force, attraction, distance, geometry, chemistry, computation, quantum mechanics...?

I don't think that the experience of seeing color being an illusion makes sense. We are conscious of colors just like pains and smells. But those aren't real, meaning independent of an animal's perception.

Does it make sense near the end of the first Matrix movie that Neo sees reality as a waterfall of symbols instead of colors and textures?

Do you not think if you want to claim that we see actual colors as colors, instead of something else that we only interpret as colors, requires this thing “color” to actually physically exist in space as some new unknown substance rather than property or side effect of something else?

1. Camera A: visual input extern -> feeds into 2.
2. Program A: subconsciousness & memory -> feeds into 3.
3. Display A: visual output inner -> feeds into 4.
4. Camera B: visual input inner -> feeds into 5.
5. Program B: consciousness & free will -> feeds into 6.& 2.
6. Speaker: audio output extern
— Zelebg

Let us know when you've figured out how to implement 2 and 5.

Why is that a problem?

And then maybe you can explain why my telephone is not a conscious thing using Zelebg's method.

Most importantly, or for a start, it does not have the same hardware configuration.

I think you are wrong about that. You certainly do not need sentience or consciousness to learn good enough "make choices". I assume you know better than that, so please better articulate what you mean, esp. wrt have "free will", which would only seem to require the agent (e.g., robot) to have control of the direction of its own program (easy to code that!).

To learn by imagining, that is mental / virtual experience in advance, rather than by waiting to live or die when the physical / actual experience really happens.

It looks like another hint our ‘selves’ are virtual entities, virtual characters like in computer games. Living in a simulation, built not by evil machines, but by our own brains. Our personality, identity, ego, soul... it’s just a virtual little homunculus inside our heads.


Yeah, free will should really mean actions are determined autonomously, that is mostly by personal identity or character, instead of whatever else. Any other meaning is self-defeating contradiction, including the current popular definition: “ability to choose otherwise”.

I'm starting to build a coherent hypothesis that qualia and emotive phenomenon are logically needed to optimally create and convey wisdom, but not at all needed to create data, info, or knowledge.

The whole meaning of your statement hinges on the word “wisdom”, which is terribly undefined, if not undefinable, but surely it has something to do with data and knowledge. No? What exactly do you mean by “wisdom”?

3. The internal qualia projection of 'red' color is what we intuitively consider 'red' and that almost certainly exists only in our qualia projected internal reality, which is likely commonly shared b/c of common visual/mental systems genetic coding.

Projection of what onto what (perceived by what)?

Eyes convert light into signals. That’s the only fact here. So the question is whether that signal is ever converted into something else, something like a symbol or something like a color.

Now, if that signal is not converted into anything else, or if it is converted into some set of symbols, or say, some molecular structure, then the conclusion is colors do not actually exist, but we only perceive something else as if it is a color. Ok?

But, if you want to claim colors do exist, then you have to explain that convertesion of signals into colors, where and how do those colors exist in space, and what are they made of. Yes? So what claim do you want to make?

Hence the reason why falsification isn't a good model of science or epistemic judgements in general.

Alternative? Common auxiliary “side-effect information” inherent in empirical observation is a general problem we have to accept and ignore, what else?

I’d say dark energy example does not show failure of falsifiability, but astronomy. Also, theories of consciousness, like panpsychism, how is it any more scientific than religion? And what is it that separates hypothesis like religion from scientific ones if not falsifiability?

For in an open-world, the meaning of the material implication O => ~H isn't empirically reducible to observations, and is instead an auxiliary hypothesis, A, which isn't itself entailed by some other observation on pain of infinite regress. So in an open world we have A => ( O => ~H) , and hence O => (~A OR ~H)

Can you show that idea with practical example?

Consciousness, external reality and their growingly well-defined connection seem to destine a reconstituted conception of the physical, as involving quantum-like properties that contradict the classical paradigm of force interrelationships between collections of fundamental spheres.

And yet we do not know of any other physical structure directly except magnetic and electric fields. That is all we interact with, all we ever measure. Everything else is inferred indirectly.

I want to say something about understanding the infinite.

Infinity can not be realized, it can not exist, except potentially through repetition, so no “unique” infinity can exist. There is a simple proof having to do with a digital photograph and number of possible pictures it can contain.

Only intuition, whatever that is. There are no words that can satisfy certainty because anyone’s beliefs are ultimately grounded in their own intuition.

Yes, but randomness applies to chemical action in a solution, colloid, and perhaps a mixture, how the particles come in contact in order to get to the point where they can interact. Think Brownian motion.

That’s the situation in every living cell. Everything floats entangled in a mess, stuff just bumping around randomly, and yet we do not fall apart. Determinism is maintained through saturation levels of necessary compounds, so on average molecules will find the place where they belong in a certain period of time.

There is both attraction and repulsion at play here, so molecules are not only attracted to the places where they are wanted, they are also repulsed away from the places where they do not belong.

So what about abiogenesis? Provided some chemical environment with certain dynamics, temperature, and certain saturation levels of certain compounds, what results is not different random mess every next time, but the same thing every single time, with only slight variations.

Just like snowflakes, they are all “random”, and yet none fail to become a beautiful crystal pattern. The chance, or set of coincidences responsible for life on Earth has to do with the planet itself, with its formation and cosmic geology on a larger scale. Once certain conditions were met, life simply had no choice but to happen.

The only odds working against aggregation of molecules into living things are the odds of a certain planet not providing necessary conditions, but if it does the chemistry will lift off and fly into biology. What is the chance of such planets in this universe? Larger than zero, apparently.

If i were to add in degradation of the DNA and the primordial pools and then the probability of producing proteins and other necessary precursors of life I suspect no matter how long the odds became from having necessary concurrent and successive processes in place your answer would be the same.

Didn't I explain there is no randomness in chemistry or biology? H and O will always produce H2O, and never H4O3 or HO5. Chemical formulas are deterministic like 1+1=2, you know? So what odds are you talking about?

d.) I hypothesise photons are made of unicorn tears, and I explain everything with a story that makes sense as much as quantum mechanics, but my equations are the same as QM, so I make all the same predictions and my theory is already validated as much, but can my predictions really be considered falsifiable? And even if they can, does that necessarily mean my hypothesis is falsifiable?

QM. The whole theory is based on statistical simplification of measurement tables and predictions thus follow “naturally”, kind of like my prediction that the sun will be bright when you look at it.

In QM you first measure, then you hypothesise by abstracting description of that experimental setup and explaining it with whatever nonsense, so then you just simply predict what you already measured.

We must therefore conclude that quantum mechanics is a fraud, I mean it is not falsifiable and thus not scientific, more like a crackpot fringe.

c.) I hypothesise consciousness is ‘integrated information’, it’s just how integrated information feels inside, and I can accurately predict levels of consciousness in awake, sleeping, anesthetized and comatose people. I also accurately predict already known observation that cerebellum is not relevant for consciousness. My hypothesis has been independently confirmed many times with strong evidence, it’s a theory, but are my predictions falsifiable?

Predicting already known cerebellum observation sounds suspicious, for some reason. In any case, I do not see how this can be falsifiable, it would be a biological paradox.

But predictions of the levels of consciousness are independently confirmed as quite accurate and currently it is the basis of the only method for such analysis in coma patients. Predictions fail, say 10% of the time, and this is considered confirmation, so to what percentage prediction failure has to rise in order to be deemed as falsification?

And here we also have infamous ‘explanatory gap’ and mind-body problem. I’m afraid any hypothesis trying to explain what _is consciousness, as opposed to _how it works, can not, in principle it seems, produce any prediction based on empirical observation.

Most such theory may propose to define consciousness inevitably falls among the lines of “that’s how quantum collapse feels inside”, “that’s how information feels inside”, or “that’s how universe feels inside”.

We must therefore conclude that all of those so called theories of consciousness are ultimately untestable and unfalsifiable, definitely not scientific, but more like a crackpot fringe.

b.) I hypothesise many worlds, infinite number of universes and predict we will be able to see some kind of overlap when we discover super-strings or build a telescope three times the size of the Moon. Are those predictions falsifiable? Are they testable?

Telescope prediction is falsifiable, we either observe that overlap or we don’t. But I would not classify it as testable nor scientific. What’s the hurry? If we ever manage to build such a huge telescope, then your hypothesis will become testable and falsifiable, just wait.

Superstrings prediction, being out of realm for observations with current technology, must also be extra precise in defining experimental setup, otherwise it can not be classified as testable or falsifiable.

a.) I hypothesise life after death and predict all kinds of phenomena like near-death experience, ghosts, communication with the dead. Are those falsifiable predictions? Are they testable?

These contradict scientific consensus, so it is not obvious what the predictions are in terms of empirical observations. Without explicit experimental proposal we only have empty assertions, we do not know what the prediction actually is and thus no way of knowing what possible counterexamples it may imply.

So the first step for a hypothesis to become a scientific theory is to describe exactly where, what, how and when at least one prediction is to be observed.

In case you missed, I mentioned a piece of information missing from the article.

The Solution of Falsifiability
In Popper's later work... statement being falsifiable "if and only if it logically contradicts some (empirical) sentence that describes a logically possible event that it would be logically possible to observe." https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demarcation_problem

Thus, this should work better:

A prediction is falsifiable if it logically implies counterexample.
A prediction is testable if it is falsifiable and empirically feasible.


It doesn’t make sense a prediction could be falsifiable but not testable, so some things need to switch places, but nevertheless let us test these definitions and see if can falsify, or confirm temporarily, the definition of falsifiability itself...

I reject them both

Yeah, so how do you reject the hard problem of consciousness?

No ordinary statements or claims here. Testability deals with predictions, and falsifiability with counterexamples.

If we arrive at something which contradicts it, we aught pause and reconsider.

There is a lot to reconsider. We have definitions of two concepts for verification, testability and falsifiability, both useless, less and more.

Wikipedia says testability is falsifiability with added concern that “there is some real hope of deciding whether it is true or false”, one day. Could it be any more vague? Of course, just take that whole part out and we get falsifiability, completely open to interpretation, or worse, without any interpretation.

Testability implies falsifiability, making it redundant, but scientific theories are defined by both testability and falsifiability, so there must be some real difference between the two or something doesn’t add up.

Wikipedia on testability has a bit of information that is completely missing from the falsifiability article itself -- falsifiability means counterexamples to the hypothesis are logically possible -- whatever is that supposed to mean and however it is supposed to apply in practice, or not.

Obviously now, definition of falsifiability needs to be far more specific, and if testability has additional concern of practical viability for experimental verification, then falsifiability must deal with the additional concept of ‘counterexample’ and narrow it down, or it remains pointless. Let me illustrate...

a.) I hypothesise life after death and predict all kinds of phenomena like near-death experience, ghosts, communication with the dead. Are those falsifiable predictions? Are they testable?

b.) I hypothesise many worlds, infinite number of universes and predict we will be able to see some kind of overlap when we discover super-strings or build a telescope three times the size of the Moon. Are those predictions falsifiable? Are they testable?

c.) I hypothesise consciousness is ‘integrated information’, it’s just how integrated information feels inside, and I can accurately predict levels of consciousness in awake, sleeping, anesthetized and comatose people. I also accurately predict already known observation that cerebellum is not relevant for consciousness. My hypothesis has been independently confirmed many times with strong evidence, it’s a theory, but are my predictions falsifiable?

d.) I hypothesise photons are made of unicorn tears, and I explain everything with a story that makes sense as much as quantum mechanics, but my equations are the same as QM, so I make all the same predictions and my theory is already validated as much, but can my predictions really be considered falsifiable? And even if they can, does that necessarily mean my hypothesis is falsifiable?

If we lose "statements" and stick with predictions, things change rather remarkably.

Also confirmed/falsified instead of proved true/false brings more sense into sentences like this: first experiment confirmed prediction, but hypothesis remained falsifiable and it was tested again, however negative result falsified prediction this time, so at the end conclusion is inconclusive and the hypothesis remains falsifiable, forever, regardless of how many times it will be confirmed or falsified in the future.

No true statement is falsifiable.

True statements cannot be falsified.

Those are two different claims. First one is wrong.

To be falsifiable is to be able to be shown as false.

Possible, not able. Almost synonyms, which is why jump to error is not obvious...

If a statement cannot be shown as false, then it is unfalsifiable.

A claim is falsifiable if some observation might show it to be false, says Wikipedia. So, proving a statement to be true does not invalidate the status of that statement as being falsifiable.

Additionally, instead of ‘claim’ or ‘statement’, better fit is ‘prediction’, which is a special kind of statement, a claim that invites verification. The word ‘prediction’ is meant to be used in exactly this context of testability, verifiability and falsifiability, it carries additional useful information. Therefore, to sum it up:

Falsifiability is testability.

A prediction is falsifiable if it is testable.

A claim that renders counter-examples verifiable.

I love conciseness and find your expression artfull. However, words “renders” and “verifiable” are very complex and thus too vague and ambiguous to be used in this definition. It’s kind of like talking about points and lines in terms of cubes and dodecahedrons.

The primary purpose of any definition is to draw strict boundaries around the concept being defined, so it can be differentiated from all the other concepts. And the question is - what are the essential properties or boundaries that definition of ‘falsifiability’ must address?

a.) hypothesis implies or explicitly states at least one empirical prediction
b.) this empirical prediction must satisfy:
1. if test measurement differs from the prediction, hypothesis is deemed false
2. proposed empirical prediction must be realizable with current technology

Maybe I’m forgetting something, but surely without that last clause b.2.), definition of falsifiability will be useless and pointless since any hypothesis can potentially argue one day it will be testable.

Mistake, I was quoting Banno.

You might have a look.

[edit: quote corrected]

Is any of the theories of consciousness falsifiable? And shouldn't article provide sufficiently precise definition so we can make that distinction?

I'm thinking Falsifiable is potentially false.

I would limit it to what is testable right now, otherwise you could argue something like many worlds QM hypothesis is potentially testable in the future. That is why I insist falsifiable hypothesis should come together with actual experimental setup proposal using available technology.

You can't prove it to be true.

You're right. I did not realize what I was saying. Then this:

A hypothesis is falsifiable if it predicts observation that can prove it false. Without explicit and viable experimental proposal I’d say it is at most ‘potentially falsifiable’.

I only now see you are not talking about my bold, but yours. In any case, can you articulate some explanation for your assertion?

You test a hypothesis, and you either measure what is predicted or not, therefore you either prove it true or you prove it is false.

But the bold bit is wrong.

According to what?

It seems you misunderstood my response. If pain were radically private (in the Cartesian sense), then we would not have language to talk about it.

We don't have language to describe ontology of pain or any of the qualia. We can talk about it on a superficial level because we share similar experience.

We sure can not talk about qualia in terms of size, weight, speed, charge… or ony of the physical units of measurement. How come?

Yet we do. So the term pain must have public criteria. This is surprising to many people. The links were to Wittgenstein's arguments against the possibility of a private language, in case you or other readers weren't familiar with it.

What is your conclusion then: there is no hard problem, there is no qualia, or what?

How else would you summarise falsifiability in ten words or less?

Hypothesis is falsifiable if predicts observation that will either prove it true or false.

There has to be explicit prediction, if not even suggestion of viable experimental setup. I assumed possibility of 'proving false' is the same as 'proving true', so I guess I'm saying falsifiability is the same thing as testability.

My feeling is that there is a 10% chance of no God and a 90% chance of God.

I guess that god of yours is not necessarily the one to create this universe then, not really that one necessary cause without a cause, after all. Too bad. But did you know the chance of the devil is 417%, and can go up to 735% when beyond time and space? I’m afraid to even think what that could mean.

No, all intelligent creatures are basically the same; an information processor (mind) and a memory. All intelligent creatures desire information. So left with a blank, empty universe, any intelligent creature would try to create something to occupy him (IE spacetime).

And I say god is fine-tuned to be intelligent. You think it’s an accident?

There is no fine-tuning of God.

I can argue senselessly like you, look: universe is natural and natural universes naturally create life. There is no fine-tuning of the universe.

It is very unnatural for a universe to create life; nearly all hypothetical universes would not support it.

Creation is artificial, nearly all hypothetical gods and devils would not create universe, while the most of the rest would create heaven or hell right away. Universe is natural, it spontaneously evolved life.

No that's not the case; intelligent creatures are interested in information; IE other intelligent creatures. Its just natural to want to fill the emptiness with something.

Oh yes, it is the case. You are merely substituting one word with another and think new word brings in explanation. Wake up!!

God is fine tuned to be exactly in the way of whatever properties you imagine it to have, so fine tuned to be interested in information, thus fine-tuned to create life.

And also, god creating the universe would be artificial, while it is only natural for the nature of the universe to naturally produce life, obviously.

There is no reason for God's existence

There you go, congratulations! You are free now, enjoy.

Was there a chance for god to not create the universe?

Is the thought I am having right now certain in how it is?

Thought involves time and memory, so just by having memory be a subject of malfunction, for example, there is already a possibility to draw wrong conclusion even after the whole thought process was going fine up until that point. Plus whatever other possible ways our thoughts can be corrupted that we may not even know about.

So no, there is no absolute, or any kind of certainty in a single thought by itself, apart from how being ‘self-evident’ may be considered a measure of truth. However, if you write down as you think, and then further extend, derive and combine consequences of your conclusions, then consistency and practical applicability increase certainty to the point where it becomes true as much as it matters, i.e practically true, and I guess that’s the kind of truth we are after even if it is actually false in some wider metaphysical context.