I side more with Harry Hindu regarding the basics of logic. I think a chimpanzee's ability to make logiclike differentiations amongst perceptions isn't fundamentally different from human beings, but the sphere of qualitative phenomena its logical or "protological" mind is molded to focus on and intuit about differs, and attention span as partially driven by intentionality may also be somewhat inferior. My post is probably way too long for this forum, but perhaps it decisively resolves the issue, so why not? You guys dig philosophy, maybe you'll read it. And its not really THAT long. If any of the terminology is mystifying, the OP of my
Categories of Human Thought thread probably clarifies. Go ahead and critique any of it you want!
Like humans, songbirds have facility with structure concepts, for they erect nests that are intricate masses of sticks and brush, clearly envisioning how parts fit together as a whole. Beavers display a similar behavioral repertoire when they build dams, squirrels as they construct their abodes, and even though many of the more highly cognitive mammals have much different ways of obtaining shelter, perhaps merely digging and adorning a hole in the ground, the modest adaptability each of these organisms have to differing times and places over the span of their lives and ranges entails at least rudimentary protomechanistic reasoning from novel cause to imagined effect. In what measure this springs from linkages between cognitive centers of structural and linear protologicality in other species besides humans is unknown, but if there is any analogizability it is obvious that humans are far superior in this regard. Our species adapts protologically structural thinking to vastly more and larger scale material contexts, and humanity’s abstract (extrapolative and interpolative) inferencing in the domains of both sign and image symbolism is much more capable. Even children of average intelligence catch on to the infinitely recursive nature of numeral systems after exposure to sequences of only a few numbers, and have no trouble incorporating these linguisticlike concepts as quantitative labels for the proportions and additional basic properties of shapes. Chimpanzees, our closest hereditary relatives, can do a biologically respectable job of object manipulation as adults if utility for behaviors such as food-acquisition becomes apparent, but applying abstract signs to figures, then deriving mathematical principles according to which these figures are systematically permuted in infinitely variable ways, a purely conceptual language of objects, is completely beyond them.
Expressive intentionality of the human psyche has its evolutionary roots in ancestral species’ aptitude for symbolic recognitions, evinced by thousands of additional biological lineages as well. Even moderately advanced cognition can experience numerous phenomenal attributes as symbolic of causal properties in the environment, learning, predicting, putting two and two together by inspection of indirect evidence. Organisms pick up on each other’s scents, tracks, sounds and so on, from which is constructed a mental model of behavioral tendencies, whether for hunting, eluding predation, or seeking an intraspecies social opportunity. Likewise, weather and the body’s own homeostatic states signal seasonal exigency, inducing activities such as migration and hibernation that are carried out with greater survival-related efficiency and success when an animal’s thinking is more capable. To illustrate this, we can simply compare a Monarch butterfly to a grizzly bear: these butterflies manage to migrate thousands of miles, completely beyond the capacity of a bear species that, for analogous purposes, can do no more than hole up in the vicinity, but the ascendance of grizzly intelligence was such that this animal became almost impervious to death by either starvation or violence, its food-finding and danger avoidance being rather cunning and resourceful, while thousands upon thousands of Monarchs die each year from a relative absence of foresight. In general, an individual mammal’s prospects prove better than an insect’s with its much smaller brain, for implications of relevant environmental patterns and perception generally are in the former case more interpretable.
The primary precondition for graduating from recognition of attributes as symbols to symbolic expression is of course robust intentionality. Intention evolved as mode selecting awareness for internal control of brain states, empowering the mind to align with environments in more context-sensitive ways while also starting to place further checks on the reflexivity of stimulus/response, beyond simple sensitization and habituation, so that delayed gratification in service of more causally efficacious outcomes became possible along with diversification in the repertory of behaviors, altogether increasing adaptability of individual organisms to variabilities and nuances of circumstance. Attention span and improvisational thought advanced in some species until a sort of primordial introspection arose, which assessed cause and effect entirely absent environmental cuing, by self-directed conception conjoined to perceptual stream of consciousness.
In most natural settings, strong selection pressures are exerted on the introspectively problem-solving self to target particular practical objectives, whether of feeding, mating, sheltering, safety, etc., limiting the creativity of most organisms. This is clear from observation of how vocalizing bird species have a more economical range of calls when their lives are spent in the wilderness, deprived of the ample food and relative security usually afforded by close contact with humans. Cognition in these cases is honed for a lifecycle of overriding material requisites, with libido canalized almost exclusively towards particular functional needs. When introduced to captivity, provided that basic essentials are readily accessible and stressors as well as other preoccupations minimized, many of these birds start to sing more inventively, as if entertaining themselves during idle stretches by novel riffing. We of course see the same phenomenon in our pets, albeit often less related to conceptualization: when certain dog breeds are left to their own devices, they incessantly chew for no purpose but recreation; some cats will paw a toy mouse around the room and repeatedly pounce to mimic the pleasure of hunting; a hamster has great fun mock scurrying on its wheel. Offering pets diversions that have no problem-solving stipulations places little strain on their cognition, so that domesticated recreating does not perforce incline towards extraordinary intelligence, but in order for a wild animal to come upon the same level of open-ended idle time, it must be smart enough to have mastered its environment. There is much besides an organism’s wits that figures into this type of behavioral supremacy, such as sparsities of both threat and deprivation due to size, speed or group congregation, but when some or all of these factors happen to intersect with substantive introspection potential, the devotion of libido to self-amusement of peak imaginativeness along with physiological dynamics such as neoteny can select for evolution of an identity-complex in the organism’s mind, a self-awareness constructed from keenly observing and reflecting upon its own experience.
The Homo genus was quite sophisticated in this respect, harnessing nature in biologically unprecedented ways with a commanding technological insightfulness. Consciousness in these species was becoming able to discriminate more obscure relationships between many kinds of phenomena by introspection-informed observation of immediate patterns in perceptual content within an expanding framework of structural protologicality. Hominin minds simultaneously moved ever closer to conceptually resolving linear protologicality into the narrative thought process of explicit expressiveness we know as logical inferencing, which would one day interface written symbolism and structural abstraction within a culture of rationalist empiricism in order to disseminate high technology worldwide, thus far the apex of humanity’s self-aware competency for analyzing and utilizing environments. But before all of this possibility could be realized, the human race had to evolve its archetypical language faculties.
The key physiological factor was evolution of brain regions that interface cognition with vocalizing for the sake of articulated utterance, what we know as speech. This mental scaffolding that fine-tuned unconscious processing, intentional thinking, the forms and modes of meaningful statements, and facial coordination to complement each other during acts of verbalizing is of course exceptionally versatile, adopting a plethora of different configurations depending on expressive context, the heterogeneous reality of which formal grammar and analysis of logical argument do not even begin to capture. At base, this structural parameterization is made up of an intuitive grammar roughly divided into conventional parts of speech with very flexible attachment to meaning in many cases, and a sort of expression-centric formulating of protologicality, distantly approximated by the basics of formal logic. A satisfactory theorizing of these underlying structures calls for punctilious research on a level that linguists have probably not yet even dabbled in, a task for science of the future.
Individual and relationship psychology most likely contributed to the evolution of language in multiple ways. First, basic desire to vocalize is of course necessary, a characteristic shared with thousands upon thousands of nonhuman species. The Homo genus must have begun reflecting on its own vocal behavior as it became more thoughtful and introspective, resulting in primordial cognizance of utterance’s structure and eventually an implicit awareness of expressive sound as involving something like technicalities, which caused the patterns of utterance to grow more consistent. Conceptualizing of utterances as a sort of phenomenal object and then a construction took hold, so that articulation acquired greater aesthetic impact, with more pleasurable, skillful, difficult and beautiful expression held in higher esteem, impressions no doubt stimulating much mimesis in prehistoric clans and tribes. At this point, two simultaneous threads of evolutionary development must have been in effect: the most functionally and aesthetically popular of these species’ expressive tendencies unfolded in a train of progressive social conventions, advancing language as technological and artistic protoculture, while any mutations conferring superior expressive ability would have quickly and dramatically improved language via behavioral mimesis. Thus, reflective observation, aesthetic sensibility, cognitive mutation, imitation and protocultural traditionalizing moved the Homo genus towards linguistic communication, a behavioral trait that is crucial to anatomically modern Homo sapiens’ higher cultures and which likely played a primary role in bridging the gap to our much more expressively symbolic ways of life.
The first semblance of human language was probably short declarative statements, then rudimentary conversation which hominins and early Homo sapiens took part in primarily as recreational diversion. With humans at least, expression became elaborate enough in its structure to permit storytelling, and the constructing of narrative is of course a core feature of not just casual but more ceremonious forms of socializing, with many prehistoric and historic tales alike serving as culture-defining myths, ritualistically retold, reenacted, shared for millennia as part of basic public consciousness. At the same time as intention to express oneself and the values of one’s culture molded verbalization, speech acts likewise selected for the structure of thought. Linear protologicality of the introspective mind grew increasingly organized while it interacted with linguistic behavior, perceived more and more as chains of discrete syntagma within definite yet infinitely generative meaning. The open-ended iterativity of narrational sound thus coevolved with a cognitively internalized knack for complementary iterative conceptualizing, the abstractional apprehension of languagelike symbolic sequences and further distributional arrangements of symbols in the form of more habile inferencelike extensionalizing and eventually infinite schemas. This affinity for the abstract ultimately prompted humans to invent infinitely generative writing systems, a seminal technical method of civilization.
One of the most significant benefits accrued from linguistic behavior was greater flexibility in the boundaries of social relationships. Full-bodied language made thinking of almost any complexity or novelty provisional of being expressed with explicitness, while simultaneously generating conditions under which unprecedented thoughts and behaviors are admissible. Human bonding does not merely rally around collective recognition of psychologically obvious means by which to satiate basic drives, such as in hunting, self-defense, mating, familial caretaking or additional relatively compulsion-based activities, in essence crude practical need, but conveys concepts and reflects upon the insights of fellow individuals via the medium of language in a cerebrality and tolerance for comprehensional difficulty or obscurity that is unparalleled by organic life on our planet. Even the most arcane experiencing can diffuse into the general cultural milieu as humans attempt to express entirely unconventionalized and even nonfunctional ideations, with brute negative feedback attenuated by the more intellectualized prerogative of linguistic discoursing, so that groundrules of mutuality do not inhibit independence and diversity necessary for the highest level reasoning. Humans are highly innovative while nonetheless managing to subsist in extremely normalized, eons-old communities.
Convening the whole of human cognizing towards collective purposes succeeded in tightly binding individuals of prehistoric clans and tribes on numerous experiential planes: members of our species were not only drawn together by feeding, reproduction and protection, but also from out of more conceptual communality such as shared beliefs, spiritual and symbolic rites, gods, technological methods and inventiveness, rituals of many kinds, conversational fraternizing, context-variant manners and mores, all inculcated by way of teaching, learning and reflecting over the span of decades and centuries. This arranging of human life by biologically precocious cognition kept tribes close-knit even as languages and traditions underwent evolutionary drift, which was a huge boon to in-group solidarity, but also a driving force for rapid divergence of separate cultures, so that when human communities lost contact, they could arrive at discrepancies in conceptualizing, expression and practice bordering on incompatibility within only several generations. This was a blessing and a curse, for human decision making and behavior are massively adaptable, but we can tend towards misunderstanding, obstinacy and confrontation during the preliminary stages of intergroup interactions.
I think this explains in a general way the evolutionary period between pre-Homo sapiens protologicality and the uniquely linguistic, creative protological capacities of anatomically modern, prehistoric humans. Agree?