How can someone become gay, without becoming homosexual, if to be gay is just to be homosexual? That makes no sense.

And clearly since to be be member of the set of things referred to by "gay" is just to be homosexual, and they already were, then they already were members of this set.

Of course it doesn't make sense. You think people became gay when a new sense of the word 'gay' was coined? No-- they were already gay. Furthermore, many people were gay thousands of years before any such word existed.

They became appropriate referents of the word 'gay' when the new word was formed, but as I said, 'gay' does not mean 'appropriate referent of the word 'gay'', which is the underlying prejudice you are holding onto. Rather, it means attracted to the same sex. They were already attracted to the same sex, and so were already gay, long before they were called 'gay,' if indeed that is what the word means.

So to be a horse is have to properties A, B, and C and to be a rabbit is to have properties X, Y, and Z. — Michael

What do you mean, 'so?' There is no 'so' about it: being a horse consisting in having certain properties is not causally dependent on people choosing to call creatures with those properties by the name 'horse.' Again, they were already horses.

At T2 we decide to name those things that have the properties in the first set "rabbit" and those things that have the properties in the second set "horse". So to be a horse is to have properties X, Y, and Z and to be a rabbit is to have properties A, B, and C. — Michael

No, what the fuck? You literally just said that changing what words we call animals would change whether they are rabbits and horses around. Assuming that properties of the animals themselves don't change, you just said that the ones that bore the same properties at t1 that used to be horses will now be rabbits, and vice-versa, by virtue of our swapping the names around.

Surely you see that this is insane?

At T1, Animal 1 has properties A, B, and C, and so is a horse. At T2, Animal 1 has properties A, B, and C, and so is a rabbit. — Michael

This makes no sense whatsoever. If it has the same properties, then it hasn't changed, and so it can't have changed from a horse to a rabbit. The only way to change from a horse to a rabbit is to change properties, but you've stipulated the properties haven't changed.

It is not like saying that. Common nouns are property-denoting, while names are not. There is of course a sense in which you are still Michael, even if we consider counterfactual situations we consider that your name has changed -- this is obvious from the fact that even in considering such counterfactual situations, we can still call you Michael in the current one: so we can say, 'If he had his name changed to Andrew, Michael would be pretty upset,' or, 'in this imagined scenario, Michael's name is Andrew,' where in both caes we intend the name 'Michael' to scope beneath the modal. However, there is ultimately nothing to being a Michael than being an appropriate referent of 'Michael.'

However, being a horse requires you to be a certain kind of creature -- it does not require you to be called 'horse,' nor does your being called 'horse' make you a horse. This is obvious from the fact that there were horses before the word 'horse' existed, and further calling them something different would not make them not horses, nor would calling rabbits horses make them horses, and not rabbits. Consider that if your position were correct, we could literally turn rabbits into horses by changing the way we called them. But this is not so.

You confuse "to be a horse is to have qualities A, B, and C because we use the word "horse" to name those things which have qualities A, B, and C" with "X has qualities X, Y, and Z iff we use the word 'horse' to name it" (as if calling a thing by that name gives it those properties and not calling a thing by that name removes those properties from it). I'm saying the former, not the latter. Nobody says the latter. — Michael

But your own position is committing you to the latter, which is what I am trying to show you. That you deny it doesn't matter. If your position is:

"To be a horse is to have qualities A, B and C because we use the word 'horse' to name things which have qualities A, B, and C:" it follows from this that if we use the word 'horse' instead to name things that have the qualities of rabbits, then rabbits would be horses. And since they were not horses before, surely even you will admit, you are committed to saying we can turn rabbits into horses by calling them 'horse.' But since we can't, your position is wrong.

Obviously people do more than manipulate symbols when they use language: for one, they employ these symbols in social settings for various purposes.

As the old analogy goes, a Martian who knew how to manipulate a chess board to produce all legal moves would still not know how to play, without understanding that one is trying to win. Focusing on symbol manipulation only ignores semantics and pragmatics, without which language is incoherent, and whittled away to an idle assembly of abstractions.

You'd have to ask a biologist that one (my hope is that in this tedium you see the error).

Eventually you're going to have to concede that we use the word "horse" to talk about this type of animal rather than another, and so that's why this type of animal is a horse rather than something else.

Again, no, horses aren't horses because we call them 'horses.' That's dumb, because they would go on being horses even if we called them something else. In fact, most people in history have called them something totally different, yet they were still horses for all that.

U. G. Krishnamurti - Mind Is a Myth

And I would answer, because those are qualities typical of horses, and not rabbits.

It depends on what the animal is. If it was a horse versus a rabbit, I'd mention the size, the shape of the legs, the mane, etc.

Then why did you ask me what grief is? Presumably you wanted an answer, but don't want me to kill your family. — Michael

I asked what you thought it was, or were claiming to in guise of philosopher.

So given two animals, which one do I point to? The horse? Which one is the horse? — Michael

If you show me the two animals, I can show you by pointing! I certainly don't say 'the one I call 'horse,'' which would be stupid.

Can you? Explain grief to me. Explain understanding to me. — Michael

The best way to explain grief to you would be to kill one of your family members.

It's the only answer I can give. My answers can only ever be in English. You either understand the English words I use (which is to know when to use them) or you don't. — Michael

Except that's NEVER the answer anyone gives unless they're a philosopher. Instead, they do things like POINT TO HORSES.

Yes, and as I said, I assume you know the answer to the question "what is grief?". — Michael

But I don't know the answer because you are a philosopher and have idiosyncractic, non-intuitive ideas about what it means to understand things, for example, or what it means to feel grief. And you cannot explain those conceptions to me.

I meant to quote "grief" and "horses" in that sentence: The only way to understand "grief" or "horses" is to know in what sort of empirical situation you would say "I'm grieving" or "this is a horse". — Michael

And whats situations are those? Presumably, you must answer, situations involving grief and horses. Which are what...? Those in which people use the word 'grief' and 'horses?' No; that is not an appropriate answer.

And there are lots of things that are not named "grief", so in saying that grief is that thing we call "grief" I've ruled them out. — Michael

It rules out nothing, because to know what it rules out, you'd have to already know the answer to precisely the question you just asked.

But as I've said before, in the case of grief there are no component qualities, and in the case of horses there are no necessary and sufficient conditions. The only way to understand grief or horses is to know in what sort of empirical situation you would say "I'm grieving" and "this is a horse". — Michael

But this is horseshit. For one, you can understand them without speaking English, or without English even existing! For another, you can understand grief and horses say by feeling grief or by riding horses!

Yes, it's uninformative. But how can I provide an informative account? Your response "grief is a feeling" is also uninformative because plenty of feelings aren't of grief. Which feeling is grief? — Michael

Just because it isn't maximally informative doesn't mean it's uninformative: there are also lots of things that are not feelings that this rules out.

Also, your offer is not just uninformative, but outright misleading: when someone asks you what something is, they're asking you to characterize it, viz. to give an account of what sorts of qualities make it that sort of thing. But your calling something a 'horse' in no way makes it a horse. So it is not an appropriate answer to the question.

And knowing what falls under "rabbit", "mane", "small arms", etc.? You can't avoid the fact that when push comes to shove knowing what these words means is knowing when to use them. At some point you tie them to some empirical situation in which such words are the appropriate response. — Michael

Yes, you tie them to empirical situations, but the relevant criteria are then what they look like, how they feel, and how they act, not circular appeals to linguistic behavior!

I'm not saying that grief means "thing I call 'grief'". I'm saying that grief is the thing I call 'grief'. — Michael

Not necessarily. Which is why when someone asks what grief is, and so wants a kind of characterization or definition, saying that grief is what you call 'grief' is completely uninformative. And notice that that is what you did to me when I asked.

And what does it mean to understand what sort of things fall under "horse"? — Michael

That you know, for example, that things like rabbits, which don't have manes, and have prominent hind legs and small arms, don't fall under it, whereas things with giant penises do.

And what does understanding the description consist of? Knowing the empirical situation in which such a description is the appropriate thing to use. — Michael

No. Understanding the description is understanding what sorts of things fall under it.

And when it comes to something like grief or red or happiness, I can't even break it down into some components parts (like I could do in a generalized way with horses). All I can do is say that they're the things that I name "grief", "red", or "happiness", and hopefully there are things that you name "grief", "red", and "happiness", and so you understand what I mean. — Michael

And yet there is no way in which 'grief' means 'thing I call 'grief'.' This is a gross misunderstanding.

I can't list the conditions that must be satisfied to make something a horse. What I can do, however,is ask you to consider the sort of thing that you'd have to see to respond with "that's a horse". Well, that thing is a horse. — Michael

No, you can't do that, because then there's just a question, okay, so what the hell do you call horse?

In response to that, you'd do what a SANE person would do, and POINT TO A HORSE. I find it unbelievable that you think that "consider the sort of thing that you'd have to see to respond with "that's a horse"" is something people ever actually do in response to these questions (they don't), or that it is in any way elucidating (it isn't).

If you ask "what's a horse?" and someone responds "the thing you call 'horse'" you know they're (1) an idiot or (2) a philosopher.

I'm not saying "X is a horse iff I name it 'horse'". — Michael

Consider, you might ask me what a horse is. I'd say it's the thing I'd name "horse". — Michael

iff clauses are definitions. If someone is asking you what a horse is, they're roughy asking a definitional claim: what are the conditions that make something a horse?

"The things I call 'horse'" is obviously a totally uncooperative answer to that question, and everyone except OLP philosophers understands this.

I'm not saying that if we stop calling this animal "horse" then it disappears. I don't know how you've managed to derive that from what I've said. — Michael

If a horse is that which you call 'horse,' it follows that if you do not call anything 'horse,' there are no horses. If there used to be horses but aren't any more, that means all the horses disappeared. QED.

Then how would I answer it? Perhaps by showing you a horse? — Michael

YES. That is what a SANE person would do, as opposed to a brain-damaged OLP philosopher.

So let's say I show you two animals. Which one is the horse and which one is the rabbit? The horse is the one that, if shown to you, would predictably have you respond with "yes, that is a horse". — Michael

No, the horse is the one that HAS A MANE. Christ.

Consider, you might ask me what a horse is. I'd say it's the thing I'd name "horse". — Michael

Then I'd ask if you were an idiot. That's not the appropriate way to answer that question, obviously.

Horses aren't just the things we call horses -- for example, if we stopped calling anything 'horse,' there would still be horses. Unless you have the incredible power of making all horses disappear by never uttering 'horse.'

I'm sorry if my fuse is short, but I'm so tired of this line of thought.

No. I didn't say that "I am grieving" is the only appropriate response. — Michael

???

So what is grief then???

I didn't say that. I'm asking what evidence shows that computers can't. Marchesk said that there is evidence. I think it's just dogma. — Michael

The evidence is that they display none of the qualities that make us think people feel, such as rigorously inspiring empathy.

It means that if when presented with something I consider "I am grieving" to be the appropriate response then that thing is grief. — Michael

So people who don't speak English can't feel grief?

And feelings are? And what evidence shows that humans can have them but computers can't? — Michael

I understand what a feeling is better than what a symbol is. We think other people feel because we relate to them in certain ways, and we don't relate in those ways to computers.

Are you seriously claiming computers feel?

Perhaps the input to which "grief" is the output? And if we go with something like the James-Lange theory then the input is physiological arousal. — Michael

Grief is the input to which "grief" is the output? As in, the English word? What does that even mean?

How about this: grief is a feeling.

Whatever it is, it is obviously not a mechanical response with an output such as "it's raining" upon feeling moisture. I take it we can agree that is not a serious hypothesis.

What exactly do you think grief is?

This sort of thing seems disingenuous -- if someone honestly claimed that if there was a computer designed to display 'it's raining' when water hits it, it thereby understood that it was raining whenever it was, it would seem to me he just doesn't know what 'understand' means.

Or think of it this way -- tables calculate pressure by their tolerance for pressure before they break. So if they break, they've in a way outputted 'I'm broken,' or a cipher of it -- so do tables understand that they've been broken?

That's what mathematical proofs are, right?

No; that is what proofs in a formal deductive system are. The most interesting mathematical proofs are not formal.

Knowing what drives the proposals for the rules of symbolic manipulation.

You won't get far on the harder tests with that level of 'understanding.'

A funny thing about this is that no one is actually taught math that way. Children aren't taught to output certain numbers when certain other numbers appear to the side of + -- no, they're taught to count, then learn addition on analogy to counting, then multiplication on analogy of multiple additions, then exponents on analogy to multiple multiplications.

Why all this hairsplitting and apologia? Jut be an anti-natalist. Birth sucks, life sucks, we all know it.

Most people, I'd hazard to say, are content most of the time, and would affirm that that is the case, if asked. — Sapientia

You have to get up pretty early in the morning to believe this. Jesus.

That has been my experience. I tend to believe now that reading large amounts of secondary literature is actually positively harmful not only to your enjoyment, but to your understanding as well.

This is philosophy, we don't care about random opinions. It's not my job to assume your random opinion as the default and then try to move you out of it. You believe this or that, or can't believe this or that, no one cares. You don't have any reason for believing or any way to defend it.

Okay? I don't care what you believe or what is believable to you.

I don't think the mere appeal to prehistory suffices, though, which is all these criticisms ever amount to.

The past, if you like, is like a rule of thumb: it's a schema for extending the way something can be manipulated 'backward.' It's projected by experience, not something that was 'really there' as if before it.

On the contrary it is in a way all we experience. We tell stories about it in refracted light because like the sun, you can't look at it too long. So we think our desires and strife are 'out there,' and that there are 'things,' which we come along and perceive the qualities of. What we take to be inquiry (science, philosophy) is actually just a frustrated shifting about of these struggles, usually to no end.

I think the worries about distant light and the ancestral problem show that the Schop. passage hasn't really been 'gotten.'

I agree that time is a kind of veil of Maya, and that life as experienced is timeless. Not eternal or immortal, but timeless, and time is a kind of projection born from a 'momentary' or timeless suffering. Schop. seems to think that individual acts of the will are experienced in time, though, and so we can never feel the thing in itself as totally removed from the veils of perception. On this point, I think he also should have stuck to his guns: we don't experience our individual will as acts succeeding one another in linear time. We might try to place it in time, but that is in retrospect.

That Schopenhauer passage is classic. I think you can divide philosophers roughly into the ones that 'get' that passage and the ones that don't.

What I found silly in your post was the idea that the Oscars don't matter because you think they have no artistic importance. — csalisbury

Isn't the point of the Oscars that they're supposed to have artistic influence? Doesn't the fact that the don't make their pretensions ridiculous on their own terms?

Well, quite obviously attitudes influence media portrayals. — csalisbury

But it's common to think of all social and political issues as 'top down:' some group of people designs the way the laws work and so the way society is run, and therefore any flaws in society are traceable to bad decisions, presumably made by bad people whom we need to shame into behaving correctly, so we can design society the right way. Analogously, social attitudes are built top-down: the way we think about people governs the way we treat them, and representations of people govern how we think about them. Thus, identity politics is the most basic form of politics, and representation and existence or legitimacy are taken to be deeply entwined. So you may think this is obvious, but it seems not to be obvious to many people. Or if it is, their direction of attack makes no sense (and don't give me the 'feedback loop' nonsense: if they really think it's a loop, why is their approach so unidirectional?)

Are you really skeptical of the claim that media portrayals influence attitudes or do you just not like the way some people talk about media influence? — csalisbury

Yes. I think by and large media is a slave to those who consume it, and those who craft the media are impotent to enforce tastes deliberately on those they broadcast to. In other words, the only reason bad movies exist is because people watch them, and the second they stop is the second they will cease to exist. Media portrayals that don't reflect pre-existing prejudices will be destroyed, usually before they are even made, rather than change the prejudices to match the portrayal.

*This is where you can say 'yeah but the *material conditions* are what most urgently need to be addressed. I don't disagree with this, but, considering the only way to address suffering you seem to find permissible is antinatalism (the mass espousal of which I'd hope you admit is sheer fantasy) I have trouble taking anything you say about changing conditions as sincere. — csalisbury

The mass espousal of anti-natalism is not a fantasy. Statistically, a large portion of the world are de facto antinatalists: they do not produce enough children to continue the human population. So in Western societies the birth rate is not even replacing the population, and their populatins are literally dying due to a de facto antinatalist trend. The material conditions that facilitate this are economic freedom and access to birth control: that is, precisely when people can control when they want to have children, and have the economic and social freedom not do have them, they don't. If you believe that material conditions will steadily improve, then you are hard pressed not to believe people will start having less children. If all the world was the West (which it may soon be, how things are going), we would literally need artificial incentives just to keep people producing children. Having children sucks. People promote it nominally, but they don't put their money where their mouth is when it comes right down to it. If they don't have to have kids, most of the time they don't.