Because I'm right about everything.

Yes.

I'm convinced a career in philosophy doesn't make you any better at thinking. Any time a philosopher opines on anything to the public, I cringe.

I have sympathies with this view, and something like this metaphysical picture was the one I came to naturally early in my teens, before I ever knew what philosophy, idealism, solipsism, etc. were, and much of what I've thought since has been variations on it and trying to come to terms with it. The 'solution' isn't odd, as I see it, unless you insist that you somehow encompass everything, which is precisely the solipsistic impulse that's trying to be excluded.

It doesn't strike me as at all implausible that we can influence and be influenced by things that we have no idea about and no way of ever coming into intimate contact with. In fact this view of things seems to gel quite naturally with life experience. Some sort of metaphysical picture like this would be what is most 'true to life:' but philosophers, in my experience, are less concerned with 'truth to life' than abstract conditions of self-consistency and consistency with prejudice of one sort or another.

And yes, there's a tie-in to Leibniz, who was, frankly, a genius, and the Monadology is probably the greatest work of hardcore, no-nonsense ambitious speculative metaphysics there is.

Can't an experience be foundational without being able to be known that they are in every (or even most) instances? But yeah, I think this is orthogonal.

So then: how do we know whether we really know? — csalisbury

We don't; but then, epistemologists usually don't frame the question this way, but rather in terms of 'Do we know?' or 'how do we know?' Some sort of sliding happens between knowledge and knowledge of knowledge (some people even think the so-called 'KK' principle is valid).

No, just wondering how SX wants to make use of it.

Yep, I've got it. So the question is the extent to which having a value for one argument for each level is comparable to knowing the original function to begin with, or what conceptually this buys you.

The point is that you only need to know the value at some point for the multiple integrations, not the function itself.

Without knowing the original function? — Agustino

I think, for the series, you must know the value of the function at some point, not the function itself. But then you have to know the derivative values at that point, and so on down the line.

I don't understand Taylor series, but I'd still be curious to know what's to be said about the simple linear example. Doesn't a derivative of '3' determine an infinite class of linear functions, one for each y-intercept?

Edit: no, I get it. You would need to know one point of the line plus its slope for the series to get off the ground, and this uniquely determines a line. But then in this case it's trivial, since knowing this is tantamount to knowing the original function.

So, to illustrate, suppose you had 4x^3 + 3x^2 + 2x + 1 to describe motion, distance v. time. Your derivatives for the velocity, acceleration, and jerk would be as follows:

1) 12x^2 + 6x + 2
2) 24x + 6
3) 24

At each derivative, you lose a piece of information, and clearly there is no way to construct the original function from just 24, or from any intermediate step. For '24' erases the y-intercept of the linear function that comes before it, but this intercept is crucial for determining the character of the original function: that's how you get to the 3x^2. So from each derivative you can reconstruct part of the previous function, and less and less of it at each successive stage. You won't be able to tell how fast something is moving from '24,' nor where it should be located at each moment in time.

The original function, however, can be stated independently of the derivatives.

I'm a little lost here, but the claim that you can generate a polynomial function from its differential is wrong.

For example, f(x) = 3x + 1 and f(x) = 3x + 2 are different functions, but their derivative is the same: f(x) = 3. You cannot go 'backwards' from 3 to either of these lines, not even around a single point (they're parallel and share no points in common). The lines can be specified without reference to the differential, as I just did.

Also, the claim that the differential is not a number is confusing: if by 'differential' you mean the result of performing the differential operation on some function, then of course it's not a number, it's another function. The result of differentiating is of the same sort as the thing differentiated, it's just of a lower power.

If by differential you mean the infinitesimal, I don't know what people think about it generally, but certainly you don't need to treat it as a number. You seem to be saying you don't want to treat it as an ideal limit, either, but then, I'm not sure what you're proposing instead.

I don't recall my calculus well, but so far as I know, the derivative still uses the function-argument schema, and I'm not sure what you were trying to say about it: the dx/dy are essentially notations for explicitly binding variables. The rate of change with one value w.r.t. another still just means, if the argument were to change 'infinitesimally,' how the value would change, and then extrapolating from that.

I should also note that none of this is particularly 'out of the box': the sciences have been operating in this domain for decades, and continental philosophy has never taken predicate logic seriously. I would suggest instead that the whole institution of formal logic has on the contrary 'boxed itself in', playing formal-logical games without actually attending to the world about it. — StreetlightX

I think the general continental illiteracy with modern technical advances in logic is unfortunate. Even if there are metaphysical qualms, it's a useful skill to have, and has lots of applications in computer science and linguistics and so on.

Alright, sure. I guess it's not clear to me what's at stake or what you want, but I can sympathize with thinking outside of an established framework. It still doesn't make clear to me what is special about a relation that we cannot also say about a property, though, which is where your OP began.

Also, if you believe Plato, anyway, the becoming-privileging view, where relations precede individuals, is far more ancient than the substance view. It probably has mythological precursors as well. I'd be inclined to think about it in terms of suffering, but that's just me.

The experience of non-veridicality precedes the idea of veridicality. The very idea of veridicality would be meaningless if we hadn't already experienced being wrong. (it's an anstoss type of logic.) — csalisbury

I don't know, why? I think it's a coherent position to say that there are no non-veridical experiences, even if there are veridical ones. We might draw certain inferences or get certain expectations from veridical experiences that are unlicensed, and so have our expectations disappointed, but the issue with non-veridicality seems to be that realist assumptions about perception engender their possibility, not that we learn about non-veridicality from experience and so project veridicality back onto it.

The sense datum theorist seems to me to be seeking a realm in which act and object unite, making realist metaphysics of perception irrelevant, and hence the notion of non-veridicality that accompanies it. It always seemed to me that skeptical arguments about non-veridicality are only coherent, and are meant to be, in response to realist assumptions.

Veridicality doesn't seem to hinge on this – what you see is what you get.

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Although I will say that the objection as Sellars outlines it -- that empirical knowledge can't rest on a secure foundation if it must come from a class of things that has non-veridical members that can't be distinguished surely by any mark -- presupposes that in order for knowledge to have a secure foundation, there must be a sure way of knowing that one knows in any particular case. But this just doesn't follow if we're interested in knowledge, not knowledge of that knowledge. It might be that we know all sorts of things, even if for any particular case we can't infallibly (or even reliably!) know that we know this.

this 'taking part' or 'participating in' is itself a relation - and it's no good to account for a relation in terms of a relation. — StreetlightX

terms themselves become defined by their relations — StreetlightX

This is possible, but I'm not sure what it buys you. For example, one can 'Montague-lift' an individual, to turn it into what's called a 'generalized quantifier -' that is, the set of properties true of that individual (which includes its relations to other things - these being properties once you saturate the first term). In fact, the originator of the device, Richard Montague, proposed that the meaning of say a proper name is not the individual which it denotes, but rather the set of properties that individual bears.

You could also create a logic in which properties are primary and individuals are secondary, reversing the role of function and object we've had since Frege. But I think ultimately this is a terminological quibble and it's unclear to me how it genuinely rephrases the problem. The point is that properties and individuals interact in a certain functional way: whether one takes individuals or properties/relations as fundamental probably won't change that.

"If relations are external to their terms, and do not depend on them, then the relations cannot change without one (or both) of the terms changing. A resembles B, Peter resembles Paul: [if] this relation is external to its terms, it is contained neither in the concept of Peter nor in the concept of Paul. If A ceases to resemble B, the relation has changed, but this means that the concept of A (or B) has changed as well. If properties belong to something solid, relations are far more fragile, and are inseparable from a perpetual becoming — StreetlightX

I still don't understand the special status granted to relations here. Again, a property is a relation, just with an arity of 1 rather than 2, and everything said about it here could be said of properties as well.

Mmm. I think we're done.

Also, reading comprehension is interpretation. — Terrapin Station

Interpretation can't happen until reading comprehension is complete. A 'criticism' that misreads a paper on the most basic level is not even a criticism; it hasn't yet understood well enough to be in a position to criticize.

Such is, for example, the 'criticism' that Sellars' 'therefore' in his quoted paragraphs is a non sequitur; it misreads the text in such a fundamental way, in thinking that Sellars is there making an argument, and not speaking in the voice of the sense datum theorist, that it is not a cogent criticism. To think that Sellars is here criticizing the sense datum theorist for not being rigorous enough in excluding the possibility of non-veridicality is not yet to engage with this paper, because that is not what's going on.

Again, I think this is a matter of reading comprehension, not interpretation, which is important to a reading group.

So your argument that Sellars counts non-inferential knowledge of particular matters of fact might logically imply the existence of sense data is sufficient for noncognitive sense data throwing light on the foundations of empirical knowledge is ________? — Terrapin Station

There's no argument to be had: Sellars outright admits that even if sensation of sense data doesn't constitute knowledge, it might nonetheless shed light on the foundations of empirical knowledge (i.e. by being a logically necessary condition for empirical knowledge), contrary to your claim. You essentially are saying the opposite of what Sellars says in the paper.

Again, that reason that makes it sufficient to throw a light on the foundations of empirical knowledge in Sellars opinion, in your view, is _______? — Terrapin Station

Are you asking me how it is that isolating a necessary condition for the existence of something sheds light on its foundations?

So who is he supposedly paraphrasing "baldly" anyway? — Terrapin Station

The sense datum theorist. Hence why the very paragraphs end with conclusions about sense data, and right after he says that not all sense datum theorists have been subject to certain confusions, but that they have formed an integral part of the tradition.

In first-order logics, properties are in fact just treated as relations: they're just relations of a specific arity (1). What I am trying to see is how the change from an arity of 1 to 2 changes anything, or removes dependence on the 'terms' or 'individuals' that take part in properties and relations.

Peter being taller than Paul isn't, I would say, a property of the dyad <Peter, Paul>. Perhaps I would say that the dyad takes part in the relation 'taller than,' or that this relation is true of, or holds of, <Peter, Paul>. 'Taller than Paul' is a (one-place, intrinsic) property of Peter, of course.

What does it mean for a relation to be external to its terms, in a way a property isn't? If I think of a property as a set of individuals, those individuals of which the property is true, and think of a relation as a set of ordered pairs of individuals, then it seems they depend in the same way upon the relevant individuals, it's just that one involves one individual, while the other involves two.

Well, regarding the first point of disagreement, I've provided what I think is pretty damning textual evidence against you. To repeat, this:

He's assuming that for the concept of sense data to throw light on the foundations of empirical knowledge, sense data must itself be knowledge

Cannot be right, given that he says this:

Yet it would be hasty to conclude that this alternative [that is, alternative (a), that sensing is not itself knowing] precludes any logical connection between the sensing of sense contents and the possession of non-inferential knowledge. For even if the sensing of sense contents did not logically imply the existence of non-inferential knowledge, the converse might well be true. Thus, the non-inferential knowledge of particular matter of fact might logically imply the existence of sense data (for example, seeing that a certain physical object is red might logically imply sensing a red sense content) even though the sensing of a red sense content were not itself a cognitive fact and did not imply the possession of non-inferential knowledge.

That gets as close to a straight denial of your claim from the text itself as I can think of. He also says this:

He can abandon A, in which case the sensing of sense contents becomes a noncognitive fact -- a noncognitive fact, to be sure which may be a necessary condition, even a logically necessary condition, of non-inferential knowledge, but a fact, nevertheless, which cannot constitute this knowledge.

Now being a logically necessary condition of non-inferential knowledge clearly is a way in which something 'throws light' on the foundations of empirical knowledge. But this is something that he allows of sense data, even if sense data is not itself knowledge.

So your claim that he thinks the only way something can 'throw light' on the foundations of empirical knowledge is for that thing to actually constitute knowledge, is wrong.

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Regarding the second disagreement, you seem to be implying that Sellars is critiquing the sense datum theorist for allowing uncertainty in their empirical foundations, which is just not the point of this first section. The point is rather that sense datum theorists have according to him been confused about whether or not sensing something is an inherently epistemic or cognitive fact.

Furthermore, the two paragraphs in which he talks about 'progressively less precarious' subclasses of sensations are in quotations, followed by these words:

This unfortunate, but familiar, line of thought runs as follows:

This signals that Sellars is taking the viewpoint of the sense datum theorist in order to criticize it, not expressing his own view as you imply above. He then concludes by saying that the sense datum theorist is subject to confusions, not that he fails to secure some sort of apodicticity in his position. The latter is simply not what this section of the paper is about.

Alright, man, but I think this is less an issue of interpretation and more of reading comprehension. That is, I think you're misreading the paper on a very surface level.

Again, in that section he's speaking in the voice of the sense datum theorist, and hasn't reached the conclusion (of the sense datum theorist) yet, which is that sense data constitute precisely such an empirical domain that rule out the possibility of non-veridicality.

His objection is then in one sentence, implying that the possibility of veridicality implies the possibility of non-veridicality.

Again, I don't think Sellars thinks that; I think he's speaking in the voice of the sense datum theorist.

And in fairness to the sense datum theorist or skeptic generally, the point is not 'you can't be 100% sure,' but 'your epistemological commitments force you to say you can't even be 1% sure.' So it goes if you open the door to nonveridical perceptions that can't be distinguished from veridical ones, but believe experience is foundational to knowledge. The sense datum theorist sees a way to rescue knowledge via experience.

Yeah, that sounds about right. I think you could make a case for delusion, linguistic incompetence, etc. creeping in even at this level, to get non-veridicality back in the door, but this seems to rely on people not being within their wits, which is not usually what epistemologists have in mind in these sorts of scenarios. The point is supposed to be that with claims about objects, there's no way to tell the difference between veridicality and non-veridicality in any particular case, not that one might slip up and miss the difference, misunderstand their own language, etc. In other words, even a perfectly alert and rational person could never tell the difference in principle between a veridical and non-veridical experience of an object in at least some cases, whereas it seems absent such lack of faculties, that kind of mistake isn't possible in the experience-oriented case.

As I read this passage Sellars is speaking in the voice of the sense datum theorist, and has not yet reached the sense data punch line, viz. that the foundations of empirical knowledge must depend upon a class of things that don't have veridical and non-veridical members that are in principle indistinguishable, and that sense data or appearings are such an appropriate class. It's only afterward that he makes the objection, that the possibility of veridicality implies the possibility of non-veridicality, and this, so far as I can see, he does not explain or justify, but merely says. I don't expect to find an answer for why he believes it in the paper, because I don't think he gives one. I'm just speculating on why he might think that.

That can't be right, though, because the sense datum theorist doesn't claim that all things of the form 'I had experience X' have no duality between veridicality and non-veridicality, only that there's a certain class of experiences that it makes no sense of to call non-veridical.

The question is why Sellars thinks, of that class, why this must be sensical. One might think (quite reasonably – this seems to be a recurring trend in philosophy for thousands of years) that claims grounded in experience that are about that experience itself self-verify, and so it makes sense to speak of them as veridical but not as non-veridical. The whole point of non-veridicality, if you like, is that there was a seeming that led you to believe something that wasn't so. But if what 'was so' was merely the seeming, this possibility seems to become incoherent. Sellars seems to want to say that this makes veridicality incoherent too, but I'm not sure what leads him to think this.

He's assuming that for the concept of sense data to throw light on the foundations of empirical knowledge, sense data must itself be knowledge — Terrapin Station

No, he's saying that if sensation itself does not constitute knowledge, then it's appropriate to ask in what sense sensation grounds knowledge. He acknowledges a couple times that having a sensation might be a logically necessary condition to coming to empirical knowledge, and thus serve as a 'foundation' in some sense other than being a 'cognitive fact' (i.e. sensation constituting knowledge in of itself).

Yet it would be hasty to conclude that this alternative precludes any logical connection between the sensing of sense contents and the possession of non-inferential knowledge. For even if the sensing of sense contents did not logically imply the existence of non-inferential knowledge, the converse might well be true. Thus, the non-inferential knowledge of particular matter of fact might logically imply the existence of sense data (for example, seeing that a certain physical object is red might logically imply sensing a red sense content) even though the sensing of a red sense content were not itself a cognitive fact and did not imply the possession of non-inferential knowledge.

Although I do think it's odd for him to equate the notions of 'being a cognitive fact' and 'constituting knowledge.'

The "unfortunate, familiar" line of thought that "scarcely anyone" would accept sounds pretty good. And the response:

Rather they would take the contrapositive of the argument, and reason that since the foundation of empirical knowledge is the non-inferential knowledge of such facts, it does consist of members of a class which contains non-veridical members.

While in some sense logically unassailable, has the flavor of an appeal to consequence. That is, I can't understand the motivation for taking this line, except from deciding a priori that a certain conclusion is unacceptable and so rejecting any argument that reaches it.

though for it to strike them as it does, they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experience as veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it as unveridical.

Hmm. Why does Sellars think this?

I don't see how a relation is 'an example of becoming.' As I said before, it's no different from a property, it just involves more than one individual. So I am unclear where SX is going with this.

Then we are left to look at the nature of the relation without the relata. What type of thing, exactly is a relation, and how could it exist prior to the things being related, such that the relation only gains real physical existence when there are things which are being related? — Metaphysician Undercover

This doesn't make any sense to me, but OK. I'll let SX speak for himself on the matter.

Something can be in a relation towards itself. For example, you can be your own harshest critic. Identity is then just the minimal reflexive relation.

I don't really understand the rhetorical strategy. If the point is that you want to think about becoming without recourse to substances, moving to relations doesn't seem to do that, since relations still have relata which are thought of as 'terms' – there's just more than one of them. So there's nothing intrinsically 'taller than' about Peter, but there is something intrinsically 'taller than' about the dyad <Peter, Paul>. Increasing the number of substances by one doesn't seem to change anything.

If anything you'd think you'd want to look at a zero-place predicate like 'rain' as a model, but even here, I 'm not sure what this accomplishes.

Erection achieved!

Maybe. Although catharsis may in some fundamental way be linked to throwing off the world rather than living in it. I get it from the production of art, mostly.

No, I'm not excluding us in saying that. I really don't know what to do to be happy etc. I simply don't understand my own body or psychology well enough, and so I stay miserable because I seriously don't understand what to do not to be. I think people as a whole are pretty much this way, and things only get worse as the situation becomes more complicated with more people.

Right, I think no amount of skill can free you from all suffering. The contention was about improving the lot of suffering in a substantial way, even if not perfect. I don't see humans as generally competent at achieving even this lesser goal.