And there are words like molecules and quanta. — Banno

Yes, and these have a more technical use than chairs and tables.

Unfortunately I have a bad habit of editing after I post instead of taking the time to reread and edit beforehand. So you quoted something I replaced, but that works.

Okay, so there is how we use words like chairs and tables.

SO is a concept something in the brain - or should I say mind - that is different to the word and the thing? — Banno

This is difficult question, because we might want to locate concepts in culture. Being pedantic, I wanted to differentiate between the sounds we say or print and the meaning they denote. But our ability to understand and generate concepts is definitely in the brain (or mind).

OK, now to get bit pedantic. You've given me the difference between "democracy" - the word, note the quote marks - and democracy - the thing. — Banno

Being pedantic here, I understand "word" to be the symbolic form we use in some language to denote the meaning which is also the concept, and in order for there to be concepts, which although social in nature, depends on having brains that can cognate (form concepts).

Let's look at... democracy. How does the concept of democracy differ from democracy? — Banno

One is a word that has meaning and the second is the actual political organization that some countries use in a mixed manner which the word is about.

Or... how does the concept of 2 differ from 2? — Banno

That is a tricky question. Two things or mathematical two?

What sort of thing is a concept? — Banno

I don't know a good definition. It's a way our cognition organizes our experiences into understandable units, I guess. So the world is full of objects and events that we can recognize and do useful things with, such as survive.

No, I see them as problems with our conception of ordinary objects which philosophical inquiry and science reveals.

Consider the notion of material solidity of ordinary objects before atomic theory was accepted. Take a standard materialist arguing against an atomist. It's clear our everyday notion of solidity did not include particles and space.

Yes, the problem of many and casual overdetermination are the two physics-based ones.

That's not the only funciton exists serves. Consider the question whether life exists elsewhere in the universe. That's not a functional question. It's asking whether we're alone.

Anyway, I've always understood exists in ordinary language to mean whether something is real. Do dragons exist, no. Do dinosaurs? They did in the past. Elephants? Yes, today they exist. What about life on Mars? We don't know, but it's a possibility, either now or sometime in the past.

When the physicist tells us that the chair is made up of particles and space, he is making a statement about the chair. So yes, our notion of normal objects fits with their being made up of particles and space. — Banno

So then there should be no paradoxes from fitting our notion of normal objects with what the physicist tells us.

The notion of real has been misused here. — Banno

However, notice the difference if someone asks whether the world consists of pictures, like we might ask whether the universe is populated by ordinary objects. In this context, the meaning of real is contrasted with that of appearance.

When the question is asked, "Do ordinary objects like tables and chairs exist?", the question is asking whether our conception of normal objects fits with being made up of particles and space.

Good that you're trying to argue with me when you're not even understanding and don't particularly care about what I'm saying, haha. — Terrapin Station

You're an ass.

You ignored clarifying if you're claiming that and tried to redirect. — Terrapin Station

I'm not saying anything about what scientists said. Jesus man! This is an issue in metaphysics.

Some philosophers noticed that our concepts of ordinary objects result in paradoxes when combined with our scientific understanding, leading to a metaphysical discussion of whether ordinary objects exist as we conceive them.

orget trying to support the claim that philosophers are perpetuating a particular misunderstanding of science rather than computer techs etc. who like to talk about philosophy online. — Terrapin Station

I supported the claim with links to philosophical sources, not computer techs talking about philosophy. You can do a Google search yourself if you're not satisfied.

The issue isn't one of misunderstanding science, btw.

Are we changing the subtopic from whether it's philosophers who are misunderstanding what science is doing? — Terrapin Station

The subtopic is whether philosophy questions, particularly metaphysical ones, but could also are an abuse of language.

ol - in other words, you stated it as if there's some implicational relationship, but there isn't. — Terrapin Station

Let me give an example. Here is an image of ancient Hebrew cosmology:



Now given what we know from science, do the waters above the firmament exist? If human beings get things like that wrong, isn't it possible that our notion of everyday objects is also mistaken?

Let's be clear what is being claimed. It is not that the chair-stuff doesn't exist, only that our concept of a chair does not map onto the physical reality.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/problem-of-many/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-h6L-pBG7o

https://people.umass.edu/lrb/files/bak08metM.pdf

Why would you even doubt something so easily proven? Do you require more links?

Huh? What do the two have to do with each other? — Terrapin Station

Ontology.

What I said was that anyone who thinks this is a problem doesn't understand what science is doing. — Terrapin Station

I think they understand well enough. The question is whether they properly understand what language is doing, and whether focusing on language can dissolve this inquiry.

, "The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular 'ordinary object' might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway." — Terrapin Station

So there are two important things here. The first is that our concept of ordinary objects may not reflect what makes an ordinary object, which leaves the door open to the possibility that there are no ordinary objects.

The second is more along the lines that language is being taken out of context. I disagree here, because I've always understand ordinary objects to be an implicit claim to existence, thus everyone's shock when someone says they don't exist. Or laughter after passing the pipe.

It's not a problem. — Terrapin Station

So you're saying professional philosophers agree it's not a problem and don't discuss it? Or that you have just solved it now?

That would be a misunderstanding of what science is doing/saying. There's no conflict. — Terrapin Station

If you say so. But I'm telling you it is problem discussed in contemporary metaphysics. Of course not everyone agrees it's a problem

Ordinary object concepts aren't about molecules, are they? — Terrapin Station

They are not, which is a problem when doing ontology, since science says they're made up of molecules.

Are they? IF ne of them says, "sure, it's not a forgery - but it's not real..." what do we say? — Banno

We seek clarification, because it doesn't make sense without proper context.

Science isn't saying anything at all like "chairs aren't real" lol — Terrapin Station

Yeah, but you're missing the philosophical argument here. The problem arises because philosophers noticed conflicts between our notion of everyday objects and what science says they're made up of.

You'd have to give an example. The only thing I can think of is that the concept of a particular "ordinary object" might not include what's really going on to make the ordinary object as it is from a typical phenomenal standpoint, but ordinary object concepts are not usually claims in that regard anyway. — Terrapin Station

I updated my response as you were posting. Go back and read the extra part about boundaries, particle collections and vagueness. I can also link you to an article on the problem of many.

So, if someone insists the painting is real, what do they mean? — Banno

In context of art, they're disagreeing over whether it's a forgery. In general, they're being pandantic about the painting existing.

Is the chair real? — Banno

Not if we take science seriously, in my opinion. Is there some other context you have in mind when we ask that question?

The "scientific versions" aren't different than the "ordinary versions." They're other ways of looking at the ordinary versions, they're the ordinary versions from other reference points, at least different explanatory reference points. — Terrapin Station

The problem is that this leads to paradoxes because the scientific version raises issues for our concept of ordinary objects.

For example, How do you decide exactly which collection of particles is the chair? Note that if you give an imprecise answer here, this conflicts with our notion of chairs having precise boundaries.

Chairs aren't vague objects with imprecise boundaries such that we can give a rough answer to which collection of particles count as the chair. This is the problem of many.

If you like; the point being that context is all. It's a real paining as opposed to an illusion, but it's not a real McCubbin. The frame is real wood, not plastic. — Banno

Okay, so the context is wanting to know whether the world is populated by ordinary objects in addition to their scientific versions (particles and empty space). Or whether they are the same thing, or don't exist (the scientific version is exclusive).

What we mean by "it's real!" is decided by what we are opposing it to.

How's that? — Banno

Ehhh, wouldn't it be the other way around? What we suppose is fake, an illusion, fictional, etc. is decided by being opposed to what we have reason to believe is real.

IS the issue there that we see chairs as solid, manipulable items in our world, but scientists tell us they are particles and space - something quite different? — Banno

Yes, realism about ordinary objects given what science has to say.

Sure. Do you want to have this discussion here? — Banno

I suppose we should just focus on Wittgenstein's approach and whether it works.

Even better, how we would know whether it works. When can we say a long standing philosophical problem has been properly dissolved?

42. — Banno

I thought that was the answer? Are you playing a different language game?

But I hope you see the thrust of this very powerful approach to doing philosophy. — Banno

I see the potential yet remain skeptical. Sure, it probably works on some problems. But as a universal acid? Is all metaphysics merely an abuse of language?

f red is not the name of a thing, then there is no need for there to be a thing that is red. That is, we can make sense of talk of red in dreams; and that's all there is. We do not need to invoke red dream-things. — Banno

Red is the name of an experience, and is the experience of red that Chalmers thinks raises a hard problem.

But that does not bear directly on the case in hand: that he whole philosophical exercise of explaining universals is based on a certain picture of how words work, and dissipates when that picture is dropped. — Banno

If it does indeed dissipate. If so, then we have an iconic example of this kind of therapeutic philosophy working. Which raises the question of how many philosophical problems can be dissipated.

But first i would need more arguments to believe in the dissipation of universals. Does this problem not come up in languages which don't make nouns of all words? Do we not see a parallel of the problem in Indian, Arabic or Chinese philosophy?

For my part, I remain unconvinced that there is a useable distinction to be made between phenomenal red and plain ordinary red. — Banno

It's a lot trickier with perception, since other issues such as direct and color realism come into play, but Chalmers point can be more easily made with dream red. How does neuroscience account for an experience of red when you're not seeing a red object?

↪Marchesk see https://www.gondwana-collection.com/blog/how-do-namibian-himbas-see-colour/ — Banno

That's a very interesting experiment, and I did hear about the lack of blue references in Homer's works on a RadioLab episode, but it's also quite a controversial claim.

Can we apply this to a hot button contemporary issue, like say, phenomenal red? Is Chalmers making a language mistake when he says that the experience of red is not captured by the scientific description of perceiving a red object?