Well, yes. That's the disagreement; over what it means for a tree to be real. — Michael

No, that's not the disagreement! The disagreement is over whether the tree can be mind-independent, and if so, if realists we warranted in maintaining such a position.

It's a metaphysical dispute, not a semantic one, although it seems to turn into a semantic one on these forums. And the reason is because someone wants to use the other side's terminology, but with different meaning, and then a big argument ensues over who has the right to use the terminology. Which completely derails the metaphysical dispute.

The anti-realist can continue to use "real" as one ordinarily does; to describe the things we see everyday when awake. — Michael

And the discussion can become a never ending argument over what is meant by "real".

"Real" doesn't mean "mind-independent". My dreams are real dreams but they're not mind-independent dreams. — Michael

But in context of metaphysical realism, realists mean mind-independence when talking about reality. Anti-realists mean something different if/when they wish to use the word "reality". Of course realists don't deny that dreams happen, but dreams have no ontological status independent of minds, and that's what matters for being real, to a realist.

The anti-realist position is that what appears to us when we're awake has the same ontological status of dreams, in that it's mind-dependent. The realist disagrees. So using the word "reality" for both is to employ different meanings.

Because they are real. — Michael

But they're not real, as in they're not mind-independent. Which is what real means in context of this discussion.

Yes. The anti-realist says that the real world is what appears, not something else. — Michael

If the real world is what appears, and the anti-realist isn't a naive realist, then the anti-realist is talking about appearances.

The disagreement is over the separation of the real world and the empirical world. — Michael

I'm not sure about that, since direct realists and scientific realists might disagree. The disagreement then would be over whether the empirical world is mind-independent.

To be an anti-realist is to be opposed to metaphysical realism. It's not to be opposed to the existence of reality. — Michael

But it is, by definition. Reality entails mind-independence.

Anti-realism is not un-realism. — Michael

It is anti-realism, which means opposed to realism. So it's really strange to want to hold on to the word "reality" in such a discussion.

but aren't mind-independent/objective/verification-transcendent. — Michael

If they're not mind-independent, then why call them real?

They're saying that the world as it appears to us is the real world. — Michael

But that's abusing language in context of a discussion over metaphysical realism. The realist thinks the distinction between appearances and reality is important, because there is a real world beyond appearances. The anti-realist denies this.

Mind-dependent/subjective/verification-immanent things are nonetheless real. — Michael

Yeah, sure, dreams are real too, in that people do have dreams. But they're also not real, as in the things I dream about aren't part of the world. They didn't happen, except as a dream. Same with imagination. So we don't say that dreams or imagination are real. That's abusing language, even though it's true that people do imagine and dream.

They're denying the realist's account of what it means to be real. — Michael

They're denying that there is a real world, only the world as it appears to us. This is a philosophical discussion, and as such, it's important to not misuse language.

But the anti-realist is denying that things are real, in the metaphysical or ontological sense, thus it's confusing to use that language. Ant-realists aren't realists, obvously, therefore they don't get to use the word "reality" for their position in a debate over metaphysical realism.

It would be the same if someone said that dreams were real and claimed the right to use dreamland as reality in a debate over realism.

A Realist believes that it is possible, even if it is difficult, to obtain true depictions of reality. — darthbarracuda

I think the fundamental position of a metaphysical realist is the existence of a mind-independent world, regardless of whether we can truly depict or not. That's what makes someone a realist. Given the OP, I would agree that it's necessarily possible to obtain a true depiction of reality, at least in part, since the mind is grounded by reality, but mind-independence of that world is what is key to the metaphysical position itself.

What is the point in using the word "reality" in a metaphysical debate on realism to describe a position which is opposed to realism?

Do you agree that everything you can think of is mediated by a thought? That is not 'real' access, surely? — invizzy

Sure, and I agree that everything I see is mediated by seeing. As for real access, thoughts are real. People have them, presumably because they have brains, brains that are part of bodies moving about in the world. I consider being a body in the world to be real access.

here is no access to the real world, you see. — invizzy

Not really.

But presumably there is a cause; perhaps light reflecting, cones firing, the lack of tinted spectacles or water in the way, — invizzy

Which would be the real access. You can't appeal to the real world to undermine real access. If everything is a mental construct, then that includes the brain, photons, etc. As such, scientific explanation can't undermine realism if they're already ideal.

whereas living well involves commitments that must be made in virtue of being alive — The Great Whatever

True.

pleasure and pain, which have intrinsic, rather than extrinsic, value: they are never good or bad 'insofar as...'. — The Great Whatever

I guess I just disagree with this. I think pleasure or pain are only good or bad insofar as the context makes them good or bad. I can feel pain and think it's a good thing, and feel pleasure and think it's bad. I can also think that a less pleasurable state is preferable. It just depends on the context.

Anyone here want to fess up to being fully self-actualized? — Bitter Crank

No, not remotely. That sounds like a god, not a real human. Are there such people? That sounds positively transcendent. I mean, we can all be some of those things some of the time. And some people more than others. But all of that all of the time?

For example, you might be compelled by metaphysical hypotheses about the basic structure of the world because you feel uneasy when you lack understanding of something, and so have a desire to understand, or feel as though you understand, everything. But if circumstances change and so does your psychological predisposition, so that you no longer feel uneasy in these circumstances, the corresponding metaphysical hypotheses will cease to be interesting. — The Great Whatever

Or they might find such questions fascinating. It's interesting that you frame it in terms of anxiety or tradition, leaving out the obvious motivation.

Put another way, it is possible to lose interest in such questions, while it is not possible to lose interest in living well, whatever one's opinions on the matter are. Thus, only an arbitrary opinion imbues such other questions with their (extrinsic) interest. — The Great Whatever

But for some people, the thing that gives their life purpose is pursuing such questions. There was a mathematician who cared about nothing other than math to the point that he was nearly helpless in other areas of life.

They find them interesting insofar as... Remove the condition following, and they lose their interest. Their interest is, in other words, derivative. — The Great Whatever

The condition being that an individual or group finds them interesting?

And I'm not denying that living well or ethics are an important philosophical project, I'm just questioning that they are the central project of philosophy, when the evidence seems to be to the contrary. Philosophy is much broader than that, until you narrow your focus to groups of philosophers who think/thought a certain way.

ther projects, such as 'knowledge of the universe,' or 'seeing how things hang together generally,' are only of extrinsic interest, that is, they are not interesting on their own terms, but only insofar as an arbitrary opinion decides to grant them interest relative to something else. — The Great Whatever

But that's not true. Plenty of people find them intrinsically interesting.

Why would the project of philosophy be to live well?

I wouldn't call that gorgeous. Interesting and different, certainly. It sort of reminds me of the Borg. Or beehives. It sort of looks like a forgotten temple one would stumble across in the jungle.

There is a fundamental disconnect with that way of life and the modern one: it's not a matter of certain contingent things about life being out of whack, but the values that determine what people think a life should consist of to begin with are so foreign to those interests that there's no connection. — The Great Whatever

What would that look like today, and what sort of values would foster that kind of community? Is this the kind of commitment Jesus demanded of his disciples? Leave your normal life and practice philosophy instead?

Also, it seems you think the Cyrenaics figured out most of the interesting philosophical problems, so how would contemporary philosophers improve upon that, in your view?

Right but I'm saying universals don't exist. We just have a THOUGHT of redness. — invizzy

We have a thought of redness, true. But then there are red things. Which is presumably why we think of red.

Why do we need to account for the concepts? Can't we dismiss them as false if we reject platonism? We can have false concepts right? — invizzy

Sure, but I guess the question is what do we mean we talk about the world using universals? If the universals are false, then what are we talking about?

As for antinatalism, the reality is that people are going to keep having kids, despite any philosophical arguments to the contrary. Some people here or there might be convinced to not bring new people into the world, but it won't make a big dent. So the alternative is to make a better world, if possible. Unless the antinatalist is thinking truly long term, and believes their arguments can win out over generations. I kind of doubt it, but who knows. Maybe future people will become bored with everything.

The good thing about nukes is that they're hard to come by. A nasty designer virus might have a downloadable genome that you can 3D print in the future.

I don't think you can end suffering in a generation. I don't know that it can be ended. Maybe the posthuman stuff is pie in the sky. Maybe not. I'm sort of on the fence. It's a mix of fanciful and feasible. Hard to disentangle what's realistic. Hard to ignore technological progress also. There's some technologies that are still immature, such as nanotech and 3D printing. It's hard to imagine what the world be like when the following is achieved:

• Mature molecular nanotech (this implies self-replication and nano-machines)
• Mature DNA engineering (CRISPR is a start in that direction)
• Deep understanding of the brain (full brain simulation perhaps)
• Very advanced computing (let's say we're half-way there, so maybe another 70 years of advances)
• Strong AI

If the above is realized (and there are other important technologies of course), then it's easy to imagine that the world could become a very different place. But who knows to what extent that ends suffering. There are dystopian scenarios. One can only imagine what a 22nd century warfare would look like.

If everything is a thought I'm not sure you run into the same problems. There is no platonic realm needed to explain where redness etc. is, it is just a mental realm. — invizzy

Well, you still need to account for why we have such concepts, and how they map onto particulars. I assume we use concepts such as redness because it makes sense of something about particulars (that some of them are shaded red).

I am a little confused as to the difference between nominalism and conceptualism. Is it that nominalism just sees universals as naming schemes and arbitrary groupings, while conceptualism is more a matter of our cognitive makeup that we see the world in universal terms?

Focusing on what's doable in the shorter term, I'm guessing that over the next century, things like mental illness will be much more treatable as drugs become tailored for the individual, and you have increasingly better simulated brain models. Those are still a work in progress, but we can expect results of human brain simulation at some point. The primary purpose of simulating the brain, or different regions of it, would be to further neuroscience and to create more effective treatments.

Well, do you think that an alien civilization 1 million years older than our own would still have suffering members? Will we, if human civilization lasts that long in some form?

What if machines are our progeny? Will they suffer? If the future of advanced life is machine based, maybe not? Then again, maybe machines need to be able to suffer to be fully alive? But then, why suppose that machines need to be anything like us? Some will be. Others will be very different.

What if we could bioengineer new kinds of bodies? One's that don't have mental illnesses, don't get sick, aren't shortsighted and foolish, etc?

Or perhaps an advanced civilization can upload their minds into virtual worlds to fulfil their deepest desires?

There's a lot of possibilities if we're talking the truly long term, and not ruling out anything which can be physically arranged (at least in principle). Our current civilization could be infantile compared to one that's been around a very long time. Even a million years is a drop in the bucket of deep time.

It's only an absolute in-so-far as it's a meta-statement applicable to different ways of life. It's not in the same class of statements as rules which apply within a particular way of life, but rather the very structure that governs ways of life themselves. — Agustino

Well, there have been more than a few societies who decided that imposing their way on others was not only okay, but necessary. The Romans weren't exactly live and let live.

As Wittgenstein has stated, and I agree with him, criticisms of ways of life can only come from inside. From inside a culture or a country, people can decide they no longer want a certain law/rule, and thereby get rid of it, by force if necessary. But it is wrong when somebody imposes things from the outside. — Agustino

Usually it is wrong to impose things from the outside (although, is that an absolute or something?). And it often has bad consequences, because nobody likes to be imposed upon. But on the other hand, at what point do we decide that we're all in this together on the same planet?

It's also a question of who doesn't want the imposing. Would American slaves before the Civil War have welcomed a foreign power putting an end to the institution? What if the foreign power had the means to flip things and put blacks in power to subjugate the whites? Then would the blacks be resentful of the foreign power, or become close allies?

Therefore, I realise the importance of respecting different ways of life and different cultures so long as they respect mine. My land, my rules, your land, your rules :) — Agustino

That sounds good and reasonable and all, and it is for many things. But then you have things like female circumcision, child soldiers, genocide sometimes, and what not where your land is some people in the land treating others very badly.

As a parallel, I can say your house, your rules, but if I found out you were beating and doing terrible things to your spouse, children, or roommates, then I will be motivated to take some sort of action.

Of course that parallel can fail because I can just get the police involved in your case, whereas it might take a war in the case of a sovereign country, and all the fallout that comes with that.

So whereas I might wish that Western values could prevent genocide or the use of child soldiers, to do so would be very bloody and messy. Unless those values can be spread in a non-violent means. And that's where I become less relativistic about things. I do want to people to be told that female circumcision is wrong.

False. It is to say that the better plumber is to be MORE respected than the worse plumber when it comes to plumbing only. — Agustino

That tends to happen naturally anyway. Are you just promoting meritocracy? Flesh that out for other aspects of life in addition to work. How is the superior plumber treated legally?

Amazon produced the first season of a tv series based on a Ray Bradbury short story where the Axis won WW2. It's called 'The Man in the High Castle', and it's set in 1962 in an America divided between Nazis Germany and Imperial Japan. As such, you get exposed to a different set of values promoted by those societies, and the dissidents living in it. It's interesting, if grim.

The biggest value in those societies seems to be promotion of the state apparatus. Individual lives (unless you're high command or Emperor) are to be sacrificed to the state. And of course all those lives not deemed worthwhile are either subjugated or exterminated.

I will agree with Augistino in one sense. Societies do determine what the fundamental values are. I happen to grow in a society where equality, justice and tolerance are promoted. But I could have grown up in Sparta. So from an absolute point of view, how does anyone say which values are best? That's kind of disturbing.

As it stands though, the West has the power and influence to remake the world in their image, and so those values are the ones which will win out. I say that's good, but with an understanding that it's my modern Western preference for those particular values. And also with an understanding that China could change that equation in the future. And as the rests of the world modernizes and makes it online, the balance of influence could shift.

If I want to become moderately rich, a "free and equal" society is good. But if I want to become immoderately rich, extremely rich - then such a society places more constraints on me than its opposite. — Agustino

I don't know. Seems like the tech billionaires did alright for themselves. Bill Gates was the richest person in the world for how long? How influential are companies like Google and Facebook?

Better in any of these ways. Not better in absolute terms, since there is no way to decide if the best plumber is better than the best lawyer — Agustino

But in most societies it's already the case that people can find all sorts of ways to end up better off than others financially, in terms of status quo, or other ways. A free and equal society gives people the most opportunity to do this, whereas more stratified societies tend to put barriers in place for ambitious individuals born to the wrong class, ethnicity, gender or circumstances.