What if the original cause is consciousness, and the ultimate effect is consciousness? And what If consciousness is infinite? — Pop

I do believe that, but my question isn't about that. It limits to living beings inside the Universe.

Do you think it's possible for a "superior" alien species in our physical universe -- or even in a forever multiverse -- to be Omniscient? — Gnomon

I don't know. There are some things, like the infinite for example, which we cannot understand. But are there things that we wouldn't even be capable to think of without a stronger brain? Maybe Martians can understand the infinite and they have other fundamental questions, questions that we wouldn't be able to ask with our brains. Other species, superior to Martians would understand everything that Martians wouldn't be able to, and they would have another extra-level of incomprehension compared to the Martians.
I am not talking about a God, but about biological creatures.

That's what "everything understandable" implies. — Gnomon

No, I do not think it implies that. I think a true God can understand everything, not only everything understandable. Maybe the notion of infinite cannot be understood by any biological creature, no matter how evolved is it. For me, ''understandable'' limits to biological creatures, not Divinity.

So my issue goes like this: our brains are more evolved compared to ant's brains, so we have an extra-property, i.e. meta-cognition, abstraction, call it how you want it. If our brains continue to evolve, will we get another extra-property?

Would that kind of (super-natural) "superior being" answer your original question? :smile: — Gnomon

You go into the divine realm, I limit myself to biological beings.

I wonder how it would be if it operated through an idealistic paradigm. — Pop

I think the same. We sometimes tend to exaggerate the influence of philosophers and ideologies inside the academic world on society. Normal people don't usually pay much attention to these things and people act as they normally do.

Does "everything understandable" imply everything logical, whether empirical or not? — Gnomon

''Everything understandable'' is more like a difference between us and a superior species if that exists. I sometimes ask myself if there are some living beings out there for which Maths would be something trivial and they would be so far from our understanding that even the notion of ''notion'' will be insufficient. In one word, something that we couldn't understand not because we have not enough information, but because our brains don't have the capacity to. Exactly as an ant cannot understand us and our actions. For an ant, seeing us playing the piano is simply meaningless.

So are there creatures that if we looked at them we would be able to understand them as much as an ant understands us? Would their actions be forever meaningless to us because our limited capacities?

Yes again. A paradigm shift is like a change of sanity, or like enlightenment, so results in a completely new way of thinking, and so possibilities arise that were previously impossible. — Pop

Thank you for your answer!

I don't have a definite opinion on that, I might open another OP related to this topic, but I've got 3 issues with this:

1. The reality has to be infinitely complex, and it has to become more and more complicated.

2. I simply don't see another extra-step. If the reality is infinitely complex and complicated, we can already state that, so in a way, we comprehend that. An animal cannot do that. I don't think there can be something more than an infinite complex and complicated reality. So if we can grasp that, I think it is just a matter of details. Indeed, an infinite number of details, but nonetheless, nothing fundamental in my opinion. So what fundamental difference can be between us and another ''superior'' creature?

3. Let's call the fundamental difference between us and animals P1, the fundamental difference between Martians and us P2, and so on. In order to be more evolved, Pn must include all Pn-1 properties, plus something extra. I've got 2 problems with that:
a. Too complex - at one point, there will be too many properties, too many layers. The brain structure can, as you mentioned, change, but in order to be infinitely complex, quantity is also necessary. So we will end up with enormous brains. Not only that might not be sustainable after a specific point, but it might be detrimental. We will need, for instance, no limit to speed, so that the information can travel fast and make those creatures act fast, otherwise they'll be slow and inefficacious. Also, the power and speed of computing has to be unlimited.
b. Too many properties = no identity - this is a complicated one, but probably the most important thing, so please bear with me on this one. It is not enough to have the physical capacity to manage all those many properties, but it is also important to have each of them active in parallel, otherwise, a huge number of those properties will become irrelevant in time, thus useless. In order to have them active, the environment in which that creature lives has to constantly provide with all the necessary challenges in order to keep active all the properties. If this condition is not fulfilled, and many of the previous properties will be lost, then we cannot talk about a ''more evolved'' being but just a fundamentally different one.

Perhaps you have a better understanding of it, but as far as I am aware he still cannot explain the qualia of experience, what its for, why we have it. — Pop

The hard problem of consciousness is how do you get from matter to experience, i.e. from the properties like mass, spin, or velocity to pain, happiness, or thoughts. Hoffman does not have the problem of how to get from matter to mind, because in his view, the mind is fundamental, not a result of the matter, and the question of qualia is irrelevant in this case because it is like you're asking why does God have these properties. This is a form of idealism, and there's no hard problem of consciousness in idealism. As an idealist, you have to be careful not to get in conflict with science and not to have a fundamental metaphysical problem. So far, it seems Hoffman's theory is alive and well.

In my view, a theory of consciousness that dose not answer the hard problem, is not likely to be the correct theory. — Pop

- But in Hoffman's theory, the hard problem disappears.

In my view, communication is the main difference. — Pop

- I agree, but communication is the result of abstraction. So I guess that the ability of abstraction is a fundamental one, not only a matter of quantity. An animal is limited to its immediate environment, while humans have no boundaries in this sense, and we can contemplate the infinite. So I agree with you that if the Universe is infinitely complex, our knowledge is basically 0 (and it will always be that way).

So let's take an example: the Martians are far more developed than us, the quantity of information that they own in comparison with ours is bigger than the difference between our knowledge and an ant's one. So this is for sure a quantitative difference. But is it also qualitative? Do they have something ''extra'' like we have the metacognition (abstraction) whilst ants don't in order to get to that information? Or, if we continue to gather information, we will become like the Martians one day without the need of something extra that is fundamentally different than all the qualities we possess today?

But I am not referring to that. In Hoffman's view, I believe it is a matter of quantity, not quality. For example, in one of his interviews, he said that a superior conscious agent could see colors that we couldn't. So we wouldn't know how is like to see that color, but we would be able to express this in an abstract way. Well, an ant cannot do that. So my question would be: if between us and ants there's a fundamental difference (the power of abstraction), are there other fundamental differences between us and other species? With all the information needed, is abstraction enough to understand everything?

The best justification I've heard for this came from Donald Hoffman, who applied Gödel's incompleteness theorem to an axiomatic consciousness, with the result that there is always something outside the system which is required to justify things within the system. So this suggests infinite consciousness. — Pop

I am familiar with Don Hoffman, and I can say that his theory is very bold, but nonetheless, I find it plausible. But in regard to limits, how would my analogy ant-man would stand in his view?

There are other limits than intellectual limits though, like the fact that we can only access the world via our senses. — ChatteringMonkey

Maybe new senses will arise? Is this even possible, have we already reached the limit of all possible senses? Are there countless senses or just a few of them?

Alright guys, I see that you mostly disagree with mysterianism. But are there some good arguments for or against this ideology? Reminder: I am not limiting myself just to the topic of consciousness.

Interesting answer. Sometimes I think that only the fact that we can think of ''there can be an infinite of degrees of knowledge'' is a fundamental difference between us and an ant, not just a quantitative one.

I read this review, but I am not sure if Gazzaniga would agree with it. I believe he is a bit confusing, because, on one hand, he clearly says that the mind is strong emergent, it has its own new laws, and that it constrains the brain. I also think he could have ended his book here. But then he says that the brain cannot be controled by us, and that the brains takes the decisions, and we are just interpreting its actions. And that is a bit contradictory. Does the mind play a role or not? That would be my question for Gazzaniga. Personally, I think his answer would be affirmative. He has a chapter where he actually thinks that people with brain damage, like schizophrenics, should be held responsible for their actions, and ''the brain made me do it'' is not a valid statement. I also think he doesn't say that mind is quantum, and that he uses QM just to validate the strong emergence. Finally, I believe he introduced the Interpreter because in order to remain physicalit, you have to deny a ''self'', but he mentions that there is an ''essence'' of us, only that it is distributed.
Nonetheless, I find Gazzaniga hard to be interpreted 100% correctly. It is hard to reconcile ''There is no free will..." with ''...but people are free and we are the ultimate agents of our actions''. So this is why I am not entirely sure about his optinion.

I have also read your blog, and I would like to ask you if you find free will in the quantum realm, in the hazard, or if the mind is responsible, at least partially, for our actions. When it comes to mind, I believe ''probabilities'' are for those analyzing from outside, but the mind itself isn't. What do you think?

Unfortunately, I couldn't read the article. I was referring mainly to his book ''Whose in charge?'', but also to some other articles.
At first glance, I would describe his view as the following: (I) brain = matter; (II) brain generates mind through a strong emergent process; (III) mind has other fundamental laws; (IV) mind constrains the brain; (V) we can identify ourselves with our minds, so we constrain the brain; (VI) therefore, we are free.
But sometimes I understand something else: brain is matter; I and II are the same, but then it comes the so-called Interpreter, which creates us the illusion of unity. I suspect he only wants to show us that the mind is composed of many parts, and that the Interpreter's role is to narrate. But one can also deduce that Gazzaniga endorses epiphenomenalism. I don't think he does, I think he only wants to remain a physicalist who just denies a unitary entity that pulls the strings, but who keeps the mind at the center of our actions.
Do you think he endorses epiphenomenalism?

But under epiphenomenalism, ''liking'' plays no role. That is what we're arguing against. ))

What do you mean by "reporting" in Q1? A conscious experience? Or causality chain in the system? — Ignoro

Every time I feel something, I can talk about it. For example, if a sudden pain struck me, I can say ''I am in pain''. Under epiphenomenalism, brain states that produce qualia can also cause one to say ''I feel X'', when X is being felt. At the same time, there are no brain states that don't produce qualia but make one to say ''I feel Y'', if Y does not exist. For example, there is no brain state that makes you suddenly say ''I feel plamburine'', when this quale doesn't even exist. So it is weird how we got to this perfect accuracy.

Nobody likes epiphenomenalism these days. Poor epi :(

I've read the Acquaintance Hypothesis and to be fair, I really don't understand:
1. When matter gets acquainted with consciousness, isn't that producing a cause already?
2. How does matter get acquainted with pain, love, thirst, etc. if these things are epiphenomenal? I don't get it!
Is there any other example in this world of acquaintance that produces no causes? I would like to know, maybe this way I'll understand this hypothesis better.

I think there are correlations between mental states and what we call physical brain.

Action-reaction. But indeed, epiphenomenalists say that mind is not really physical. It's either immaterial (property dualism) or some kind of proto-phenomenal thing (Russellian monism).

Agree!
One of Chalmers' response was ''the acquaintance'' and to be fair, I do not understand it exactly, because this supposed acquaintance seems to me like a cause itself, a cause that would be missing in the zombie world.
By the way, nice to see you again, Coben!

The mind is also physics. — Helder Afonso

So far, materialism has unsuccessfully tried to avoid the hard problem. The strongest theories so far are the identity theory and functionalism, both having serious fundamental flaws in my opinion. So your heavy statement is sitting on a sandy foundation.

By the way, if epiphenomenalism is true, why do we go watch comedy movies at the cinema?

I mean, I cannot see any reason to spend resources and precious time that could be used for reproduction, other than the pure need for feeling well and have a laugh, or, in other words, it's a feeling-driven act.

Pretty nearly yes. It would only be possible under extremely unlikely circumstances in my opinion. I talk about this in my thought-experiment thread. — Francis

Is it because of the huge coincidence between reports and epiphenomenal states? Not only that, but it also looks like a law of nature to feel, for example, pain, every time you're being hit. And if epiphenomenalists claim that this is a psychophysical law, then they're wrong, because in some cases, pain produces pleasure. So only huge coincidence remains on the table.

Another thing, why on earth ''I'm in pain'' would even exist in a world with no feelings? Why the concept of pain in the first place? it's like something out of the blue, a non-sense.

But then again, sometimes I feel it's me who doesn't understand the topic.

But here's what I still don't understand after a decent amount of research:
1. Why would a zombie report pain?
a. where did the zombie have the notion of pain?
b. why would it mention it at all?
2. If it does mention it, isn't it a HUGE coincidence that all reports correspond to exactly the same epiphenomenon?

I have read a lot about this topic, and I admit sometimes things get too complicated for me. But from what I understand from Chalmers zombies is that the zombie world has to have some different physical laws in order to act exactly the same, and Chalmers kind of admits that.
Moreover, I don't understand the ''acquaintance'' argument. The acquaintance of whom? Of the physical with the epiphenomenal? And doesn't that mean that this acquaintance has an effect on the physical?
It might be the case this topic is too complicated for me.

It is also surprising for me that Sam and Annaka Harris endorse epiphenomenalism, it seems to have so little chance to be real, I thought Harris are success-oriented people, this seems to be a hard bet to win in my opinion.

Thanks!

Hmmm... you got me thinking... so the only way I see it in favor of epiphenomenalism in case panpsychism is true is to assume that:

1. atoms have mass, charge, spin, etc. + consciousness
2. consciousness does not interact in any way and does not play an active role in the Universe
3. mass, charge, spin, etc. influence consciousness, but not vice versa

*2. consciousness has an effect, it combines with itself

But I am wondering if what I have written is a panpsychist view itself.

''I suspect'' says more about you than the subject :rofl:

:rofl:

It seems to me consciousness is an accident — tim wood

Let's assume it was an accident indeed, not a purpose of nature. But in order to happen, it must be possible. So I am arguing that the very possibility of its existance in a finite/infinite universe is incredible by itself. From quantity to quality, from non-aboutness to aboutness, etc.

It's a nice OP, you have to admit. Not my best but still...

Absolute Infinity does indeed imply that all things are possible, and all possible things are actual. But the Multiverse is not timeless or changeless, hence not absolute. Instead, it is a dynamic directional process with no known beginning and an unknowable ending. Only spaceless-timeless Infinity-Eternity (Enfernity) is absolute. And the powers of being & causation exist necessarily in Enfernity. — Gnomon

You've raised something interesting hee, but please answer me a question first: the Absolute Infinity you mentioned, if it exists, it also include what we would call supernatural? (magic, gods, etc.)

That is similar to my kind of functionalist panpsychism. On my account, everything has whatever is metaphysically necessary for conscious experience, everything in some trivial sense “has experience”, but what that experience is like depends entirely on the function of the thing, and consciousness proper is a kind of reflective functionality, self-awareness basically, and only things that have that functionality have what we ordinarily mean by “conscious experience”. But it’s not like the emergentist account where when mindless matter arranges just right suddenly a new kind of thing, mind, occurs; rather, the elementary constituents of mind are already present in everything, and fully fledged mind as we usually mean it is built up out of that just like our physical behaviors are built up out of the physical behaviors of the atoms etc we’re made of. — Pfhorrest

Sounds very elegant and in my opinion plausible, but being at the beginning of my quest for answers, I also find plausibility in other theories. But I can say what has convinced me not to be true so far :
- ''The illusion of consciousness''
- Idenity Theory
- Consciousness is a classic ''weak emergence'' phenomenon

It seems to me consciousness is an accident of time, place, and circumstance. What does that, or any account of it, have to do with larger issues of cosmology? — tim wood

1. And how can we prove it is an accident? It is just an assumption.
2. Even if it is an accident, the hard problem remains and as long as it remains, it is going to be problematic for materialism.

And you missed this.

If you want a discussion on the basis anything is possible, therefore is, have at it - but what's the point? — tim wood

The OP isn't meant to argue the Identity theory. All I am saying is that over time, materialism has come up with all sorts of answers for consciousness which are really not convincing (e.g. identity theory). So now, some of them invented this multiverse argument in order to solve the problem. So the main topic was the multiverse argument, not the identity theory.

Basically, whatever is metaphysically necessary for minds as we know them either happens for nothing (eliminative materialism), for only some things (dualism, and strong emergentism), or everything (panpsychism). Only the first and last are really compatible with physicalism, the middle ones are not. — Pfhorrest

It totally makes sense to me, but.... But as always, things are complicated! I should open a discussion called ''Why things are so damn complicated!?''. But let's assume there's a law of nature that allows consciousness to exist only in some circumstances, let's say in a DNA structure. So the law exists there, is fundamental, but consciousness appears only when criteria are met. Maybe consciousness is a kind of information that contains information about itself and it can be created when two types of information meet. None of them is conscious, but when they combine, they become something new and conscious. I'm not saying it's probable, but I don't see it impossible.

But maybe ''the laws of physics'' are very different in other universes, so different that you'd consider them magic.

I think this is incorrect. An infinite multiverse does not mean anything one may imagine can actually happen. — Stan

I didn't say that's the case. I wrote it as a variant. Read 2. And by the way, who decides what's physical, natural and what is not?

emergentism has uncomfortable shades of dualism. — Pfhorrest

Interesting, could you please give me more details on that?

Panpsychism isn't necessarily non-materialist (assuming by "materialism" you just mean "physicalism"). — Pfhorrest

You are right, but the mainstream ideologies are called materialism and panpsychism, and they are competitors.

How did supernatural become natural? — tim wood

What you define as supernatural for this universe may be natural in other universes.

The identity theory seems to mean that consciousness is accounted for by physical nature. Is there a problem with that? — tim wood

You were a bit vague with that. The identity theory states that consciousness is exactly the same thing with a particular particles interaction, not an effect of that, not correlated with it. Is there a problem with that? Many say it is, but it is not the topic of this discussion.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z27k9_NP4FU