What Chomsky points out is trivial -- he's saying there's a genetic component to language, and that's all. I've never understood why this is controversial. Of course it's hard-wired into us somehow
— Xtrix

Last I checked, genes, and their components DNA/RNA, constitute a language. The bases - Adenine (A), Thymine (T), Cytosine (C), Guanine (G) - are the letters and the words are base triplets (ATG for example), each triplet coding a specific amino acid. Google for more information.

Also, what of Galileo's claim that "the Book of Nature is written in mathematical language"? Genes are, what?, a chapter in the Book of Nature and that means...since the universe needed a language, a mathematical one...Chomsky is wrong - language precedes genes. — TheMadFool

I can't tell if this is serious or not, which isn't a great sign I guess.

Assuming it's serious: the structure of DNA and the naming of nucleotides as "A," "T," etc., is an analogy. Yes, we impose this structure on what we see. We impose form on music and on the world through our concepts, numbers, etc.

Saying "language precedes genes" is like saying "vision precedes genes" or "the liver precedes genes." Really? Does walking precede legs? These are what was once described as "endowments" of nature, which today we think of in terms of DNA and genes. But it's describing a biological truism: there's a genetic component to vision, just as there's a reason we grow arms and not wings. Likewise for the faculty of language.

If we deny this we're really off in space, in some idealistic reality where everything is "language." Absurd, in my view, but so be it.

An interesting passage:

The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that independently of it and 'outside' of it a 'world' is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and makes requests for proofs has not been made definite enough. This is why a demonstration that two things which are present-at-hand are necessarily present-at-hand together, can give rise to the illusion that something has been proved, or even can be proved, about Dasein as Being-in-the-world. If Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it already is what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it.

(p. 205)

I think many on this forum are largely operating within this purview as well -- which is to say, one oriented towards subjects representing objects, and a picture of the human being as an evolved animal with reason, or a mind. Zoon echon logon holds true to this day.

Try this: one might argue that being, "is" and so on are of some import, but the whole purpose of philosophy is to answer the great question of what a man is to do with his life (sic.). Hence, such weeny whiny arguments are not for real men, but an indication of nerdish cowardice. — Banno

But here I think you fail to notice that these questions of ethics and morality, which I'd agree are ultimately what we're after, are rooted in our beliefs, values, and attitudes towards the world. They're rooted largely on the question "What am I?" "What is a human being?" etc. Aristotle is a well known example, of course. Politics and governance are grounded on answers to these questions, even if held tacitly as unquestioned presuppositions. If it is assumed that we're created by God, for example, the answer to "What should I do with my life?" is answered in a very definite light indeed.

So most niche intellectual pursuits I would agree are ways of avoiding the "real" questions of action, of living in the real world, etc., and questions about being could be added to this list. But from my view, I keep the question you raised in the background at all times -- and this is in fact what motivates me to even care about the question at all. On the surface it seems the most hifalutin, abstract bullshit you could imagine.

Better to look at what philosophy is in terms of it's method - critical analysis that seeks clarification - than in terms of this or that content. — Banno

Critical analysis presupposes thought and awareness and, in fact, human being, does it not? When we analyze, question, interrogate, investigate, dissect, clarify, etc., we're engaging in a very human activity. We can call it "philosophy" or "thinking" or anything we like, but my claim is about the question of being as first in rank -- as the broadest of questions and deepest. I don't think this should be controversial, really. If you ask about being, you're asking about everything. Hard to get broader than that. It may not be the "central" concern, or the most interesting, or the most relevant to our lives, or the most studied, or the most popular, etc.

I would say the "method" of philosophy is really phenomenology, by the way. But replacing this word with "critical analysis" doesn't matter that much to me. The point above stands either way, as both assume the human being.

It's this very move that is contended: treating existence as a state. As if there were things that do not exist, waiting to change their condition into one of existence. That is, treating existence as a first order predicate. — Banno

Well then here we agree. Being (or existence, whatever we like) isn't a "state." It's not as if being emerges from a void of nothingness and "comes into being." That's certainly not the claim I want to be making.

it seems a rookie mistake for Heidegger to have made. I guess his attention was elsewhere. — Banno

Heidegger is well aware of Kant -- in fact he had several lectures on him.

Descartes not only evades the ontological question of substantiality altogether; he also emphasizes explicitly that substance as such-that is to say, its substantiality-is in and for itself inaccessible from the outset. 'Being' itself does not 'affect' us, and therefore cannot be perceived. 'Being is not a Real predicate,' says Kant, who is merely repeating Descartes' principle. Thus the possibility of a pure problematic of Being gets renounced in principle, and a way is sought for arriving at those definite characteristics of substance which we have designated above.

B&T p. 94

He goes on, of course, but I won't bother quoting the entirety of it. Needless to say he's certainly aware of the mistake you claim he's making.

Yet who’s noticing that— and how? What is it that recognizes thought as thought?
— Xtrix

I assume your answer is 'being'. — I like sushi

No, I would say awareness— wouldn’t you?

Even so, if this is your view then what exactly do you mean by 'being'? — I like sushi

This is the question of the OP. But I don’t give any definition or interpretation myself. Again, it would be a little like asking “What is God?” I could add to a long list of interpretations, but I’d rather delve into the question itself, who’s asking it, and its history / development.

I'm with Banno in regards to words. If Heidegger cannot make clear what 'dasein' means then the reader should have serious concerns about everything that follows. — I like sushi

I agree. He should be clear about it. This is why he dedicates 100s of pages to expand upon it. In the end, dasein (literally “being there”) is interpreted as temporality.

Alarm bells should ring there for anyone looking critically at his work. — I like sushi

Well what are you getting at here? Are you of the opinion that Heidegger is a charlatan, or simply misguided? Perhaps you agree with what Russell said was “language running amok” (paraphrasing) or when Chomsky says its “empty verbiage.”

I respect these men and I sympathize with this view, yet I also feel I’ve learned a great deal from Heidegger — so the onus is on me to explain what’s so interesting. Apparently I’ve failed to do so up to this point. But I can only keep trying, against the charge of charlatanism and obscurantism.

Earlier I returned the discussion to the OP: The OP asks the question "why is there something?"

Does the theory of being you are presenting answer this question? — Banno

This will sound evasive, but no. Nor would I say I'm presenting a theory of being, since I've not defined what being is. Perhaps it's best to look at a positive claim, one made by Heidegger and one which I agree: the traditional interpretation of beings, starting with the Greeks (especially Plato and Aristotle) and stretching throughout the history of the West, is the that of constant presence. If we agree on this, we can proceed with the more general question.

How can this be contended? '-ness' forms a noun from an adjective, expressing a state or condition. — Banno

@Janus

If I may preface this by something relevant here:

It simply no longer occurs to us that everything that we have all known for so long, and all too well, could be otherwise-- that these grammatical forms have not dissected and regulated language as such since eternity like an absolute, that instead, they grew out of a very definite interpretation of the Greek and Latin languages.

We also find the same relations in our word "Being" (das Sein). This substantive derives from the infinitive "to be" (sein), which belongs with the forms "you are," "he is," "we were," you have been." "Being" as a substantive came from the verb. We thus call the word "Being" a "verbal substantive." Once we have cited this grammatical form, the linguistic characterization of the word "Being" is complete. We are talking here at length about well-known and self-evident things. But let us speak better and more carefully: these linguistic, grammatical distinctions are worn out and common· place; they are by no means "self-evident." So we must turn an eye to the grammatical forms in question (verb, substantive, substantivization of the verb, infinitive, participle).

This is important to keep in mind.

Lastly:

Above all we must consider the fact that the definitive differentiation the fundamental forms of words (noun and verb) in Greek form of onoma and rhema was worked out and first established in the most immediate and intimate connection with the conception and interpretation of Being that has been definitive for the entire West. This inner bond between these two happenings is accessible to us unimpaired and is carried out in full clarity in Plato's Sophist. The terms onoma and rhema were already known before Plato, of course. But at that time, and still in Plato, they were understood as terms denoting the use of words as a whole. Onoma means the linguistic name as distinguished from the named person or thing, and it also means the speaking of a word, which was conceived grammatically as rhema. And rhema in tum means the spoken word, speech; the rhetor is the speaker, the orator, who uses not only verbs but also onomata in the narrower meaning of substantive.

[...]

Thus the two terms onoma and rhema, which at first indicated all speaking, narrowed their meaning and became terms for the two main classes of words.

(All from Intro to Metaphysics, "The Grammar and Etymology of Being.")

So appealing to grammar doesn't help much. We can categorize the word itself, but that's not really the point. If being isn't a "thing," then it's not a noun. "Is" isn't a noun either.

But remember, the question isn't "What kind of word is 'being'"? The question is what is "it"? What is the meaning of being?

Can you think without 'language'? As in this worded stuff I'm using here? — I like sushi

These are open questions, but my opinion is that we can indeed think without language. You can visualize a scene without a verbal commentary, for example. Or rotate an imaginary object in your head— which doesn’t involve words but which nevertheless happens internally.

There’s also the issue of awareness. When I’m imagining something or talking to myself, projecting into the future or remembering an experience from my past, I consider it thought. Yet who’s noticing that— and how? What is it that recognizes thought as thought?

It seems the answer is Awareness, or perhaps our consciousness. (I use the terms interchangeably.) Awareness, then, seems “bigger” than thought — in the sense that we can “hold” thought in awareness.

It seems that beingness should be though of as a noun. — Janus

I don’t think so. Remember that nouns and verbs, as the two main groups of words, has a history as well. It dates back to the Greeks, in fact. But the Greeks, when analyzing Greek language, were still doing so from a certain understanding of being — being as phusis. What later became noun and verb was initially a unity.



When you say meaning being prior to the word, I think of perception. There are so kinds of beings around us — pre-linguistic humans (babies) and non-human primates can sense and perceive just as human adults. Most of us are still pre-linguistic in out activity, in fact. Our habits and various skills are testament enough that we don’t even have to be fully conscious, let alone “thinking” in the sense of words and concepts, most of the time.

"What is being" is one question among several of philosophical concern. Add "what is knowledge?", "What is beauty?", "What am I?"... and a few others. Each has at one time or another been claimed to be the prime, defining question in philosophy. My favourite amongst these is "What ought I do?". — Banno

I think metaphysics/ontology has always been seen as the most general and the most basic. There are many important questions worth asking— but when we do so we’re asking about beings. I can’t see how it could be otherwise. Even in the questions you posed, there’s the “is”.

But the question of being is the first in rank — as the broadest, deepest, and most originary. Here I agree with Heidegger. That’s not to say it is the only question, or that it’s the first one we ask in philosophy or in life.

Few philosophers restrict themselves to one of these questions, after all. — Banno

Sure— nor should anyone. But yet there’s an understanding of being in every inquiry, whether explicitly stated or not. If we inquire about nature, about language, about life, or about stamps, we’re inquiring about beings. Perhaps we say they’re objects of thought or physical objects— doesn’t matter.

"Being and thinking." This is the dichotomy within which we're mostly stuck, in our western culture. "Thought," in this case, being viewed as logic and language. The human being is defined as an animal with reason, with language -- and whose essence lies in a knowing-relation to things. Hence we get minds and bodies, the inner and outer world, subjects contemplating objects, consciousness and its contents, etc.

This leads right into the analytic tradition. Frege, Moore, Russell, Quine, Kripke, Chomsky, etc. I'm not putting this down, really -- it's still very much a part of a long and powerful tradition. But we should recognize its historical development.

You suggest that clarification is an outgrowth of science. Rather, science is an outgrowth of clarification. — Banno

I agree science is an outgrowth of philosophy, but if philosophy is clarification to begin with, then should we conclude that everything is a science? What "degree" do we reach which determines something as a science? Which is to say, what do we mean by "clarification"? When is a question or word clarified, and how do we decide?

It was the clear understanding of momentum and force that permitted the development of physics — Banno

If by "clear understanding" you mean mathematically formulated, sure.

the clear understanding of atoms that led to chemistry — Banno

Chemistry existed far before atomic theory.

the clear understanding of speciation and evolution that led to biology — Banno

Biology has existed long before Darwin's theory as well, as you know.

Did Chomsky's "clear understanding of UG" lead to linguistics?

Clarification is not an ontology. — Banno

What do you mean by this emphasis, that clarification is ontology itself?

And analytic philosophy is not the same as philosophy of language. — Banno

I never said it was.

Nor is there any restriction in looking at language. On the one hand, what is there that is outside of language? On the other, understanding language will show us what is outside of language. — Banno

Well first we have to ask: what is language? Is language everything? No, I wouldn't say that. I'd say it's something worth studying, and an important part of what it means to be human. But I would say yes, there are things outside of language: experience, thought, desire...but also being (the very fact that we "are"). Language is a kind of being.

I would say that's restricted, yes. Unless we define language as being itself, which would be rather odd.

"Being" is not central to philosophical concerns. — Banno

True, the question has largely been forgotten. But it constitutes the object of philosophy. Whenever we think, we think in terms of beings. To ask "what is being?" is, in the end, the question of philosophy. It busies itself with many other subjects, no doubt.

It'd be helpful perhaps to talk more about consciousness, thought, and language to flush out what I mean. Invoking Descartes and Kant is helpful, I think, as this underlies most of the last few hundred years, including the linguistic turn.

More commonly it is understood that a degree of clarity is eventually reached that allows a science to bud off from philosophy. — Banno

Right, and that's mostly mathematics. Physics being the best example. In other sciences, there are explanatory theories and technical notions defined within this context. All well and good. But philosophy is not the philosophy of mathematics, or the philosophy of science, or the philosophy of language. It's just a mistake to believe it is.

The OP asks the question "why is there something?" - does it provide an answer?

@Xtrix? Does your dialogue answer this?

What of the title question - "What is being"? For my money an account of how we use the word "being" goes a long way to answering this.

Some folk like answers, right or wrong. Other folk are comfortable saying that they don't know. — Banno

I'm comfortable saying I don't know, which is why I give no answers. Looking at the word "being" itself -- its grammar and etymology -- is fine, but doesn't tell us everything. An understanding of history, of culture, of values, of the religious and political context of the Greeks, etc., are all necessary as well to round out a picture.

Whatever "this" is that's happening and which we're all a part of, is worth questioning indeed -- and the interesting part, in my view, is that we're all already living the answer.

But while you seem to think it is somehow to be done prior to philosophising — Banno

No, in my view philosophy is a kind of thinking, which is a human activity. It does indeed consist of questions, but they are not limited to "clarifying" words -- a belief which is an outgrowth of science and mathematics. Because they've been successful in many ways, this has come to dominate what constitutes "philosophy." You see it as an improvement, but it's simply another ontology. A powerful one, no doubt -- but restricts "philosophy" to the narrow questions of logic and language. But the philosophy of language isn't philosophy. I think we need to grow out of that and return, as you mentioned, to the Greeks. You see Socrates as being interested mostly in "clarification," I see him as simply one who was willing to question.

The question of questions, of course, is the one in this thread.

Yes, let's reduce philosophy to "clarifying" terms. Amazing how science and academia has influenced how philosophy is thought about these days.

What a pity.

Philosophy is about clarifying concepts — Banno

Says who? Pretty strange to reduce philosophy to this. Try thinking outside the analytic tradition.

To know what "being" is is to know what is referred to with "being". But when the uses of "being" are distinctly divergent, then no amount of endless analysis of use will determine what "being" is. The word refers to distinct things (or conceptions). Then we must turn to something other than use (which only leads us into confusion), to determine what being is. And in this sense Banno is clearly incorrect — Metaphysician Undercover

The OP is about the question, "What is being?"

When we say, in our modern world, that everything consists of forces acting on matter, as in the field of physics, then this is one possible answer. It determines what things are, and implies an interpretation of being -- in this case, ultimately a naturalistic/materialist ontological view (being = material, substance, the empirical, etc).

By asking the question I'm not necessarily looking for a definition, any more than I'd ask "What is God?" Many different definitions and interpretations of that word as well, represented by many sects of Christianity.

Rather, we're asking "Whereon is every answer to the question about beings based?" This is similar to the Kantian move, because the answer is basically the same: human beings. But Kant's conception of being, human being, and time, are still all within a Cartesian and Aristotelian framework -- one with a particular view about "truth," a deep concern for epistemology, and a modification of dualism of the world as "subject and object," where objects become representations for the subject.

Where Heidegger is interesting here is in the same way as Nietzsche is interesting when discussing values and morality. He's going beyond the tradition, questioning things that have been either forbidden to question, taken as self-evident, or totally forgotten altogether (as "God" was at one point).

So I'm not looking for a definition, really -- I'm looking into how we've interpreted being (and most importantly ourselves) in the ways in which we have, and why. Can we ask this question without already imposing an ontological interpretation? Can we look at things anew? That's the purpose.

Why not just say Time isn’t something we can readily atomise? The ‘Now’ is merely a way of framing time appreciation just like a second is a measure of physical time a ‘moment’ is merely a human reference to unregulated and vague demarcation of felt time. — I like sushi

That’s fine, but it’s not that we can’t atomize it— we can and do. It’s that we don’t want to mistake this for “lived” or “felt” time.

You’ve tried to define dasein before and failed. Not surprising as Heidegger failed too. That is my point. — I like sushi

Dasein is temporality. I can't be more concise than that. If that's a failure, then indeed his entire project is a failure. But explain to me where it fails.

It's saying something very similar to Kant, in my view. Where Heidegger thinks Kant failed was in (1) not asking about our being and (2) in still holding to a traditional view of time.

Personally , I don’t need to know the meaning of being in general, although I believe that it is closely linked with temporality, as his 1962 book, On Time and Being suggests. I am satisfied with knowing Dasein’s kind of being ( the ontological difference , the in-between , happening , occurrence , the ‘as’ structure , projection). — Joshs

Dasein is temporality. Being "here" (da-sein) is being the present moment, but only if we don't define the present exclusively as a present-at-hand now-point (that is, thought abstractly) -- but instead as the experience from which all time tenses arise. That's my understanding. So dasein (its being) is temporality, and dasein is the being that cares about, questions, and interprets being.

I think the quote below justifies the views above.

We have already intimated that Dasein has a pre-ontological Being as its ontically constitutive state. Dasein is in such a way as to be something which understands something like Being. Keeping this inter­ connection firmly in mind, we shall show that whenever Dasein tacitly understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. Time must be brought to light-and genuinely conceived-as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for anyway of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being.

B&T, p. 39 (18) Macquarrie/Robinson translation -- emphasis is Heidegger's.

I also find it tiresome when I’m told he makes more sense when you’ve read his earlier work. If so why can’t anyone explain what he meant? — I like sushi

I have done so multiple times. I'm happy to do so again -- I'll even give references. I'm also interested in criticism -- because maybe there's something I've missed. But when you or others come to this thread with conventional views about Heidegger, which in my view amounts to little more than a dismissive hand wave, and want to post nothing more than your feelings about his often unclear and difficult style, there's very little I can do with that.

With regard to the awkwardness and 'inelegance' of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'. If we may allude to some earlier researchers on the analysis of Being, incomparable on their own level, we may compare the onto­logical sections of Plato's Parmenides or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle's Metaphysics with a narrative section from Thucydides; we can then see the altogether unprecedented character of those formulations which were imposed upon the Greeks by their philosophers. And where our powers are essentially weaker, and where moreover the area of Being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than that which was presented to the Greeks, the harshness of our expression will be enhanced, and so will the minuteness of detail with which our concepts are formed.

-- Heidegger himself, emphasis mine

notice that the account of being given in the tradition of Frege, Russell, Quine and so on does not depend on time.
— Banno

This is like saying it doesn’t depend on human being. But Frege and Russell were indeed human beings. — Xtrix

This is like saying it doesn't depend on German, but both Husserl and Heidegger arranged their arguments in German. — Banno

An account of being doesn't depend on German either, it depends on the human being -- and Frege, Russell, and Quine were human beings.

The world as always already interpreted should not be conflated with the world as already named in my view. Meaning is not an artifact or "after-fact" of language; meaning is also pre-linguistic and is what makes language possible in the first place. — Janus

Well said. :clap:

I would invoke an analogy to perception at this point, but perhaps that’s not helpful in this context.

But I’m iffy on whether abstractions are things — Srap Tasmaner

What else would they be? Are they nothing? If they’re not nothing, then they’re “in” being along with everything else— clouds, feelings, sound, force, Bach’s fugues and strawberry candles.

But you have to say a lot more than, for instance, “Santa Claus exists — as an idea,” or something like that. An idea of what? Not of a person. — Srap Tasmaner

Well yes— Santa is usually thought of as a person. But regardless, as I said before in normal usage it’s perfectly fine you say Santa doesn’t exist. But ontologically, yes the concept of Santa claus is a being— it’s something; it “is.”

I don't see being as separate from becoming; the only difference I could imagine would be to see it as becoming abstractly considered by putting the idea or sense of change aside. Do you understand being as changeless? — Janus

No, but I don’t see “it” as separate from change either. I don’t really see it as anything. Yet there are all kinds of things in the world— obviously. Beings all over the place. When asking about the beingness of beings, I think all we can say is that there have been many interpretations, and perhaps ask about the human beings doing the interpreting.

notice that the account of being given in the tradition of Frege, Russell, Quine and so on does not depend on time. — Banno

This is like saying it doesn’t depend on human being. But Frege and Russell were indeed human beings.

I’m getting this from Heidegger. He uses lots of similies for Being. Happening, occurrence, the in-between , the ontological difference, the ‘as’ structure are some of them. — Joshs

Where does Heidegger say being is a “happening”? Or that being is anything at all?

Occurrence, so far as I’ve read, is another term for the present at hand. That’d be like saying Heidegger agrees with the western tradition.

The ontological difference is the distinction between being and beings— it is not a description or claim about being itself.

Again, I don’t see Heidegger ever offering another interpretation of being. What he’s trying to do is analyze the human being asking this question/ interpreting being. The basis for the various western interpretations, for example, is presence — which indicates time. So he sets off to “explicate” dasein in terms of a new conception of time (i.e, temporality) brought to light by a phenomenological analysis of everydayness.

As you know , Heidegger has lots to say about the nothing, authentic angst , the uncanny, absence. — Joshs

Indeed. Would be worth getting into.

Yes, being is a happening. — Joshs

I don't agree with this.

Being isn't any-thing, including a "happening," including "becoming," including "change." It is very much like nothing. We interpret this "nothing," but that's all we can say about it.

So being literally has no properties? — Heiko

Beings have properties. Being is not a being.

What we do in pretending does not seem to be grounded in how things can seem to be something they’re not; nor does it bring about any such seeming. Maybe I’m missing something, but I can’t find much of a connection. — Srap Tasmaner

From what I gather, phenomena appear in various ways, but all are "manifestations" (phusis), related to unconcealedness (aletheia). So that which manifests or is uncovered. That's phenomena, as traditionally thought. Heidegger will go on to talk much more about this relation to "presence" (time), and basically say that phenomenology is the study of absences. Or that's what I gather from him anyway.

His talking about "seeming" is important because it shows up right away in early Greek thought, along with "becoming," and leads directly to Plato's ontology. Being, as opposed to mere seeming/semblance and inconstancy, becomes thought of as the constant, the enduring.

"Harry Potter is a fictional character" on the other hand explicitely expresses the mode of his existence and makes perfect sense. — Heiko

Harry Potter is a thing. Harry Potter is a being. That's where we start. Whatever else we want to say about it is up to us. He's a fictional character, yes. In common usage, if we were to say that Harry Potter is "real," people would think we're insane. But does Harry Potter "exist" -- if by "exist" we mean is a being? Yeah, of course. So do unicorns and Santa Claus.

:up:

Existence is a predicate. — Cuthbert

No it isn’t.

Imagine going on and on about an apple that “doesn’t exist.”

Ohh so he was an activist, didn't engage solely in direct action, but he's OK because he didn't "electioneer" and give "campaign contributions." Got it. So not a "suck up to power."

sucking up to power. — StreetlightX

Oh ok, I get it now. Only direct action counts as "activism." Cool. :up:

MLK was a real suck up to power, too.

Petitioning is another abstraction and one of many types of activism, yes.

direct action — StreetlightX

Is an abstraction -- one of many types of activism.

Probably because they don't reduce activism to 'petitioning those in power to act on their behalf' — StreetlightX

Not reducing, no. But that’s exactly what they’re doing.

It's hard not to ask the question of being without getting into Heidegger, but let's see this question has any relevance to our lives, as individuals and also in the society/culture we happen to be living in.

I think it does, in the same sense that belief in God does. This is why I bring up religion often as being in a similar dimension as philosophy. I think they both ask and try to answer fundamental, universal human questions— and the answers (tacit or explicit) manifest themselves in our culture and our lifestyles.

Although Christianity is still around, I’d argue that this is a secular age, defined by capitalism and scientism — based solely on looking at how we actually live, and who our leaders are (and the beliefs on such they make and justify their decisions).

Thoughts on this? Am I way off?

My bad— just stupid activists then.

people actually doing good — StreetlightX

No— stupid activists. Probably voted against Trump to boot.

Stupid kid activists.

A place can't disagree with someone. — Bartricks

:rofl:

For the most part, education, health and wealth are not things you have a right to. — Bartricks

Thankfully most civilized places on earth disagree with you.

The roasting must take place on democratic party approved bounds only. — StreetlightX

No.