Let me see if I’m understanding what you mean when you say persistence and becoming both presuppose being.
Are you arguing that we need both the concept of persistence and that of becoming in order to understand being? — Joshs
No, I'm saying persistence and becoming, stability and change, are "in" being themselves. There's the being of stasis and the being of change. So being is presupposed.
Remember Heidegger's "restriction of being" chapter in
Intro to Metaphysics: being and becoming is the first restriction he analyzes, as being one of the most ancient. He talks about how Parmenides and Heraclitus get incorrectly interpreted as opposing one another, and how in Plato this problem (and the problem of "being and seeming") is solved through the Forms -- the Forms being the enduring prototypes. Thus "being" becomes "constancy" and "permanence," the un-changing, as opposed to all that is transient, perishing, unstable -- becoming.
But later he'll say "Becoming -- is it nothing?" "Seeming -- is it nothing?" His is "No, it's not nothing." So if it's not nothing, it's something -- and so belongs just as much "in" being as anything else does. He'll also go on to explain how these concepts were originally a unity and how they got disjoined.
I hope that's perhaps a bit clearer.
Heidegger asks, why does change require the notion of something sitting still as itself for a moment? Instead of founding the idea of change on sequences of things that sit still for a moment, (which is really founding change on bits of stasis that we cobble together), why not recognize that there are no things that sit still. Why not found the illusion of stasis on change , rather than the other way around? — Joshs
I see what you're arguing but I'm not convinced by it. When you say "sequences of things," the "things" you're referring to he will describe as "now-points." That's why I find the use of "now" to be a problem.
Also, I don't see stasis as being an "illusion" any more than change is. Yes, things change. Things also stay the same. We talk about matter changing forms but never being created or destroyed, so matter itself doesn't change...and all of that jazz. Again, we don't want to get caught in the restriction of "being and becoming," where we associated being with permanence. But we also don't want to say being
is becoming.
In any case, if change isn't nothing, then it's part of being. To equate it with being is an interpretation, and not a bad one -- it's claimed that Heraclitus did so, and the Buddhists do so in a sense, etc. -- but it's still just that, an interpretation. An interpretation "grounded" in what? In dasein, who cares about being and interprets being (including itself).
You seem to be saying: in the West, being has been interpreted as "presence," as constancy/stasis, and everything, including change, has been grounded on this basis; let's instead ground stasis on change.
I don't think this is what Heidegger is getting at. He's much more cautious than to give any interpretations or recommendations. He is always emphasizing
questioning, opening new lines of analysis -- and frequently talks about how a lot of this is probably off track, that new obstacles will arise, etc. He wants to reawaken the
question of being.
If anything, I see his main attack being against the objectification of the world and its implications for the future in terms of nihilism and technology. One way to combat this nihilism, according to him, is precisely to stop "staggering" in history, to reawaken the question -- to wake up from our mesmerization with beings and our forgetfulness of being itself.
Heidegger didn’t consider Dasein as just a human being, which is an empirical concept . He wasn’t anthropomorphizing Dasein. Dasein is priori to the thinking of human beings or living things. In this he was following Husserl. — Joshs
Agreed, but I'm running out of ways to talk about "us." So if I say "human being," don't take me to mean anthropologically -- Heidegger is avoiding that, which is why he uses "dasein" to begin with. Take me to me "us," the entity which we are.
It deals with your question: how can we understand change and becoming without beginning from objects which are present for a least a moment ? — Joshs
But that isn't my question at all.
“I propose an expanded model of time. Time does not consist only of nows.” Linear time consists merely of positions on an observer's time line. The positions are supposed to be external and independent of what happens. Linear time is an empty frame.“ — Joshs
I agree.