That is, the-thing-itself is so inaccessable to knowledge that we can't even say of it that it is an object, or that it has the form of an object. — StreetlightX

Exactly correct. So you're right, why bicker about whether noumenon means the same thing or something else -- it doesn't negate the above, which is all I'm really concerned with in this thread.

Thank you, I'll check it out.

Thank you!

And also a lot of nonsense.

Here are the definitions of subject and object that seem to best fit the OP's meaning: — Andrew M

Can someone explain to me what "OP" stands for? Thanks.

But in terms of what they refer to, noumena (or better the noumenal) is thought as being appearance relative (insofar as it is the "limit" of appearance) whereas things in themselves are thought as being utterly independent of all appearance (and human thought, understanding and knowledge). — Janus

"limit of appearance" is meaningless at this point. It can be repeated again and again, sure, but until it's explained it's just nonsense. I'm tired of pointing this out. Might as well say the noumenon is the limit in the Twilight Zone between appearance and thing-in-itself. Whatever the case may be, if there is a distinction it's so trivial it's a wonder we've spent so much time on it. According to Wikipedia there is debate about what it is in serious scholarship, so I suppose it doesn't make one dim to struggle with it. But I fail to see it. Simply declaring "it's the limit" or "the boundary" isn't saying anything at all. Nor has there been any definitive, clear textual evidence presented of anything remotely like this being said.

So far you just said:
Thing in itself = independent of appearance.
Noumenon = relative to appearance.

So both are at least contrasted with appearances in some way. Regardless, neither can be known, neither have properties of any kind, etc., but yet they're different. In what other way are they different than what's stated above? Can you give me anything else whatsoever?

You remove the subject, you remove both. Or you can say if you remove the subject, both still exist. But to say removing the subject and one stays around due to it's independence, but the other disappears because it's defined as the limit is just unnecessary. Just call the damn thing the limit of understanding in that case. Calling it a different word is an extra step.

Blahhh

Very clear. Almost my thoughts exactly.

These semantic games are tiresome. The thing in itself is beyond our knowledge, as I said before. The rest is irrelevant to me.

I’m unconvinced by your arguments- my reading is clearer, and every quote given so far either clearly agrees or can very easily be interpreted as much. Yours makes sense after much a linguistic gymnastic. Regardless, I’m sure you’ll simply claim the opposite- so be it. There’s no sense prolonging this discussion. I appreciate the effort.

Things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal modes of experience) — Xtrix

Things, without respect to whatever they are in themselves, absolutely must conform to our necessary conditions of space and time, otherwise, we would never be affected by them. — Mww

Sure.

Things and things-in-themselves are equal as objects, just not as knowledgeable objects. Things as they are in themselves are still spatial-temporal things. — Mww

This doesn't make any sense I'm afraid. The thing-in-itself is exactly what Kant, repeatedly, says is what cannot be known. Why? Because we're bound by space and time. You seem to keep wanting to bring the thing-in-itself back into the spatial-temporal world somehow.

We label objects as thing-in-themselves only to tell us we have no way to prove that what we know about objects is what they actually are. — Mww

"Actually are" apart from our way of knowing them, which is spatial-temporal. There's nothing left over, hence why we cannot say anything about it.

That is: the limitation set by the understanding on sensibility does not apply to things-in-themselves. Noumena are 'appearence-relative', and only appearence-relative. Things-in-themselves are not. — StreetlightX

The quote does not demonstrate this at all. In fact it does not MENTION noumena, it mentions things in themselves as apart from our (limited) understanding. Of COURSE the things-in-themselves are appearance-relative. How could it be otherwise?

Further down: "If we want to call this object a noumenon because the representation of it is nothing sensible, we are free to do so. But since we cannot apply any of our concepts of the understanding to it, this representation still remains empty for us, and serves for nothing but to designate the boundaries of our sensible cognition" (B346, my emphasis) — StreetlightX

Again, substitute "thing-in-itself" in this and see if it works. I think it does, without any contradiction whatsoever.

Yes, what effects us from outside corresponds exactly to what we sense. That which effects our eyes exactly corresponds to what we see; that which effects our ears corresponds exactly to what we hear, etc. We have to have consistency between incoming data and what the cognitive system works with. — Mww

Then the stimuli would be the thing in itself, not representation.

All kinds of things are outside us, but they are not representations, they are real, physical objects of experience, — Mww

Saying they're real physical objects and representation is the same thing. Of course they're representations. If not, you're arguing some kind of correspondence theory of truth. Again, that's not Kant.

Yes, we perceive objects. We don't perceive objects in themselves.
— Xtrix

I just quoted Kant as saying that’s exactly what we do.
“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility...” — Mww

I'm utterly baffled. I say we don't perceive objects in themselves (which is obvious), then you disagree and quote Kant and the first thing he says is "objects are quite unknown to us in themselves" and "mere representations of our sensibility," which is exactly what I said. What's the deal here?

Object are quite unknown to us in themselves says exactly the same as objects in themselves are quite unknown to us. — Mww

Sure. So you agree?

I can think swimming the English Channel, and it is experienceable, but the perception, the sensation and indeed the very phenomenon, are entirely absent. — Mww

Fair enough. Like I said earlier, I do consider thought to be phenomenal. It is true that Kant isn't the exemplar of clarity on this.

Imagination is not an experience. Empirical cognition is. — Mww

I just don't see this as true at all. Imagination is, of course, an experience. Reducing experience to "empirical" experience is pretty limiting, and not very clear. But I see now how you define the terms, and the source of misunderstanding in this conversation. So be it.

And the band played on..... — Mww

Yeah, I think we're getting into the weeds. The last thing I wanted to do was defend Kant in some way or other. I don't really care! The initial response was about my saying the subject/object variation I was thinking of was Kant's. But at this point, I'll concede it's not Kant's -- it's my interpretation of Kant. And could be completely wrong.

Maybe that'll stop the band?

Not at all. I've repeatedly acknowledged that noumena can be understood as things-in-themselves. Only that the converse does not hold in all cases. There is an asymmetry. — StreetlightX

Clear enough. I just cannot for the life of me understand the justification for this. They can be understood as things in themselves, but they're NOT things in themselves? What's added or subtracted? You claim it's in relation to the subject, but I have said repeatedly you can make the exact same argument by substituting "thing-in-itself" for "noumenon" in that case, and it still works.

But even if your point is granted, and there is a difference -- it doesn't seem to illuminate Kant's argument in any way, it doesn't give us insight into human understanding, sensation, perception, our scope or limits...who cares? Earlier you said it's important to insist about this "subtle" distinction. Why?

By their respective relation to the subject! — StreetlightX

And as I said before, they're both related to the subject. If you argue the thing in itself somehow sticks around with no subject, yet the noumenon disappears with the subject gone, then the noumenon is either subject-dependent and thus phenomenal, or there's no difference between it and the thing in itself, which (at least as a concept) disappears with no subject as well. I see no difference, and the point was to differentiate the two.

I've run out of ways of saying the same thing. — StreetlightX

Fair enough. And I've heard you, but still think it's a mistake.

Kant distinguishes between knowing and thinking. We can think about infinity, but not know it. Knowing implies defining and grasping its existence. — David Mo

And both are phenomena.

Similarly we talk about rivers of honey or flying horses. Mixing concepts or using meaningful words in wrong contexts where they mean nothing. — David Mo

OK, but that's all phenomena as well, in my view. It's all experience -- the experience of imagination, of creative use of words, metaphor, etc. Again, thinking is an activity and thus phenomenal.

I probably didn't explain it that simply after all. The way I understand it is that 'noumenon' is an idea of a limit beyond which sensory experience cannot go. A limit is itself an idea or at least a conceptual 'object' so 'noumenon' is in that sense an idea of an idea. — Janus

'Thing in itself' is an idea of an actuality which is totally independent of (and not merely a limit to) sensory experience and any and all human knowledge and understanding. — Janus

Ok, I follow you here a little more. If noumenon is a word for (or idea of) the limit of our understanding, fine. That's, I believe, what Streetlight and Mmw are saying as well. But I don't see any need for it. Why not just say "the limit of our understanding"? Why the idea of an idea, to use your phrase? It sounds to me like "noumenon" now becomes a word for "boundary," like being on the fence -- not a thing in itself, but not appearance/representation ("phenomenal"). I suppose you could read some passages this way (and only some), but I don't really see what it adds or why it's important.

Which follows from that fact that the thing-in-itself, as I keep saying, is not defined by it's relation to the subject, as the noumenon is. — StreetlightX

What is the thing in itself "independent of"? The subject. You said so yourself. Yet it's not defined in relation to the subject?

Your argument in general is somewhat odd: it's true that both share a certain 'quality' (that of not being subject to space and time), but this alone cannot say anything as to their idenity. Two apples may be green, but that does not make them the same apple. — StreetlightX

True, but if both noumenon and thing in itself are beyond space and time (green), what ELSE makes them different? You say the relation to the subject, that noumena is the limit or the mark of the limit. I say both can be applied to things in themselves as well.

If both are unknowable, how can we differentiate? It's like saying there are numberless, timeless, spaceless apples -- but there are two, and they're different somehow, but both are also unknowable. It makes no sense to me. Better to just say that human beings have scope and limits -- a scope bounded by space and time. Beyond this limit (of space and time), whatever there is we can't know -- because what we know is, again, bounded, and thus if we could know something about it it wouldn't be noumenal, it'd be phenomenal. What's the point of saying, "From the subjects point of view, the word for our limit is noumenon, which would disappear if we disappeared -- but from the point of view of nowhere, there's a thing in itself which lives on regardless"?

It frustrating to me. If there's something I'm truly missing, I want to know. Obviously it's convincing to a lot of people here -- more than I realized -- so I don't disparage it, but I still think my reading is more accurate.

"The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention; it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility." (B311) — StreetlightX

Yes, a limiting concept. Just as the thing in itself is a limiting concept. He's not saying noumena ARE the limit, as you stated, he's saying it's a limiting concept. You could just as easily replace "noumenon" here with "thing-in-itself" and Kant would be make exactly the same point. I still see no grounds for a distinction, or at least the one being made here on this thread.

"Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, but does not thereby extend its own sphere. In the process of warning the latter that it must not presume to claim applicability to things-in-themselves but only to appearances" (A288, my bolding). There could hardly be a clearer distinction between the remit of noumena and the thing-in-itself than in this passage. — StreetlightX

Our understanding limits sensibility, and can claim applicability to appearances only, not to things in themselves. This is what he says. If this is the clearest distinction, then I'm truly unconvinced and don't see how anyone can arrive at the conclusion that noumena are somehow different from things-in-themselves.

If both are not subjected to space and time, then what's the difference? Nothing. In my view these passages cited certainly don't support any such differentiation, and in fact at least one has been cited that clearly states they're the same thing.

I think it's unmotivatable to make this move, and really don't see what it adds, but to each his own.

One might say: noumena are things-in-themselves under the aspect of the transcendental subject. However, get rid of the transcendental subject, and one similarly 'gets rid' of noumena - but not things-in-themselves, which are subject-independant. — StreetlightX

So noumena are subject-dependent, unlike things in themselves -- and they mark the limit of sensibility.

So the limit of sensibility is what exactly? Not phenomena or representations, and not really the thing-in-itself. It's just another word for the boundary between what can be known and what can't?

It's clear that we have limits. We're limited by space and time. Something in itself isn't part of that. Are noumena part of space and time or not? If not, and yet they differ from things in themselves, then what are they (is it)? Saying noumena "mark the limit" just isn't clear to me.

Or put it this way: what exactly is "gotten rid of" when the subject goes away? In that case, why not just say the thing in itself goes away too? Who's to say?

Putting it very simply and in a way that Kant may not have specifically explained it: a noumenon is the idea of an idea; the concept of something beyond our (sensible) knowledge; an idea of the in itself. A thing in itself is the idea of an actuality beyond not merely our knowledge, but our very ideas. — Janus

So they're both "ideas"? This seems so riddled with confusion I really don't know how to respond. But if it makes sense to you, you're a smarter guy than me.

This shit is all very hard to speak coherently about: hence the disagreements and misunderstandings. — Janus

I certainly agree.

Please explain why he gets it right, by all means.

"The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself[...]

No, I do not grant that what we perceive are representations. — Mww

This is baffling to me, but OK...

One needs to keep in mind perception actually is nothing but reception of incoming empirical data. If incoming data, not in but incoming, are representations, how were they created? We can say how representations are created on the backside of sense organs, but we cannot use the equipment from the inside of us to create representation on the outside of us. Inside, everything relates to something, on the outside, what would data relate to except other data, which tells us nothing. — Mww

The incoming stimuli, our sensations, are data, yes. The second they hit the sense organs, they become representations to us, unless you argue that what effects us from "outside" corresponds exactly to what we sense, perceive, etc. That's fine, but it's not Kant. So how are representations created? By the brain and nervous system on the "occasion of sense," through our cognitive faculty. Whatever our representations are representations of, outside of our cognitions, is the thing in itself. Things in themselves are what is represented to us, but because we are bounded by space and time, there's nothing whatever to say about them (or it).

Saying we can't create representations "outside of us" is not true -- there's all kinds of things outside me: trees, books, rivers, anything at all. Who said representations are limited to "internal" things like feelings or thoughts? If that's not what you're saying, OK, but then surely you admit trees aren't "internal" -- and if you do, then everything we can know or talk about is technically "internal", bounded by our skin so to speak, and so the "internal/external" or "inside/outside" distinction is useless.

An affect on our senses, not of. It isn’t that perceptions are unknown, as in we don’t know we have been affected. We don’t know what we’ve been affected by. — Mww

We don't know what we've been affected by in themselves, you mean? We certainly know what we've been affected by otherwise -- as objects in space and time; our representations. I already granted we don't know what our sensations or representations are of in themselves, apart from our spatial-temporal boundedness.

Try this: incoming data is information in certain forms of energy. The output of the sense organs is still energy, but a different form. — Mww

This is saying the same basic thing, yes. And I agree. But the "different form" is our representations -- how we experience the world, bounded by our brain and nervous system.

We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it
— Xtrix

Thing is...to say we have no knowledge is to say we have no experience. — Mww

You're right. We don't experience the thing-in-itself either. Experience is bounded by space and time.

But we often perceive things of which we have no experience, every time we learn something new. — Mww

That's not using experience the way I'm using it here, of course. I mean human experience in general, not, say, an "experienced doctor." The forms of any experience whatsoever is space and time. Anything we experience at all will be experienced in this way. Thus, to say we have experience of the thing in itself isn't correct.

Not yet. If something is perceived, it will be a phenomenon. It isn’t phenomenon merely by being an affect on the senses. That is sensation and tells us something has appeared to the faculty of representation. — Mww

Ok, you're using the term in a different way from me. I consider sensations to be phenomena. What would it be prior to "becoming" phenomena, exactly? How do we know we even have sensations at all "before" they become phenomena. Either something is experienced (as phenomena of experience) or it isn't. I don't understand these extra steps you seem to put in. Doesn't make much sense to me.

Correct. It’s not. See above. The thing-in-itself perceived is just another something perceived. Same-o, same-o. See waaaayyyy above: object in itself equals thing-in-itself, and we certainly perceive objects, so....... — Mww

Yes, we perceive objects. We don't perceive objects in themselves. I don't know what that would mean. How can we perceive an object that isn't spatial or temporal? What would it look like? What properties does it have? We don't know, because we can't say a thing about it. We can certainly say plenty about objects -- as objects of our sensations and perceptions, and thus representations.

I think this stems from the above and not using sensation and perception in the same way I am. Again, I consider them phenomena, and by phenomena I mean literally anything experienceable. Out experiences are bounded, again, by space and time. Thus, whatever else sensations, perceptions, phenomena, etc. are outside of these forms we really cannot experience or perceive in any way. That would be the thing-in-itself. it's almost a matter of logic.

Don’t forget. We cognize representations, not things. There’s no contradiction in allowing things-in-themselves to be the objects of perception, because they have nothing to do with the system, other than to kick-start it. — Mww

That's exactly what I think, yes -- it's a contradiction. I don't see how "things" and "representations" are different. Things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal modes of experience) is a different story.

We can’t have an empty object affect us. How would we know we’d been affected? We have no knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. That doesn’t mean we don’t know anything about the thing that affected us. We are given an object, that object must have characteristics of some kind which show up in its appearance. — Mww

Of course it has characteristics -- in space and in time. A weight, a mass, color, shape, a quality of feeling, etc. We know we're affected because we experience things, as representations -- not in themselves. So whatever affects us certainly isn't empty to us -- it's any object at all, and not just trees and books but feelings, emotions, pains, thoughts, etc. Anything else whatever is the thing in itself, which you admit is not knowable. There isn't a third realm between knowable and unknowable, in my view -- or between experience and nothing, or between life and death. There's one or the other.

You almost seem to be saying there's an object out there affecting us that isn't yet a phenomenon but isn't empty, and that we can still know something about. I still have no idea what this means.

No, the phenomenon has been imagined as having wings. In light of the manifold of intuitions imagined, that contradicts experience, this object is not possible. Scratch the wings) — Mww

Imagining a pink unicorn is still an idea, yes? Imagination is an experience as well, bounded by our human limits. That's still part of phenomenology.

The cantankerous one is very much correct. That doesn’t stop them being a needless impolite and obnoxious person. — I like sushi

I don't think this characterization of me is altogether just, but I guess that's neither here nor there.

"it also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word "appearance" must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. Now from this arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not at all positive and does not signify a determinate cognition of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition". (A251–2) — David Mo

(My italics)

Exactly right.

You quoted me in this post, but don't address noumena at all -- which is what I was questioning. I appreciate the attempt, and don't want to be accused of "cantankerousness," but I still fail to see what role the noumenon plays if it's not representations and not the thing-in-itself.

(1)

Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. — Mww

Ok, sure.

(2)

Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. — Mww

Of course.

Here's where you make the jump I just am not seeing:

Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. — Mww

Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. What we perceive -- our representations, our sensations in time and space -- are phenomena. You grant this.

If something is perceived, it's phenomena. To say the thing in itself is perceived is therefore saying it's a phenomenon or representation of some kind. It's not. Kant's postulating something that may be "outside" our representations, apart from spatial and temporal forms. This is what "in itself" means -- in itself as opposed to the forms of our knowing anything (in space and time). Sensations, and hence perceptions, are spatial and temporal, and hence representation, and hence phenomena. So we can't "sense" the thing-in-itself, we can't "perceive" it, we can't "know" it. This is why the concept of thing-in-itself has been so controversial for so long.

Human beings have scope and limits, and the thing in itself has always appeared to me to mean simply whatever there is outside this scope.

That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. — Mww

You just said perception is an affect of our sensations, of our senses. Some sensations and perceptions are "unknown"? I still don't see your point I'm afraid.

That which is conceived can be talked about. To be conceived does not require existence. — Mww

Sure.

We perceive the thing-in itself. We don’t perceive noumena because there is nothing in the human faculty of representation that allows for it. — Mww

In my reading we don't strictly perceive either. Our perceptions, our representations on the occasion of sense, are phenomena. What's represented apart from our spatial-temporal "cognoscitive powers" is noumenon, the thing-in-itself. We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it -- what we perceive is whatever shows up for us in time and space: representations. You see what I'm saying?

If you're just using "perception" in the same way I'm using "representation," then sure, representations of something makes sense -- but we have no idea what that something is, and as soon as we try to attribute to it any property whatsoever we're assigning to it something spatial-temporal -- that's the whole point of bringing in the "in itself."

Again, I think your own passage says it nicely:

objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility... — Mww

(1) Outward objects = representations of our sensibilities.
(2) Objects in themselves = quite unknown. (Notice he doesn't say they're "unknown, yet we perceive them." That would make them representations of our sensibilities [1].)

Now what about "inner objects" like thoughts and the like? Maybe this is what you're getting at. I would argue they're phenomena as well, but perhaps that's off topic.

Just saw this:

Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous, and there is textual evidence for this relationship.[14] However, Stephen Palmquist holds that "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only loosely synonymous, inasmuch as they represent the same concept viewed from two different perspectives,[15][16] and other scholars also argue that they are not identical.[17] Schopenhauer criticised Kant for changing the meaning of "noumenon". However, this opinion is far from unanimous.[18] Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:

...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.[19]

He is much more doubtful about noumena:

But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.[20]

A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim a kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing-in-itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But Stephen Palmquist explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing-in-itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.[21]

So, again, it's more controversial than I thought. But I'm still not seeing much textual evidence to support many of the claims being made here.

What's another word for thinking about an object not as one of the senses but of a thing-in-itself? Answer: noumenon.

"The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself[...]"

Seems pretty clear here.

The importance of the distinction as I understand it lies in Kant's desire to remain a certain kind of realist (an 'empirical realist', as he famously calls himself). As is well known, Kant is keen to distinguish himself from idealism of Berkeley, and does so precisely by positing the thing-in-itself which gives rise to appearance. The importance of the fact that the TII is not relative to us (or to our transcendental constitution) means that in some way, the universe exists 'out there' regardless of whether we are there to cognize it or not. — StreetlightX

Sure. What I'm failing to see is where noumena play a role if they're not representations and not the thing-in-itself. If noumenon is used as word for the "boundary" between phenomena and the thing-in-itself, I'm just not yet convinced by that. Kant, in many passages, also clearly links both the noumenon and the thing in itself -- one passage was already cited earlier. It would be hard to square the two interpretations.

Maybe I'm just hopeless, but I'm still not understanding exactly where noumena are supposed to fit in your (and others') readings.

God, soul, Universe as Totality... It can be thought, but not known. It is thought as a mere boundary of what I cannot know. My intelect push me to it, but knowledge fails because only phenomena can be known. — David Mo

Things we think aren't phenomena? "God" and "soul" and the "Universe" are not phenomena or knowledge? Than how can you speak about them at all?

If you're not including thoughts as phenomena, I don't agree with that at all. If Kant says that somewhere I missed, I think it's just a mistake.

I read the exact quotation and yet I don't see your point. Kant is discussing the limits of what we can know and is equating the thing-in-itself with the noumenon in that passage, in my reading. It's actually a little baffling that you you interpret it as supporting you, but so it goes.

It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it. — Mww

Then in this sense both thing-in-itself and noumenon exists, otherwise we wouldn't say anything about either. Although to use "perception" is misleading -- we don't strictly perceive either.

The thing in itself isn't generated by our faculties limits, or anything to do with us, rather it's that which generates whatever appears to us — fdrake

So the thing in itself is what's represented, though we don't know what it is "in itself." Fine. Either the same is true of noumena, or else noumena are representations of some kind, which would make them phenomena. If noumena are something in between, it's not been demonstrated here.

The distinction between boundary (noumenon) and what lays outside the boundary (thing in itself), what lays within the boundary are phenomena and appearances. — fdrake

"Distinction between the boundary" is meaningless to me. There's phenomena and noumena, in my reading. In yours, there's phenomena, noumena, and the thing in itself. Fine. But I'm not seeing it in anything that's been quoted from Kant so far.

More specifically, noumena are intelligible objects that are not sensible — StreetlightX

OK. Examples of such intelligible objects would be what exactly? And whatever is given as an example, is this not therefore phenomenal (as objects)? I see the difference being made between understanding and sensibility, but my point is that it's completely irrelevant. Why? Because both the noumenon and the thing in itself are unknowns -- in any way other than that they're unknown. If you're arguing one is known in some other way, then it's no longer unknown.

The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible — fdrake

So does the thing-in-itself. Anything beyond space and time, the forms of sensibility, is unknown.

it's generated through our faculties' limits — fdrake

As is the thing-in-itself.

he thing-in-itself is the name for being insofar as it is not conditioned by our faculties; it is that which exceeds the limitations of our faculties. — fdrake

So the noumenon doesn't exceed our faculties? But the thing-in-itself does.
Both are unknowable, yet both are somehow different unknowable things.
One is a limit of sensibility and for us, the other is a limit of our faculties and outside us.

I just see no evidence for these positions whatsoever. I realize now it is held by quite a few people, but in my view it's a mistake. But at this point whatever the supposed difference is between noumenon and thing-in-itself, we can't say a word about either because they're beyond time and space, which is the basis for knowing anything at all. So, I guess, who cares?

and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real. — Mww

"Real" in what sense exactly? That aliens could see it differently from our perceptions?

That's such a misreading of Kant. But have it your way.

I see from this discussion that apparently this point is more controversial than I realized. Nevertheless, if we all agree that both the noumenon and the thing-in-itself are unknowable, doesn't this make them essentially the same?

The noumenon marks the limit of the sensible (it belongs to the order of the intelligible).
The thing in itself marks the limit of the conditions of possibility of knowledge. — StreetlightX

I don't understand "belongs to the order of the intelligible." Is this saying it's intelligible in some other way than the thing-in-itself?

Noumena are "for-us", while things-in-themselves are indifferent to sensibility. — StreetlightX

What possible good is it to say that noumena are "for us"? In what way are they for us? Something unknown, whether in reference to our "understanding" or our "sensibilities" or our "capacities for knowledge" are still unknowns and unknowable. They're "intelligible" in the same way, therefore: as unknowns. But that seems to be the extent of it.

Maybe you're right and there's a subtle difference here, but I'm not seeing it. And "cantankerous" as I'm accused of being, I'm actually really trying to see the point -- I have no stock in being right or wrong about this side discussion.

To summarize:

The noumenon (the unknown) is "internal" because it's "cognitated" by the pure understanding. The thing in itself (the unknown) is "external" because it's an object of sensibility.

Does anyone on here take this seriously?

Maybe no one's even listening. I don't blame them, given how ridiculous the above forumlation is -- without one citation of support.

That you don’t know he talks about the thing-in-itself in another section, describing it as the real, albeit known object of sensibility, — Mww

No, he doesn't talk about that -- because what you're saying makes absolutely no sense. Which isn't a surprise. And if what he talks about "later" is so very important to your point, then why leave it out? Especially when the point was to demonstrate how the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon" are supposedly different? Kind of a crucial missing piece there. And no, I don't have the Critique of Pure Reason memorized. If you have a point to make, the make it. So far you haven't. And you certainly haven't earned being taken on faith. Cite the passage or shut up. You're boring me.

and here, on noumena, he talks of the pure understanding cogitating noumena in the same way it cogitates the thing-in-itself. — Mww

You really have no clue.

Here's what Kant is saying, for anyone else listening: The noumenon (the thing in itself) is simply that beyond our sensations and perceptions in time and space and hence unknowable -- yet not self-contradictory. That's it. If the "thing in itself" and the "noumenon" are different in any way, it's not indicated here, never mind one being "external" and the other "internal."

Reading comprehension wasn't your strong suit I see. Pity.

The only justification for conceiving noumena is because we are not entitled to claim our form of cognition is the only kind there is. — Mww

I congratulate you on one true statement. This is indeed what Kant is driving at in the passage. It's also simply repeating, almost verbatim, what he stated.

Also:

for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application to all that the understanding thinks — Mww

(My italics)

He's literally saying what I've been asserting twice in a passage you have chosen. And yet you still maintain that somehow he's saying the thing in itself is "external" and the noumenon "necessarily within us." That's telling.

The point doesn’t stand; I specifically said I gave no quotes on the distinction. The claim I referenced has to do with the phenomena/representation distinction. — Mww

Yes, you said you gave no quotes AFTER saying you cite Kant while I cite wikipedia regarding noumenon and the thing in itself, which you initially claimed was "ridiculous." How about going back and reading.

The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. — Mww

(Bold mine)

Exactly right.

Yet:

Noumena is not thing-in-itself. — Mww

First, Kant doesn't say noumena, he says noumenon and thing-in-itself, in the passage cited. Let's at least be clear. Pluralizing one and not the other is unclear. Notice when he does mention noumena (plural), he also pluralizes "phenomenon."

Second, look at the quote. Breaking it down further: the conception of a noumenon - a thing which must be cogitated NOT as an object of sense [representation] but as a thing in itself. I don't know how much more clear that can be. And this is your citation, remember.

Thing-in-itself is external to us, noumena are intellectual intuitions given from pure understanding, thus necessarily within us. — Mww

This is NOT what Kant says, as demonstrated by your own citation. Noumenon is no more "within us" than the thing-in-itself. There's no indication that there's a difference -- in fact Kant is literally saying they're the same thing in this passage.

What Kant is getting at in this passage is whether the thing-in-itself (the noumenon) is contradictory. Nowhere does he say the thing in itself is "external" and the noumenon "within us." Nowhere. You added that in yourself. Nor should you expect this, since the point he's making isn't even to differentiate the two -- it's justifying the use of the conception of "noumenon."

You told me this was all basic stuff, but you didn’t seem to understand any of it. — Mww

I would be embarrassed if I were in your positron. I hope others are reading this -- I'd like others' opinions of this passage. At the very least, it certainly doesn't support any notion that noumenon and thing in itself are different things - which is your claim. Quite the opposite, actually. Despite this embarrassment -- since you obviously don't see it -- you feel entitled about how little I understand? As my nephew would say: "that's cringe."

Happy now? — Mww

I get no joy in being proven right over and over again. I'd much rather learn something new.

OK. I already referenced that sentence myself in the former post. That doesn't make it Lockean. But regardless, I'll rephrase: subjects have representations, some of which we call the outside world.

All my quotes are right out of CPR 1787. — Mww

Yes, and say nothing about the phenomenon being different from representation. But in any case, that's not what I was referring to. I asked for citations regarding:

The "thing in itself" and "noumenon" is essentially the same thing, yes. If you have evidence otherwise, I'd be glad to hear it. — Xtrix

Which you then claim you gave, while I merely cite Wikipedia.

So the point stands: you haven't.

What I mean is, that to say that there's a representation of, or a representation and, is suggestive of representative realism, which is more like Locke's philosophy. — Wayfarer

When do I say "representation of" or "representation and"? I'd like to see the context that was "suggestive" of this.