The thing is quite a few members on here are ordinary language philosophy fans, and not great fans of metaphysics, so discussing the usage of words is important to them, since they're convinced philosophy goes wrong with a misuse of language, particularly when it comes to ontology. — Marchesk

Discussing words, their origins and the history of their meaning, is indeed important. That's not being done here. To resort to the dictionary is as useless here as it is in physics, as I mentioned before. No one cares about how "energy" is used in everyday discourse if you're discussing physics. Likewise, no one cares here either -- unless it somehow plays into a deeper analysis of the etymology of the word (in this case "being") in the context of the history of ontology (which is what we're concerned with). But that hasn't been done.

I think we experience the world as if there is a subjective/objective divide, but the ontological situation is unclear, because we don't know the nature of consciousness. However, we're made of the same stuff as everything else, so I tend to think it's an epistemological divide. — Marchesk

What "stuff" would that be? Atoms?

Carrying this to its logical conclusion, taking into account your other thread on the problems the world is facing, it seems that the scientific bent of the human mind, albeit only expressed in a minority but widely claimed by all, which is the quintessence of the subject-object distinction, is actually an indication that the world has broken and is now present-at-hand. — TheMadFool

Give me an example where it does make sense. — TheMadFool

Well to say the world is "present-at-hand" simply means the theoretical, "rational" mode of being (which underlies science) where things show up as "before us"in the present moment -- as objects with properties, usually. Hubert Dreyfus often says the hammer becomes a "wooden stick with a metal blob at the end" -- a piece of equipment that has a certain weight, color, etc.

None of this is relevant when the activity of hammering is going transparently well -- or take your driving example, which is a good one. That would be ready-to-hand activity.

Given this, I think you mean to say that the current reliance on science shows how this present-at-hand mode of being is taking over the world?

I voted political corruption, by which I mean not just occasional bribes, but the way the powers that be serve elite interests and not 'the people'. This leads to many of the other problems on the list. And many problems not on the list. In my version of 'corruption' one can be utterly corrupt and not break a single law. — Coben

Can't necessarily argue with that.

I voted climate change, but if I had two choices over-population would have been #2. — Wayfarer

Likewise -- although I'm a little less certain about overpopulation these days. I would put nuclear weapons as second. It's still a much bigger threat than most people realize, even with the end of the Cold War.

I'm surprised at the choices, isn't it obvious that climate change is the most pressing, — Punshhh

I'm a bit surprised as well, although people have given good reasons for the other choices.

I would say climate change is the most urgent problem we face currently, but it's certainly connected to overpopulation and political corruption. Again, my biggest surprise is only one vote (so far) for nuclear weapons.

No one cares how the word is (mostly) used in English. Least of all me. I'm talking ontology. Do we walk into a physics lecture and gripe about their "counterintuitive" use of the word "energy" or "work"?

I'm continually discouraged by the lack of any familiarity with ontology in this thread. I was hopeful in the philosophy forum, members would be somewhat educated in philosophy.

I really hope this is all a big lie and science is wrong. If it is I will be happy. In my opinion we should heed the warning regardless. — Lif3r

This is an excellent point. I'm in continual awe of the power of the fossil fuel industry's propaganda.

Well reminds me of driving. When traffic is flowing smoothly we're completely unconscious of the act - the car and the driver are one. The instant something unexpected happens the driver becomes aware of driving the car. Carrying this to its logical conclusion, taking into account your other thread on the problems the world is facing, it seems that the scientific bent of the human mind, albeit only expressed in a minority but widely claimed by all, which is the quintessence of the subject-object distinction, is actually an indication that the world has broken and is now present-at-hand. It makes sense since morality, something that has been on our minds for over 2000 years, is about oughts, as if to say the world is busted and needs repair. — TheMadFool

Fair enough. I don't feel the use of "present-at-hand" makes much sense in this context, but I get your meaning.

Very interesting so far. I would have expected nuclear weapons to come up higher!

Well, that’s just not so. Maybe you’re not a native English speaker? Buildings and furniture are structures and artefacts. The point is that beings are not things or objects, but are subjects of experience, which is demonstrably not the case for inanimate objects — Wayfarer

Yes, it is so I'm afraid. Except in your world, where you reserve "being" for sentience, and cite the English dictionary.

The entirety of that quote:

Buildings and office furniture are certainly beings. No one is saying they're sentient beings. How is this hard for you to understand? Possibly because you not only ignore ontology,but you ignore me and everyone else on this thread who continually try to tell you that "being" as "conscious being" is your peculiar terminology. — Xtrix

(Bold mine)

The fact that you only quoted the first sentence already proves my point. You're a joke.

Next up: let's go to a physics forum and explain that the way we use the term "energy" in English just doesn't line up with how physicists use it. Then cite the dictionary. Bam!

Buildings and office furniture are not 'beings'. If a building burns down - unfortunately this has happened more than a thousand times in my part of the world in the last few weeks - we don't say that the building and its contents 'died. But if it contains living beings - animals or people - then we say 'they died'. Is it strange to say that? Does saying that amount to 'ignoring ontology'? How is this 'ignoring metaphysics'? — Wayfarer

Buildings and office furniture are certainly beings. No one is saying they're sentient beings. How is this hard for you to understand? Possibly because you not only ignore ontology, but you ignore me and everyone else on this thread who continually try to tell you that "being" as "conscious being" is your peculiar terminology.

You don't have to go far back in the history of ontology -- just look at Heidegger, who you quote.

Maybe someone should have been around to tell him that in English, "being" is usually used, in common interaction, to refer to "sentient things," hmm? What a profound realization he would have had.

What do you make of this gloss of Heidegger's work: — Wayfarer

A very decent summary from someone who's clearly read Heidegger. Something I can't say about you.

Note, 'our kind of Being', capitalised. What do you make of that? — Wayfarer

What do I make of what? The capitalization? In Being and Time, and in other translations, "being" is usually capitalized -- and it's unfortunate, in my view. It implies some kind of "God"-like "special" entity or something. In German, all nouns are capitalized, so it's misleading to reserve "being" for special importance.

Anway, I've been told I'm 'peddling nonsense' a number of times in this thread already, which I think is completely untrue, but I will go and do some more reading and contemplation and will take a time out for a while. Bye. — Wayfarer

You're peddling nonsense in the case of reserving the word "being" for "conscious being," citing the English dictionary as support, and then basically saying this in turn lends proof to your belief that consciousness and being are the same thing. You've got to do better sir. This would fail as a dissertation, a master's thesis, an honors thesis, and probably as a Presidential tweet (alright, maybe not THAT bad).

For example? — Wayfarer

See Heidegger, "Introduction to Metaphysics," p. 88 (in German) or p.122 (English). It's available online for free.

The very idea of a conscious entity (a conscious, "rational" being) as sui generis and the "problem of consciousness" itself are, at bottom, taking up the tradition of substance ontology and, I would argue, presuppose the subject/object distinction.

Oh, I'm sorry, then. I thought this was a philosophical discussion. I will, however, be edified in my newfound knowledge that buildings are beings. So long. — Wayfarer

The fact that you find so strange the idea of a building as a being, or a chair, or a rock, or literally anything at all, is puzzling. Unless you've managed to ignore ontology (and metaphysics) altogether.

And yes, it is a philosophical discussion - not a venue to talk nonsense, which is what you're doing.

Don't you think that the issue of the 'hard problem of consciousness' and Chalmer's argument as to why the natural sciences can't sufficiently describe the nature of experience is basically an argument about ontology? — Wayfarer

Since you ask me what I think, I think it's a complete waste of time, and one would do well to skip Nagel and Dennett (who I like personally) and Chalmers altogether. And no, it's not ontology. They're discussing consciousness, not being.

Consciousness or mind or rationality is that which discloses meaning, which makes it possible to define, consider, or analyse anything in the first place. Yet we don't actually know what it is, just as Nagel remarks in his OP. — Wayfarer

If we don't know what it is, then it isn't simply "that which discloses meaning." No one is interested in defining something out in space. It's armchair philosophy. I can choose to define consciousness as the light of Zorthar. Who cares?

So I am arguing is that the very element or aspect of reality which both these passages are referring to as 'what it is like' or 'the point of view of the subject' is actually 'being', and that attribute is why living creatures are called 'beings'. In the broadest sense, 'being' is the capacity for experience, which is found in the simplest of organisms, but which reaches the plateau of self-aware, rational being in human beings. — Wayfarer

So consciousness (of any kind) is "being," which is why (as you claim) we only refer to sentient beings as "beings." But this (1) completely ignores the field of ontology and the Greek sense of being and (2) is simply subjectivizing the word.

"Beings" are everywhere, conscious or not. Even in English. I'm sorry you don't like that, but it's true. If you want to reserve the word "being" for conscious beings, fine -- then everything else let's call "things" or "entities." Makes no difference.

You're well within the ontological distinction of "being and thinking," which has a long tradition.

Your argument, once the smoke is cleared, is not very interesting. Citing an English dictionary does not an argument make.

There is no issue that they exist, but they're not referred to as 'beings', and this is philosophically significant. — Wayfarer

How? And according to whom? The English word "being" and how it's used most of the time tells us what about the state of ontology exactly?

My argument is that the loss this distinction is a characteristic of modernity, generally, and the significance of the elision is more than semantic, but is a symptom of what has been described as the 'forgetting of Being'. — Wayfarer

So because most of the time, in everyday usage, we use the word "things" instead of "beings" for inanimate objects (as a matter of fact, for any object whatsoever), this is an example of the "forgetfulness of being" of modernity? Is that really what you're arguing?

"Forgetfulness of being" is indeed an interesting subject -- in Heidegger. But he's not meaning it in the way you are.

I don't give much weight to the distinction, at least whenever I think it's relevant. I think that it generates intractable access problems (how does a mind move a body?); — fdrake

Well that's slightly different. Notice I didn't put "mind/body" in the title. To equate the subject with a "mind" is a different topic. But your point is taken nonetheless. I don't give it particular weight either.

You probably mean objects incapable of being subjects. They will be machines by definition, no matter what. Or do you mean, that we are not machines, or fundamentally distinct from machines? If so, how? — simeonz

Depends on what you mean by "machine," but yes I think that we're not only machines in the traditional sense. How so would require a separate thread regarding human nature, of which there's much to say. But quickly: I like Heidegger's conception of the being for which being itself is an issue.

It is not obvious to me what does it mean for something to "acquire" consciousnesses. Is this a behavior modification or substance change or some other metaphysical phenomenon? Because stated in this way, how does one challenge any claim that something has or hasn't acquired consciousness. Also, it isn't clear to me what consciousness denotes - a behavioral pattern, a type of experience, etc. If it is a type of experience, how can a person know that it exists outside of their own being - i.e. the solipsism style argument. — simeonz

True, no one has pinned down what consciousness means yet as a technical notion. Hence the use of quotation marks.

Is time relevant? Or do you mean that the emergence of such advanced AGI is suspect to you for some fundamental reason? — simeonz

What's relevant is that we don't know what consciousness is, and computers are non-human objects. So to answer your question more clearly: no, there's no problem here.

I think it's more accurate to say that scientists will articulate justifications for scientific inquiry in the abstract in terms of something resembling the subject object distinction based on how common and pervasively applied a metaphysical intuition it is, rather than saying anything about whether the subject object distinction is really relevant to their work. — fdrake

Yes and no. I agree most scientists would repeat something like this as a philosophical grounding of their work, especially in the cognitive sciences, and that it does't really matter to the particulars of their research. But on the other hand, the particulars are seen in the light of fundamental notions, even if taken for granted and completely unexamined as they usually are. Every science has an ontological basis.

I think the subject/object distinction is one such fundamental notion for science, a variation of Kant, who took up Descartes' ontology, who in turn took up the Scholastic tradition, which of course was influenced by the Greeks.

It may not seem to matter, and it's often hard to care when modern science is so successful -- especially in terms of technology -- but the philosophical underpinnings are still worth questioning. I started this thread to see how many still question this particular notion, and as you can see, not many really do -- yourself included. That's interesting.

I never claimed this. I have said 'being' in the noun form refers to living creatures. — Wayfarer

In common usage (maybe), which is completely useless to this discussion.

So in some ways, the term 'ontology' applies to the 'discipline of the study of Being' in a manner that includes, or at least implies, the first person perspective. And I think that is crucial to understanding what 'ontology' really is about — Wayfarer

And what would that be exactly?

The Greek sense of being was phusis and, later, ousia. Neither privileges the first person perspective. A casual glance at an online etymology site just doesn’t tell you much.

I'm no Wittgenstein but check out language as Andrew M suggested. All languages I know of have a subject-verb-object structure and m — TheMadFool

I’m not talking about grammar or world languages. I’m talking ontology. It’s discouraging that this has to be explained, repeatedly, in a philosophy forum.

What would it mean to say that there's no subject-object distinction? — TheMadFool

In my view it would mean that we’re not engaged with the world in a particular way (in this case, as “abstract thinking”). Heidegger would say something similar, only as a “present-at-hand” mode of being.

Once you’re in this mode, then a subject contemplating objects as a fundamental distinction can commence. But this is a “privative” mode- what human beings do for the most part does not involve subjects and objects at all.

hat about AGI in computers. Hypothetically — simeonz

I’d consider them machines. Maybe in the future they’ll acquire “consciousness” of some kind, but we’re a long way out from that.

If you look up the definition of the noun form of 'a being' in any dictionary, — Wayfarer

It amazes me you continue to argue about this. I’ll grant your point about the noun form in common usage —because it doesn’t make the slightest difference to what I’m talking about.

Wasting time making a joke about climate change as Australia is literally burning to the ground isn't my idea of "using my imagination."

Unless you're a climate change denier, in which case: bye!

Good in Plato's philosophy, you mean? And what do you mean by "being"?

Okay. Put a freeze on elections. Climate deniers are removed from office. A climate coup is enacted. Media must apply for new registration. Those that print contrary reports are to be fined or threatened with imprisonment. Corporations are put on notice.

As I said, only China and India will contribute CO2. — Brett

Forgive me, I thought you were trying to have an adult conversation. My fault.

In English, the word ‘being’ applies to living creatures. Chairs and other object are artifacts, objects, tools, etc, but they’re not designated as ‘beings’. As I say, this is simple English albeit with philosophical implications. — Wayfarer

No, it doesn't. The word "being" in English references "existence" as well, and not simply human or living existence. It's the present participle of "be." But this completely misses the point anyway. What I was talking about was in the context of ontology, not common usage.

It seems that before anything happens at all, people will have to (1) vote out of office climate deniers and other politicians bought off by Big Oil and (2) escape the shackles of propaganda, misinformation, and sophistry being carried out by the industry, particularly in countries whose economies rely heavily on fossil fuel.

Governments are bought these days, and they're bought by concentrations of wealth and power. What's unfortunate is that because they also own the media companies, they can convince a sizable number of those who actually do vote to vote for leaders who are actively pushing us in the direction of extinction.

What is interesting is that neuroscientists and biologists are beginning to make claims about consciousness where this used to be off limits. — Harry Hindu

BTW -- no one is making claims about consciousness, because no one has told us what consciousness is. It would be like saying "neuroscientists are making claims about ectoplasm."

Oddly enough, when they even try to make a definition, they fall back on those long-dead philosophers you find so boring.

If its everywhere, it universal. Objects appear in my visual field as an instinctive act - without any intent of objectifying anything. It isnt cultural. It is biological. — Harry Hindu

No, it isn't. To say every human being has perceptions is more accurate, but to say what they perceive are "objects" -- a concept with a long history -- is to mistake the current (Western) worldview with a universal. The Greeks didn't view the world this way, nor did the Christians. That's not to say they didn't perceive things -- of course they did. But they did not refer to things as "objects" in the sense we mean. So to argue the subject/object distinction is universal is a mistake.

I dont understand why people still resort to pointing to long-dead philosophers claims as if they'd say the same thing knowing what we know today. That's not interesting. What is interesting is that neuroscientists and biologists are beginning to make claims about consciousness where this used to be off limits. — Harry Hindu

Neuroscientists and biologists all have philosophical beliefs guiding their research, and often follow dead-end paths because of holding bogus ones.

To wonder why we study thinkers of the past is kind of ridiculous.

But I think that the fact that we can't differentiate "beings" from "things" actually conceals a very profound philosophical truth. A chair is not a being, but a cow is a being. When Heidegger talked of 'forgetfulness of being', was he talking about forgetting his car keys? — Wayfarer

Of course a chair is a being. Heidegger's talk about forgetfulness of being is not about beings, but that on the basis of which beings "show up" for us at all -- namely, "being" (some like to capitalize this, but I don't).

Beings are capable of perceiving, whereas inanimate objects (minerals, for instance) are not. Is it 'strange and eccentric' to say that? — Wayfarer

To say any being is not a being is meaningless. An object is a being. A chair is a being. That building is a being. That piece of sand, Bach's fugues, mineral baths, and a trombone. All beings. Literally everything in the world has being. As I said above, to reserve the term "being" for "sentient being" is an extremely narrow and specialized usage.

Although it may not be a conscious decision, all thought and action implicity assumes the subject-object distinction — TheMadFool

I doubt that very much. This conception is so prevalent in the west we take it as part of human nature, but there's no reason to assume it's universal.

But perhaps you have a specific thesis with respect to subject/object that you think is basic to (or assumed by) modern science? Perhaps you could give some examples of how it applies. — Andrew M

In psychology, particularly in studies of perception. It permeates the philosophy of language (Quine's "Word and Object"), cognitive sciences, etc. This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions is literally everywhere. It'd be hard not to find examples.

Substance dualism? On your view, how do Popper and Kuhn presuppose it? — Andrew M

Because while they may not themselves explicitly refer to the res cogitans or the res extensa, they both discuss knowledge and theory from the subject/object formulation.

I was. Except consciousness, which inescapable under any conditions of human action whatsoever, depending on what one thinks consciousness to be, of course. — Mww

Please rephrase. This makes no sense.

The reason this matters, is that habit cannot explain the first learning of what may eventually become habitual. Pure reason, on the other hand, has no problem with it. — Mww

I'm not sure "pure reason" really explains all habits either.

But in modern times, Popper and Kuhn are probably the main influences (and Positivism before that). — Andrew M

Popper and Kuhn are interesting, but themselves presuppose Descartes' ontology.

It's true I can see other people as 'objects' in a sense. But think about the implications of that. When you refer to other persons, you use personal pronouns. You don't treat them as objects, as 'it' - at least, I hope not! - because you implicitly recognise that they are subjects themselves, and not just objects to be picked up and put down. — Wayfarer

By "being" I'm not talking about "sentient beings." By "beings" I mean to include literally any entity or "thing" whatsoever. This is where the miscommunication is coming from.

Re Heidegger - I've only picked up bits and pieces. I am loath to study him in depth and detail. — Wayfarer

I can see why. But once you give him enough effort, it's very interesting.

No doubt, and is the ground for refutation of Hume’s human action by mere habit, or, which is the same thing, convention. — Mww

I can tie my shoe via mere image without conscious thought because I already know all there is to know about tying shoes, that is, by habit. — Mww

These seem to contradict each other. What I thought you were talking about was habit, something in which the subject/object distinction (and even consciousness) often plays no role. That's not to reduce all of human behavior to habit, of course. Not sure how it's therefore the grounds for refuting Hume's thesis of human action by habit.

Subjects are called 'beings' for a reason; whereas objects lack being. — Wayfarer

You lost me here. Objects aren't beings?

The reference to Heidegger (who's fascinating to me) was very relevant indeed. I suggest "Being and Time" but more importantly, and too often ignored, his "Introduction to Metaphysics."

In a scenario where Alice sees Bob, Alice is the seeing subject and Bob is the seen object. — Andrew M

Yes, that's a linguistic distinction. That's not what I was getting at, as I feel I've made clear already.

A philosophical basis would have to be something substantive, non-trivial, something that is both consequential, and that could plausibly be constituted differently and have different consequences. — SophistiCat

Says who? That's a nice list, but you'll rarely find that to be the case in the sciences. The philosophical justifications that many modern scientists make (if pushed, at least in my experience) is from the philosophy of science of maybe 100 years ago or so.