Well, I have been trying to go at identity from my limited grasp of eastern philosophy on the matter. Specifically stuff like what Ramana Maharshi talked about and similar people. I hope I don't misrepresent him or similar teachers, but they say stuff like (in my own words) "You are not the body, feelings, thoughts, or mind, which are always subject to change. You are the changeless, impersonal, uninvolved, neutral witness of these processes, the subject."Sounds like what we are talking about is the IDEA of self, rather than an essential identity. Which, depending on what we mean by identity, there may not be one.
— Yohan
Sure. Let me know when you've made up your mind which you want to discuss. — unenlightened
But if I meet another structure exactly like mine, but composed of different particles, I would be me and not them. That must mean my identity is rooted in the particles, not merely the structure. Further, how much change in my structure would constitute a change of identity? Surely I am different each moment, structurally. Does that mean I cease to exist every moment and a new self emerges each moment? Sounds like what we are talking about is the IDEA of self, rather than an essential identity. Which, depending on what we mean by identity, there may not be one.I am saying that a person is all relationship. we know for instance hat all the particles of the body are replaced over a few years by new particles. So what is maintained the same over years is the structure, the arrangement of changing substances. — unenlightened
I don't consider arrangements necessarily meaningful. Not if they are essentially just composed of insentient matter. Only relationships between living things do I consider meaningfulWhat's with the 'just' and 'merely'? Stuff is just stuff, merely stuff. Relations, arrangements, structures, are meaningful. just meaningful, merely meaningful. — unenlightened
I guess I can agree with you? But I don't see how your two posts form a coherent picture of the world we live in. Are you a reductionist or aren't you? Am I merely a relationship of particles or am I a person? Is reality just a complex relationship of "stuff"? Or is reality some kind of meaningful relationship?I try to be as vague as possible, but someone has to ask. Really, trot along to a physics forum, and when you find out what stuff is, come and explain it to me. I suppose if E = mc^2 and energy is activity, then it seems that stuff is pure active relation of emptiness to strings or quarks or fuck knows.
But I don't have to care about that. For the convenience of human understanding, light and matter is stuff.
Wouldn't then the definition of the world be "The collection of all particles of matter/energy"?
Absolutely not. It's the relations that matter, not the matter itself. Music is just vibrations in the air you think? No, I say, that's noise; music is vibrations in a relationship. — unenlightened
What do you mean by 'stuff'? Do you mean particles of matter/energy? Because isn't everything besides particles of matter/energy relationships between participles of matter/energy? (That is within metaphysical materialism).P1. There is stuff.
P2. Stuff is related.
P3. Relations are not more stuff. — unenlightened
I have no idea how to go about determining the "nature of being". I don't really even know what "nature of being" means (going by a simple definition of what ontology is supposed to be about?). I'm not even sure there is anything really there, in the way I experience things. Not that I think there is absolutely nothing, or just nihilistic solipsism. I'm just not sure if 'existence' is an added quality to...things....labelling things as 'experiences' may also just be a label/addition.The problem is how you are going to arrive at an epistemology with no notion whatsoever of ontology. While I agree that speculating on ontology in detail isn't useful, we need to at least consider the question of what information is. If we don't want to conclude that information isn't real (which would lead to Solipism) then there must be something ontological to this information. — Echarmion
It's really mind boggling for me personally. I kind of have a sense of what knowledge is...or knowing. Seems the same as awareness or experience, or at least in that area. But 'being' I don't know. I'm leaning toward it being some kind of illusion. 'Being' doesn't seem self evident to me in the same way knowing does.↪Yohan And what exactly do you think ontology is, or what the word means - that makes a difference. The word itself appears from its roots to mean knowledge of being - so far so good. But being itself has no differentia. And thus it is more than a little difficult to figure out just what "knowledge" of being is knowledge of. What do you say? — tim wood
I don't mind being silly, unless it means I am wrong or offensive. I think you meant the perception of sentence sentience?↪Yohan Yeah, silly buggers. They're a bit like the folk who think they have to specify that letters can't read themselves, presumably to guard against sentence sentience... — Banno
It seems like people who believe stuff can happen without a mind are very selective on what those things are...apparently words can mean things without a mind giving meaning to the words.... but a tree can't be beautiful without a mind present to give a tree that particular kind of meaning. Or do you think the beauty of a tree can exist without a mindStove's gem again. This post cannot refer to itself without a mind to interpret it, therefore it cannot refer to itself. — Banno
I think its always a mind who labels sensory data as being objects, then interprets objects to be symbols, then attaches meaning to the symbols, eventually creating the idea of a post. It's actually the mind that arranged the post and referred to it, and/or the reader as well after it was posted, but not the post itself. The post does not exist as a form of communication without some mind...at least I can't conceive how it could.↪Yohan
Define what it is to be the post, and then define what it is referencing the post. You might find that part of the post is referencing the whole. So a thing cannot reference it self, but can use part of itself to reference itself, like using your fingerprint. — Harry Hindu
So if there was a painting with the words painted on it "I am a painting". You think the painting is literally referring to itself? Isn't reference a type of thought? Wouldn't that be the same as saying the painting is having a thought?Yep, your post refers to itself. — jorndoe
Except that isn't the case.[/quote]Except that isn't the case. You read the above, you thought about it, you referred to past thoughts and experiences, decided what you wanted to convey, thought about it, worded it in what you thought we be an efficacious way again based on past experience, and posted the above. There is a distinct process A > B > C > D in what you did that involved weighing up alternatives and choosing relative to your frame of reference, i.e. based on your experience and reasoning capabilities, whittled down all possibilities to one without external bias. — Kenosha Kid
Before you can claim consciousness depends on matter, you have to clearly define matter and conciousness. Science has not defined either adequately. It doesn't know what we are looking at, nor what is looking.
This is plainly obvious for all to see.
As far as we can tell, its impossible to know anything about objective reality. Science has not revealed a single objective truth as of yet, only subjective observations (repeated observations sure. But no amount of subjective observation will change the fact that its subjective) — debd
source https://aphilosopher.drmcl.com/2008/01/04/argument-by-definition/An acceptable definition must be clear, plausible, and internally consistent. It must also either be in correspondence with our intuitions or be supported by arguments that show our intuitions are mistaken.
I think this is your argument, which kind of reads in a confusing way...:Brain function is clearly not more fundamental than brain. For brain function, you need a brain. The opposite is not true. — Kenosha Kid
And in Christian Science only God and mind have ultimate reality. Calling something a science doesn't necessarily make it one. And a "scientific" discipline can have an admixtur of actually rational guidelines mixed with unfounded assumptions or dogma, which I would say is possibly the case with most materialism-based scientific traditions. Idealogy seems to form when masses of people get together with a common vision, even if they all genrally share values like objectivity...so it seems to me. Maybe its part of human tribalistic nature...sorry for small tangent.In neuroscience, brain function is mind. — Kenosha Kid
So neuroscientists have demonstrated that there is not only correspondance but causation between mental and brain activity? How can one ever prove that corresponce is not only correspondance, but that one actually is the cause of the other? Further, you said before that to neuroscience brain activity is mind activity. If brain activity IS mind activity, then there is no causation between one or the other, rather there is no separation between the two in the first place. If one can cause the other, then there are two things. But I don't think an idealist has to disprove any neuroscience findings, he just has to show that materiality is an idea.1. If you wish to claim that a mental activity that corresponds to a brain activity is not causally linked, one has to reproduce the success of neuroscience at explaining such correlations without the benefit using what is apparently to neuroscientists accurate, predictive and obvious. It's a difficult position to be in. — Kenosha Kid
Here is a simple argument why I think, if monism is the case, mind is the fundamental rather than the material world.2. Otherwise one ends up in a turf war that dualism can only lose. You might accept that yes that brain activity does indeed describe a particular mental activity, but that's -not all that mind is-. As neuroscience explains more and more, this separable dualistic component must necessarily retreat, else resort to (1) above. — Kenosha Kid
That sounds logical but could experiencer, experiencing, and experience... or self, perception, and object perceived...could such division be a delusion of the experiencer or self?An experience being had by nobody is an experience not being had at all, and an experience being had of nothing is again an experience not being had at all. — Pfhorrest
Makes sense.one cannot doubt that an experience of doubt is being had, and so that some kind of experience is being had. — Pfhorrest
This sounds rock solid...But, does it necessarily imply duality?But I then say that the concept of an experience is inherently a relational one: someone has an experience of something. An experience being had by nobody is an experience not being had at all, and an experience being had of nothing is again an experience not being had at all. This indubitable experience thus immediately gives justification to the notion of both a self, which is whoever the someone having the experience is, and also a world, which is whatever the something being experienced is. — Pfhorrest
Do ideas think? Are ideas mental? Conclusion: Both ideas and material objects show no clear signs of thought. Whether or not something has thoughts is irrelevent to whether or not that things is an idea or a material object, since thoughtlessness can apply to either.And that's just brains. There's toasters, rope, jelly, shoes, trees, water, air, chinken nungents, mud, sand, oil, car keys, bedsheets, cups, and so on, all material things that show no evidence of thought, that we would be astonished to discover had thoughts. And no evidence of thoughts without some material foundation. — Kenosha Kid
I had edited my original post quite a bit. I tried to explain that correspondance between mental activity and material activity does not in itself prove either one to be the foundation of the other.And no evidence of thoughts without some material foundation. — Kenosha Kid
I must admit I've read some plato, including the Republic - Thanks though (I could perhaps read more.)I suggest you get the essence of the Republic by Plato. You don't have to read the entire danged book itself, just Google it. — god must be atheist
thanks. Doing philosophy is quite hard. Especially being unbiased and questioning what seems obvious. The more obvious something seems, the more I try to question it. I still feel hopelessly inadequate to understand reality, a lot or most of the time, but I try to keep going down the rabbit hole regardless. Death will come some day, and I figure if death is the end, then it wont have mattered if I wasted my life philosophizing. If there is even an miniscule possibility of immortality, I figure its worth seeking since the prize of immortality is of infinite worth. Whereas a life, no matter how great or horrible, if it leads to permanent exinction, such a life will equate to absolute meaningless in the end.You are a brilliant mind: you reinvented the wheel that was first described 2500 years ago, and constantly remindered. This is actually brilliance, to come to the same conclusion as Socrates, without prior knowledge of his teachings. Well done. (I am NOT being facetious.) — god must be atheist
I disagree that understanding is the origin of all concepts. I think it is misunderstanding that is the origin of concepts. Concepts are generated in an attempt to resolve misunderstanding. Misunderstanding leads to the creation of concepts, which leads to greater and greater misunderstandingSorry...I got carried away. You asked about the “origin of the concept “reason””, which is easy enough to answer: understanding. Understanding is the source of all concepts, but the question remains as to whether reason is a concept. The argument has been made that a definition is sufficient to justify the possibility of a concept, but we find so many definitions for reason that conceptual veracity for it diminishes accordingly. — Mww
Well, physicalists claim ...correct me if I'm wrong...atoms of light reflect off of atoms in a "world" and those atoms hit our eyes. And the atoms of our eyes trigger atoms that make up "our" brain...and then what? many triggered atoms collectively have a particular atomic activity that corresponds to an "experience of an external physical world"Explain away if you’re so inclined; no argument from me.......promise.
Yes, I favor idealism of a certain sort, along other disciplines. But that doesn’t matter here, cuz I’m not arguing anything. Just listening, even though I might ask a question or two. — Mww
I could try to explain my point of view ... But I don't want to argue it.Direct experience does not reveal an external physical world.
— Yohan
Why wouldn’t it?
—————-
You actually have to assume metaphysical physicalism in order to have the illusion of experiencing an external physical world.
— Yohan
What if I don’t want my experience illusory? — Mww
How is switching from non-existence to existence any different from switching between nothing and something?But if I truly didn't exist before, yet now I do, then I came into being from nothing...
— Yohan
The one does not necessarily follow from the other. While true you didn’t exist at one time, and did at another, doesn’t mean you came from nothing. Granting that the mechanics of standard reproduction gives the body, and if no mind is possible without the body, it follows that the possibility of mind is given from the certainty of the body. One would be forced to show how mind absolutely cannot arise from body, or, show how body is insufficient for mind to arise from it, to disallow that it does, which only then makes room for coming into being of mind from nothing. — Mww
So you are saying if you exist again, then you didn't really cease existing prior.So no need of the arrow of time? There is no content expectation from pre-existence to existence, but if from post-existence to existence holds, then there should be content expected from the former to the latter. Post-existence implies an existence already done, then to return to it should bring the content with it. If there is no such implication, and the return from post- has no content, how can it be said it is a return at all? — Mww
Tautologies are only worthless if they are obvious.Which is it....all things or possible things? All things except impossibilities, or all things that can exist, which is the same as all possible things that exist, do exist? If all possible things actually exist, they are not merely possible. In which case, the proposition is the same as all things that exist, exist, a mere worthless tautology, true by meaning alone and having absolutely no particular knowledge derivable from it. — Mww
