When we view a sunset, our experience as observers is a relational 'whole' that includes a variety of elements—color gradients, the curvature of the horizon, temperature, what it might mean to us emotionally, etc. The 'sunset' is a dynamic context << (you might want to reflect on hypostatic abstraction here).

The color orange is not an isolated, separate entity; it is a feature relationally embedded in the manifestation of the sunset. ... Through precisive abstraction, we can mentally focus on 'orange' by disregarding other features such as the movement of the clouds or the fading blue above, and we can do this without asserting that orange exists independently of these relationships.

Through Peirce's precisive abstraction, we can recognize orange as a dependent quality—it cannot exist without its relational context in the sunset. ... So, our next step might be to explore hierarchical dependencies—such as, how the perception of orange depends on the interplay of light, atmosphere, and our personal sensory apparatus.

Peirce's approach emphasizes continuity. ...The experience of orange emerges from a relational process involving the world, the perceiver, and the broader phaneron.. ... And as for emergence. ... Orange is not "out there" or "in here" but arises through the semiotic process of interpreting the event of the sunset. <<< I will explain more about this semiotic framework in a subsequent post.

A nominalist might argue that orange is merely a label we subjectively assign to what we perceive, dismissing its relational genesis in the physical world.
A Platonist might treat orange as a universal form existing apart from the sunset, as though it were a preordained property applied to sunsets (like orange is on God's or the gods' paint palette).

Some questions we might ask ourselves in this precisive abstraction might be ... How does focusing on orange change our understanding of the sunset as a whole? Could orange exist if we didn’t also perceive the gradients leading to and from it (such as yellow, red, etc.)? How does our shared biology and cultural context (placement) influence the way we abstract orange from this relational whole? <<< More on this later too.

Lecturing us on how Peirce is misunderstood should give way to some sort of discussion of what he was trying to say. — ToothyMaw

I completely agree. ... I work two jobs, maintain a home and the beginnings of a new vegetable garden, plus I'm trying to write a book, so my time here might be a bit more sporadic than I'd like. Perhaps that influenced my frustration in trying to keep this thread on track.

My next post today will have some directional meat on its bones. Thank you for your patience and understanding.

Ok. ... I am going to try again to explore Peirce's 'Precisive Abstraction' in this thread. ...

Peirce developed precisive abstraction to be employed in this way. ... to select or point to a feature of an experience while 'properly' (NOT a binary 'not) negating others. Peirce used this method to discern emergent differences and analyze concepts and ideas juxtaposed to one another to discover hierarchical relationships of dependence among them.

We are going to explore the color orange in a sunset as an example to assist in examining all three positions of thought (the differences from nominalism and Platonism that make Peirce's original precisive abstraction stand out). We will also explore how or why ancient texts did not use the word 'blue' and that there is still a current-world tribe that has never developed or used a word for 'blue'.

I am posting this again for ease of reference. ...

The misinterpretations of Peirce’s work, especially regarding concepts like precisive abstraction, typically stem from several intertwining issues. I will do my best to explain the reasons why this is so important to understand. ...

Peirce's philosophy is inherently complex, relational, and dynamic, which makes it resistant to quick summarization or simplification. Secondary sources often reduce his ideas to fit into frameworks that are more familiar or widely accepted. Using terms like "separate" reflects nominalist thinking, where everything is viewed as discrete and bounded, rather than relational and continuous. Terms like "concrete" might be chosen to make the concept seem easier to grasp but end up distorting its original meaning.

Many contemporary scholars and interpreters are steeped in nominalist, analytic traditions, which prioritize linguistic precision and treat concepts as isolated entities. These traditions can fundamentally clash with Peirce's synechistic continuity, leading to a failure to understand relational ontology and its implications, and an emphasis on abstraction as separation rather than as an emergently relational operation.

Online content is often not written by experts in Peircean philosophy but by people referencing tertiary sources. Errors or biases in interpretation are amplified and manifested due to content creators relying on surface-level understanding, and the emphasis on keywords like "separate" or "concrete" aligning with SEO (search engine optimization) goals rather than fidelity to Peirce’s original intent.

Many philosophers, even teachers, are not adequately trained in Peirce's semiotic and synechistic frameworks. Instead, they approach his ideas through the lens of Western dualisms (e.g., subject/object, mind/body), and struggle with the triadic nature of Peirce’s logic, often collapsing it into binary or dualistic structures.

This confusion persists because Peirce's original writings are challenging, not only due to his intricate language but also because he introduces new terminologies and redefines existing ones (e.g., "abstraction"), and his work is spread across a vast array of manuscripts, making coherent interpretation difficult for many people.

My frustration with the distortion of Peirce’s ideas is entirely valid, and my insights will hopefully operate as an important corrective to what has happened with how others misinterpret his work. By emphasizing continuity, manifested placement, and relational dynamics in my explanations, I am attempting to return Peirce’s ideas to their rightful context.

Peirce used this method to discern emergent differences and analyze concepts and ideas juxtaposed to one another to discover hierarchical relationships of dependence among them. — Mapping the Medium

Why did I use the word 'juxtaposed'? To notice when things are in juxtaposition is to notice things side by side, with the outcome being that specific qualities are contrasted. ... Juxtaposition doesn't mean exactly that this thing and that thing are opposites and separate, however. ... Pose…as in, to place. To place next to. To juxtapose. The connection has to do with proximity, immediacy, and the temporal, analog continuity of experience. This is why I often refer to a 'manifested placement'. My PRP (phaneroscopic reciprocity principal) aspect of my Evrostics Triad framework explores this. In considering PRP, juxtaposition serves as a manifestation of relational reciprocity, where the observer and observed, or contrasting qualities, are dynamically interdependent. Think 'Heraclitus's Unity of Opposites, or Janus. ... Qualities are contrasted, while at the same time being dependent. ... Again, there is no 'I' without the 'Not I'.

Who developed precisive abstraction? ... Charles Sanders Peirce
Prescisive abstraction, also known as prescission, is a formal operation developed by Charles Sanders Peirce. It selects or points to a feature of an experience while 'properly' negating others. Peirce used this method to discern emergent differences and analyze concepts and ideas juxtaposed to one another to discover hierarchical relationships of dependence among them.

I have edited the above descriptions.

These are my modified versions of online descriptions. words like 'separate' and 'concrete' are often mixed into these descriptions, but they are not accurate implications. — Mapping the Medium

It is no wonder that so many people are confused about Peirce. SO MANY online descriptions mix his work up with other veins of thought. Doing so takes Peirce's work in wrong directions and points to errors that do not actually exist in his work.

I suppose I should clarify this....

The name of this thread is 'Hypostatic Abstraction, Precisive Abstraction, Proper vs Improper Negation'.

Who developed hypostatic abstraction? ... Charles Sanders Peirce
Hypostatic abstraction is a formal operation that transforms a predicate into a relation. It was formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce, a philosopher and mathematician, and has applications in philosophy of language, mathematical logic, and the analysis of empirical science.

Who developed precisive abstraction? ... Charles Sanders Peirce
Prescisive abstraction, also known as prescission, is a formal operation developed by Charles Sanders Peirce. It selects or points to a feature of an experience while 'properly' negating others. Peirce used this method to discern emergent differences and analyze concepts and ideas juxtaposed to one another to discover hierarchical relationships of dependence among them.

I have edited the above descriptions.

These are my modified versions of online descriptions. Words like 'separate' and 'concrete' are often mixed into these descriptions, but they are not accurate implications.

This is the focus of this thread.

Peace. — Arcane Sandwich

Peace to you as well. You are always welcome to join in again if you are willing to focus on the topic of abstraction through a Peircean lens.
Happy Foruming!

Asserting compatibility between incompatible ontologies — Metaphysician Undercover

...

Taking a nominalist structure of "discrete categorization", and imposing an assumption of continuity, without justification, just to make it more "Platonic", is not a solution to the discrete/continuous dilemma. — Metaphysician Undercover

Peirce absolutely does NOT do what you are asserting here.

I am exploring this issue in my thread on Hypostatic Abstraction, Precisive Abstraction, Proper vs Improper Negation

If you want to participate in this thread, I only ask that you keep your mind open regarding what you think you know of Peirce — Mapping the Medium

In this thread, we are going to approach abstraction through a Peircean lens. — Mapping the Medium

and we will not be constantly squabbling over which one is better. — Mapping the Medium

As for the nature of abstraction, I'm with Dewey on this one: they're in the brain, our abstractions, that is. Peirce and James are simply mistaken, and therefore, wrong. — Arcane Sandwich

Ok. Thank you for letting me know that you are not interested in participating in this thread. Fortunately, there are plenty of threads on this site for you to discuss those topics in. — Mapping the Medium

That was a little...cold. I'm not sure that Sandwich wasn't contributing to the thread, and inviting someone to stop participating in a thread in the absence of belligerence or something kind of needs more justification than just that that person disagrees in a valid way with some core suppositions imo. — ToothyMaw

From my perspective, that was a decision Arcane Sandwich made, not me.

Moving forward...

What we will do in this thread is first try to go back in time to when these nominalistic and Platonistic divergences in 'thought' took shape. Of course, to really explore how these veins of thought were first conceived, we would have to go back to pre-Zoroastrianism times, and that is not really feasible here, so we will begin with how nominalism and Platonism both have their roots in Athenian philosophy, which introduced the idea of discrete, bounded forms. This intellectual heritage is what ultimately shaped a worldview that often overlooks the relational, dynamic nature of existence—a hallmark of Peirce's synechistic (continuity) thinking.

We're going to explore the color orange in a sunset as an example to assist in examining all three positions of thought. We will also explore how or why ancient texts did not use the word 'blue' and that there is still a current-world tribe that has never developed or used a word for 'blue'.

I just wanted to set the stage for how we will begin to understand Peirce's tool of precisive abstraction. .... I'll be back later with some first steps for us to take.

As for the nature of abstraction, I'm with Dewey on this one: they're in the brain, our abstractions, that is. Peirce and James are simply mistaken, and therefore, wrong. — Arcane Sandwich

Ok. Thank you for letting me know that you are not interested in participating in this thread. Fortunately, there are plenty of threads on this site for you to discuss those topics in.

as a subject in the ontological sense, to have such rights. — Arcane Sandwich

Of course you do.

If you want to participate in this thread, I only ask that you keep your mind open regarding what you think you know of Peirce, as we are extremely fortunate through his huge collection of writings to bear witness to the evolution (a continuum indeed!) of his architectonic framework.

For instance, speaking of 'isms', ... in Peirce's The Law of Mind, those of us who have studied him thoroughly recognize that this 'early-in-his-architectonic-thought' written essay (published in The Monist, and following 'The Fixation of Belief'), when he used the term 'synechism', he did so to counter nominalism in the public eye in such a way as to help others understand. Later, as he developed and became less available to the public eye, he avoided the use of any 'isms'. It is clear in his private notes that he did not care for 'isms' (nominalism, materialism, phenomenalism, etc). His understanding of continuity is not agreeable to 'isms'.

It is not easy at all to hold a framework that the majority of people are unable to understand, and unfortunately, trying to bridge the 'understanding chasms' often means meeting people where they are in their use of terminology and then walking with them in thought to a place of understanding. ... It is a HUGE challenge.

So, for this thread, this is what we will keep in mind when approaching 'abstraction'....

Abstraction is the process of identifying and isolating qualities or properties from specific, so-termed 'objects' in which they appear. It allows us to focus on certain characteristics while setting aside the complexities of the whole. For example, when we think about "redness," we abstract this quality from all red objects, such as apples, cars, or sunsets.

Abstraction plays a central role in philosophy because it enables us to discern, compare, and analyze the world around us. However, how we treat abstracted properties—whether as real, independent entities or as mere linguistic tools—has long been debated in the philosophical traditions of nominalism and Platonism.

In this thread, we are going to approach abstraction through a Peircean lens. We will not be jumping around from nominalism to Platonism, etc., and we will not be constantly squabbling over which one is better. ... A phaneroscopist understands the value in all 'genuine and dialogue-committed' perspectives, and it is a waste of valuable dialogue time to not adhere to that recognition. Beating each other up verbally is not at all productive. A system that does not remain productively open has no other choice but to become stagnant and die.

Just to clarify, my framework is 'Evrostics'.

-evros
breadth, as in breadth of a river

-tic
relating to a process or state

To be fair, you're the one hurling the 'isms' around. — bongo fury

I am only pointing to the 'isms' that others have labeled.

I am not a follower of any 'ism'.

I agree with Nominalism, on those three points. — Arcane Sandwich

Thanks for stepping up and clarifying your position.

The two distinctions are usually kept apart. Does Peirce associate them? Or could you flesh out how you think they correlate? I would be interested in that. — bongo fury

Please see the image I just posted above. Trying to put Peirce in either nominalism or Platonism (label or categorize him) just doesn't work no matter how hard you might want to try.

Image link didn't work. I'll post it later on my site and then use that link to post it here. ... I'll be back. :wink:

In moving on to 'Precisive Abstraction', it will be helpful to stay aware of the differences in the ways that nominalism, Platonism, and Peirce approach abstraction.

This will be my final description of the differences between nominalism, Platonism, and Peirce in this thread. There is clearly no reason for me to keep repeating myself here.

For Peirce, abstraction is dynamic, relational, and grounded in semiosis (the process of sign-making and interpretation). Universals and abstractions are not arbitrary (as in nominalism) or static and disconnected (as in Platonism). Instead, they are real but only in the sense that they emerge through relational continuity and are embedded in a triadic process.

Peirce's approach stands out by addressing the limitations of nominalism (over-reliance on discrete categorization) and Platonism (over-reification of abstractions). He emphasizes the relational, processual, and evolutionary nature of abstraction, making it more aligned with the complexities of the real world.

And that is not a good ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can only say that understanding Peirce's intention takes a lot of time in research and study. There's clearly nothing I can say to you to instill that understanding.

Of course, if you're a staunch idealist like Peirce seems to be, — Metaphysician Undercover

No. This is where the misconception lies. Perhaps you didn't read what I posted on the other thread. I will post it here for your review.

-----

Intrinsic Properties are characteristics that an object has in itself, independently of anything else. For example, the shape of an object is an intrinsic property.

Extrinsic Properties are characteristics that depend on an object's relationship with other things. For instance, being taller than another person is an extrinsic property.

Essential Properties are attributes that an object must have to be what it is. For example, being a mammal is an essential property of a human.

Accidental Properties are attributes that an object can have but are not essential to its identity. For example, having brown hair is an accidental property of a human.

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be.

Platonism takes this same idea and applies it to universal forms (but it is the same historically influenced idea!).

In Platonism, 'Forms' are abstract, perfect, unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world. According to Plato, the physical world is just a shadow or imitation of this realm of Forms.

Unlike nominalism, which treats properties as mere labels, Platonism asserts that these properties have an essential, independent existence in the world of Forms, but the issues with concretized identity are the same as in nominalism.

Platonism provides a framework where properties and identities have a deeper, more substantial existence beyond the physical realm, which SEEMS to contrast sharply with the nominalist view, butthe premise is based on the same historical development of nominalistic thought. This has its origins in religious theology. As I explained before, the view was that God can only be omnipotent if able to damn an individual sinner or save an individual saint. Discrete, individual forms/objects is the foundational idea behind both nominalism and Platonism. Continuity is disrupted in both of them.

On to Precisive Abstraction ...

Unlike hypostatic abstraction, precisive abstraction involves isolating certain aspects of a concept while deliberately ignoring others for the sake of analysis or clarity. It’s a critical tool for philosophical inquiry, but like hypostatic abstraction, it can be misused or misunderstood. The challenge is in using precisive abstraction effectively without employing reductionism.

Taking into consideration what we've discussed so far about abstraction, how might we discover the rewards and avoid the reductionist pitfalls when using the tool of precisive abstraction?

You doing anything special? — ToothyMaw

I am spending the holiday with family, working, hiking, and enjoying some nature and sunshine. They are all special to me.

I'm going to open the next topic for the thread in my next post.

People might think that it is cogent to say or believe that honey (for example) possesses sweetness in a static or intrinsic sense according to concretized categories, when the reality is much more complicated. — ToothyMaw

:sparkle: Happy New Year!

Intrinsic Properties are characteristics that an object has in itself, independently of anything else. For example, the shape of an object is an intrinsic property.

Extrinsic Properties are characteristics that depend on an object's relationship with other things. For instance, being taller than another person is an extrinsic property.

Essential Properties are attributes that an object must have to be what it is. For example, being a mammal is an essential property of a human.

Accidental Properties are attributes that an object can have but are not essential to its identity. For example, having brown hair is an accidental property of a human.

By labeling, nominalism often concretizes properties that are actually relational. Nominalism argues that properties, types, or forms only exist as names or labels and does have the effect of concretizing abstract or relational properties. When we use labels to categorize and identify properties, we often treat them as more concrete than they might actually be.

Platonism takes this same idea and applies it to universal forms (but it is the same historically influenced idea!).

In Platonism, 'Forms' are abstract, perfect,unchanging concepts or ideals that exist independently of the physical world. According to Plato, the physical world is just a shadow or imitation of this realm of Forms.

Unlike nominalism, which treats properties as mere labels, Platonism asserts that these properties have an essential, independent existence in the world of Forms, but the issues with concretized identity are the same as in nominalism.

Platonism provides a framework where properties and identities have a deeper, more substantial existence beyond the physical realm, which SEEMS to contrast sharply with the nominalist view, but the premise is based on the same historical development of nominalistic thought. This has its origins in religious theology. As I explained before, the view was that God can only be omnipotent if able to damn an individual sinner or save an individual saint. Discrete, individual forms/objects is the foundational idea behind both nominalism and Platonism. Continuity is disrupted in both of them.

Could be, I suppose. That hardly explains why you would blame 'nominalism' rather than 'platonism' for the sorry state thus exacerbated. — bongo fury

You may have missed my statements about how I feel about Platonism. .... This is all fleshed out historically, by studying nominalism's conceptual early roots in the ancient world.

There is a book by Kojin Karatani titled 'Isonomia and the Origins of Philosophy'. It is one of my favorite books. I highly recommend it.

It might be mentioned in passing that Peirce's academic career was pretty brief. — Wayfarer

Thank you for adding this background to the discussion. The quote we were examining was from one of his lectures. We can only speculate as to how his work might have had more influence if his academic career has not been cut short.

I took a road trip in the Fall of 2023 to Milford, PA to visit his home. You can read about here, if you like.

My Road Trip to Arisbe

Again...... Haphazard' Hypostatic Abstraction... refers to the careless or uncritical process of reifying a quality, relation, or concept into a separate concrete entity or 'object' without sufficient consideration of its relational context, grounding or implications. This process often results in oversimplification or misrepresentation, where an abstracted concept is treated as if it possesses an independent, fixed existence, neglecting the dynamic interconnected nature of the phenomena being abstracted.

By framing hypostatization as something that exists as an isolated or universalized phenomenon, we risk oversimplifying a process that varies depending on context and intent.

We mustn't gloss over relational emergence, assuming that hypostatization inherently leads to error without exploring how it may reveal insights when applied thoughtfully (e.g., in Peirce's work).[/quote]

It might be helpful for some readers to go back just a bit in this thread and review the interaction I had last night with Banno.

Influenced by which one? — bongo fury

I am? In what sense of nominalist position? That of someone disposed to nominalisation/reification/hypostatisation? Or that of someone opposed to it? — bongo fury

That of someone whose thought has been influenced by nominalism, hence the binary categorization nature of your question.

even if sweetness is not a monadic predicate in the sense that it only takes one argument. It could take many. Furthermore, if we (optionally) visualize a continuum of sweetness, it is clear that the statuses of other propositions regarding other things being sweet have no bearing on whether or not honey possesses sweetness. — ToothyMaw

I like where you're going with this. Are you now envisioning a fractal-like nature of sweetness that maintains that thread in the continuum?

It also helps to think about the commonly understood definition of 'a property'. Is a property a static characteristic?

I am? In what sense of nominalist position? That of someone disposed to nominalisation/reification/hypostatisation? Or that of someone opposed to it? — bongo fury

That of someone whose thought has been influenced by it.

that (and the consequent expansion by one of the assumed ontological domain) is exactly what nominalists from Ockham to Goodman have generally abhorred. — bongo fury

No doubt. ... You have reached a midway point in the attempt to understand, but you still have some ways to go. You are approaching this from a nominalist position,.

I lived for a while in the mountains of North Carolina. There was a funny saying folks used to share if someone were to stop and ask for directions. .. "You can't get there from here."

he uses that term to say that it's called "its object". Why argue this — Metaphysician Undercover

Peirce isn’t conflating or confusing "physical objects" and "mental objects" but rather proposing a more flexible and relational understanding of "object" as it functions within a semiotic framework.

The focus of Peirce's logic is on the semiotic framework.

You are suggesting that Peirce’s approach violates the laws of noncontradiction and excluded middle, but Peirce doesn’t see these laws as universally applicable to all aspects of reality. His logic of relatives and his commitment to synechism (the doctrine of continuity) allow for a more relationally emergent view of identity and difference. For Peirce, reality is not static but dynamically unfolding, and his logic reflects this processual nature.

The "sameness" in Peirce’s framework is not about static, metaphysical identity but rather about functional continuity across interpretations. The triadic relation ensures that meaning evolves through interpretants while maintaining a thread of continuity tied to the dynamical object. He views the "object" in the triadic relation as that to which the representamen refers, not necessarily something with a rigid ontological identity.

Peirce doesn’t reduce Secondness to physical 'objects' alone. It’s about the dynamic relation of reaction or resistance between two elements, whether physical, mental, or conceptual. So yes, the "object" in the triadic relation can be either physical or ideal, depending on the context. Again, Peirce's focus is on the semiotic triadic dynamic relation. Whereas nominalism's focus is on concretization and static identity.

Not so much. Reminds me a bit of General Semantics. — Banno

Yes, there are some things reminiscent of General Semantics, but General Semantics is more nominalistic. :wink:

Perhaps this would be a good time to move on to 'precisive abstraction'.

I am going to calm my dog due to the fireworks in my neighborhood.

Happy New Year! :sparkle:

Perhaps now you are beginning to understand how I feel about nominalism and Platonism. They are both major societal problems because none of this is taught in our schools. Abstractions fly around on the internet and media sources, and it is an autopoietic nightmare that is now in our artificial intelligence, THAT is why I became AI certified and engage in the research that I do. We are living in an abstraction that is getting further and further away from what is real. ... So yes, call me passionate, call me 'extreme'. ... This is what is actually happening.

I did not mean for my last posts to come across as overly critical. My intent was to just unpack this as succinctly as possible. It's a tricky subject, and I think we are all wrestling with it in different ways.

As I said, a can of worms.