Why would "we each only have one way to do it with, though" ? I am not aware of any compelling argument for that conclusion. — Janus
I think novel constructions are possible; indeed commonplace. — Janus
where the feeling is of universal inter-connectedness — Janus
If you reject a theory on the basis that its originators have a vested interest in it, you would be rejecting most, if not all, theories it seems. — Janus
I think the same kinds of altered states may be realized with meditation as with psychedelics, but perhaps not as reliably :wink: . — Janus
My experience is that the unexpected connections are precisely not made in the "normal" way, they don't feel 'normal' at all. Having said that I'm not sure what your conception of "being made in the normal way" is. It may be different for each person, so if you say it is like that for you, I can only accept your word on it. — Janus
It is ineffable only insofar as nothing propositional or determinate can be said about, or on the basis of, the experience. For me this is what poesis (making) is all about; evoking (showing) what cannot be literally said. — Janus
What he apparently didn’t realize from this was that it is not the mere realization of interconnectedness that leads to bliss or love. It is the IMPROVEMENT in one’s experiencing of that interconnectedness. — Joshs
Pleasure isn’t passive but instead innovative, which is tough to sustain. Most of the effort, and reward, on the part of the meditator takes place when they initially put themselves in the meditative state. From that point on , they have to continually discover something new in the experience in order to keep it from slipping into meaninglessness. — Joshs
How far should it be seen as an aesthetic quest or one which is part of a cultural statement? How influential can art be in raising consciousness? — Jack Cummins
I'm still not really clear on what is meant by "normal mechanism of thought". In the altered states of consciousness I have experienced, through music, painting and writing practice, meditation and psychedelics, the everyday ways and tracks of thought (which themselves are obviously not always the same but could be thought to occur within a kind of 'range') are altered in different ways and degrees such that they may no longer seem to be in that 'range'. — Janus
Why can't experience be phenomenal even if the "normal mechanism of thought" (whatever that is meant to be) is not occurring? — Janus
Heidegger does a much better job than I do of explaining this view of time as temporality. I highly recommend you read his section on time in Being and Time. You can get the pdf of the entire book online free. — Joshs
If the feeling present in mindfulness is one of all-encompassing interconnectedness then it is not "similar to ordinary consciousness". — Janus
Perhaps it won't be "me", but it will be "composed" of me in some sense, I suppose. — Pantagruel
I think our concept of materiality, or more specifically, the presumed dichotomy between mind and matter, is archaic, given everything we have discovered about the nature of reality — Pantagruel
Everyone brings a different interpretive context to any statement they read. For me, the conjunction of ex nihilo nihil fit and cogito ergo sum is compelling. — Pantagruel
In Gendlin’s model, the awareness and intending of something is a single differential crossing between one’s implicit past and what occurs into it, — Joshs
In other words, our mind primes perception to see what we believe we should see and then provides that information alongside what we are
actually seeing. Optical illusions where we see a complete figure where there was only a partial
pattern are examples of this, and so is what happened s when we read. We will swear that a complete word was present when in fact only some of the letters were actually there.This is because we anticipate the next letter in a word, the next word in a sentence, etc. — Joshs
One can read Racliffe’a model of existential feeling as oriented along a binary of meaningfulness vs lack of meaning. Situations and people can appear more or less enticing , exciting, appealing, salient. You could
say that he keeps your notion of pleasure but re-interprets pain as meaninglessness. Depression isn’t a. experience of painful sensation, it’s an inability to care about the world or find meaning in it.
Like you, Ratcliffe explains the perceived
salience of events by virtue of an interaction between intentional meanings and bodily felt sensations which reinforce and orient cognition.
Kelly, like Ratcliffe, sees the affective binary in terms
of construed meaningfulness-coherence vs emptiness-chaos-confusion, but he sees this as inherent in intentional organization rather than as depending on the feedback from the body. — Joshs
I cannot get past the idea that ultimately everything only matters in terms of the pleasure or pain it provides us. — Pop
Except that for Heidegger the cognitive and attunement are not separate constructs or processes. They are co-implied aspects of a single event, the event of transition that is how I am thrown into a world
moment to moment. — Joshs
I’m with Heidegger on this: — Joshs
background feelings are ever-present, although ordinarily tacit. They serve to structure the everyday ways in which we encounter the world, the basic ways in which we find ourselves in the world:Ratcliffe 2002, p.298) — Joshs
“Things are experienced as significant to us, as mattering to us, in various different ways, something that involves a sense of the possibilities they offer.” (Ratcliffe, 2020) — Joshs
These globally structured patterns of existential feeling amount to “ ‘ways of finding oneself in the world'. As such, they are what we might call ‘pre-intentional', meaning that they determine the kinds of intentional states we are capable of adopting, amounting to a ‘shape' that all experience takes on.” (Ratcliffe 2015 — Joshs
Do we perceive raw data and synthesize reason out of it or do we perceive events already pre-interpreted by us? In other words, do we hear a series of acoustic pitches or do we hear the train whistle and only later, as a derived d artificial act, dissect it into objective data pieces? — Joshs
You said we are anticipating beings. Do we reach out to the things we perceive with expectations and anticipations? Do those expectations co-create the perceived object or can we separate ‘raw’ perceptual data from our expectations and anticipations? — Joshs
If I am in a room and the lights are suddenly turned off , is the violation of my expectation for continued illumination the result of a translation of reason into emotion, or is my surprise a direct perception, prior to any translation? — Joshs
If your ability to experience affect were eliminated, describe to me what it would be like to function as a reasoning person. Give me an example of how you would interact with others at a party. Would you be like Mr Spock? — Joshs
This still sounds like feeling is a mechanism
separate from thinking-cognition, as if we can manipulate it independently of cognition, or even remove it. — Joshs
, I follow George Kelly. He said we are always in motion, from moment to moment, meaning change in experience, not physical movement. Each new moment of time is a new, never before occurring event. We don’t directly perceive events, we construe them. That is, we assimilate each new event to a pre-existing internal scheme
of understanding. At the same time, that pre-existing internal scheme must slightly alter itself to accommodate itself to the novelty of each new event. So each construal is equal parts assimilation and accommodation. — Joshs
It is important to understand that feeling is not a RESPONSE. to such success or failure, not a mechanism that detects such organizational changes after the fact and then relays them to one’s consciousness in the guise of kinesthetic or proprioceptive receptors. Feeling simply IS the organizational dynamics as they are directly experienced. — Joshs
I hope you can see how this notion of feeling differs from a reinforcement mechanism that signals pleasure and pain. In such a model, pleasure and pain are no more than a dumb bodily system of feedback sensors. — Joshs
Radical time is a past which is changed by the present it functions in , and this present anticipates beyond itself. This complex structure defines a single moment, not three separate time positions. — Joshs
Thiese attempts to meld a certain interpretaion of Buddhist thinking with complexity and dynamical systems approaches, without putting into question objectively casual pre-suppositions of physics. — Joshs
You say time is change, but this notion presupposes, like the physical view of time, that change is what happens to things, that events occur IN time ,as if time is an independent axis placed upon events or objects that subsist in themselves first and then interact. — Joshs
We don’t need extrinsic sources of motivation to push or pull us, or determine direction, because we are always already in motion. — Joshs
. If a thing is changing, it is better described as "becoming" and so we have the ancient dichotomy between being and becoming. Since thinking is better described as an activity of change, it is better classified as a sort of becoming, and Descartes would have been more accurate to say I think therefore I am becoming (as changing). — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider now the possibility that thoughts too exist like radio waves - disturbances in the electromagnetic field - permeating all space and our brains are simply receivers that pick up these thought waves — TheMadFool
Other than a joke, it is also a play on the idea that the words 'nothing' and 'always' and 'happening' have different senses depending on the context, your focus, your interests--to show that 'exists' changes too, as does 'identity'. — Antony Nickles
I can agree that "We are not a static - I am", but, in what sense are we agreeing? Factually, sure. But we can also disagree: "I am a static; I've always been a Bruins fan". And maybe if one part stands still, anyways, not all of us does. Sure, but that is to say.... what? Something is always happening? And who would disagree? (Until I'm 18 in Vernon, B.C. on the weekend, and then nothing is happening.) — Antony Nickles
I understand this as an underlying, necessary occurrence, and maybe you are aligning this with Descartes' desire for something to connect us (to). But the idea of something inseparable from us, however fundamental, does not replace our possibility to claim our existence, our responsibility to, even, or we may, in a sense, not exist at all. — Antony Nickles
But to say that all of us are is a different claim (factual or general), without the moral force of one claiming their own identity--"I am the means of production!" I'm not saying our thought or identity cannot be forced on us, but, in that case, do I exist? — Antony Nickles
Yes, but you might as well call it "X" or "God," then. If we don't understand what it means, then what's the point? We're not interested in replacing one word with another, or defining things in a vacuum. — Xtrix
I wouldn't go so far as to say all life has emotions (I'm thinking of amoeba, bacteria, etc here). — Whickwithy
Yes but if you don't understand it (and neither do I), then how can you invoke it? How can it "come into its own"? We understand so little, we could just as easily assert that "God did it," or it was the "Force," etc. True, self-organization (according to Wikipedia) seems more sensible than that, but apparently more in the social fields. — Xtrix
Regardless, I don't quite see how it changes anything about what I said above -- namely, that our lives are first and foremost unconscious activity, and that the rest of it (self-consciousness, the "self," the subject opposite an object, the "I," the ego, etc) is largely derivative. — Xtrix
we have Immanuel Kant and the problems of epistemology, the subject knowing objects (representations), and a long history of problems within the "mind/body" Cartesian dualism for literally centuries afterwards. — Xtrix
OK...I'm just not sure what "self-organization" means. — Xtrix
whether we're defined first and foremost by conscious activity, — Xtrix
I agree. But remember that Descartes means "consciousness" too, as you point out. — Xtrix
but the emotions and feelings that underpin our actions are also mainly unconscious. So shouldn't we start with unconsciousness? — Xtrix
I'm not sure what the "self organization" part means. — Xtrix
As far as consciousness goes -- we can't "think" or talk about anything like this without first being conscious entities, but whether we should define our being based on thinking (logic, "rational animal"), on language, or even on conscious activity is questionable. — Xtrix
So if we are what we do, what we do is mostly habitual, and what is habitual is mostly automatic/unconscious, then we're hardly "thinking things" or "rational animals" or "consciousnesses" at all. Hence the idea that we're "minds" or "selves" or "subjects" is derivative. — Xtrix
We are an accumulation of all of our experiences — MondoR
No interpretation is necessary. It is exactly as stated. — MondoR
Exactly! The relationship between cause and effect is information, and information is a fundamental unit of cognition. — Harry Hindu
I guess I've always thought of emotions as an extension of our heightened awareness. — Whickwithy