Got a source for that?

It's all capitalism. Everywhere. It's precisely what's killing war. Everything is owned by internationally spread and tied corporations, so that one can't pay for war by conquest, that's stealing now.

What matters is keeping things running smoothly, and promoting growth and infrastructure, which is far more profitable than war, shared visions or ideologies. Wes talkin' dollars.

Both Freud and Jung did pursue hypnosis, but Jung attempted it on an experienced subject, and they just kind of did everything, and he didn't feel like he was doing much, and didn't understand how it worked.

Freud thought that it was always erotic.

Oh, yeah, sorry, it's also about weird sex stuff. I just didn't read all of it, skipped the parts that seemed weird and unimportant.

"a harmless pill, medicine, or procedure prescribed more for the psychological benefit to the patient than for any physiological effect." - google

The fuss is about the comparative insignificance and significance, connotatively, and in the popular imagination between the two.

If you'd have actually read Aristotle, you'd know that that's because that's a form of phronesis, and can't be taught, or imparted dialectically, and so there isn't much to be said. It's all to be done.

You're just making shit up.

"But, as a matter of fact, higher animals possess in
addition to the lowest form higher forms, e.g. man has the rational soul (410 b 16
24). These higher types of soul cannot, as above shown, be present in the air.
Therefore, if the soul is to be present uniformly in the air, it must itself be
homogeneous: and, if it is not homogeneous, it cannot be present uniformly
in the air. " - Aristotle De Anima.

I don't read much secondary literature, so I dunno.

De Anima is probably the best source.

The short answer is kinda... like an amorphous "mind", or "reason" can exist independently of the body, but devoid of any particular features of any particular thinking subjects. No personality, no individual's soul that exists after death, basically.

But isn't that the thing. If I asked you're family if you are the same person as you were as a child, they would immediately think and know that yes, literally, and obviously you are (especially if I asked one of your parents), so that the question must be asking at a "deeper" or "subtler" distinction, beyond the obvious, and literal.

Literally, of course you're the same person. You remember experiencing the life back then, no one figures you've been replaced by a duplicate by the martians or Chinese.

I also think that there is a sense in which that very first "you", that awakes around 5-7 remains some part of you forever. The "inner child". They have to be with you, because you were with them. You can recall what they felt like, exactly what it was like to be them. You have access to their "qualia".

Transition always works if it works, but only for the stoic otherwise. It's all about passing. This is usually synonymous with being attractive in a lot of people's minds as well.

Those that had good structure and features already, pour like 100k into it, and train, train, train succeed. Those that were not as naturally gifted to begin with, regardless of money and work will often never succeed. This used to be, in itself, a criterion for the gate-keepers back in the classic transsexual days. It had to pretty much be obvious that you'd pass before they'd sign off on much.

I only read the one, and also watched a couple lectures he did.

Well, his notion of "rigid designator" is actually an unhelpful tautology, meaning the thing he's trying to suggest.

He contrasts rigid designators with non-rigid ones, which he gives as descriptions, and not names at all. "Dog" is not a description.

Not like I know much about him, just read a couple articles about it, nothing significant.

Rigid and non-rigid designators, presumably. Though what's most significant to me, is that he argues that the former are a priori, and necessary. That rigid designators designate the precise same things "in all possible worlds", whereas the latter is descriptive rather than non-discript proper names, so is a posteriori.

I'm sure that it makes sense to him. I don't know why the designation "dog" doesn't refer to cats in another possible universe. I mean, the same names refer to all kinds of very different things in this universe...

Not only does none of that even matter to me, because I'm not a fan of PP, but it's also damn silly.

How does the panpsychist explain why the robot isn't conscious? Almost certainly by denying that premise in some way tout court if they wish to maintain their position.

You might as well be asking them "well, if you're right, then how do you explain why you're wrong"?

As amazing as apocalypse always sounds, since it stood up the last 200 generations, I'm not holding my breath.

No... lol, I doubt it could answer that, seeing as how the question, and panpyschism being true would be mutually exclusive.

I ain't battin' for PP in any case. I said not only that it's wrong, but clearly, obviously, manifestly wrong.

The basic problems of consciousness are just things like the nature of it, how it interacts with the physical, or emerges from the physical structurally, whether it's contingent or necessary. PP answers a lot of those questions.

The problems you suggest are problems for, and introduced by PP...

That's like responding to "this bullet will solve all of my life problems" with, "How can that be? What about the mess afterwards?".

But the question of whether time and space really are objective realities is a deep philosophical problem in it's own right. Recall that Kant saw both as part of the 'conditions for experience' rather than 'objects of experience'. — Wayfarer

Not really. See Kant is an empirical realist, and transcendental idealist, which can be seen as drawing an epistemological, and ontological cut through the noumena. His transcendental idealism is affirming the ontological reality of the categories, but denying that they can be known through experience, since they are the conditions for experience themselves. Which is the distinction between "the nouemna", and "the thing in itself". The noumenon is the idea, the ideal, the category, and the "thing in itself" is actually the feature of reality.

So, the "thing in itself" exists independently of the categories and the mind.

If consciousness is inherent in matter, and is just a fundamental aspect, like space and time, then it solves a lot of problems, but it just doesn't seem to be so, it's so counter-intuitive, and annihilates any supposed notion of what consciousness might actually be experientially to us. If we take away our reasons for excluding anything as conscious, then we also remove our ability to include anything as conscious. It's just the polar opposite of solipsism, and based pretty much on the same rationale. That the inner personal experience is all that matters, and no experiential, or empirical evidence ever counts for anything at all.

Nope, you're identical, and the same in every way. Stop spending your lives polarizing, and denying it.

Bart Ehrman has written an interesting book on this subject — Arkady

Was it Misquoting Jesus? I read that, t'was good.

Damn, it's supposed to skip to the end, at like to 6:50 mark.

I think that process-esque type wholeness approach is best. An identity can be defined by its entire lifetime, and identifying something from our end takes a duration as well, and cannot be entirely atomized, but rather just arbitrarily and vaguely chop off a piece of its identity at one time, and then at another, noting physical differences, and asking how they can be identical? But it is the whole "ship of theseus" event, or phenomena that makes up its identity. Where we're referring to a whole universe of context within which the ship phenomenon took place.

So, I think that saying that something isn't self identical at t1, and t2, but physically vary between the two times, thus don't share all of the same properties, and can't be self identical is like saying that you're not self identical because your hand varies from your foot in their properties, and aren't self identical with each other, therefore you can't be self identical.

Hume was a cool dude, brah. I listened to a lecture course on him, and read like three of his books. I liked his machine head when I was one as well. He made the most sense to me. He wrote raving reviews of his own books under pseudonyms, and ate and drank himself to death because "reason is a slave to the passions". He also suggested that England had attained an unprecedented, and the highest comparative state of liberty mankind had ever seen. He liked to talk about all of this, while high-fiving his French buddies and scattered among talk about what a tosser god is in his Scottish accented French.

He didn't have a lot of sense, but he had a machine head, better than the rest.


I do like Kant, but no one should be taken too seriously, as if they have all of the answers, or always know what's what. If someone seems wrong to you, then they probably are, and where we disagree is a lot more fun and interesting to focus on than where we agree. If we can handle it.

Yeah, I did. The only difference is that the one that was posted has the brightness increased. Colour constancy can't be right, as that's about seeing the same colour in varying lights, not seeing one when it isn't there at all. This implies that no matter what colour the strawberries really were, we'd just be basically guessing based on what colour they "normally" are, but if this were true, just any different colour strawberry should create some perceptual confusion, but it doesn't.

Silly geese. Go look up a blue strawberry, and then a green one. Why don't they look red? Why don't unripe green and white blotchy ones look red?

The sneaky thing about the image is just that the red has been removed, rather than replaced, or coloured in. Like just removing an image leaves a silhouette, or the impression of its absence. Because all of the red has been removed, rather than covered up, or replaced, it's still obvious that they're really red. This is the interplay between precepts and concepts. From the bottom up of precepts, there's no red, but from the top down of concepts, we recognize the form of red, even by its silhouette, as it were.

Isn't it about whether you feel guilty or not when you do wrong things? How can you ever feel contrite if you don't think anything is ever really wrong?

Those were the two points I thought significant that were raised in the thread. I didn't pluck them from the aether.

You don't think that there are a lot of people that aren't sure whether they should eat or not just because they're hungry? Check yo privilege. Some of us want to stay pretty. I definitely have much less indecision about whether or not I should torture, steal, or lie when I feel like it than whether I ought to eat.

What kind of ground are you looking for? What kind of thing could make you, or compel you to be good? These seem to be the major claims of absence, but what would these things be like, if they were to exist?

People usually ain't as ambivalent about moral right and wrongness when it's about them and people they care about. Someone who's faculties are fully functional cannot witness pain and distress and not feel pain and distress themselves.

Of course it's wrong... wake up. To witness such a thing, or be subject to it, you'd not only realize it to be wrong, but trauma inducing, haunting -- effecting you the rest of your life.

Morality is inherently about subjects that can be harmed, so that it is dependent in some way on subjects that can be harmed is no problem, or drawback. The scope need not be wider, and it need not account for anything beyond this. Living things are a certain ways, and share certain interests which make some things objectively better and worse for them.

The only problem is why one ought to care at all in the first place, not whether moral statements can be justified or not. This is a nonsense question though, because we always already do. The only real problem is on the finer details where moral disputes lie, where it isn't obvious what's right and wrong. That's where the adults play. This is baby games.

My metaphysical commitment is that actually, everything is spheres, and I'm the most spherical. Wish you were sphere!

The problem is that you're all dirty pagans, praying to nemesis. Everyone is a debater, everyone is entrenched (even I am *gasp*) -- and we're all at a safe distance. Combine that with the fact that we're all too often interested in the invisible audience member, so that our interlocutor can be the butt of jokes, ridicule, and the proof of our greatness.

There's also the problem of a bunch of 14 year old trolls holding real political sway. Things like pizzagate, and "the punching game" things I've heard expressed by people that take them very seriously, and make them more sympathetic fear and hate mongering. "Triggered" is the new big catch phrase for upsetting people. People talk about a lack of "freedom of speech" when censorship has never been as lax, and it has never before been as easy to get your voice out there to a wide number and range of people internationally.

It's really easy to start to become disrespectful. It's really easy to become more concerned with the imaginary audience than the person your actually talking to, and it's really easy to think your sides got it all figured and everyone that disagrees are wrong in horrible ways.

We do want interesting, engaging, thought provoking material, but what that is for me is not what it is for everyone else, and making it this way for the "audience" can only really be making it this way for me.

Everyone's got a magic cheat code, that if you press the buttons in the right order, you'll invoke their ire... so if we want less of that, then we should attempt to not do it to others, nor express it in ourselves. Not that anger, or nemesis is an evil goddess, but if our times are marked by an excess of her presence, then perhaps it would be good to operate as a counter balance.

There also the thing that we're entertaining ourselves here, so that we may find it more objectionable for someone that isn't as entertaining to be annoying or obnoxious than when it's someone we find entertaining, so that we're ready to forgive them, and punish the bore. This is fine, if that's what you're doing, but then what's important is how entertaining you are, not how disruptive, or civil. At the very least, it's a definite factor. Volume is significant here. Too much of a good thing makes it less good, and even bad things can be good in small doses.

I watched the video when it was first posted in the shout box before the removal, t'was alright. Was that beard comment removed though? That was great.

My preference is to ignore it until it goes away. That usually works for me... well... until they find me...

It's interesting and relevant for art, but not really metaphysics. See, the aesthetic element to the judgment means that it's still an evaluation, rather than the identification of some attribute, or quality. It's not purely analytical. Kant suggested that for this reason, the universality that the judgment makes claim to is not about the object but the judgment itself. It is the judgment itself which is exemplary.

Now, we can say that this is because the judgment is in fact better in the way it recognizes, or distinguishes accidental from necessary features. Is it then true that anything accidental is beautiful though? Analysis still demands some attribute, feature or rule that can only be itself excused through another general principle or rule that accounts for exceptions.