Comments

  • Squirrels and philosophy: 11 degrees of separation
    "Hair" is 8 clicks. Woman 10 clicks, and man 9.
  • Is it rational to believe anything?
    Certainty, and knowing everything would suck. Not knowing what's going to happen next is more fun.
  • Is an armed society a polite society?


    I'm not skinny! I'm definitely Goldilocks.
  • Is an armed society a polite society?
    All they would need is a pressure cooker and BOOM!! They are easier to buy than guns as well.Sir2u


    They also have a chance of blowing themselves up trying.
  • Is an armed society a polite society?


    Personally I'd much rather face someone that has a knife than a gun -- and fewer skinny teenagers could pull off mass murder.
  • Is an armed society a polite society?
    I grew up with guns, definitely did it first. Shot plenty, used to throw knives, axes, and hatchets too, I like axes and hatchets the most, and still enjoy chopping wood. I wouldn't own a gun now. It seems to me, that guns as defense is about fear, and escalation. I fear violent conflicts, and being out gunned, as it were. You have a stick, I need a stick now, you have a sharp one, I need a sharp one now, you have a sword, I need a sword now, a bow, I need that now, a gun, I need one too, a missile, need one of those too -- a nuclear warhead, I need five of those, the escalation continues. Things always continue to escalate until someone takes the risk of deescalating. These dispositions are contagious, and trickle up and down the social hierarchy. I think that deescalating at the personal level is a positive force to overall reduction of violence, with more and more extreme force.
  • Dreaming.


    http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC534695/

    That's a study that attempts to link memory consolidation to dreaming, and goes into the distinction. They also though, I think importantly, don't claim that dreams are all about memory consolidation, more than involve it. It also seems to endorse the position that there are mental contents during all stages of sleep, but REM is the one where brain states are closest to being awake, and recollection is highest. Also suggesting that based on reports, NREM sleep has more episodic content, about time, place, events and things, whereas REM has more to do with semantic, or symbolic content, which is rarely about actual things that have happened to us.
  • What is the point of philosophy?
    I was arrogant and reclusive long before I got into philosophy.
  • Dreaming.


    There's different kinds of dreams, mostly we focus on REM dreaming, because it's more interesting, but non-REM dreaming is way better described as recounting the days events -- but in REM dreams we can meet new people, the laws of physics don't apply, and we have a deja vu sense of familiarity with people and things, even though they're quite unfamiliar in how they're composed, situated, or how continuous they are throughout the dream.

    Dealing with latent emotional content is far more persuasive of a suggestion than memory facilitation for REM dreaming, whereas non-REM dreaming seems to fall more in line with ideas of memory facilitation.
  • Dreaming.


    You misunderstand what I mean by form, and characteristics. I don't recall him talking about sensory modalities, chronology, spacial, or physical characteristics. Talking about the form as in what particular symbols, and the forms they take in essence stand for, is talking about the content, and not the form in the sense that I mean in.

    You definitely read too much into my quip about dreams all being about dicks, although I do think that dreams are not nearly as libidinally charged as Freud thought that they were, that his Platonic symbolic essentialism was malarkey, and there is no such thing as the unconscious, preconscious, or any of that.

    Not that relevant, it was a passing comment, I probably misunderstood the whole book, and don't know anything about him, don't really care to discuss it in any case.
  • What is the point of philosophy?
    I'm a lost soul, just looking to get even more lost. The point is its pointlessness.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications
    Pffft, the only ones that live more dangerously than I do are my enemies.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications
    Hmm, didn't remember him making that point, which is unfortunate. I've heard it made a lot, about how feeling with someone is inferior to being motivated to make a difference, or take action and solve the problem and all of that -- but I disagree. I think that a huge misunderstanding of people, and what they need when they're suffering is for someone to swoop in and solve their problems. They just need someone to feel with them, and I didn't see him as missing this point.

    We have enough social justice warriors as it is, we need more sympathy. You don't have to do anything, just feel. Also consider the absurdity of attempting to solve someone's problems, or make the world a better place for them, when you haven't even taken the time to feel what they feel about their situation. Wouldn't want to be dragged down, or made depressed.

    Anyway, I think I'm done with the tangent. Thanks for producing that, I asked you because I didn't think that you could, but I stand corrected.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    Oh yeah? Where does he talk about this distinction?
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    Tell me what the difference is then, you figure? What distinction does he draw? My own view is that Nietzsche shouldn't be taken as endorsing a lack of compassion, or sympathy anyway, this is a gross mischaracterization in my view. It isn't really relevant, but I like Nietzsche a lot, so I'll indulge in the tangent. I believe that Nietzsche is rather saying that the strongest and most healthy human beings are naturally highly compassionate beings, that will be heroic, and self-sacrificing by nature, when they should take more care of themselves. It isn't a critique of compassion at all, in my view, but a call for the strongest and most healthy human beings to also take care of themselves, and to allow themselves selfish pursuits, and maintenance. There is no risk that they should fall into evil, or anti-social, behavior in the first place, compassion overflows from them, and his critique of it has to be taken within this perspective, in my view.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    "com·pas·sion
    kəmˈpaSHən/
    noun
    sympathetic pity and concern for the sufferings or misfortunes of others." - dictionary.

    In any case, quoting authorities aren't arguments, and I've not been making a prescriptive argument in any case, only a descriptive one. Merely pointing out how people tend to perceive and react to these things. Nietzsche by his own accord only reproaches the irreproachable, and counters what is most commonly, and widely believed. Bringing him up is just a point in my favor.
  • How will this site attract new members?
    With pie. Delicious pie.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications
    Notice that, on its face, pleasure derived from misery is evil, whereas feeling empathetic, sympathetic misery for the suffering is good. These are cases in which the supposed absolute value of either are turned on their head. Clearly neither are intrinsically good, but only substantial at all because of a wider context of evaluation.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    No, hedonists can think what they like (though I highly doubt that they'd actually practice that opinion, and would rather viscerally feel this to be the case in the relevant circumstances, if it were happening to them). It clearly doesn't compound the suffering, most cases in which suffering is caused because of suffering, or in ambiguous circumstances where it is difficult to blame the perpetrator, because of brain tumors, terrible upbringings, brain washing, and such makes us feel bad for everyone. We don't feel extra back because the perpetrator is evil, we rather feel vengeful, angry, and seek to feel pleasure from their misfortune.

    I actually do think that all that is relevant for sympathy is the pain of whomever is hurt, and the bad feeling we get from that ought not be effected by the cause -- nor even character of the one in pain -- which is why (as I mentioned before), the hero even feels sympathy for the evil villain, because this is a higher good than deriving pleasure from even their misery.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    I don't see this point as seriously disputable.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    That clearly isn't the case, and I don't know how you can reasonable maintain that. If that were the case, then it wouldn't matter if you cause the harm by accident, from coercion, under distress, for money, out of passionate anger, or whatever reason, when clearly the reason does matter to everyone -- and there is no eviler reason than for the sheer pleasure of it. You know this is true, and you cannot reasonably maintain the contrary.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications
    I don't see why that 'compounds the evil.' If someone's getting hurt, then the bad thing about that is that they're getting hurt.The Great Whatever

    I don't think that I'm suggesting anything controversial at all, but quite universal, and ubiquitous. Causing someone harm and deriving pleasure from it is what villains do (it's what psychopaths do, which is the evilest psychological profile you can give someone) , feeling remorse and reforming their ways is what anti-heroes do, and heroes don't even derive pleasure from the suffering of their enemies when they deserve it (though anti-heroes may, because they're still a little bad, but it's forgivable, because we want the villain to suffer too, because even we aren't as pure hearted and good as the hero, even though we recognize their not deriving pleasure from the suffering of the villain as a higher good)..

    I don't feel the need to speculate why this is the case, I think that it is sufficient to point out that it is the case.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    No, that isn't the case. If it were just the pain that is caused, then whether or not pleasure was derived from the pain wouldn't effect how evil the action is perceived, but this isn't the case, as I pointed out, pleasure being derived from the action compounds the evil. This indicates that pleasure isn't absolutely good, in itself, but the circumstances by which it is derived are relevant to its determination as good or bad, and where most cases in which pleasure are derived are neutral or good, not subtracting from the pleasure as a good, it is also possible for pleasure to be seen as an evil, depending on how it is derived.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    That is an amoral view, however, and not conventional. Normally there is more to it than just pleasure, as it matters what one takes pleasure in. Taking pleasure in causing misery and suffering is seen as evil, and not good. Pleasure derived from an evil compounds the evil, makes it all the move evil. One causing suffering because they're coerced, or feeling remorse for it reduces how evil the act is perceived, doing it for the pleasure of it makes the act all the more evil.

    You can of course maintain that pleasure is always good in all cases, regardless of how it is derived, but this would be a quite controversial opinion, in my view.
  • Popular Dissing of Philosophers
    He thinks some things schop thought was stupid, you think some things he thinks are stupid, and it's a big circle. Smart people say things I think are persuasive and interesting, and stupid people don't get the things I think are obvious, and disagree with the former.

    There is also an ironic dismissal of the obvious, that I think is pretty dumb. Like "sure, we're highly conditioned, but we can realize what conditions us, and escape this", i.e. I'm the exception.

    That all said, misunderstanding is a great source of creativity, and novelty. It isn't obvious, or necessary that a misunderstanding will be less correct, interesting, or innovative than the source, it will just not be as representative of the source, but oh well, we rarely quote barers of absolute truth,
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications
    Because details beyond what is necessary to establish the case, are not useful, and thus their relevant factor in their undesirability would be their lack of importance, or usefulness, and not how terrible they are. You need to make the case based on how terrible they are, not based on how irrelevant, or useless. I long long long suggested (even back on another thread before this one) that inconsequential facts don't matter, and who cares if you know them or not? You suggested, however, that it would be their awfulness that would render them undesirable to know, so you have to make the point on this basis, and not some other basis while attempting to sneak in that they're also awful through the back door.
  • Dreaming.
    I couldn't tell you whether I dream in colour or not, probably the most vague of images at best, but most likely purely narrative (I'm fairly confident that if they cracked my head open, they'd find something wrong with the visual part of my brain). I might remember half a dozen dreams a year, but since I was reading about it today, I might remember one tonight, that is how it's supposed to work. People remember dreams because they're interested enough, and want to.

    As for lucid dreaming, I have realized that I was dreaming in a dream before, but then I forgot about it right away. It would be cool to be able to lucid dream though, but I'm of the opinion that nothing can be taught, only learned, and people learn things because they're interested, look for the information, correlate, interpret, and incorporate information into their learning process, and become skilled at things in this way. So that if someone is a good lucid dreamer, They began with a talent for it, I think, and what worked for someone else may not work for you, and vice versa.

    I didn't mean to limit the idea to physical disciplines, line a gym, I just thought I'd mention those for their physical components. I imagine that learning a new language, solving math problems, or whatever it is that you're doing and interested in would be the same.
  • Dreaming.


    Sometimes a candle is just a candle... but most of the time it's a dick.
  • Dreaming.
    Also, happy birthday BC!
  • Dreaming.
    Incidentally I've actually read the interpretation of dreams. It was a funny one. Spoiler alert, everything is really dicks. He doesn't go into the formation or characteristics of dreams themselves, but rather only interprets their contents, as dicks.

    The contents is all I too considered before, but I hadn't considered the forms they take, or their characteristics, until I read about the influences of video games and tv on this.

    If one could accomplish physical maneuvers in their dreams that they couldn't in real life, then this at the very least man facilitate their accomplishment in RL. As the muscles, and body movements involved with the activity may only be able to be, at first, facilitated in dream, which actually in real life activates those muscles, and trains the neuropathways in this respect. I agree that it may be a stretch to think that one could learn it all in their sleep, and then wake up from a coma with master gynmast skills, but I could see how it may be helpful joined with real life practice.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    I think you've just moved the goal post.
  • Should fines be levied in proportion to an offenders income?
    Wealthy persons will remain inherently bad in my view, until I become one.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications
    The evil falsehoods do in both cases, is firstly by big brothering people, and deciding what kind of information they can and cannot handle, or should and shouldn't be privy to, which makes you an unreliable, patronizing person. The evil it does in the second case, is that anyone that would rather believe pleasant falsehoods than terrible truths is also not trustworthy, or credible, and weak of heart and mind.

    In the first case, I wouldn't be so patronizing to decide what people should and shouldn't know, though I would respect anyone's decision not to know, and of course wouldn't force any information down anyone's throat that they preferred not to know, but if they preferred not to know (and not like terrible irrelevant facts, about people that I have no ties with, in circumstances I have no control over, involvement with, and cannot learn from -- then of course I wouldn't care to know a string of terrible details for no reason at all, I'm not a masochist), then I would respect and trust them less as a result.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications
    Value, much like truth, is not "out there" to be found(IMO). Something could be potentially useful but unknown, and therefore not valued. It would only attain a value by us or some other being deciding so.ProbablyTrue

    You misunderstand. If someone values something based on its usefulness, but is wrong about its usefulness, then their placing value in it was a mistake by their own standards and intentions. The very notion of a neutral objective "usefulness" is of course absurd.

    Firstly, I would be dead and therefore I imagine I wouldn't be able to care.ProbablyTrue

    Obviously, but I would be able to, and would rather feel emotions appropriately than just the ones I like regardless of context, or appropriateness.

    Secondly, how much truth or how many truths about the loved one's demise is sufficient enough to honor their memory and amount "the appropriate emotional response"? Do you need to know every detail of their suffering, lest you not understand the significance of the ordeal?ProbablyTrue

    Between not knowing anything at all, and knowing every conceivable detail? Since I cared about them deeply, probably as much as I could find out in order to get a sense of what happened to them, like most anyone else, I figure. Try asking these questions to the family of a missing person. Advocate just forgetting about it, and not worrying about what happened to them, and sing the virtues of just feeling good all the time, regardless of what happens to you or those around you.

    You value truth in all cases because you think truth is desirable in all cases. I think that truth is undesirable in some cases, and therefore has no use for the living or the dead(in those cases*).ProbablyTrue

    Kind of undercuts your credibility, if, as you suggest, truth is not undesirable for being useless, or irrelevant, but because it might make you feel bad?
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications
    The question that was put to me was about a miserable death, and my response was within that context. Not all deaths are miserable, some are surely glorious.

    All lose of loved ones, and even things bring about mourning, and grief, but this is the feeling of lose, lose for something one is attached to, and which was partly integrated into their very being. The feeling of lose isn't fun, but it isn't about empathy, or concern for the thing that was lost's feelings per se, it is the feeling of getting over a significant relationship that has become no more.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    No, its value is relative to its actual usefulness. We can be wrong about something's usefulness, which may make us value facts that are useless, but we value them mistakenly believing them to be useful.

    As I pointed out to TGW, that there are useless facts is not relevant to my point, but contested none the less that people have no interest in facts regardless of their perceived usefulness.

    I'm not interested in speculating as to why knowing any fact is desireable, but I suppose that facts are generally useful, and authoritative, and we cannot always see in advance whether or not a fact will be useful in the future or not.

    The truth about what happened to your loved one is indeed desireable, in order to feel the appropriate emotional reaction, which I think at least honours their memory and what they went through. Would you like to have suffered a great trial, and have everyone think that it was a walk in the park?

    This very point is often my visceral reaction to the idea that being in a constant state of happiness is desireable, because if loved ones suffered or died, it would be inappropriate, and distasteful to feel anything but misery, that's what empathy and sympathy is, to understand what someone has went through, and feel the appropriate emotional response to it. I'm not one to engage in such self-protection that I'd sever empathic ties in order to not feel too bad about anything.
  • Depression, and its philosophical implications


    I don't currently consider life generally to be all sunshine lollipops and rainbows,
  • The compatibility between science and spirituality
    Spirituality, to me, at base, is about soul maintenance. It's about keeping in healthy spirits. Art, and things that focus on the qualitative, rather than the quantitative are simply superior disciplines towards these ends.

    When scientists go on about the awe of being insignificant, this is just a counter-cultural move against religions, and their often stated opinions that religious views and people like to place themselves and humans as the center of the universe, and importance. It is a one upping ethical move, combined with a misunderstanding of impersonal directed focus as a sort of quasi-spiritual selflessness. Or confusing lack of concern, and energy spent focused on the self, as being a humble, enlightened behavior in itself.

    There's no incompatibility between taking care of your soul, and practicing, or being interested in science.