Indeed, and that's the point. When we discover that a former knowledge claim was mistaken, we retroactively downgrade its status from knowledge to belief. We say that they didn't know it after all, since we no longer believe that it was true then. — Andrew M

some truths are unknowable — Luke

In practice it may be that asserting a proposition implies that one believes one's assertion (see Moore's paradox), but in formal logic there is a distinction between asserting that a proposition is true and asserting that a proposition is known to be true. — Michael

The non-omniscience principle states — Michael

I don't understand what your comments have to do with anything. — Michael

I might believe it to be so? e.g. alien life exists, the real part of every nontrivial zero of the Riemann zeta function is 1/2, it will rain tomorrow. — Michael

a the cat is on the mat
b nobody knows that the cat is on the mat

Both a and b are true. This means that, even though a doesn't say so about itself, a is an unknown truth. — Michael

I am posting this on page 33 of the topic "Is there an external material world?", which is very close to 1000 responses!

I really wonder and cannot believe how could such a trivial and without real value or use --for me, of course-- question, the answer to which is more than obvious,, could arise such a huge interest and create such a huge discussion! — Alkis Piskas

My view is that ideas already exist in the mindscape, just as trees exist in the landscape. Seeing a pair of apples may awaken our mind to the idea of two, but the idea already exists. Any being which lacks the mental capacity will never perceive the idea "two." Imagine an earthworm, for instance, crawls over two pebbles. I doubt the idea of two ever enters what mind it has. — Art48

An analogy: Imagine indirect experience as watching a baseball game on TV, as opposed to being in the park. We don’t directly experience the tree; our senses play the role of TV. — Art48

Apple is a universal. A particular apple is an instantiation of the universal called “apple”. — Art48

Without the idea of two, we cannot apply the idea of two to a pair of apples. Example, I define “xyz” as the set of all xyz things. Not a very useful definition. — Art48

Moreover, the set of all existing two things is constantly changing. If I eat one of the two apples, then the “set of all existing two things” has changed. If two atoms are crushed out of existence in some neutron star in another galaxy, the “set of all existing two things” has changed. — Art48

Ideas exist in the “mindscape.” Physical cats exist in the physical world. — Art48

Experience is concrete. I physically experience rough brown patches and smooth green patches, which lead me to mentally experience a universal, i.e., the idea of a tree. — Art48

Without the idea of two, we cannot apply the idea of two to a pair of apples. Example, I define “xyz” as the set of all xyz things. Not a very useful definition. — Art48

Here’s the difference between an objective truth claim and a postmodern assertion. The former invokes a picture of the way things are. This picture consists of a specific, arbitrary content. The postmodernist is not offering a picture containing an arbitrary content. They argue that we are constant moving from one picture, one value content to another. It is not the particular claims, schemes, worldviews , objective definitions that the postmodernist is interested in describing , but the movement. And saying that they are ‘describing’ something is not quite accurate, as if they stood outside of this flow. Rather, the postmodernist is enacting change and movement in talking about it. Their assertions are self-reflexive, already caught up in and changed by the flow. — Joshs

Not when you're arguing against certain brands of anti-realism which deny the "trivial" distinction that realists take for granted. — Michael

Intersubjectivity is different than objectivity. The former is a dynamic pattern of interconnective relationality that cannot be captured by a formula or rule capturing the whole. The latter looks for a rule, law , fixed description applying to some aspect of nature. Objectivity tries to ground fluid self-organization on some content external to it which is not fluid — Joshs

Well, I have a map of the United States which is definitely not a part of the United States. — Michael

Exactly what I said before; the utterance "the cat is on the mat" is separate to the cat being on the mat. — Michael

And again, you're just being too literal in your reading. When others talk about a distinction between language and the world understand it as your oft-quoted distinction between a map and the territory. — Michael

I think you're being too literal in your reading. They're just saying that the utterance "the cat is on the mat" is not the cat being on the mat. — Michael

I agree that how humans use language is a state of affairs, but is there an ultimate arbiter of the truth of certain statements about the world, for example about the truth of empirical propositions? Are there objective
truths about physical nature, or are these truths relative to contingent and conventional linguistic states of affairs?
Is the claim that dinosaurs existed before anybody talked about them incoherent? What if we instead say that SOMETHING existed before language-using communities named and defined them, but we can’t say that they were dinosaurs , since that is a conceptual convention? — Joshs

But let us take a look at this so-called natural kind. Natural kinds, when we examine them, almost always turn out to have boundaries which are to some degree arbitrary, even if the degree of arbitrariness is much less than in the case of a completely conventional kind
like “constellation”. — Joshs

Stars are clouds of glowing gas,glowing because of thermonuclear reactions which are caused by the gravitational field of the star itself, but not every cloud of glowing gas is considered a star; some such clouds fall into other astronomical categories, and some stars do not glow at all. Is it not we who group together all these different objects into a single category “star” with our inclusions and exclusions? It is true that we did not make the stars as a carpenter makes a table, but didn't we, after all, make them stars? — Joshs

Now Goodman makes a daring extrapolation. He proposes that in the sense illustrated by these examples, the sense in which we “make” certain things the Big Dipper and make certain things stars, there is nothing that we did not make to be what it is. (Theologically, one might say that Goodman makes man the Creator.) If, for example, you say that we didn't make the elementary particles, Goodman can point to the present situation in
quantum mechanics and ask whether you really want to view elementary particles as a mind-independent reality. It is clear that if we try to beat Goodman at his own game, by trying to name some “mind-independent stuff”, we shall be in deep trouble.” — Joshs

Language is about the world, and I would include mathematical and visual representation in that characterization. So, it is via language that a kind of separation appears between the world and what is about it. Of course from one perspective that which is about the world is within the world, but from another perspective the world appears only within that which is about the world. Remember the nature of the dialectic; every idea holds within it its own negation. — Janus

. Truth would simply be what is the case and what is the case is independent of our having articulated what is or isn't the case.
— Harry Hindu

And is this your belief about the nature of truth? — Joshs

Do you agree with Hilary Putnam that “while there is an aspect of
conventionality and an aspect of fact in everything we say that is true, we fall into hopeless philosophical error if we commit a "fallacy of division" and conclude that there must be a part of the truth that is the "conventional part" and a part that is the "factual part””, and that "this dichotomy between what the world is like inde­pendent of any local perspective and what is projected by us seems to me utterly indefensible."?

Or do you prefer David Lewis , Donald Davidson or San Dennett’s attempts to hold on some form of separation between fact and convention? — Joshs

Let’s begin with perception. I experience the physical world though my five senses: sight, taste, touch, hearing, and smell. I do not possess a special “tree-sensing” sense. So how can I experience a tree? The answer is I do not directly experience the tree. — Art48

An abstract object is defined as something which is neither spatial nor temporal: an abstract object does not exist in space and time. (“Object” should not be taken too literally; think “abstract entity.”) A typical example of abstract objects is numbers. Numbers such as 2 or π do not exist in space/time. Yes, two apples exist in a particular place at a particular time; but the number 2 itself does not. — Art48

We can directly see on only one thing: light. The mind does the rest. Almost everything we experience though our senses are universals, are abstract objects, are ideas in our mind. — Art48

My mind directly experiences the number two because the number two is a thought and my mind experiences thoughts directly. Similarly, my mind can directly experience the abstract object named “tree” because that, too, is a thought. As to what is causing my experiences, I suppose there’s a material object, a material tree, existing in a physical universe outside myself. If I’m not dreaming, hallucinating, or a brain in a vat, then my supposition may be correct. There may actually be a material tree, existing in a physical universe outside myself. But, then again, there might not. — Art48

It's amazing how twisted up you can get over the concept that all intentional actions have consequences. — Wayfarer

My issue with karma is the idea of personal continuity. Are we always the same in essence from one moment to the next? Karma in this sense doesn’t permit the ability to change for the better or for the worse. This is a form of unjust eternalism. “Type-casting” as it were. — Benj96

Truth is where the world and language meet. Some of our beliefs are true, some not. Not just anything will do. — Banno

And this makes sense only if we say that there are truths that are independent of our attitude towards them, or even of our having articulated them at all. — Banno

Then I guess Trump supporters and liberals
in the U.S live in different worlds, as Goodman says, given that they disagree profoundly on ethical, political and scientific issues. No pointing to the true facts , while castigating our foes for their laziness, stupidity or malevolent motives, will change this situation. — Joshs

No, rightness is where the world and language meet, and rightness is not about truth and falsity but coherence of fit. What fits and what does not , and in what way, depends on lour purposes. We can ignore the particularities of our participation in social activities on some occasions , such as when we create broadly general categories of purpose that abstract — Joshs

This is too abstract: I think it would be far better to say that it is in actuality and significance that the world and language meet. Some of our ideas are workable, some not. Some of our ideas are insightful and inspiring, others not. Who gives a shit if the cat is on the mat or the cup is in the cupboard? — Janus

I'm not interested in proving that propositions exists. — Michael

OK, but do propositions exist when nothing is said? Do propositions exist when nothing is thought? Does the existence of a proposition depend in some sense on us? — Michael

I am simply, for the sake of argument, taking as a premise that "p" is true iff p, or to use a specific example, that "the cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. I then show what follows from assuming this premise. — Michael

I don't know, as I previously said. — Michael

I don't understand what you're trying to get at. Either there are rules of inference or there aren't. If there are then my argument is valid. If there aren't then I guess anything goes and we can say anything we like and we abandon all talk of reason or contradiction. I don't even understand how you expect us to engage in argument unless you accept the reality of logic. — Michael

We could be simulations, in fact that's what follows if you think my argument based on the novacula Occami is flawed and you do. Do we deserve the same rights as our creator(s)? — Agent Smith

I don't know. Regardless, unless you want to reject the accepted rules of logic, you have to accept that my argument is valid (and as you accepted the premise, that my argument is sound). — Michael

You have a point monsieur - the simulation is part of the real world; you said the same thing about the notion of unnatural many suns ago if you recall. — Agent Smith

The difference between unnatural and simulation is that yhe latter is a world and so deserves, how shall I put it?, equal respect as the real deal. — Agent Smith

2 is an application of existential introduction. 4 is modus tollens. They're valid rules of inference. — Michael

OK, but do propositions exist when nothing is said? Do propositions exist when nothing is thought? Does the existence of a proposition depend in some sense on us? — Michael

It's usually thought of as an abstract object, which just means a proposition is "beyond" any particular person. I can be wrong about the status of a proposition, so it's not just a resident of my noggin. Mathematical entities are also abstract, so you can compare propositions to things like numbers. — Tate

I'm not ruling out propositions, I'm questioning what it means for a proposition to exist. Do propositions exist when nothing is said? Do propositions exist when nothing is thought? If they do then it strikes me as Platonic realism. Is that what you're arguing for? — Michael

Let's look at this from a human perspective. The possibilities are:

1. We're in a simulation, meaning there's the real world + the simulation we're a part of.

2. We're in the real world. This isn't a simulation.

Your point is that the simulation is part of the real world, whichever world that is, and that implies that I'm wrong (about the simulation hypothesis being a perfect Harry client for the novacula Occami :snicker: ).

Let's do the math.

From the simulator's point if view: Real world + The Simulation it creates = Real World (no issues).

From the simulated's point of view: The Simulation it's part of + The real world of the simulator > The Simulation it's part of. — Agent Smith

Is a map of the territory another "territory"?
— Harry Hindu

It can be, e.g: — Michael

How would William of Occam tackle this? — Agent Smith

It's true that the simulation is part of reality, within it to be precise. However, the simulation is a world unto itself and so must be treated as equals with the world it is within. — Agent Smith

A simulation’s an additional entity over and above reality. — Agent Smith

Perhaps there is a subtle joining here of 'effect' and interpretation of that effect becoming a personalised meaning. I would prefer your last sentence above to read 'So effect and its interpretation as good or bad are two different things.' I am not sure the word 'meaning' rests as comfortably in your sentence as the word 'effect,' I don't see the word effect and meaning as synonymous — universeness

I concur with your first sentence here but yes meaning, because it can be very subjective and interpretive is garnished from effect. If an item falls towards me from a window and just misses me then once I know whos window it came from, I can interpret the meaning to be a deliberate act or accidental.
I need further investigation to know for sure but 'deliberate' or 'accidental' are both valid creations in my mind at the moment of the 'event.' — universeness

Well 'scribbles on a screen' is a phrase intended to dilute the importance of the communication attempt or the communication method or perhaps both. We are social creatures, asking questions seems to be fundamental to our psyche and our 'seek meaning' imperative. — universeness

To me, your tree example speaks to how meaning becomes knowledge and finally widely and sometimes even universally accepted knowledge such as 'all humans are mortal.' — universeness

When we are sure what interpretations/meanings are correct to most people than we accept them as truth. — universeness

I agree but it's also a continuum of how your legacy is interpreted by each new mind that encounters its forms of memorialisation and their view of the memorialised interpretations of others, about you.
Socrates has no personal memorialisations so we only assign personal meaning to his legacy through the interpretations others have made about him yet he remains an important figure in human history and to each new generation of humans — universeness

Absolutely -- waiting-for-death is not a suitable approach for people who are not old yet -- whatever one thinks of as "old" for themselves. My approach isn't "resignation from the game" altogether, because I, of course, don't know how long I may live yet. I still "engage". — Bitter Crank

But you can't, don't, won't teach others your solution. You simply blame them. (So typical for religious/spiritual people and optimists.) — baker

1. What causes a turn from distraction to facing the meaninglessness of human existence?
— Tate

Chronic pain, among other things.
Social ostracism, disenfranchizement. — baker

My brain tells me this:

1. Real (1 entity)

2. Real + Simulation (2 entities) — Agent Smith