There's no such thing, though. Hence the nothing new of "there's always some reference point." The reference point can be a combo of others, but it's still a reference point. — Terrapin Station

A reference point is a location is space-time. If there are a combination of reference points, where are they located relative to each other? I can see you looking at the tree, and you are located relative to the tree and myself. Why am I suppose to assume you exist independent of my reference point, but the tree doesn't?

I just wrote that there is no such thing, you just quoted it, and you just said "Nothing new here." So why would you even be asking? — Terrapin Station

You wrote it in the post above - AFTER my post, so how could I have quoted it in my post before you wrote it?

Appearances are what things are really like from some reference point, and there's always some reference point. — Terrapin Station

Nothing new here.

An appearance is a reference point. Not everyone is talking about reference points (appearances). Some are talking about how objects are independent of reference points (a view from everywhere). Which one are you attempting to define as it really is - the reference point or the object? What is the nature of the tree independent of reference points?

Realism isn't simply the view that there are things that exist independent of perception — Michael

Realism, in philosophy, the viewpoint which accords to things which are known or perceived an existence or nature which is independent of whether anyone is thinking about or perceiving them. — Encyclopedia Britannica

If we look at Kant's transcendental idealism as an example, it is accepted that there are things that exist independent of perception but argued that these "noumena" are unknowable and not the objects of perception. The objects of perception – known as "phenomena" – are not independent of perception and so Kant's transcendental idealism is a kind of idealism. — Michael

Sounds like realism to me. For a realist there are objects and perception of objects. The qualia of experience are not objects themselves. Many people here seem to be confusing the two. If there isn't a difference between the two, then solipsism. If there is, then (indirect) realism.

So it might be clearer to say that one is a realist about some X rather than just to say that one is a realist. For example one might be a realist about the kind of fundamental entities described by our best scientific models but believe that the objects of perception – chairs, trees, people, etc. – are not reducible to these fundamental entities. — Michael

If you are a realist about some experience, but not others then you aren't being logically consistent. Experiences exist out in the world, separate from me, and within me. There are experiences that are not part of my experience. We can talk about our experiences just as we can talk about trees. Experiences are real things. Trees are real things. What is the difference?

An example of a theory that suggests something like this is enactivism: "organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, ... [they] participate in the generation of meaning ... engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world." Objects of perception are products of our interaction with an external world and as such are as much dependent on us as they are dependent on this external world. — Michael

I've talked about something similar. Our perception of X is the effect of our body's interaction with the world. When we attempt to explain some experience as the effect of some cause that isn't the same as the effect, then we are explaining some form of realism. Notice that you still use realist terms, like "organisms" and "environments". Our experience isn't an organism or an environment. It is an experience - which is a causal relationship between the two. You have experiences about organisms and environments.

I guess Terrapin would disagree with that, he says he encounters mostly phenomena of direct things, for instance the phenomenon of "just a tree", not the phenomenon of "light traveling from a tree towards our eyes", so how does a realist conclude that everything he sees is light reaching his eyes? — leo

Then I would ask what happens to the tree when the lights are out? Why do you need light to see anything?

Terrapin said "The only way to move away from realism with respect to experience is to introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on", I'm arguing that to stick with realism we have to "introduce theoretical explanations for what's really going on" all the same, unless we say that everything we experience is real. — leo

Realism is just one of those theoretical explanations. Idealism and solipsism are others. Anytime we attempt to get at the cause of our experience, we are introducing a theoretical explanation.

Is your mind real? Does it have causal power? If you can talk about your experiences, then they are real, no? The problem here is that we aren't be clear on what we are talking about. Are we talking about our experience, the thing we experience, or something else? When we use language we need to be more specific of what part of reality we are referring to - our experience, our perception, or the thing that we are perceiving (light or the object).

No one is going to be able to justify some political ideology from within a political perspective. It is going to take a more objective perspective to understand what humans need in order to sustain our existence. — Harry Hindu

And so I predict that this thread isnt going to go anywhere until we start to do just that. When you're stuck with trying to explain or define "aggression" from a political perspective rather than a scientific one then you're not going to have a proper definition. When you don't put humans in perspective of other organisms, then you're going to have a skewed understanding of aggression.

Trade does not even exist outside a "perimeter" of lowered aggression and violence.

Biological life does not "trade" in the wild. Everything in nature revolves around confiscation.

If I think that the flesh around your bones would be better off in my stomach, I am not going to ask for your opinion, and I am certainly not going to ask what you would like in return.

A commerce-friendly "perimeter" of lowered aggression and violence needs to be created at great effort, and then painstakingly maintained.

Libertarians seem to believe that such "perimeter" would naturally materialize out of the fricking blue. That is why I am a bit wary of libertarian views. These views are simply too naive to my taste. — alcontali

Read Dawkin's "The Selfish Gene". Aggression and violence are naturally inhibited because to allow them to proliferate is a detriment to any society made up of any organisms. Natural selection has filtered out unfettered aggressive and violent behaviors because if these were common behaviors, then they would lead to extinction. Aggressive behavior by all organisms of a society is no different than an organism feeding on itself. Eventually it will die out and leave no offspring.

Altruism is the result of a social organism acting in social ways in order to propagate its genes.

I still see many people conflating libertarianism with anarchism. Libertarians support the existence of government - a limited government. Libertarians do not eschew from the notion that they are part of a society. Libertarians understand that we are a social species and to be part of a society means that altruism is a viable means of obtaining what one needs.

Humans are inherently non-aggressive compared to other species as a result of our larger brains with longer memories of other people and their actions, and our ability to share our experiences of others with others (leaving reviews of our interactions with others). Being a social species means that aggressive behavior is at a minimum within that species. If not, then we wouldn't be labeled as a social species. It really is that simple, but of course morality and politics muddies the waters and makes things complicated.

Libertarianism is the default skeptical understanding that one doesn't know what is best for everyone else. If you think that you know what is best for everyone, then don't you have to justify that reasoning? How do you know what is best for everyone else?

Notice how I am elevating myself above the political fray into a more objective mindset and hitting political debates from a scientific angle. No one is going to be able to justify some political ideology from within a political perspective. It is going to take a more objective perspective to understand what humans need in order to sustain our existence. This is why political debates are so drab.

And how does the realist get to conclude that what he experienced was a hallucination or that he had a false belief? For instance if the realist sees water in the distance and moves towards it and the water progressively disappears as he gets closer, how does he conclude that this water was an illusion and not that it was real water that progressively disappeared? — leo

Illusions are simply misinterpretations of what is real. It only seems like water when you don't move towards it. When you move towards it, it doesn't behave like a pool of water. This is how you know it's not a pool of water.

When it is understood that it is light we see, not objects, then mirages and "bent" sticks in water is what you would EXPECT to see.

Saying there is no object that is perceived as it is independently of the perceiver is not saying that there is nothing beyond perception, of course if you assume there is nothing beyond perception you end up with solipsism, idealism doesn't make that assumption. — leo

Then idealism is no different than realism.

Is this just an opinion of yours or do you have justification for these assertions? — Noah Te Stroete

This is why I don't engage in ethical and political discussions much. Ethical and political discussions always comes down to feelings, or opinions. There is no such thing as an objective morality. It makes no sense to ask questions like, "what is the best way to live for everyone?" or "What is the best government for everyone?" There is no objective answer to such questions, so it makes no sense to ask for justification for the way everyone should live or be governed. It is personal, so how I want to live and be governed may be different than how you want to live and be governed. This is the basic foundation of Libertarian thought - that I know what is best for me, not what is best for everyone else.

Sure, there are many people in the world that can't live their lives without being told how to live them or what to think, just as there are many people who can't live their lives without telling others how to live their lives and what to think. Then there is everyone else who know how they want to live and what they want to think without anyone else's input, and don't feel the need to impose it on everyone else (Libertarians).

The number I found was 34.000. Having 34.000 dollars in assets is not "poverty" according to any definition I am aware of. It's also for every single person, not household assets. For the vast majority of the population, that would be significant wealth. — Echarmion

Sure, that was the upper range of the numbers that I saw. I saw numbers as low as $10,000. I thought I would be a little less biased by putting up a number in mid-range. You also ignored the fact that most of that money is tied up in commodities and property. So, using your number, people would get around $10,000 cash, and then they would own a fraction of a beach house on the California coast. They would have a place to stay for two weeks out of the year, but then what would they be able to own with just $10,000?

Ownership is a social convention though, so you cannot necessarily enforce your own view on what you own. — Echarmion

LOL. Isn't this what we are discussing - which version of "ownership" is "better" for everyone? If you have to share everything, do you really own anything?

I could enforce my view by physically defending what I own. Sure, there could be a larger group of people (ie a government, because that is all a government is - a group of people with a social contract and the resources to defend it) that come and take what I own, but then does that make it "right" or "wrong"? Is there such a thing as an objective "right" and "wrong" way to live and be governed?

It's really simple. If there is no object independent of perception, then it would simply be wrong to say that we perceive anything. There would be no such thing as perception. Perception is about acquiring information about state-of-affairs. There is an aboutness to perception. If those state-of-affairs don't exist independent of perception, then "perception" becomes incoherent. So, if there are no objects independent of perception, then you are misusing the terms, "perception" and "perceiving".

Trees exist in the same way that other people do - as perceived objects independent of my perception of them. If we are going to question the existence of trees as "just trees", then what about "just people"? How do biological organisms with brains exist independent of my perception of them? This forum is full of idealists questioning the existence of objects independent of us, yet contradict themselves when they talk about other minds, or talk about people, as if they are sure there are more than one. If we are going to question the existence trees independent of perception, then why are we not applying the same skepticism to the existence of other minds? Once you question realism, you slide down the rabbit hole of solipsism, and there is no such thing as a middle ground (ie. idealism) because that would be a contradiction.

This discussion of the theoretical of universal collective vs. private ownership is just that, theoretical. Practical implementation is much more complex and messier than the discussion seems to take into account. Neither side is in reality doable, but I still think the discussion is worthwhile to try to solve the systemic problems of the status quo. This is my opinion. — Noah Te Stroete

It seems obvious to me that I own what I worked to get, where "worked" doesn't entail stealing from others, or oppressing others, rather it entails providing a service or product to the rest of society that you are part of.

A government is only necessary to provide protection against external and internal threats to the free system, and to build and maintain a system of roads and bridges to make the free market more effecient. Those are the only powers a government should have.

If you want to quibble, just Google "how much money would everyone in the world have if it was divided equally".

It's been discussed elsewhere on the internet, so you'll find plenty of links. But you won't find much of a difference in the number I provided. Everyone in the world will still end up in poverty.

To declare ownership is an act of aggression. Libertarians cloud this issue, creating the illusion that we naturally own things. In reality we are born without private property. We are born with nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it aggressive to lock your doors so that you can keep all of your possessions and your home? Do we own our bodies? According to you the State has the power to decide what we can or can't do with our bodies.

Socialists create the illusion of infinite resources that can be shared by all and accessed by all whenever they want. This is a pipe dream. If we were to redistribute all resources and wealth on the planet every person would end up being in poverty. Google the GDP per capita of the world. It's $17,300, and much off that isnt cash, its locked up commodities and property.

There is also the illusion of the level-playing field. In order attain a level-playing field state would have to engage in genetic and social engineering which just erases individuality and diversity.

Some socialists may have good intentions, but their ideas are disastrous. The rest are just authoritarians in a liberal costume.

Your post is all just scribbles to me.

In other words, I have no idea what you are talking about. Your scribbles did not invoke any images in my mind (other than the image of the scribbles themselves). I'm sure they have meaning independent of my lack of understanding for how they are being used. It's just I'm unable to use those scribbles to get at the idea you're trying to convey (what you or Lao Tzu mean by them).

No.
You ignore the fact that 'existence' is a word like any other whose meaning is also contextually dependent. The alternative, that 'existence' has an 'absolute' sense, is no different to a religious claim. — fresco

Exactly. Words are contextually dependent upon the things that they are about, which are not words themselves.

There is a sense in which words bring the universe into existence. Before that, there is something unnamed which isn't really anything at all. Trees are not trees until we, or somebody, calls them that. Lao Tzu wrote "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." I guess you could paraphrase - The World that can be spoken is not the eternal World.

Coming to terms with that truth has changed the way I think about reality, truth, and knowledge. — T Clark

It's not that words brings the universe into existence. Words make the universe communicable. The word, "tree" is a word. A tree is not. A tree looks nothing like a string of scribbles, yet a particular string of scribbles for a particular group of humans on Earth invokes the image of a tree in their minds. How did you learn to use the word, "tree"?

Words don't make you understand a tree any better than just observing a tree. Your words simply reflect your observations of the tree. I don't need words to observe a tree grow, or shed it's leaves over time. I just need eyes. I need words if I wanted to communicate things of a tree to you when you can't observe it yourself. If you could observe it yourself, why would you need me to tell you that trees grow and shed leaves?

In teaching you the word, "tree", I'm not teaching you anything about the tree. I'm teaching you how to communicate non-verbal properties of trees.

Oh boy. :gasp:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5097/is-gender-a-social-construct/p1

If behavior is the effect of some cause, the cause is the meaning of the behavior. In this sense, purpose is the cause of the behavior, and is therefore the meaning of the behavior. Purpose and meaning are the same.

Opinions on Derrida tend to polarize due to his iconoclasm.
Have a go with Maturana. He doesn't do 'mind' or 'thinking'...only behavior. — fresco

Maturana is a p-zombie?

I understand (I think) what each of you thinks meaning is. What I don’t understand is how you both can’t be right at the same time. I am dumb. We all can agree on that! — Noah Te Stroete

Fresco/Derrida claims meaning doesn't exist. I say it does. How can we both be right?

I see ! So 'cause' = 'meaning'...good luck with that one!

Let me know if you follow up my references. — fresco

I did.

There have been problems defining deconstruction. Derrida claimed that all of his essays were attempts to define what deconstruction is,[26]:4 and that deconstruction is necessarily complicated and difficult to explain since it actively criticises the very language needed to explain it.

In the early 1970s, Searle had a brief exchange with Jacques Derrida regarding speech-act theory. The exchange was characterized by a degree of mutual hostility between the philosophers, each of whom accused the other of having misunderstood his basic points.[25]:29[citation needed] Searle was particularly hostile to Derrida's deconstructionist framework and much later refused to let his response to Derrida be printed along with Derrida's papers in the 1988 collection Limited Inc. Searle did not consider Derrida's approach to be legitimate philosophy, or even intelligible writing, and argued that he did not want to legitimize the deconstructionist point of view by paying any attention to it. Consequently, some critics[48] have considered the exchange to be a series of elaborate misunderstandings rather than a debate, while others[49] have seen either Derrida or Searle gaining the upper hand. The level of hostility can be seen from Searle's statement that "It would be a mistake to regard Derrida's discussion of Austin as a confrontation between two prominent philosophical traditions", to which Derrida replied that that sentence was "the only sentence of the 'reply' to which I can subscribe".[50] Commentators have frequently interpreted the exchange as a prominent example of a confrontation between analytic and Continental philosophies. — Wikipedia

It seems that other prominent philosophers don't even think that Derrida's Deconstruction theory is legitimate philosophy.

How is it that you can criticize something that you say doesn't exist? What are you criticizing? "Language" is a string of scribbles, not the actual act using signs to refer to other signs. So, scribbles can be about something else that isn't scribbles. Your end up contradicting yourself and defeating your own argument by criticizing something that isn't a word with words.

What you and Derrida seem to be saying is that it is signs all the way down. Good luck with that one.

NB. In terms of your flair for combative philosophy you might appreciate this critique of the Schaller study.
It has been suggested that the characterization of Ildefonso as entirely "languageless" may be an oversimplification. In the same review, Padden speculates that "Schaller may have been teaching language to Ildefonso, but more accurately, she was teaching him how to map a new set of symbols on a most likely already existent framework of symbolic competence." — Wikipedia

Like I said, how can we learn language (how to map a new set of symbols) if we don't already think, or know how symbolism works - if there isn't already an aboutness to our experiences? Sure, Idelfonso could already understand symbolism in that some feeling is an indicator of some state of his body, or some state of the world. How do you expect some person to learn language if they don't already represent things in their mind?

You ask 'what words are about'. — fresco

No, I asked what human-caused scribbles and sounds mean, among many other questions. You aren't answering the questions.

They are about 'ephemeral agreement about action decisions' whether in internal or extenal dialogue. They are not about 'things' except insofar that 'things' are contextual focusings of attention towards which action might be directed. 'Things' are actively 'thinged' by thingers ! — fresco

:brow: Huh-wha? They are about agreements about action decisions?
Earlier, you said:

But your lay term 'aboutness' is vacuous, because unless you are a naive realist you have no 'bedrock'. My 'cordination of coordination' rests on the bedrock of 'action decisions' involved in physical, psychological and social 'prediction and control'. — fresco

If 'aboutness' is vacuous, how is it that you've used it twice in one sentence to describe what words are about? I asked you how 'aboutness' could be vacuous, but you again ignored the question and then contradict your own statement by using the word. :confused:

So to think 'meaning' is about independently existing 'things' is to assume a 'bedrock' which is in essence 'quicksand', because it fails to take into account the subtle dynamics of linguistic interactions which constantly shift or negotiate the focal boundaries of 'thinghood'. — fresco

I never said 'meaning' is about independently existing 'things'. I said 'meaning' is the relationship between causes and their effects. You aren't paying attention.

So the 'direct answer' to your question has been given. 'Words' are behavioral markers in the process of organising actions to fulfil human needs. They could be considered to be 'the currency of thought', and like monetary currency their 'value' can change according to context. — fresco

What are humans if not things? Another contradiction

So, from that pov, which is supported by my references, any failure to take this on board constitues an incestuous 'language game' involving futile demands for words to define words...futile because its like asking 'how many dollars is a dollar worth' ?
Q: What does a dollar/word mean ? A: What action you can perform with it.

BTW Your 'scribbles' are equivalent to banknotes/coins/poker chips, etc. — fresco

Another misinterpretation of my statements. I have never said that words ultimately define words. Words are just types of visual and auditory cues. We try to get at the cause of the experiences we have, whether it be a car horn, a knock at the door, words being spoken, the sting of an ant, a hand waving, scribbles on paper, steam rising from water, smell of smoke, upset stomach, etc. By getting at the cause, we get at the meaning of the sensory impression.

Words (spoken/auditory or written/visual) are just a type of sensory impression that we understand through experience over time to mean some idea some person wanted to convey. The idea isn't just other words. It is other types of visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, olfactory sensory impressions, which are themselves about the world.

When someone says, "I don't feel so good." What are those sounds about? What do they mean? It means that the person has a pain somewhere in their body. Pain isn't just another word. It is a feeling. If you ask them, "what do you mean?", they may be more specific and define the pain as throbbing in their head and dizziness. The fact that they used other words to define their pain does not mean that words define words. It means that words are the only means we have to communicate to others things in our experience that aren't words.

What we do with words is communicate, or invoke, our other types of sensory impressions in other's minds.

Some philosophers hold words, or language use itself as the foundation of all of our thinking. That we can't think without words, or language. That simply isn't the case. Animals and infant humans are thinkers without any understanding of language. How can you even learn a language without being able to think prior to learning it? How can you learn anything at all without thinking?

I have referenced Ildefonso's story numerous times on this forum. If his story doesn't put to rest the claim that we can't think without words, then I don't know what would. The only reason people could think that we can't think without words is because they are unaware of Ildefonso's story.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Man_Without_Words

Ildefonso is a deaf man that didn't learn what language was until he was an adult. He didn't understand why people moved their mouths at each other. Once Susan Schaller took the time to teach him what language was about (which wasn't easy), Ildefonso wasn't surprised that he could think, he was surprised to learn that we had a shared symbol for all the states-of-affairs in the world, including his own ideas, which allowed him to communicate them to others.

As I see it, it all comes to banks, money, power. This is very zeitgeistish, i reckon. Politics are the show indeed, the bread to the people, the coliseum to us Romans. Everywhere in the world. — James Pullman

Money is power, which why money should be taken out of politics. Take out the political parties as well so that people are forced to vote for ideas, not for party, or the ones that are on tv the most because they have more money.

Not only that. The “State” itself is equally divided. — Noah Te Stroete

That is only the show that they put on for their constituents. They all work together to expand the powers of government over the governed. Behind closed doors they are all pals.

It is often the case that the respective tribes cannot even agree on many facts. — Noah Te Stroete

This is because they aren't using facts. Facts are only important in science, not in politics. While political parties may use scientific knowledge to support their views, it is often cherry-picked.

The rise of identity politics is the result of the State focusing on our differences to use them to divide us. Instead of focusing on the corruption of the elites in government positions, they have us pointing the finger at each other.

I don't see how any of this addresses my post. I'm not the one playing games or dancing with language. I'm asking direct questions and you are performing mental gymnastics in order to avoid answering direct questions.

But your lay term 'aboutness' is vacuous, because unless you are a naive realist you have no 'bedrock'. My 'cordination of coordination' rests on the bedrock of 'action decisions' involved in physical, psychological and social 'prediction and control'. — fresco

How can a term be vacuous when words are only used for coordination? And the reason you gave that it was vacuous isn't that it doesn't coordinate (because you replied back with more scribbles), but because there is no 'bedrock' - whatever that means. What would it mean for a term to be vacuous, or to have no bedrock, if terms are only used for coordinating actions between individuals?

And why would I be asking what your word use means if we are merely coordinating actions? Where is the coordination when I ask, "what do you mean", or say "I don't understand what you mean." It seems to me that coordination comes about only when we agree. But then what would be be agreeing on, or about? What does it mean to agree or disagree?

Now part of that coordination certainly uses the abstract persistence of 'words' to mentally paint shifting snapshots of 'an external world', but my contextual 'snapshot' can never be guaranteed to be synonymous with yours. All that matters is a degree of mutual coordination as to what might happen next (which Maturana calls 'structural coupling'). — fresco

I don't use words to paint shifting snapshots of an external world. I have shifting snapshots of a world in relation to me and I use words to categorize different sensory impressions under one sensory impression - a word - which is a visual scribble or sound. Words are not abstract. They exist out in the world as ink on paper, light on a computer screen, or as vibrations in the air. The abstraction lies in our mental representation for the cause of hearing sounds or seeing scribbles. The abstraction lies in our attempt to simulate the meaning, or the causal relationship between hearing or seeing sounds or scribbles and what caused them. What do the sounds or scribbles mean? How is it that I am having a visual experience of scribbles on a computer screen right now when looking at your post? What are those scribbles about? What are you trying to convey?

I suggest you need to consider some of the empirical studies of language pathology to understand my position. For example, it is well known that the development of twins can be hampered by an ideosyncratic private language. And studies by Merleau-Ponty of brain damaged war veterans showed for example that the command word 'salute' produced no understanding but social situation of an officer entering the room produced immediate saluting action. — fresco

So now you are pointing to states-of-affairs with words - like studies and the development of twins, brain damaged vets, etc. Your words are about things - these states-of-affairs. If not, then I don't know what your are talking about. If you aren't talking about these things that are not words themselves, then you are just making scribbles on a screen that have no meaning other than the fact that you, fresco, put scribbles on a computer screen.

What is the difference between scribbles and words?

Languaging' is a form of behavior which co-ordinates behavior. Your languaging sample about 'just squiggles on a screen' is your attempt to to elicit a response from me involving the word/concept 'ideas'. — fresco

So how can scribbles be about themselves? What does it mean for something to be about something or itself?

But from Maturana's 'languaging' point of view, 'ideas' are merely sequences of 'internal actions/conversations which we call 'thinking'. It is this ability to 'act off line' which gives humanity an evolutionary advantage over most other species. In fact, one definition psychologists use for 'intelligence' is 'the capacity to delay a physical response'. — fresco

Or to filter our instinctive behaviors. But this is all scribbles about things that arent scribbles. I'm not writing to get you to write back, or to hear you talk. My intent is simply to convey ideas, and ideas can be non-verbal. The scribbles on the screen are about my ideas, and ideas are about the world.

I don't understand the argument you are making. Your definition doesn't match my understanding of what "meaning" means. — T Clark

It might do you some good to read the rest of the post. The definition I used is how everyone uses the word "meaning" - to refer to some cause or purpose.

When someone asks, "what do you mean?", they are asking what ideas you intended to convey with your use of words. They are trying to get past the scribbles and the words to the idea in your head which is the cause of the scribbles or a words.

When someone uses words and we don't understand their use, we don't ask "what do the words mean", we ask "what do you mean" which is talking about your idea in your head and your intent to communicate it.

We understand that people may use words differently than the dictionary definition but that isn't to say that they don't mean something when using the words that way.

When someone asks, "what is the meaning of life?", they are asking about the cause or the purpose of life.

No, what I have 'done here' is to use 'languing' behavior to elicit languaging behavior from you ! There is no 'ultimate', but It would have been more gratifying if I had also elicited 'research behavior' as well ! — fresco

What is "languaging" behavior? Just making scribbles appear on screen because you put scribbles on a screen? or representing some ideas that are not of some "languaging" behavior with "languaging" behavior?

Is the State of Affairs you are languaging about the scribbles on the screen or something else?

You fail to get my point because you fail to understand that talking about language is in essence an infinite regress equivalent to pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps.
The only 'given' we can start from is that we are clever primates with a complex set of socially acquired behavioral gestures ,we call 'human language' which segments what we call 'the world'. The abstract persistence of 'words' (internalised gestures) act as place markers for focal aspects of that shifting flux we call 'things' allowing us to attempt to predict and control aspects of our world relative to our lifespans and our pattern seeking. Place markers are not 'representational' of 'things in themselves', they are contextual memory aids within potential action plans. — fresco

What you have ultimately done here is talk about language - about what language is. So where is your infinite regress?

You provide an "only 'given'" yet provide more than just one 'given', and you used language to represent that 'given' for communicating to others that 'given'.

Are we really clever primates, or is that just a use of scribbles on a screen? Does "clever primates" refer to some state-of-affairs, or is it just scribbles on a screen? Is it a fact that these "clever primates" possess "a complex set of socially acquired behavioral gestures that they call "human language" which segments what they call the world?", or are those just scribbles that don't refer to, or represent, or mean anything?

In using language, what are actually doing? Are you doing something different with language when you listen as opposed to speaking? If we are doing different things with language, then how do we communicate? What is the glue that binds the listener and speaker together? Isn't it meaning?

I see, but I don't think I agree, at least not in the context of this forum. I want to try this again. What does "meaning" mean?

Meaning is a mental relationship, connection between a phenomenon (the referent I guess) and a symbol or symbols such that the symbols represent the referent, e.g. the meaning/definition of a word.
Meaning is a mental relationship, connection between a system of related symbols and a system of related phenomena such that the symbols represent the phenomena, e.g. the meaning of Einstein's theory of Special Relativity. This is a bit clunky. Needs work.
Meaning is used metaphorically to refer to a mental connection between two phenomena which is similar to the connection between a symbol and a referent, e.g. the meaning of life. Clunky too.


As Charles Montgomery Burns once said - I don't know art philosophy, but I know what I hate. And I don't hate that. — T Clark

It's really simple. Meaning is the relationship between some cause(s) and some effect(s).

What some word means is the idea in some speaker or writer's head and their intent to communicate that idea(the cause of the words appearing on the screen). When reading other's words, you are trying to get at their meaning, not yours. If you only try to get at your meaning of the words, then how do you expect to understand what the writer intended? You are trying to get at the cause of the words on the screen and part of that is knowing that scribbles on a screen (the effect) is caused by humans submitting their ideas via language (the cause).

Seeing scribbles on a screen means that some human submitted their ideas via a post on an internet forum. What do the scribbles mean? They mean the ideas (that are not just other words BTW) in some human's head. Which causal relationship do you want to talk about - the one between you and the screen with scribbles, or the one between the scribbles and the author of those scribbles? The fact that we can talk about both and still be talking about language use shows that there are multiple causes that precede you reading scribbles on screen (using language).

When you don't understand what someone wrote - is it that there is no meaning to the words, or is it that there is meaning but you haven't been able to discover it yet (the causal relationship between the scribbles and someone's ideas)?

When we ask what something means we are asking about causal relationships - about some cause or purpose.

Maybe we should take a look at the very question of asking what something is. To say what something is is to say what it's relationships are. Your perception of the apple is a relationship between the apple, light, and your body. The apple is a relationship between certain molecules, which are themselves relationships between various atoms, and so on - relationships all the way down.

A mind is a relationship between a body and its environment. The objects of perception aren't just about the object as it is. It is about the object AND the body. The errors come about when we think that the perception is only about the object, and not about both the body and object.

I'm just saying that introspection is limited. — Marchesk

If it's limited, what is it missing? How do you know it is limited? In order to know it is limited, you'd have to know what is missing, and if you know what is missing, then you don't have a limited view, do you?

You would have to know that there are things about some object that we aren't getting at with our senses to say that our experience is "limited". What is it that we are missing of the apple as it is when we look at the apple? — Harry Hindu

Humans didn't know this at first. Chemical composition would be one thing. — Marchesk

Then how did humans come to know chemical composition of an apple? Did our senses change? Why do we now get at the chemical composition of an apple, whereas before we could not? And if we know the apple's chemical composition, then what is missing from our perception of the apple?

The rest of the EM spectrum we don't see reflecting off or passing through the apple would be another. — Marchesk

:roll: You are now talking about the light not the apple. I asked what we were missing about the apple.

What is the difference between getting at an object as it is and getting the perception of an object as it is? — Harry Hindu

It would mean experiencing everything about the object, but that's not how perception works. — Marchesk

How do you know that's not how perception works, unless you had access to what perception really is?

You keep contradicting yourself in claiming that we can never experience things as they are, yet you make all these claims about things as they are.

Experiences of objects are about those objects. We experience the objects as they are. Saying we experience something is saying that there is an aboutness - that our experiences inform us of what objects are like.

How do you know that you are missing information, instead of you just misinterpreting the information? — Harry Hindu

Science. Or careful observation before then leading to a realization that we don't know everything about objects by just seeing or tasting them. — Marchesk

How does observation lead us to realize that we don't know everything about objects, if observing is what leaves out information? In order to know that information is missing, we'd have to know what information is missing, and how would we know that if not by using the very same senses that you say are flawed, or miss information?

No, only questioning that I have perfect knowledge of my experiences or thoughts. — Marchesk

So, are you saying that you have access to your mind, it's just that you don't have a good explanation of what your mind is for?

We don't experience things directly or indirectly as they are. We only experience them in a limited fashion as human beings. — Marchesk

How would you even know this? You would have to know that there are things about some object that we aren't getting at with our senses to say that our experience is "limited". What is it that we are missing of the apple as it is when we look at the apple?

If we can manipulate nature on such a grand scales and to actually leave our planet and land on others, then I would have to say that our access to nature is pretty good. We are aware of threats to our life's existence that other animals are oblivious to.

Actually, I said we do have some access to how things are because "I'm horsed" doesn't make any sense. So we can conclude that perceiving a horse has some objective properties not dependent on use perceiving it. — Marchesk

What is the difference between getting at an object as it is and getting the perception of an object as it is? What information would you be missing? How do you know that you are missing information, instead of you just misinterpreting the information?

Skepticism only becomes an option when we notice a discrepancy between how things appear and how they are. Or when we can't tell the difference between an appearance and reality, such as during a dream. — Marchesk

So we can only be skeptical if we actually had access to both how they appear and how they are? But you keep saying that we never have access to how they are - only how they appear - so then why are we skeptical?

Maybe during the dream we can't tell the difference, but afterwards we can - after we experience the world and not a dream.

Sensory illusions are not our senses being wrong. They are our mind's wrong interpretations of our sensory impressions. When we understand the ALL of the causes that are behind the sensory impression, we will be able to tell the difference between what parts are about the object, the light and our visual/nervous system.

No, our first person access is imperfect and error prone. — Marchesk

I have no idea what you mean here. Do you question the existence of your mind - or that something exists at all?

We don't experience things as they are, directly or indirectly. We experience them in a limited fashion, imperfectly based on the kind of senses and brains we have. — Marchesk

If we don't experience things directly or indirectly, then how do we experience things at all - even imperfectly? Do you experience your mind directly? Is your mind part of the world? What do you mean by "experience"?

In one case we call those qualities which we use an instrument that reads the same for ourselves the object-dependent qualities, and in the other case we just state how we feel to designate the perceiver-dependent qualities. — Moliere

Yes, the feeling of cold/heat cannot be the temperature the thermometer measures because the feeling varies between individuals and even the same individual when the thermometer does not. — Marchesk

The thermometer is measuring something different than what your feeling of being cold and warm is about. The thermometer is measuring the outside temperature. We could use the thermometer to measure your temperature too. When we do, we would notice a pattern between how you feel and the difference between your temperature and the outside temperature.

If we subtract your temperature from the outside temperature and get a negative number, then you will feel cold. If we get a positive number, you will feel hot. The closer to 0, the more comfortable you will feel. So your feeling of coldness or warmness isn't JUST about the outside temperature, or JUST your temperature. It is about the relationship between the two.

If we experienced things exactly as they are, there would be no skepticism, and we wouldn't need science. We would just know things as they are. This is the naive view people have before they're exposed to science or philosophy, or start questioning appearances. — Marchesk

Skepticism would still exist even if we experienced things as they are, for how would we know if we experience things as they are? What would it mean to experience you, or the apple, as you are?

Again, are you not experiencing your mind as it truly is?

If you can experience things as they are indirectly, what more would experiencing them as they are provide? Isnt that what perception is - indirect access to how something really is?

There is a division because human beings are not the world. You're not a horse, or a rock or the sun. And you're not another person. But you do experience the world via a body of certain kind of animal. This was also something noted by the ancient skeptics. Animal senses differ from our own. — Marchesk

They don't differ so much that we call them different names. Dogs, horses, sharks, and lizards all have noses and eyes and nervous systems. They differ only in complexity.

But notice that the skeptics have to admit to knowing that animal senses differ, and that there is perceptual relativity among humans to an extent. This implies that there is a world we do know something about. And so a division is made between the experience of the individual, and the world, of which the individual is part, but can not experience exactly as it is. — Marchesk

What would be the difference in "experiencing" something exactly as it is and "experiencing" the aboutness of how something is?

Can't you "experience" your mind exactly as it is?

This is why the subjective-objective divide exists, whatever conclusions we draw from such a division. I feel cold, you feel warm, but the thermometer says it's the same temperature. This eventually leads to a scientific understanding of temperature as the amount of energy the particles in a volume of space have. Cold and hot are only relative to absolute zero and minimum entropy, which is far beyond the range at which we can experience temperature. — Marchesk

Just as I can point to the thermometer and say it is cold, I can point to your shivering body and say that you are cold. Your "subjective" notions are part of the world itself, and something you can get at directly, and then communicate to others using the objects as the medium of communication that you say we can't "experience" as they truly are. Then how is it that I'm able even understand any of the scribbles you put up on my computer screen?

And the horse has nothing to say about the taste of the wine. — Marchesk

Saying anything is a type of behavior. Saying, "the wine is good." is the same as seeing someone enjoy the wine. If the horse laps up the wine and begs for more, then that is the horse saying, "the wine is good". Body language is a type of language, or communication.

if the brain is not a type of machine than what is it? What does it do? What is it for? You seem to think that only carbon-based life possesses consciousness. What if silicon-based life evolved by natural selection on another planet? Would you consider that silicon-based life as conscious? What would be the difference between the silicon-based life and a robot with a computer brain and cameras, microphones and tactile pressure points for senses?

How do you "reach an understanding"?

Then attention is a type of awareness?

If awareness and consciousness are the same then doesn't that make attention a type of consciousness?

Can we be aware of anything without attending to it? It seems to me that attention is more like a necessary feature of awareness/consciousness.

What would be the purpose of being aware of something, but not attending it?