I think that if what we sensuously perceive does not fit into our concepts, we tend to ignore it because there is no place for it in our imagination. — Cavacava

I think we ignore things not because they don't fit into our concepts, but because they don't fit into the current goal we have.
Again, what governs how we form concepts?

No, it's not inconsistent, it's similar to a contingent truth, that is, it can be true in one setting and false in another depending on the state-of-affairs. I didn't say it was subjective, I said it was relative, there is a big difference. — Sam26

This doesn't seem to be much different than my explanation in making category errors when referring to something in the VR as if it weren't a representation of a computer program. You seem to be saying that it is true from a VR person's perspective that there really is an enemy robot chasing them, but isn't that because they don't have access to more knowledge - that they are in a VR program? So, it would be more accurate to say that the computer user has more knowledge than the VR person, which means that they have access to the truth, while the VR person doesn't.

It's no different than dreaming your girlfriend broke up with you and when you see her the next day, she acts like that never happened, because it didn't actually happen. You only had a dream that it did. Which is the truth - that your girlfriend broke up with you, or that you had a dream that she broke up with you?

I stated that without the concept or idea of what a tree is, there is/may be no tree. What is observed has to fit into person's conceptual structure in order for us to recognize it, in order for reality to be coherent. What we are sensuously aware of is always classified by us in some manner. This all happens in less than 500 milliseconds.

Have you ever tried to figure out what something is in the dark. — Cavacava

I still don't get what you're talking about. Are you saying that without the concept of what a tree is in here, there is no tree out there? Is it our minds that make construct our perception of reality, or our minds a reflection of reality, or maybe a bit of both? What is it that governs how we make concepts? How is it that so many different human beings, not to mention other animals, react the same way to the same thing (when in water, we either swim or drown, and animals do the same thing)?

one directly sees indirect realism — sime

This sounds like a contradiction. This sounds like you have direct access to reality to describe it with such detail and with such confidence, not indirect access.

What we perceive is tainted by our concepts, we may not be even able to be aware of an object unless it is among our concepts. — Cavacava

My point was that he could make distinctions between objects without language. You seem to imply that The Man With No Words wouldn't be aware of anything, but he obviously was. He was obviously aware of food as something to eat, not to wear, without language. Was he just manipulating concepts in his mind, or was he really getting at the differences that exist in reality - outside his mind? Is it food that he was eating, or just a concept?

One must also be aware of something in order to make it a concept, or by being aware of something is the same as forming a concept. Are we aware of concepts? Do we need to make concepts more conceptual in order to be aware of them?

There is a claim, "it's something", and then the classification "its a green tree". The claim is sensuously given, the statement is a mental construction, without which there is no awareness of a tree. — Cavacava

Words are just other sounds and visuals. How is it that words aren't just something that we then classify as words? Are we not aware of words until we engage in categorizing them?

It seems that there is an awareness of some thing and how that thing interacts with other things that exists prior to categorizing in such a way as to communicate some thing and how it interacts with other things.

The Man With No Words didn't seem to have a problem in being aware of the things around him as he was able to survive, dress and feed himself without knowing a language.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Man_Without_Words

He didn't need words to make distinctions between what to eat and what not to eat, or what to wear and what not to wear. He simply made observations and organized his observations into a consistent world-view - all without classifying his observations with words.

I find it amazing how the extremes of the human condition throws wrenches into many philosophical playbooks. The only reason why we don't try to find more of these kinds of cases, or reproduce them in order to study them, is because of something called "ethics". I wonder how it became unethical to NOT teach someone a language, but I guess that's another topic for another thread.

But you're wondering how perception can involve awareness of both mental and non-mental properties of an object. That is a good question. — Marchesk

If you are saying that you have an awareness of a mental property as opposed to a non-mental (physical?) property, then you are saying that you have an awareness of two different things, as trees don't have mental properties, only physical ones. Minds have mental properties. So, when looking at a tree, are you aware of the tree or your mental representation of it. And if you say that you are aware of your mental representation of it, then by calling it a representation you are implying that you are aware of something else, which would be the tree as well. If not, then it wouldn't be a representation.

It's like asking, "Are you aware of the word, or what the word refers to?" They are both separate things that are linked together by representation. Because it is a representation, you could say that by being aware of one as a representation, then you are aware of what it represents.

If the answer is both yes and no, then you have problem called inconsistency.

Being inside the VR or outside of it doesn't matter. The VR exists objectively for everyone. For the person in the VR, their tree would refer to an objective aspect of the world - the computer code of the VR. To say that one is subjective and one isn't is really just talking about making category errors, where those that are making "subjective" statements are making category errors, while those making objective statements aren't.

How could we argue that the world is coloured as we “directly experience” it when science assures us it is not? — apokrisis

So, going back to my question, which you avoided (yet again), is our experience part of the world, and if so, then isn't color part of the world?

Even the powerful mind that created the VR would still use it's language to refer to the objects in the VR, just as computer programmers and computer users use their language to refer to the objects in a 3D computer game.

Beauty is a feeling, which is a real property of you when looking at the painting. Rectangular is a shape, which is a real property of the painting. I doesn't get much simpler than that.

Not, it's not that. Nowadays, most people simply assume that evolutionary biology explains everything about humans, so to question that then leads to a whole series of other arguments. So if you assume the neo-darwinian view (which I think you do), responding to that is a completely different question to the questions in this thread. — Wayfarer

I'm not assuming anything when I ask the question, "What form does our linguistic abilities take prior to learning a language?".

You were the one that said this in this thread:

However humans have linguistic and rational abilities that animals don’t - they’re born with that, as per Chomsky’s ‘universal grammar’. — Wayfarer

I'm simply asking a question about what you said. If you can't answer it, then I guess your statement isn't anything more than word art. To say, "They are born with that." seem to imply that our linguistic abilities only take shape once we are born. Doesn't that assume neo-darwinism? What is it about being born - about moving from inside the womb to outside of it that gives us our linguistic abilities?

Did you notice the thread title or read the OP? — apokrisis

So, what are you saying, Apo - that you're just another sheep following the herd?

Your experience is your world, no? — apokrisis

If solipsism were the case, then "my experience" would be the world, or there would simply be the world, and to say that there would be an experience of it by me, would be incoherent.

If solipsism isn't the case, then there is the world and my experience of it, along with your experience of it, and everyone else's. If solipsism weren't the case, then there wouldn't be anything incoherent about using the terms, "my", "experience", etc., as that would be referring to real things, that are part of the whole world, which includes all experiences, like yours and not just mine.

If solipsism isn't the case, then there is only one world, and many experiences of that world.

If solipsism is the case, then there is only one world, and no experiences of it.

Still using those "direct" and "indirect" terms - as if they really mean anything, Apo?

How could we argue that the world is coloured as we “directly experience” it when science assures us it is not? — apokrisis

Your experience is part of the world, no?

thanks to the way we are "designed". — Harry Hindu


According to neo-darwinian materialism - which is why I mentioned Coyne. — Wayfarer

If you have a better explanation, I'm here to be persuaded, but it doesn't seem like you have a better explanation. You're only "argument" is "That's neo-darwinism and I don't like that." - as if labeling some explanation as "neo-darwinian" and that you don't like it, automatically disqualifies it.

I asked what form our language abilities take prior to us learning a language, and you missed that opportunity to persuade me. You just don't seem to have the stamina to support your ideas, nor the open-mind to question your own premises.

So, "subjective" doesn't really exist, except as a means of relaying objective information, like your emotional state. — Harry Hindu

I honestly don't see a difference between your definition and mine. Regardless, under this definition, it is coherent to use the word 'subjective' when describing a statement such as "this painting is beautiful". — Samuel Lacrampe

No, it isn't. That is the problem you still don't understand. I said that "subjective" doesn't really exist, so it would be incoherent to use the term at all. It would be more accurate to say that it is "misspeaking", not "subjective". The painting isn't really beautiful. You have a feeling of a beautiful painting. You're not speaking subjectively. You're simply misspeaking.

If, by saying, "This painting is beautiful.", you mean that you have a feeling of beauty when looking at the painting, then you are speaking objectively, not subjectively.

If, by saying, "This painting is beautiful.", you mean that the painting is actually beautiful, or has feelings itself that can be described as "beautiful". Then you are simply misspeaking, not speaking subjectively, because paintings don't have feelings.

But surely, you see a distinction between the two previously stated sentences A and B, do you not? That A is related to the subject's feelings (what I call subjective), and B is related to the object. — Samuel Lacrampe

A. When testing two different paintings, some subjects will observe painting (1) to be more beautiful than painting (2), and some will observe the opposite. Since there is no agreement in the order of degree of beauty, this means that beauty is subjective. — Samuel Lacrampe

No. This means beauty is a feeling. Stop using the term, "subjective".

B. When testing two paintings of different shapes (not just size), a large majority of subjects will observe one painting (say painting (1)) to be more rectangular than the other, while the minority (likely blind) will not see a difference; but no one would observe painting (2) to be more rectangular than (1). Since there is an agreement in the order of degree of 'rectangular', (at least no opposite order is observed), this means that 'rectangular' is objective. Thoughts? — Samuel Lacrampe

Agreement has nothing to do with it. People can agree on things that are just wrong. People agreed that the Earth was flat. Is the Earth flat, or does it only seem that way from our perspective? Is the Earth objectively flat, subjectively flat, or is it our perception of the world is flat?

Right. That is simply the empiricist argument - that all knowledge comes from experience. However humans have linguistic and rational abilities that animals don’t - they’re born with that, as per Chomsky’s ‘universal grammar’. — Wayfarer

Right. Thanks to the differences in our brains - thanks to the way we are "designed".

I'd like to know the form our linguistic abilities take prior to having learned any language.

Yes, that is all correct. So subjective means a feeling in the subject when observing the object. And the feeling is itself objective to the subject. — Samuel Lacrampe

No. You seem to be having a problem reading and replying to my posts without putting words I didn't say in my mouth.

I said that what is "subjective" (the word is in quotes because it's just a placeholder that we don't really need) is when you use language in such a way as to associate a feeling with things that don't have feelings in order to relay information about your state in the most efficient means possible, which includes using shortcuts in our language. So, "subjective" doesn't really exist, except as a means of relaying objective information, like your emotional state.

Of course numbers have a causal effect on things. Take for instance the numbers in a recipe. If the recipe calls for 1 teaspoon of cayenne pepper and you put 10, the food will give the consumers a serious case of heart burn, not to mention mouth-burn. — Harry Hindu

In such cases, numbers are causally efficient only because human agents act on the basis of an instruction. The fact that numbers are able to influence human behaviour, is because humans are rational agents. — Wayfarer

But not only because we are rational agents, but also because we have senses that take in information about the world, one of which is numbers. How could you know anything about numbers, what they mean, or how to use them, without having first acquired that information at some point in the past? Numbers take the shape of squiggles on a sheet of paper and sounds in the air which have to be seen and heard in order to associate them with other things that aren't squiggles and sounds, but are the ideas those squiggles and sounds generate in the mind, which then influence behavior. This is why I don't get the division between the rationalists and empiricists. In order to be rational, your rationality has to take some form and the form it takes is the forms of our sensory perceptions.

The significance of something being 'real but not physical', is that if there are things which are real but not physical, then physicalism is false. As physicalism is the de facto philosophical attitude of today's secular intelligentsia, then this is significant. — Wayfarer

I didn't ask about the implications of your statement. I asked what it meant. I asked you why you used to the term, "physical", as it isn't necessary. All we need to do is talk about causation.

If there is some thing that is real, but not physical, that doesn't necessarily mean that there aren't also real things that are physical. The problem then becomes in explaining how these different real things interact. Maybe the problem lies in the making the distinction in the first place. If a physicalist says, "Everything in here is made of the same stuff as out there.", and an idealist says, "Everything out there is made of the same stuff as in here.", it seems to me that they are both saying the same thing. Again, it comes down to causation - the relationship between things "in here" and things "out there".

And, numbers don’t cause anything. Not unless, say, you walked under a clock-tower at the precise time the numeral 7 fell off the clock-face and landed on your head. But, facetiousness aside, the ontological question concerning number is not whether numbers are materially efficient; I don't see how they can be. The question is about whether they're real and not simply the products of brains, as we are inclined to think. — Wayfarer

Of course numbers have a causal effect on things. Take for instance the numbers in a recipe. If the recipe calls for 1 teaspoon of cayenne pepper and you put 10, the food will give the consumers a serious case of heart burn, not to mention mouth-burn. Numbers influence our behavior just as much as any word, law, or thunderstorm does.

Then what you are saying is that being "subjective" is misspeaking, or not meaning your words to be taken literally.

If beauty is a feeling then it would be wrong to to use language in a way that implies that the painting has feelings, rather than the human being speaking those words. If, by making this string of sounds, "That painting is beautiful." emanate from your mouth, you actually mean that you feel that the painting is beautiful, and you expect others to understand that is what you mean, then you are simply using shortcuts in your language use to relay your intent to others. In other words, you don't mean your words literally. The only difference between "subjective" and "objective" would be the difference in your use of words by using shortcuts to relay what you really mean, which is always objective (being about reality).

And I maintain that number is real, but not physical. — Wayfarer

You keep making statements that are confusing (and then don't have the stamina to back them up). What does it mean for something to be real but not "physical"? Why use that term, "physical", anyway? Numbers are real because they have an effect on other things, including on what many call "physical" and "mental". So it seems that numbers would either be both "physical" AND "mental", or we should just dispense with these two terms and talk about causation.

Mainly, it means that philosophy is primarily concerned with a ‘metaphysic of value’ - some factual basis for values and meaning. Science doesn’t provide any such basis, as it is concerned with what is measurable, with objective fact. This is what underlies the ‘is-ought’ distinction that Hume is associated with. — Wayfarer

How do you go about determining the factual basis for values and meaning without measurements of values and meaning?

It seems to me that you are concerned with objective facts as you are attempting to make objective statements about values and meaning.

To answer you question directly, I too think 'beauty' is just a feeling. That is a consequence of it being subjective (which we assumed). This also means that nothing has beauty in itself, as it is always a feeling within the subject when observing the object. And if nothing has beauty in itself, then it is never an objective property. — Samuel Lacrampe

You agree that beauty is a feeling about something and that "subjects" only have feelings, so why say that nothing has beauty in itself? If beauty is a feeling and can only be attributed to subjects, then the subject has beauty in itself, no? It would be an objective property of the subject, as I've been trying to show you. It is an objective property of you, not me, as I don't have that feeling when looking at the painting.

What you seem to be saying is that we are mispeaking, or making a category error, when we say that some thing, other than the subject, is beautiful. When someone says, "that painting is beautiful", do you take them to actually mean that the painting is beautiful, or to mean that the person making that statement has a particular feeling that arises when looking at the painting? If by saying, "That painting is beautiful.", we are really saying something about ourselves, or more specifically saying something about a relationship between the painting and us, then we are making an objective claim.

My question for you is, do you know of a way to find if a property is objective or subjective? — Samuel Lacrampe

Nothing is subjective. Everything is objective. Look at creatvesoul's post for example.

The subjective/objective dichotomy is inherently incapable of taking account of that which requires, consists in/of, and/or is existentially contingent upon both a subject/agent and something other than the subject/agent.

Truth. Meaning. Thought. Belief. All of these things require, consist in/of, and/or are existentially contingent upon both, a subject/agent and something other than the subject/agent.

Everything ever thought, believed, spoken and/or written comes through a subject. Strictly speaking, nothing ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or written is objective. That doesn't mean that everything is subjective. It means that the objective/subjective dichotomy is fraught. Best to abandon it altogether... — creativesoul


Worth repeating... — creativesoul

Creativesoul makes all these claims about how reality is. Creativesoul is attempting to make truth statements about the world. Creativesoul is telling us how the world really is and works. Creativesoul contradicts himself when he says that "Strictly speaking, nothing ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or written is objective." Is this an objective statement about everything every thought and belief, spoken or written? Of course it is. Does creativesoul want us to believe this is a statement about reality, or the "reality" in his head? He seems to want to tell us how the world is and at the same time tell us that his post is subjective. If it is subjective, then he's not telling us how the world really is, only how he feels that it is.

When attempting to explain the world, are we attempting to get at the way the world really is, or how we feel it is? Even if it is about how we feel, we are still making an objective statement about the relationship between us and the world.

Creativesoul even says his post is worth repeating. Is it really worth repeating, or is it that only Creativesoul feels it is worth repeating? And even if it is only that Creativesoul feels that it should be repeated, that is an objective statement, "Creativesouls feels that his post should be repeated." because we are making a claim about reality itself, which Creativesoul and his feelings and inclinations are a part of.

Actually, Harry Hindu, the reason I ignored your comments is because of your dismissive attitude - 'the question is nonsense' - and your (I'm sorry to say) obvious lack of understanding of anything beyond pop science. It's not rudeness, but life being too short. — Wayfarer

No. You wanted to have a discussion about Jerry Coyne, remember? You wanted to focus on a small sentence that wasn't even that important in my post, remember? And I told you that I'm not being dismissive - that I have done a 180 on my worldview before and that I can do so again if the explanation and answer to my questions are reasonable. You seem to think that I should accept an unreasonable question. You do believe that there are such things as nonsensical questions, don't you? If I said that a question is nonsense, then make an attempt to clarify, or tell me why it's not nonsense. When I've seen you "waste your time" with others who are actually thick-headed, I know that your complaint against me here isn't actually true. You just don't have the answers to the difficult questions that you should be asking yourself.

The difference between philosophy and science is a philosophical distinction. — Wayfarer

What does that even mean? No, I'm not being dismissive. I'm asking a question that, if you have a legitimate, reasonable, answer to, then I can be swayed to see your side of things. So, instead of getting frustrated at difficult questions, that you should be asking yourself, try to answer them because it will do you as much good as it would for me.

By projecting beauty onto the painting, I just mean that I, the subject, get a sensation or feeling of beauty when observing the painting, which is also what you mean I think; I don't mean any physical projections.

Also, what is beauty? Besides being what you call, "subjective", what is beauty? Is it not a feeling? Isn't it a feeling you get when looking at the painting, and not a projection (because that doesn't make any sense)? And in this case, the feeling would be attributed only to you. You are an object, no? — Harry Hindu

This is the part where I claim you are making an error. Yes, my feeling of beauty is a property of me, and is therefore objective. But no, 'beauty' is not a property of me, as it is only a feeling I get when observing the painting, and neither is it a property of the painting. It is therefore subjective.

Let me put the same point in a different way. Consider the following two statements:

(1) "This painting is rectangular."
(2) "This painting is beautiful."

Statement (1) is objective because 'rectangular' is attributed to the object, which is the painting. Statement (1) is not objective because 'beauty' is not attributed to the object. It is therefore subjective.

I hope this clarifies things. — Samuel Lacrampe

The last part seems to be making a distinction between your feeling and beauty itself, as if beauty were more than a feeling. I asked you what beauty was, besides being subjective (because that would be circular), and you came back with, "It's subjective". You're simply running in circles. If it's more than just a feeling, then what is it?

And they bash certain scientists for being dismissive of philosophy. The hypocrisy!

What these extremists in "both camps" don't realize is that philosophy is a science.

It's funny to see them ignore our comments, Galuchat, while they continue to go round and round - never getting at what information actually is. Hmmmph. "Philosophers".

You are making an error. To say "the painting is beautiful" is not the same as to say "I feel the painting is beautiful". In the first statement, the object is 'painting', and the property is 'beautiful'. In the second statement, the object is 'I', and the property is 'feeling the painting to be beautiful'. In the first statement, 'beautiful' is subjective, because it is only a projection of my feeling and not a property of the painting in itself; where as in the second statement, 'feeling the painting to be beautiful' is objective, because it is a property of me at that moment.

To put this finding in general terms, properties such as 'beauty' is always subjective, where as properties such as 'feeling of x' is always objective. The trick is to remember that 'beauty' is not the same property as 'feeling of beauty'. — Samuel Lacrampe

No, it is you that is making the error because you are putting words in my mouth. I never said that you feel the painting is beautiful, I said that you think the painting is beautiful. I never mentioned the word "projection" either. You did.

What does it mean to "project" beauty onto the painting - as if beauty is a ray of light that emanates from you and onto the painting? If beauty were a projection, wouldn't that make it objective? I don't see beauty as something that is projected. If it were, then beauty would have a causal effect on the painting itself when projected onto it. I don't see anything projecting from you and onto the painting. You're "projection" is a misconception.

Also, what is beauty? Besides being what you call, "subjective", what is beauty? Is it not a feeling? Isn't it a feeling you get when looking at the painting, and not a projection (because that doesn't make any sense)? And in this case, the feeling would be attributed only to you.

You are an object, no? A human being is an object last I checked - something that can be interacted with physically.

It's easy make the distinction of life and non-life when talking about a giraffe and a cup. But what about when talking about a virus, or the beginnings of life that scientists theorize about that were simply self-replicating molecules? Is a DNA molecule alive? What about a liver in a jar?

I see your point, Mr. Hindu. Let me try again to describe the difference between an objective and subjective property. A property is objective if it is attributed to the object. So far so good. But, a property is subjective, not if it is attributed to the subject, (for as you say, this is still objective towards the subject), but if it is projected by the subject onto the object. This sounds complicated, so here is an example.

I observe a painting and say "this painting is beautiful". We know this property 'beauty' is not objective because many other subjects will disagree. So 'beauty' is not a property of the painting in itself. It is also not a property of me, because my expression of 'beauty' was never about me; only about the painting. Rather, this property is a projection of my feeling of beauty onto the painting. It is therefore subjective. — Samuel Lacrampe

But this doesn't go against what I said. I said that we can make distinctions between subjects, just as we can make distinctions between objects. The distinction in your example is that you think the painting is beautiful, and I don't. So, we can point to both subjects, as if they are objects, and say that they are different things, just like objects.

It is also an objective statement about reality to say that you find the painting beautiful and I don't. It isn't subjective to say that you find the painting beautiful and I don't. It is a true statement about some state of reality - something that we can both agree on.

You misunderstand me. Stanford eternalism entry says that 1917 say, "exists right now", tempting one to imply that 1917 and 'now' are simultaneous. Eternalism does not assert that. — noAxioms

Ok, I see where I misunderstood.

It seems to me, though, that terms like "now", "then", "before" and "after" become meaningless by eternalism. If time doesn't exist except in our minds, then how would we describe the relationship between 1917 and 2017 outside of our minds? To say that they both exist now, wouldn't make sense, but to just say that they both exist doesn't get at their relationship. After all, we could probably point to events in 1917 that led to events in 2017.

No, not simultaneously. Each moment is its own time (they're not simultaneous any more than each location is the same place). It's just that no particular moment is special any more than any particular location is the one correct 'here'. — noAxioms

Of course there are simultaneously occurring phenomenon. How else do we measure time if not by the simultaneous rotation of the Earth with a movement of the hands of a clock? Sure, they are in their own "time" - which is just relative change, but change is occurring everywhere, simultaneously, but at different rates. We can call this the frequency of change.

According to eternalism, every moment in the universe's history is real and as such exists simultaneously. They all exist on a 4-D structure known as the block universe and are all equally real. Such a theory is considered static due to this fact. There is no such thing as the passage of time.
However, I am having trouble understanding how such a model accommodates our experience. To be clear though, I am not referring to an experience of time as passing in a world that isn't; that is another issue for another topic. Instead, I am talking about the fact that currently, I have the subjective experience of this particular moment of asking this question. — Alec

Our minds have their own "time", as noAxioms put it. I would say that things, including our minds, have their own frequency of change. Time is simply an arbitrary measurement of change.

Our minds process the information of the world at certain rate, or frequency, that is change at a different rate, than the change that occurs around us. This means that some things appear to change so fast as to be a blur (change faster than our minds do) or change so slow as to appear to be solid, stable objects (change slower than our minds do). So the speed at which other processes of nature change is relative to our processing of it. Because our minds are part of the universe itself and change at a particular frequency, just like everything else, that is relative to the other natural processes, we end up stretching the causal relationships into what we know as space and time.

How does a conversation have any causal influence on behavior, or on one's self image?

In theory here are the criteria: a property is objective if it is attributed to the object; and subjective if it is attributed to the subject. In practice, I don't know of any way other than my relative-objective test. Maybe my test is flawed, but there is no denying that some properties are attributed to the objects and some properties are attributed to the subjects. Again, if in reality the earth is round, then 'being round' is an objective property of the earth. — Samuel Lacrampe

Subjects are just other objects. Just as we can describe the differences between objects based on their attributes and properties, we can also make distinctions between subjects based on their attributes and properties. We also refer to subjects as if they were objects.

If there is a difference between a subject and an object, then what is it, without going in circles?

you seem to be confused by the cause of red being seen in different objects. For apples, it is an indicator of ripeness but not so for cars and post boxes.

Of course. The only question is whether the state of mind is being caused directly or indirectly. — apokrisis

Again, "direct" and "indirect" are meaningless, especially if it's models all the way down.

Colour experience alone shows that conciousness is mediated Interpretation. We don’t see light as it is, but light as our neurology symbolises it.

Colour constancy rams this point home. Any interpretation is relative to some judgement we are making about how some colour would look under more ideal lighting conditions.

Perception is so indirect we can experience colour as stable properties belonging to object surfaces. Which is thus both a truth and not the actual information reaching our eyes.

It is the same as distance correction. Things far away are seen as being of normal size, far away. Which is true, but not the truth of the information hitting the backs of our eyes.

All perception relies on interpretation, so is not direct but mediated by our beliefs. That sugar tastes sweet and roses are red show just how unreal our resulting reality is. We impute a useful sensory image to create a structure of experience that certainly corresponds to the world in a reliable way. It gets us around this reality, as a map symbolises a territory. But being mediated via symbols - qualia - it is not direct. — apokrisis

That's weird because I have no conscious effort, or will, to mediate my colors. Color constancy is a process that is UNconscious (unintentional) with it's EFFECTS appearing in consciousness.

Color constancy is something that helps us identify objects in different lighting conditions. Using light as a source of information about your environment has it's pros and it's cons. Mirages and camouflage are some cons, as well as not being able to get consistent information about an object in different lighting conditions. It seems that natural selection found a solution in color constancy.

So, what color constancy actually does is prove my point, not yours. It shows that we are still getting at the real property of an object, which is the apple's ripeness or rotteness, not the light, which changes, and isn't the important information you're trying to get at. Do you want to know the state of the apple, or the state of the light?

The fact that you can tell me about color constancy and that the color we see isn't the same as the wavelength of light, which means that you actually do know the wavelength of light compared to the state of the apple and the color we see, then tell me again how you don't have direct knowledge of all these relationships?

Computers are designed to perform many different functions - from creating a document and printing it, to surfing the internet, to playing 3D games. This wide range of things that computers do doesn't mean that they are free to do something they weren't designed to do, like fly off your desk and make you breakfast. — Harry Hindu

Think. Universal Turing computation. — apokrisis

Think. Can a Universal Turing computer fly off the desk and make you breakfast?

Physics certainly constrains biology. But what then isn't constrained is by definition free to happen. And this freedom is what demands further modelling.

In fact, this freedom is something we have begun to generalise by talking about computation, information, negentropy, modelling relations, semiosis, etc. — apokrisis

That isn't freedom. Computers are designed to perform many different functions - from creating a document and printing it, to surfing the internet, to playing 3D games. This wide range of things that computers do doesn't mean that they are free to do something they weren't designed to do, like fly off your desk and make you breakfast.

I thought I already did in the last post. I also thought I said that we can dispense with the terms, "direct: and "indirect" as they are meaningless.

If colour constancy is a model, then there must be some causal relationship with the model and what caused it. If not, then how can you say that what is happening has anything to do with, or carries information about, something else - like the experience of color having to do with the state of something else? How did colour constancy arise? What evolutionary problems did it solve? These are the questions you should be asking.