What do you believe the difference is between irrational and evil? — praxis

"Irrational" has a definition that is more widely accepted than "evil".

Irrational is defined as not logical.

Evil is often defined as profoundly immoral. But then what is immoral? - as what is immoral for one group of humans, is moral for another. So, what is moral is the way you are expected to behave within a group of humans, and any other behavior would have a degree of immorality associated with it, on up to profoundly immoral acts being labeled, "evil".

So, acts that are irrational don't necessarily mean that they are also evil. Only if the irrational act has a degree of immorality to it, or hinders an individual or the group's goals in some drastic way, is it also evil.

I am not saying we should force the prevention of procreation. It is simply an argument that one can agree or disagree with. I liken it to vegans who advocate for their cause but do not ram it down people's throats or force it into law or anything like that. — schopenhauer1

Well, what does it mean to advocate if not to make others believe as you do?

Also, as I've stated earlier, I don't see the issues of procreation simply as an ethical credo but as a way to understand what we are doing here in the first place. So it is more of a jumping off point for seeing a certain aesthetic understanding of the human condition. What are we doing here day after day after day? — schopenhauer1

That's ironic. The very thing that you want to eliminate would be the answer to your question of "What are we doing here day after day after day?". We are here to procreate, and I don't mean that in simply passing down one's own genes. We are all here - even those that don't have any kids themselves - to ensure the next generation can run things in our absence and then pass the torch down to each following generation. We all share genes from the same gene pool and each do our own job in ensuring in some way that the next generation is able to keep things running (childless teachers and coaches, couples who can't have kids that adopt, gays that adopt, etc.).

I already stated the usual suspects of what people use to justify why existence is in a way "necessary" or "justified" for a new human, but really human existence is a lot of needs and wants (for survival and boredom's sake) in a cultural context. There is an instrumental nature to existence, an absurd repetitiousness, and the need to overcome burdens and challenges seems a bit trite and pat to be an appropriate answer for why people need to be born to experience the challenges in the first place. Something needs to exist to overcome challenges to feel good for overcoming them when nothing needed to exist at all, though glib-sounding, still has to be grappled with. I believe the answer to that conundrum is trickier than most people believe at first reflexive response. — schopenhauer1

I don't get that part that's underlined. I can't attempt to answer a point that I don't understand.

If science really is the asymptote of truth—an asymptote being a curve that gets infinitly closer to a line but never ever touches it ; the idea is often atributed to Victor Hugo—what would the equivalent analogy be for philosophy related to truth ? — Nuncaltussum

It would also be the asymptote of truth. To say otherwise would be saying that philosophy doesn't attempt to create explanations that are consistent with the way the world is. Philosophy is a science. You cannot have conflicting answers in different domains of investigation. Everything must be integrated. In doing so, you make philosophy a science.

I agree that the goal of wanting to be healthy can cause the negative value about eating the donut. But where does the goal of "wanting to experience the taste of donuts" come from? — Samuel Lacrampe

The goal of wanting to experience the taste of donuts comes from the stored experience of eating a donut and you enjoying it. We all seek to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid unpleasant ones. That is the ultimate goal from which all other sub-goals are derived.

Just because I like the taste of donuts, it does not follow that I have a goal associated to it, does it? One does not control their taste buds like they can control their hands. Maybe with time and perseverance, we may be able to change our habits and modify our subjective preferences, but it can't happen by mere will power. — Samuel Lacrampe

Like I said, you can be full but still like the taste of donuts. Again, we are simply talking about a conflict of goals - you being full and you liking the taste of donuts. You being full doesn't make the donut taste bad, it still tastes good, which is why you have a conflict of goals. If the donut tastes bad when you are full, then you wouldn't have a conflict.

This sounds ad hoc. You could do this for any type of good: goodness in taste is tasty or delicious; goodness at a task is skilled; goodness of a song is pleasurable, and so on. I will resist the temptation to ask for a definition of 'goodness'... Instead, let's just agree that we all have an implicit knowledge of what goodness means. With that, let's consider the following dialogue.

Person P1: "I don't want to eat this food because it does not taste good."
Person P2: "You should still eat it because it is good for you".

Both persons are using the word 'good'. P1 uses it to mean taste, and P2 uses it to mean health. — Samuel Lacrampe

If both persons are using the word "good" to mean taste and health, then their sentences wouldn't make any sense as they would be:
Person P1: "I don't want to eat this food because it does not good good."
Person P2: "You should still eat it because it is good for you[r] [good]".

I don't agree that we all have an implicit knowledge of what goodness means. That is why I defined it as what is helpful to one's goals. If we all have an implicit knowledge of what goodness means, then it should be really easy to define and everyone will agree on the definition.

So the same can be said about arguments on the limits of ethics- abortion, eating animals or animal by-products, assisted suicide, etc. These are things which are also argued about, but somehow are considered legitimate topics of consideration, why would procreation not also be in this category of a legitimate moral argument as the other things mentioned? Why is this one off limits but others not? Again, this is another way to shut down any thought on it before it enters the world of debate to begin with. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. There is no objective moral law or ethical code. Ethics and morality are subjective. What is good or bad is what is helpful or harmful in achieving one's goals.This is why I don't engage in many ethical discussions - because I realize that there are no real answers to those questions other than what is helpful or harmful to one's goals.

It seems to me that the ultimate question you are asking is: Should schopenhauer1 have the right to prevent others from having kids simply because his life is full of suffering? Well, should you? I consider the question of rights and who has more rights than someone else a question with an objective answer that doesn't have to do with ethics. Who has more rights than anyone else? My answer is no one. We all have equal rights, which means you don't have the right to tell me how to live my life, nor do you have the right to prevent others from having a life, because yours is bad.

Whenever someone brings up the idea of questioning whether existence itself should be continued for future people, a common response is that it is a juvenile topic. This is meant to disparage the inquirer by making them think that their question is not worthy for serious consideration. These are things that youth ask who are not initiated into society's "real" problems. Thus, anyone who retains this line of questioning must never have progressed beyond this stage of their life- or so the implication is supposed to be. Instead, the fully functioning adult is too immersed in the details of the world. The more detail regarding a particular matter (whether at work or entertainment), means the the less likely "larger" existential questions arise. — schopenhauer1

I don't think anyone has a problem in you making a personal decision to not have any kids. Where the problem arises and where people tend to question your motive is when you show that you believe that you should have the right to stop everyone from having kids because YOU think live isn't worth living, or is a sham. For others, life is worth living and worth bringing in others to share it. Whose to say that you are right and they are wrong and that you get to determine their choices in having kids or not? Doesn't it really come down to the kind of life each individual lives with some having more suffering than others, and where some individuals are incapable of coping with reality? There is no objective rule or law that says life really is or isn't worth living. It is up to the individual. So I don't see a point in continuing this conversation, or why you keep bringing it up. If you have made that decision, then good for you. It is obvious that others disagree.

How are we to know that these are just effective deceptions or misdirections that sophisticated societies have used to disarm the existential question-asker from engaging in questions that would lead to despair? It could be a useful meme that has effectively shifted people's questions away from existence itself so that they forget it as a topic of legitimacy and focus on details so that society can keep on moving forward without leading to feelings of angst. — schopenhauer1

That is what I have found religion to be, not working at my job.

Assuming what you say is true, it still does not follow that all that is subjectively good is necessarily a value statement. Let's say I like the taste of donuts, so their taste is, to me, good. But because of health reasons, I have a negative value about eating donuts. Well this does not change the fact that they taste good to me. So a negative value is compatible with a subjective good. — Samuel Lacrampe

I mentioned conflicting goals earlier. This is an example of that. You have two conflicting goals. One is that you want to experience the taste of donuts, the other goal is that you want to live a long time. The taste of donuts is good, however the impact on your health is bad, so not eating the donuts would be good, but then so is the taste. What should you do? Which goal will win out?

I agree. Now, in your last statement, the object is 'one', and the property is 'good or bad health', or 'health that is beneficial or a hindrance to their survival'. The property is linked to the object; therefore 'goodness of health' is objective. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think it would be more accurate and simpler to use the terms, "healthy" and "unhealthy" rather than "good health" and "bad health", as that is what you objectively mean by using the terms "good health" and "bad health". Being in good health is bad if you intend to commit suicide, or if you intend to follow through on a hunger strike.

Could we generalize that all that is considered good is a value? What if I said "I find this food to taste good, and yet I do not value taste"? I don't see anything contradictory in that statement, and it would imply that not all that we find good is a value statement. It seems to me that we consciously choose our values, but we don't necessarily consciously choose what tastes good to us. — Samuel Lacrampe

As I said, if something is good, it helps you achieve your goal. Your goal would be to seek pleasurable experiences and the food's taste does just that. This is why some people turn to food in order to alleviate stress. Feeling good, rather than feeling bad or stressed is a goal that every human has. It's just that different things make different people feel good. You eating good food and me listening to good music are two different actions but achieve the same goal for each of us - providing stress relief.

I disagree when it comes to two values, which I claim are objective: health, and morality. The second one may be harder to prove, so I will focus on the first one for now.

What is good in terms of health is objective. I am sure there is a standard criteria in evaluating if a living cell is healthy or not. And so, using the relative-objective test, every subject observing two cells of different health state would agree on which cell is the healthiest. Furthermore, if health was only a matter of opinion, then there would no health practitioners to tell us what is healthy for us. — Samuel Lacrampe

Being healthy is a sub-goal of survival. To say that one has good or bad health is to say that their health is beneficial or a hindrance to their survival.

It is the world I find myself in. I qualified if you could get away with it. This question was posed in the republic I believe it was (one of Plato's dialogues), one of the discussants suggests that if one were to find a ring that made one invisible, and one could get away with whatever they wanted while maintaining their reputation, then it is desirable to do so, and most people would do so. If morality is just prudence, then it indeed is for the weak and incompetent. — Wosret

Invisible rings don't protect you from infrared cameras, don't provide alibis, and can be found during search warrants.

Would things change if everyone had invisible rings?

Truth is the degree by which one's hypotheses and theories about the world actually represent the way the world is. This is why, as the OP states, the improved survival of an organism correlates with the degree of truth it has about the world and would be something natural selection would promote. The more accurate your perceptions of the world, the better you are able to survive in it - to the point of becoming a species that manipulates it's environment unlike any other species before.

Why shouldn't I just take everything I want from everyone in every moment? — Wosret

Consequences. Someone will beat you to a pulp or call the police eventually. Taking everything you want from everyone is fine in a world of pacifists, but that isn't the world you find yourself in, is it?

Both of you have switched examples of what it was we were talking about. Don't move the goal posts.

The first example was, "This food is good.". The point I was trying to make with this is that IF the person were referring to their mental state rather than some state of the food, then they would probably want to make that clear in communication because, as you pointed out, most people use shortcuts to communicate and most of believe that what is good for one may be good for others, and that may cause them to try it.

Some people might say that you're stating a personal preference, or making a value statement, because they also know that others might disagree. What you say isn't literally true.

In the example, "The flower is white", we're referring to an actual state of the flower in it's capacity to reflect all wavelengths of visible light. Seeing white is acquiring some knowledge the flower. The flower really isn't white. It reflects all wavelengths of visible light, and that reflected light's interaction with our eyes and brain causes us to see white. White is a representation of that property the flower has, and provides information about the flower.

I think that everyone that can see can see the color white, even color blind people, compared to the number of people who may find that "this food is good". Everyone that looks at the flower will see it as white which tells us something about the flower.

The color could also mean that they are ripe for eating, which explains why natural selection would promote the ability to make distinctions in certain states of food sources by means of color representation. It improved the ability of animals to use their energy more efficiently in consuming those food sources by targeting those that had the best nutritional value by the distinction in their color. In this case, the flower would also taste good to most members of its species as well.

If we are talking about one's projection of one's own experiences onto the flower that isn't a property of the flower, but a property of one's mental state and history, then we aren't making objective statements about the object, rather we'd be making objective statements about one's mental state and history projected onto the object.

So, to say that something is "the color white", is to say something about the object. To say that something is "good" is to make a value statement. That same food that is good will turn to bad if you are force fed enough of it.

"Good" and "bad" are value statements and are related to our goals. What is "good" or "bad" is what is helpful or harmful to our goals. Because we are individuals we can have different goals that sometimes come into conflict. Because we are members of the same species, we can often have shared goals where we work together for a common goal. Morality is the one thing that I can think of that isn't objective. There is no objective good and bad - only goals and what is helpful and harmful to achieving them.

To sum up, it is imperative to clearly identify who or what is the subject, object, and property for any given context. Once this is done, the paradox is resolved. — Samuel Lacrampe

Exactly. Once we switch to speaking objectively, we switch to stating truths about the way things are - the way reality actually is. The subject is an object, state-of-affairs, or an aspect of reality, that we talk about and have an expectation of truth associated with what we are talking about.

Truth is not a criteria to determine if a property is linked to the object or subject. "Yellow is the best colour" is indubitably subjective, for how could there be an objectively best colour? Yet this statement is true to the speaker. — Samuel Lacrampe

Only if the speaker is a solipsist and doesn't believe in other minds who think, "Blue is the best colour", or "Green is the best colour". How can the speaker hold opposing view points and still consider one as "true". One is simply making a value statement, not a truth statement.

If subject 1 says "this food tastes good", and subject 2 says "this food tastes bad", both are giving true information. But truth cannot contradict truth. Therefore the truth in both statements cannot be about the object, which is the same in both statements; and must be about the subjects, which differ in both statements. — Samuel Lacrampe

Then I don't get why they'd say "This food tastes good", as opposed to "My mental state is this food tasting good." Both are true, and objective.

So meaning and value is imposed on the world? Sounds Humean. :-|

Look, my view is inspired by McDowell's sensibility theory. — Marty

No. It's Harry Hinduan.

I don't really get this response. Are you disagreeing with the way that I have defined "values" and "meaning"?

It seems that you are committing a genetic fallacy by associating my statements with someone else, who you seem to have a negative view of, and who I've never read much about or know much about. My views are my own and I don't read much of other philosophers views, as that would just be more of an influence on my own. I could respond to you post, "Sounds McDowellean :-|", and where would we be in our discussion then?

What is ironic is that these "Pro-Subjective Philosophers" are the ones spouting off quotes of other philosophers. The people on these forums who try to make this clear distinction between the objective and the subjective, where there is none, are the same ones spouting off the quotes of other philosophers, as if they are trying to limit their subjectivity and be more objective in their philosophical view, while at the same time spouting off statements about how things really are, and how reality really is.

In order to get at what we mean by 'subjective', 'real', 'objective', it'll be best if we define these with some clarity, as to get to the notion that by 'objective' we do not mean completely mind-independent, but nor do we mean free-standing values that arise completely within the subject. They are real insofar as they are externally provide content to the subject. They are mind-dependent as far as they can only be real to subjects witnessing them, but nonetheless, they are real. — Marty

See what I mean? I don't really get what you're saying here or what it has to do with answering a simple question,

I don't see why you'd need to know what kind of cause it is when all causes can lead to effects in other areas. If some physical cause can lead to an effect in the mental and vice versa, then why is it useful to separate these things into different substances? — Harry Hindu

It seems like mere scientism to presuppose that the only qualities that can exist are ones that're material things (and suggest only primary qualities are real - you'll have to provide proof). It also seems to advocate that the only things that are real are things that exist mind-independently, but this seems misguided. Minds themselves are real, and don't of course exist mind-independently. Certain beliefs about the world are true, and their form (or idea) is manifest of the world itself. So I'm not sure what the problem is other than you haven't read metaphysics that are sympathetic to alternative views than materialism.

If this isn't something you "get", and you just want to reduce everything down to material properties then you'll run into other problems, I believe. Particularly the issue of agency, meaning, truth - all of which seem immaterial. If you reject them, you'll ulimately run into a reductio ad absurdism. Since in order to believe in materialism, you'll need meaning and truth... I don't mind a form of naturalized Platonism to solve this issue.

I think responding to all your problems won't do much good. Your foundations are unsympathetic to types of philosophy that espouse anything other than the world is a dead object without purpose and meaning. — Marty

What the hell, dude? Are you even reading anything I have said? I consider wasting my time an insult, and offensive. For the umpteenth time, I'm not arguing for "materialism". I've been questioning the very use of the word! - along with "mental", "subjective", "external" vs. "internal", etc.!

I'm not the one making a distinction between the "material" and "mental", or the "external" and the "internal". You are, and you are trying to place me on the opposite side of the fence of you and then bash "my" views by the way of the Straw Man. All along I have been asking a simple question, and asking to you try to avoid using those terms that I have tried to avoid, as they seem be the cause of the very problem itself. Is that beyond your understanding?

But then what is the intention? It seems to be generated by reasons. These reasons are supplied by external content. — Marty

Intentions, goals and reasons are all the same thing. Intentions/Goals/Reasons can be "internal" in that they are predictions and predictions only exist internally. Why is Marty walking down the street? He is intending to get home by 5pm. You arriving at home isn't external, as you could be hit by a bus and killed. It is internal and the cause of your walking.

To be clear though: There is no 'intent' that's subjectively locked away in our minds, that then "changes" by external conditions. Rather, it's constitutive of external content. But when I said that it's not "over-determined" by mechanical/efficient causes, I mean that the relationship we have with values doesn't seem to make use of these causes. I can have external stimuli like a wave push my body, but I still intend to push through them for-the-sake-of, say, a competition because I value winning a competition. — Marty

I don't see how you could choose to push through a wave that isn't pushing you back. If you aren't on the beach in the water with waves pushing you, how could you choose to push through waves? External conditions DO factor in to any kind of decision you make and determine the kinds of choices that pop into your head. If you see your child drowning, there won't be a choice to go buy some ice cream that pops into your head, unless something is just wrong with your mental processes. The choices that will probably come to mind are to jump in and save the child, scream for help, or throw them a life raft. Those choices will be narrowed down as you think about how well you can swim and if there are any life rafts around. Time is also a factor in our decision making. Take to much time in making your decision and your child drowns and the decision is taken out of your hands.

Your explanation seems to be no different than describing two forces, that are the result of separate causes, opposing each other.

The question is: What type of cause is it? I don't see a need to be reductionistic w.r.t causes. — Marty

I don't see why you'd need to know what kind of cause it is when all causes can lead to effects in other areas. If some physical cause can lead to an effect in the mental and vice versa, then why is it useful to separate these things into different substances?

As for these causes "not being needed", I'd just say look at the definitions I'm using. If they are not in conflict with your definitions of mechanism, then we're just using a different scheme. There's no right or wrong there. It's just how we setup our philosophy. — Marty

I didn't say these causes weren't needed. I said the terms weren't needed. Please read more carefully.

Perhaps you lack creativity? Surely the desirability of a cake cannot be something projected on it via introspection; rather the cake is meaningful already, has content to it that attracts me, makes sense of the cake, etc. If we took a Humean view, and the desirability is merely projected, then I think this makes agency problematic. — Marty

Well the cake does have meaning already as it was made by someone else. So in that sense the meaning of the cake is external, because the baker of the cake's meaning and intent in making the cake is external to your mind, if that is what you mean. To say that some thing has meaning independent of human minds is to say that there is intelligent design in nature, or that God's mind gives it meaning. Are you going religious on me?

I don't see why this matters. Yeah, hunger is a casual disposition. It'll serve as a motivation to eat. But hunger alone wont get me to eat a cake. I need reasons to eat a cake, and the reasons are supplied by external content. Certain values. Like the desirability of the cake. — Marty

Reasons that only exist in your head. You can say that the cake is desirable. But then what happens when someone comes along and says that the cake is undesirable? How can you then say that the desirability resides externally? It seems to me that the only good explanation is to say the desirability and undesirability reside in minds, not apart from them.

What I say isn't a claim: the subjective just is the subjective, that's how I am. It's only susceptible to ideas of truth or falsity if it becomes objective in some way. — mcdoodle

Yet another objective statement about some state-of-affairs. "That's how I am" is an objective statement.

Interesting discussion. Here is my take on it. Consider the following statements S1 and S2:

S1: "This food tastes good"
S2: "I enjoy the taste of this food"

For both statements, I am the subject, the message is roughly the same, and both are true. But in S1, the object is 'food', and the property is 'goodness'. In S2, the object is "I", and the property is 'enjoyment'. S1 is subjective because not all subjects will agree that the food is good. S2 is objective because all subjects, upon observing me, would agree that I enjoy the food.

Conclusions: 'Goodness in taste' is a subjective property, not a property of food. 'Enjoyment' is an objective property of the object that is the person experiencing it. — Samuel Lacrampe

"This food tastes good" would refer to a state of affairs where this food actually does taste good, or else how could you even say it and what you say is true? Does the food really taste good for someone, or no? That is doesn't taste good to others is another objective statement. You could clarify and say, "This food tastes good to Samuel" - another objective statement.

You can't ever escape making objective statements whenever you associate truth to your statement. Is it true that the food tastes good to Samuel? Can everyone use that statement to refer to a real state-of-affairs? Yes.

But I'm not testing any theory when I use technology. I'm using the technology for every day purposes, not to test some scientific theory. — Marchesk

This is ignoring all the other goals you accomplish by accomplishing the one goal you have in mind currently. You can accomplish other goals without realizing it while focusing on your primary goal. This is like saying that you walked in order to accomplish the goal of getting home, while ignoring the fact that you are also getting exercise at the same time.

It's also quite possible to have technology that works in absence of any good scientific explanation. Humans tinker a lot and can discover working solutions where we don't know how they work.

And that's largely what we did before modern science. — Marchesk

Well that was the point of my question. There is a difference between working, and working reliably. How do you know that it will continue to work? Test it by using it over and over.

No, not at all. I'm not furthering science when I use my iPhone to text someone about an upcoming sporting event. Nor when I use my bike made of the latest lightweight alloy to get some exercise.

In those cases and many others, I'm just using tools to accomplish some non-scientific goal of mine. — Marchesk

If the scientific theories that the bike and smartphone were wrong, would you still be able to text or get some exercise using these devices?

I didn't say that you are furthering science. I said you are doing science by testing the theory the technology was based on.

Theories are tested to further our understanding of the world. — Marchesk

No. It's the theories/explanations that further our understanding of the world. Testing theories further the reliability, or accuracy of those theories/explanations.

The claim is a statement of fact about the world, not technology. That's the point. Science isn't about making the next great smartphone. It's about explaining the world. — Marchesk

That was considered natural philosophy at the time, and Aristotle came up with explanations. — Marchesk

Do you see your contradiction?

Is science about explaining the world? If "Yes", then Aristotle was doing science by explaining the world.

Is science about testing theories? If "Yes", then don't we do that every time we use technology based on some scientific theory?

No. It makes the use of technology a science. Technology is a tool that science uses for testing scientific theories.

That's not a theory, it's an observation. Observation along isn't science. — Marchesk

It's not an observation, but a prediction based on previous observations. Any good scientific theory makes predictions about what you will find, or what will happen, when you test it. The theory predicts there will termites on your stick when removed from a termite mound. Now test it.

What is the scientific theory that chimpanzees are testing when using sticks to draw termites out of termite mounds?

Or what would our ancestors have been testing? That the ancestral spirit has gifted them with termites to eat? That the goddess causes termites to stick because of the sacrifice last full moon? — Marchesk

The theory being tested is that when a stick is inserted into a termite mound and removed, termites will be on the stick. Now let's test the theory by inserting sticks in to termite mounds and removing them. Every time you do that you are testing that theory.

The claim is a statement of fact about the world, not technology. That's the point. Science isn't about making the next great smartphone. It's about explaining the world. Obviously, science makes heavy use of technology, and vice versa.

But the two aren't the same and it's a mistake to conflate them. — Marchesk

If science is only about explaining the world, then you'd be right. But you've also said in this thread that you are referring to the modern history of science which started with the application of the scientific method, which includes testing theories. Using technology is testing the theory it is based on, and therefore a scientific act.

So, either science started way back when we started explaining the world (any explanation would do, even one that invokes a God and the supernatural), or science started with the advent of the scientific method which includes the testing of theories by others, which includes the use of technology.

For the OP, notice how, ""Science tells us the universe is 13.7 billion years old, not 6,000.", has nothing whatsoever to do with technology (as a statement). — Marchesk

Of course it does. How can you make such a claim without using technology (like telescopes)? And how can you test such a claim without using technology (like telescopes)?

No, unless you want to redefine the word "Science" to mean perception. — Marchesk

Science, as the word is commonly used, implies these things: first, the gathering of knowledge through observation; second, the classification of such knowledge, and through this classification, the elaboration of general ideas or principles. In the familiar definition of Herbert Spencer, science is organized knowledge.

Any time we use technology based on a certain scientific theory, we are testing the theory, which is itself a scientific act. If everyone in your social group is using sticks to draw out termites from a mound, then isn't that testing the scientific observation and the subsequent conclusion that termites attach themselves to sticks when stuck into their mound?

What if I said that I feel a certain way, and someone else disagreed with me? That actually does happen on occasion. Or they disagree with what I claim to believe or not believe. — Marchesk

I'm not sure I understand the question. You can claim to feel a certain way. That would be an objective statement about some state-of-affairs. If someone disagrees with how you feel, then they would also be making an objective claim - that you are wrong. At that point, who is the one making a correct statement, or who's claim is a true representation of reality? At this point do we say there is a state of subjectivity, or a state of disagreement, and what we say is how things really are (that there is a state of disagreement)?

How do we determine which one is right? And once we determine who is right, can we say that it is they that made the objective claim, and the person who is wrong made a subjective claim?

Does this mean that objective claims are true and subjective claims are false? That's how it seems to me. If the only way to determine the degree of objectivity and subjectivity of a claim is to look at the claim and it's relationship with how things actually are, and any claim that mirrors how things actually are is objective, while subjective claims are how things are skewed to appear through the lenses of our emotions, needs and wants, then it seems to me that objective claims are the most useful and meaningful, while subjective claims aren't because we don't really know the degree of truth associated with subjective claims. As a matter of fact, to say that there is subjectivity is to say that there is a skewing of perception from how things actually are - that there is a lesser degree of certainty in subjective claims than there are in making objective claims.

If you aspire to be a believer then you have to accept that your finite intellect will never be able to understand the ways of an infinte intentionailty. IF you deny infinite intentionality then you are left with Spinoza's God.
If you are not satisfied with Spinoza's God then just be an atheist. What's the problem? — Janus

How can one with a finite intellect ever hope to possess free will? If what we know is limited, then our choices will be limited. The existence of God, an omniscient being, defies the existence of free will. Why would such a being limit our intellect and then expect us to make intelligent decisions?

What does "infinite intentionality" even mean?

Not sure. You do raise an interesting question. Someone who's committed to radical subjectivism would deny that you're making a statement about state-of-affairs. — Marchesk

What else could they be making a statement about? Any claim of how things are, or a statement made that is implied to have some truth to it, would be an objective claim.

Not sure wha the Kantians would say. The state-of-affairs would be our shared conceptual apparatus for them. I'll have to think about it. Landru comes to mind with these sorts of discussions (not Kantian but anti-realist). — Marchesk

"The state-of-affairs would be our shared conceptual apparatus." is an objective statement about reality, or some state-of-affairs, or the way things are. It seems to me that you can't escape making objective claims anytime you refer to some state-of-affairs or how things are.

It seems to me that objectivity precedes subjectivity, or that the objective is a prerequisite for the subjective.

Take this statement that you made:

How about color? Humans can generally get consensus on colors, with some notable exceptions. But does that make the colors we see objective? Or are they dependant on the sorts of eyes we have? — Marchesk

You make a claim that colors might be subjective, or related to the observer, but this is an objective claim, no? That color is dependent on the sort of eyes we have would be an objective statement about subjectivity.

Any time we make a statement about some state-of-affairs, are we making an objective statement, or a subjective statement? To say that a particular piece of art makes you feel a certain way would also be an objective statement, no? You are describing how you feel, which is a real state-of-affairs in the world. So are we making objective or subjective statements when we talk about our feelings? What about when we say that different people will have different feelings when looking at a piece of art? Would that be an objective statement about the world, or a subjective statement?

Right, because the values that we experience change. In that sense the values motivate us different ways. This has nothing to do with material/efficient conditions, though. — Marty

I'd say that values develop out of our goals. It isn't the values that motivate us, it is the intent itself that motivates us and values develop from our intent as any thing is only valuable to achieving some goal. To say that any thing is valuable is to say that it helps us achieve our goal(s).

I agree that circumstances change our evaluations of scenarios and our intent. I'm not sure how this means they are over-determined by mechanical/efficient (essential material) causes, though. — Marty

I don't see how it doesn't. If you agree that it changes our intent, then you seem to be agreeing that it changes the fundamental source of our choices.

Well, I'd reject a mechanistic world view. — Marty

I'm not talking about a mechanistic world view as you understand. I provided a definition of mechanism in my first post in this thread. Here:

Mechanism
- the fundamental processes involved in or responsible for an action, reaction, or other natural phenomenon.

- a natural or established process by which something takes place or is brought about. — Harry Hindu

Notice how the terms, "physical", "material", "mental", "normative", and any other loaded term, are left out, not needed. The general idea is simply one of causation. So to reject a mechanistic world view as I have defined it is to reject causation in general. To say that some state-of-affairs is responsible for another state-of-affairs is to say that it was caused by the latter state-of-affairs.

As far as they both partake in being, yes - they are two aspects of the same world. The mental is not however a subset of the physical. — Marty

I'd say that they are two different kinds of processes. Process seems to be the fundamental aspect of reality.

External factors - such as the value of a cake, for example - don't have to be attributed to the material. — Marty

I don't see how the value of a cake can be external. The cake is external. It's value changes as our intent changes. The cake is less valuable when you are full and more valuable when you are hungry. Values reside internally and are intimately tied to our intent, or current goal.

It just serves a motivation (reason) for our actions, and are constitutive of our intentions. I'm just holding an externalist model of intentionality. — Marty

The cake doesn't serve as a motivation. It is our hunger that is the motivation. When hungry, any food, not just a cake, can be valuable.

That is, the content of our intentions is supplied by external motivations. — Marty

I don't know what this means. If the content of our intentions (meaning the form our intentions take) are supplied by external (motivations?) processes, then that is saying that external things determine our intent. I don't see how you can then say that there isn't any over-determination. I don't know what you mean by external motivations. Motivations aren't external, unless you are saying that the universe, reality, nature, etc. itself has motivation. If that is the case, then you are merely proposing intelligent design. Motivation is intent, and intent only resides as part mental processes. To say that motivation is external can only mean that you are referring to other minds. Their motivations are external to yours which is what accounts for conflicts between us as different minds can have different motivations, and other people's motivations can influence our own.

Again, you have to account for how an internal motivation gets out, or external, and then back in, or internal to some other mind in order to say that another mind influenced another mind. How does your intent get out of your mind, onto this screen in the form of letters and sentences, and then into my mind to say that it is responsible for the kind of reply I give?

It seems that to even use "external" and "internal" when talking about our minds and the world, is to fall into that false dichotomy of dualism. There is no external or internal when it comes to talking about how our mind influences the world and how the world influences our mind. It really is no different than talking about how any individual thing influences it's environment and how the environment influences it.

It would be over-determined if our actions are in some way completely reducible to external mechanisms. However, a mechanical world is completely run on material/efficient causes, while our decisions are done through formal-final causes as well, which of course presuppose normativity. Since mechanical causes aren't normative, but merely blind, then I don't see how they could in principle over-determine the facts of formal-final causes since they cannot fail.

Now, you can deny that our actions are formal-final, but I don't see how that makes sense since our own intentions are known to us prior to making the actions, which then use a type of "pull-causality". Via the intentions we have, our body would efficiently move along with them. — Marty

My point is that or intentions (it doesn't matter if they are known to us or not) are determined by external factors, as they change as the state-of-affairs around us change, which includes the states of our own bodies like in being hungry, needing to urinate, or simply being bored.

Intentions are predictions of how we want things to be compare to how they currently are, and how things currently are determine the plan we execute in order to bring that prediction to fruition. You can still have same intent in different circumstances, but the circumstances determine the actions you will take to accomplish your goal.

Knowing one's intent is simply being aware of one's state of mind, which is just another thing to be aware of - no different than being aware that you are aware of an apple on the table, and how hungry you are. The things we are aware of, and natural selection's programmed responses to what we are aware of, drive our behavior.

You also have to address how our intentions can have a causal influence on the world and vice versa. To acknowledge that is to acknowledge that there really isn't any distinction to be made about the kind of substance one part of the world is and what kind another is (physical vs. mental or mechanistic vs normative). We would simply be talking about causation and can dispense with terms like, "physical", "mental", "mechanistic" and "normative", as that turns to dualism and makes things more complicated unnecessarily.

Right, it might be the case our intentions are stopped by external factors, but that's what distinguishes them from mechanical states - that even if they fail, we know that we intended to do otherwise. — Marty

How can intentions be stopped by external factors if they are not of the same "material", "substance", or follow the same causal laws?

How do you personally distinguish these terms:

Reality, Existence, Being, World and Actuality.

Of course the question concerns things like: Is existence actual, or actuality also entail existence? Are things with being also things that don't necessarily exist, etc? Are things with essences necessarily real, or exist? Does the world include the fictional? — Marty

Here's another term that is I believe is related: "Nature"

Is one's nature one's being?

Reality, existence, being, nature and actuality all seem to refer to the same thing - some state of affairs.

I have always thought about "world" referring to the Earth, or a planet, not all of existence. It seems that the term "world" being associated with "reality" or "existence" stems from the time when we used to think that the world Earth was all there was.

Thank you very much for refocusing the discussion to the original topic. Thats my dilemma here, we have no control over what we decide; and that seems to make our efforts pointless, untill we relize that its too boring and are pushed to adopt faith in "free will". — XanderTheGrey

I don't see how having no control over what we decide makes our lives pointless. Most people who believe in a god as omnipotent designer, which implies that we don't have control over what we decide as God has already laid our our lives in his predetermined plan, point to their god as giving their life meaning - not making it pointless.

It seems to me to be the opposite of what you are saying - that being able to make decisions without any reason to point to for making that decision, would make our life, or at least the decision being made, pointless. Isn't that what we mean by freedom of will - that we don't have any reasons for making the decision we did? A reasonless decision is what is pointless, not decisions made for a reason.

The point isn't whether or not our decisions are motivated (influenced) by the world, the point is whether our decisions are over-determined by external mechanisms. — Marty

I don't see a difference. If our decisions are influenced by the world, then they would be influenced by external mechanisms, as that is what the world is.

Also, what do you mean by "over-determined"? It seems to me that you are saying that one's freedom of will is arbitrarily determined. Where does one draw the line from being determined to being over-determined?

Historically mechanism has been defined as working with material and efficient causes, and ignoring intentionality (formal-final causes). — Marty

Final causes seem to imply that some cause in the future influences the present. But that makes no sense. We often experience where a purpose we have doesn't come to fruition no matter how much work we put into it. Sometimes we fail in achieving our purposes and goals. Things happen that we don't anticipate that prevent us from accomplishing our goals and purposes. Goals and purposes are simply ideas in the present driving behavior forward in order to bring the goal to fruition. In other words, purpose isn't a final cause. It is just another cause, like every other kind of cause - that precedes an effect.

What is a "will" and what does it mean to be "free"? Most philosophical discussions go no where, and we end up talking past each other, because the terms we are talking about aren't clearly defined. How is it that we can point to certain influences in our decision-making and sometimes not?

Mechanism
- the fundamental processes involved in or responsible for an action, reaction, or other natural phenomenon.

- a natural or established process by which something takes place or is brought about.

There are other definitions of "mechanism" that do refer to explanations of physics and chemistry, but I don't think "mechanism" necessarily has to refer to those things, and necessarily relating it to physicalism.

I also don't take "natural" to necessarily entail physicalism either. "Natural" would simply refer to any fundamental state of affairs. In this sense, reality is nature.

I don't think "physical" or "mental" are helpful terms. They are terms referring to arbitrary boxes we've decided to put things in our categorizing of nature. "Mechanism" can simply refer to causation. We know that our intention/will has a causal influence on other things and itself is influenced by other things. There really doesn't need to make a distinction between "physical" or "mental" here.

Gots sources for the horses? Or is it more just you saying it? That's fine and all. Just asking. — Wosret

In philosophy, it is always someone "just saying it". What Chalmers is "just saying" shouldn't be taken to be more than what I am saying. We're both simply interpreting sensory data. What are Chalmer's sources?

As for whether I'm having a first or third person experience of someone's phenomena states by looking at their brain, I'm having neither (that's the whole damn point). Looking at someone's brain cannot be construed in any sense that I can fathom of a third person account of what happened to them that day. — Wosret

How is looking at a person's body as a whole, or looking at a sunset, or the Eiffel Tower different than looking at a brain? To say that you are having neither a first person or third person view when looking at a brain seems to imply that neither exists even when looking at a sunset or the Eiffel Tower.

A third person account of that is rendered hermeneutically, symbolically, archetypally, generically, utilizing the categories, which I then interpret, and distill down to my own first personal qualitative experiences, in order to attain the essence of what is being conveyed. — Wosret

I don't get it. First you say that you are having neither a first person nor third person view, now you are saying that you are having both at once. How do you know that your qualitative experiences aren't being rendered symbolically too?

No. From the horse's mouth: "There are many aspects to the first-person mystery. The first-person view of the mental encompasses phenomena which seem to resist any explanation from the third person." - http://consc.net/notes/first-third.html

You can say that he's wrong, or whatever, but not dispute what it is "meant" to convey. — Wosret

There are many horses saying many different things - most of which aren't falsifiable and should therefore be given and equal amount of weight which means that we should be honestly, logically agnostic when it comes to theories of mind.

What exactly is the difference between the third and first person? Again, I ask you: if you look at someone's brain are you having a first or third person view of their mental processes? If you say third, then why don't you have a third person view on everything else, as brains are just as "solid", and matter-like, as everything else. Where is the first-person view of the brain and how does that compare with the first-person view of some other thing.

The problem seems to be that the "first-person" thinkers make some distinction between the existence of some qualia and an awareness of that qualia. What I'm saying is that there is no distinction. The appearance of qualia is the awareness of some thing.

Awareness, and information, are about things. This presupposes realism. To say that there is an aboutness to awareness is to say that qualia refer to some thing that isn't qualia. To be aware of some thing and to be aware of qualia is to be aware of two different things - the thing and the symbol for that thing. The only time we seem to achieve first-person is when we turn our attention on the qualia itself - of turning our awareness back on itself.

Isn't the introduction of qualia meant to show that not all forms of information can be rendered in the third person, which is what would be required to give a complete scientific explanation of something. Qualia being a form of information is stipulated in the Mary the super scientist thought experiment, as she is said to learn something new upon first person experience, the quality of the thing, that she couldn't possibly learn second hand. — Wosret

It seems to me to be the complete opposite - that qualia are meant to show that all information is third-person. It is the attribution of the first-person to information that is faulty. Information is always about some thing that isn't the information itself.

When I look at your brain, am I having a first-person view of your mental processes, or is it you that is having a first-person view of your mental processes? It would seem to me that you would be the only one having a first-person view of your mental processes because you are those mental processes, and mine would be a third-person view. If my view is third-person and yours is first-person then that would mean that by being the process is the first-person view, while everything else would be third-person. This means that to have a first-person view of a rock, you'd have to be that rock and then turn your view back on your awareness of being a rock.

This means that whenever you turn your awareness on anything but your own mental processes, you'd be in the third-person view. It seems to me that the first-person view is only achieved by turning the mental processes back on themselves - of being aware of the process of being aware. Most other animals never achieve this first-person view and are stuck in the third-person and is why we say that they aren't self-aware. Self-awareness (awareness of being aware) and the first-person seem to go hand-in-hand, while awareness of everything else is in the third-person.