Seeing a tiger attacking you in your dream is "seeing something" i.e. seeing an image and motion. It doesn't seem to have anything to do with making predictions, solving problems etc. — Corvus

That is why I explained in the same post that you cherry-picked that predictions are a type of imagining, and dreams are a type of imagining where you do not have the external world to ground your experience.

What it is like for you to make a prediction and to imagine things when you are awake?

Why is absolute morality only absolute sometimes and relative some other times — night912

Morality only appears to be absolute when a vast majority of people agree. The morality that we thought was absolute would be shattered when we meet an alien species with a different set of morals.

Ok, if it’s not a human being then what is it? — NOS4A2

What if we were to start off with a definition like this: a human as a viable (it can survive on its own without artificial life support) organism descended from apes with a brain to body ratio of at least 2%

This does not mean that parents that want to save the life of their premature fetus should be legally prevented from doing so. This is only to determine when it is okay to choose for yourself when it is permissible to have an abortion. If you don't want an abortion you have that choice, or want to continue to keep your infant or elderly family member on life support, you have that choice.

I think we would agree what a human is 99% of the time and it is only in the gray area of embryos, fetuses, and the brain-dead, or those on life support that we might disagree. And it is in those grey areas that we as individuals should have the right to decide what we want to do without government interference because at that point what a human is is subjective.

Well, now you're establishing some kind of Cartesian theater where there is a GUI that is being viewed, but viewed by what?
— Harry Hindu

Viewed by the brain that constructs the simulation of the world within the visual field of the eyes. — ucarr

I think that "view" is the wrong way to look at this. The central executive in a computer does not view the data it is working with. The data simply exists in memory and is manipulated in real-time by the central executive. What form the data takes in memory is the ultimate question here. From our perspective it takes the form of silicon circuits, computer code and logic gates. From others' perspective the data in your working memory takes the form of neurons and the chemical and electrical signals between them. But from our own minds, we do not experience neurons and their chemical and electrical signals. We experience colors, shapes, sounds, etc. of which others' working memory is composed of. From our own perspective, our own working memory takes the form of colors, shapes, etc. and it is only by observing others' working memories that we experience something different. So which form does working memory actually take? Which one is the real form working memory takes?

Is there a "what it is like" for the computer in its working memory? What about when the computer takes visual information, like your fingerprint, and compares this visual information to its database to allow you to log into the computer. One might say that the computer is just comparing ones and zeros and does not have a visual experience of your fingerprint and the ones stored in its database. But that is just how it looks like for someone that isn't the computer's working memory.

Seeing something means there was an object in the physical world, which came into your retina in the form of lights, and activated your neurons and converted into images, which was transferred into your brain. But in the case of seeing an object in your dreams, you have no external object, which causes all the seeing process.

So what are you actually seeing, when you are seeing a tiger trying to attack you in your dream? — Corvus

The same type of thing you experience when you make predictions, goals, solve problems, etc. Imagining is part of the process that we use to make predictions and solve problems. One might argue that the more imaginative you are, the more intelligent you are, as you are able to come up with novel ideas to solve problems. When we are awake, most us are able to distinguish between what the world is informing us via our senses and what we imagine. Some with mental disorders like schizophrenia are unable to make this distinction.

When you are asleep you do not have the external world to compare, so you are similar to a schizophrenic when you are dreaming. Dreaming is simply the same process as day-dreaming, or making predictions when you are awake, but without external stimuli to ground you.

I’ve tried “a member of the species Homo sapiens” or “a biologically distinct human organism”. — NOS4A2

These definitions are circular.

You might as well ask when an embryo pops into existence. It doesn't. There's a single-celled organism which we label "zygote" that gradually develops into a simple multi-cellular organism which we label "embryo" that gradually develops into a more complex multi-cellular organism which we label "foetus" that gradually develops into an even more complex multi-cellular organism which we label "human" or "person".

Some might use the label "human" earlier in the development cycle than others, but that's a personal linguistic convention with no philosophical or moral relevance. — Michael

So then what are we saying when we say, "human rights"? Is anyone free to decide when you are a human or not and deserving of "human rights"? Are we free to decide when you are a "Michael" or "Mary"?

I've said that I think it's unlikely that non-biological entities will turn out to be conscious. — J

Yes, but why would you think it unlikely that will be the case when you don't have enough information to say what is likely or not? I'm trying to get at your reasoning here.

Well, yes, then various things follow, but I don't think that's a good thing to say. My own consciousness doesn't at all resemble this description phenomenologically, and once again we're a long way off from being able to say that, despite this, it "really is" working memory plus sensory information. Just for starters, for whom is the information informative? — J

For you, who else? If my description does not resemble what it is like for you, then please explain what it is like for you. Does your visual, auditory, tactile, etc. sensations inform you of some state of affairs in the world? Does it allow you to know things about the world? If so, what is knowledge if not possessing information about something, or being informed of something?

To answer that question, we would have to define what it means to be a human being. Care to take a run at it?

Images in dreams are interesting in the sense that, the dreamer sees images that don't exist in the external world. Where do the dream images come from? You say, well from your memories, experience, and amalgamation of what you have seen before. But there are also images that you have never seen, experienced or the places that you have never been in your life previously in your life.
Where then those images come from?

Of course all the mental images you see and dream exist in your brain. Then while sleep, your brain is supposed to shut down too. — Corvus

If it did shut down completely you wouldn't be able to wake up to loud (and possibly dangerous) noises in the world.

The places in your dream are amalgams of places you have been in the world. By using an amalgam of places you have been you can create unique places.

There is also the issue of how sensory deprivation can cause hallucinations. When you are asleep, you are being deprived of sensory input, but not completely or else you would not be able to wake in when in danger. The lack of visual input can cause you to hallucinate, or dream in the case of being asleep. You can hallucinate places you have never been, but they all are amalgams of places you have been. Even if you never experienced the idea of extra-terrestrial aliens, you might still arrive at the idea via incorporating several different ideas about life and its existence on other planets.

Let say, you are seeing a wall in front of you. You see the rows of bricks piled to make up the wall. But you also notice, the wall is level with the fence next to it. The walls and fence exist in the external wall in material level (materially, you can go and touch and inspect the walls and fences). But the levelness you perceive don't exist in the world. It exists in your mind or the perceiver's mind. — Corvus

But this goes back to what I said about thinking that humans are separate from the world. We are not. If the ideas in our mind can cause things to happen in the world then it seems to me that the mind is on the same level as the world. You are simply trying to make a special case for minds, but all that does is cause problems in trying to explain how the mind and world can interact causally when we know that they can - from experience.

Likewise, absence of sound, emptiness of space don't exist in material level, but they are perceived by the perceiver in the mind.

Now, the levelness of the walls, absence of sounds (silence), emptiness of space don't exist. Are they then pure product of mind, which are caused by the external objects? Or are they something that exist in the world without being noticed until the perceiver notices them? Because everything we perceive must come from external world. — Corvus

Ideas exist. They have a causal impact on our behavior in the world. The idea of Santa Claus causes some people to behave in certain ways in the world. To say that Santa Claus exists in the world instead of in your mind is to simply make a category mistake, not that Santa Claus doesn't exist. It does exist - as an idea, and it exists on the same level as the world because the idea can cause things to happen in the world. That is not to say that the world is made of ideas. Ideas are a complex arrangement of information and it is information that is fundamental, not ideas.

On the contrary! When you experience the world as it is, then your experience is the world. Doesn't mean that the world is a figment of your experience. — jkop

Solipsism implies that the world and the experience are one and the same, which is what you are doing. Only in distinguishing between the world and your experience do you become a realist and at the same time an indirect realist as the experience is not the same thing as the world.

Yes. Potential is not-yet Real. Science and philosophy are tools for dispelling our ignorance. :smile:

Potential :
Unrealized or unmanifest creative power. For example the Voltage of an electric battery is its potential for future current flow measured in Amps. Potential is inert until actualized by some trigger.
https://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page16.html — Gnomon

How does saying that potential is not-yet-real differ from saying it doesn't exist? In your example, it seems that you are simply saying that potential is simply the current state of an electric battery before being connected to a system to supply it with energy. Some batteries are never connected to a system so it would be incorrect to say that they have the potential to do anything. It is our ignorance of what the future holds for the battery that makes us think of "potentials" and "possibilities" when, in a deterministic universe, there is no such thing except within our minds.

Well, now you're establishing some kind of Cartesian theater where there is a GUI that is being viewed, but viewed by what?
— Harry Hindu

Are you implying the GUI is being viewed by an immaterial mind? Would this be, in context of your thinking, cognition-to-cognition, along the lines of mental telepathy? — ucarr

I wasn't implying anything. I was taking what you said - your description - and asking a question about it. You are the one that equated a GUI to our visual experience, but a GUI requires something to "look at it", or be aware of it's contents for some purpose.

So, simulation of the world by GUI is movement towards consciousness and thus it resembles the mind more than it resembles its code? — ucarr

Okay but you can only access the code via a GUI. I can only access your neurons via my GUI. Your neurons and the code appear in my GUI as visual representations of what is "out there". The neurons and the code do not exist as represented by the GUI. As you said, the GUI is a representation, and not the neurons and code as it actually is. So maybe terms like, "neurons" and "code" are representations of how they appear in the GUI and not how they are in the world, and how they are in the world is simply information or process and we are confusing the map (GUI) with the territory.

A mass of neurons has processing of memory functions attached; I'm not sure, but I think AI operates in similar fashion. — ucarr

If AI can answer questions about itself does that make it self-aware? If not, what does it mean to be self-aware if not to be aware of oneself in some capacity?

We don't yet know. My hunch is that it's going to be a version of the same thing that makes a biological creature alive, and a computer not. And yes, this could all be off base -- the sort of thing people will marvel it a few centuries hence -- "How could those people have gotten it so wrong?" But for the moment, I haven't heard of anything that suggests a computer could have inner states. Do you know of anything along these lines? (Grant me, for the moment, the idea that an inner state would be a sign of consciousness.) — J

I don't understand your point. If we don't know how a mass of neurons can be conscious then how can we even extrapolate whether a computer, robot, or a planet with life is conscious or not?

You have no reason to assume that a computer can't be conscious if you can't even explain what consciousness is and why a mass of neurons has it.

If we say that consciousness is a type of working memory that contains sensory information, then we design a robot computer that has a working memory that processes information coming in from it's camera eyes and tactile sensors on it's hands and feet as well as microphones to hear, would we then say that the robot is conscious? The "inner" state would be it's working memory and it's contents and the central executive that is processing the information within it, just like it is for you.

Develop into human beings. Interesting that you now phrase it that way. — Michael

I don’t care about flies and am at constant war with them. It’s wrong to kill a human being when he doesn’t deserve it. Flies deserve it in virtue of their very nature. — NOS4A2

I understand the position. A human-in-utero is morally insignificant. I just don’t understand how one can reach that conclusion. I suppose his worth might increase and decreases with his cell count, or, he is morally worthless until he is in my phone book, but who knows?

But weighing the moral worth of human beings in various stages of their development so as to decide who are morally permissible to kill is a disgusting business. We’ve left ethics entirely and have approached an exercise in excuse-making and dehumanization, in my opinion. — NOS4A2

It's no less disgusting business than weighing the moral worth of non-human organisms. Is it wrong to kill plants? Flies? Cows? Dogs? E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial? — Michael

Embryology shows that the zygote does not develop directly into a human being. The embryo undergoes many changes that reflect the organisms' evolutionary history. The human embryo initially resembles a fish embryo (It even has gills.), then an amphibian, a reptile and eventually a mammal. So while the embryo has the potential to become a human being, in this current state it isn't.

And to say that an embryo/zygote has the potential to develop into a human being, miscarriages shows that isn't necessarily the case. This is why I don't like bringing up terms like "potential" and "possibility" as if these things exist outside our minds. They don't in a deterministic universe. "Potentials" and "possibilities" are simply ideas that stem from our own ignorance of the deterministic path some process will take.

And then there are some extreme environmentalists who think we should be saving the flies in the Amazon rainforest, yet are fine with terminating the life of a zygote, embryo or fetus. In the grand-scheme of things humans are not more valuable, or special, than flies or cockroaches. To humans, yes, humans are special, but that is a subjective projection.

Some might argue that humans are destroying the planet, and that adding more humans to a planet with limited resources is immoral for those already alive, or that bringing an unwanted child, or a child with severe mental or physical handicaps, into the world is immoral.

Morality is subjective. It is up to each of us to do what is right for ourselves and to pick our battles carefully with others that are doing something different that either has an effect on how others live and the choices they can make or it doesn't.

This is why I get peeved when people on the right argue that the issue should have been taken out of the federal government's hands and place it with the states. The federal government never had it in their hands. Instead, Roe v. Wade implied that the decision was with the individual. In giving it to the states we now take it out of the hands of the individual and place it among a group - the people that live in a certain state to decide for the individual.

As a Libertarian, I believe in the right to life and the right to choose. Abortion is one of those issues that is difficult for a Libertarian to navigate. But as a deterministic moral relativist, I can only make decisions for myself, and what is best for myself, not for others that may be in entirely different circumstances.

Could sounds in dreams might interrupt the dream, and make the dreamer wake up from sleep, therefore you subconsciously switch the volume off during dreaming? — Corvus

I had a dream where I was trying to escape from captivity and I heard an alarm when I escaped but when I woke up the alarm was actually my alarm clock. So it seems that our minds are not completely shut off from the world and we interpret external stimuli as part of the dream.

The unique experiences we have in a dream is an amalgam of prior experiences. This is how we come up with unique ideas when awake - by logically incorporating various experiences together to come up with a new idea that is applicable to real-world situations. Think of dreams as this same process but without the logical direction that would be applied when we are awake. In the dream world we don't have the external world applying boundaries to our experience. It's more like a runaway process.

How about when we perceive silence, emptiness in space or time passing? The objects of our perception actually don't exist in material level. However, we still perceive them. — Corvus

What does it mean for our perception to not exist in a material level? Our perceptions and dreams can have a causal impact on the world, no different than when a errant baseball smashes a window. Our ideas and dreams are as real and exist on the same level as the baseball and window. The issue seems to be in thinking of ourselves and our perceptions as distinct, or separate from the world, when we are not.

But another way to think of quantum reality is as a field of Potential that can become Actual — Gnomon

I think what you wrote is very interesting and pretty much lines up with what I've been thinking.

I think the idea of potential is just that - an idea and not some inherent property of reality. Ideas like randomness, probability, possibility and potential are all ideas that stem from our ignorance.

Reading this,

there is no reason to say that quantum entities are ever really waves. Rather, the probabilities of where we will observe them in an experiment can be conveniently determined by the calculus of the Schrödinger equation, proposed in 1926 in response to de Broglie, which is formally analogous to a kind of wave equation. But a wave of what? Not of a physical thing – a density or field – but of a probability. The distribution of these probabilities, when observed over many repeated experiments (or a single experiment with many identical particles), echoes the amplitude distribution of classical waves, showing for example the interference effects of the famous double-slit experiment. — Philip Ball

seems that we are confusing some property of an electron as a wave when the wave is a property of the probability of finding a electron particle. But does the Schrodinger equation represent something fundamental about reality, or something fundamental about our ignorance?

Bishop Berkeley understood, correctly, that such a split makes no sense, so he decided to focus on the mind. Matter is not eliminated, but it's not fundamental. Mind is. — jkop

As such, idealism is a anthropomorphic projection.

In direct realism, the mind is directly linked to the world.My conscious awareness of the world is the actual world, not a mental replica. There's no gap between my conscious awareness and the world. — jkop

Sounds more like solipsism to me.

Now we go deeper into the brain_mind interface. The experience of seeing red, like the experience of seeing animated graphic images on a computer screen, is an interpretation of code for the experience. The Graphical User Interface of images viewed on a computer screen is an interpretation of Java, C++, etc. When you look at the code directly, you won't see any graphic images. Likewise, when you study neuron synaptic firing rates, electric current and voltage levels in active parts of the brain, etc., you won't see any graphic images replicating the natural world. There's no analog simulation of the natural world within the databases of computers, and there's no analog simulation of the natural world within the brain. — ucarr

Well, now you're establishing some kind of Cartesian theater where there is a GUI that is being viewed, but viewed by what? Also, the computer screen is a physical object that emits light so this still does not seem to be a valid example. The code produces output to the screen so it displaying colors and shapes on the screen would be more like a behavior produced from the processing of information going on within the computer, in the same way that you respond in the world based on the sensory processing (perception) in the brain.

What I'm trying to say is that the world may be more like the GUI than the code, more like the mind than the neurons, and the code and neurons are interpretations of other GUIs and the minds respectively. Silicon circuits and neurons are how OTHER minds are interpreted from our own. I am not trying to argue for idealism or panpsychism as that would be another type of projection. What I am trying to say is that primary "substance" of the world is process, relationships or information.

I have a lot of questions about p-zombies too, but we don't need them in this instance. Any number of computer-generated entities can do all the things you mention: respond to their environment, learn, make predictions, use feedback loops, offload routines to different parts of memory. So I disagree that "Consciousness is necessary for learning and making predictions." This is why the purple cow is such an annoying example -- it doesn't do anything. It simply sits there, so to speak, being a mental image, again so to speak. If a computer-generated entity could do this, I would have to allow that it might be conscious, but I don't believe it can. Except by rather strained analogy, there's no equivalent of a digital state that also has a subjective appearance to the software that we cannot experience.

Having said this, some computer-savvy poster is going to show me I'm wrong! OK, I'm ready. . . — J

But that's the thing. What makes a mass of neurons conscious, but a mass of silicon circuits not conscious?

The purple cow would be like a bug in the code. As I said before, not all ideas/imaginings are going to be applicable to the world. It only becomes a problem if you or the computer misinterprets the purple cow as something more than a bug in the system, but some external stimuli.

The computer has memory. You have memory. Your consciousness is like the working memory in a computer. The computer can store different types of data in its memory just like you store different types (colors, sounds, sensations, etc.) in your memory. This memory space is what we call consciousness. The difference between you and the computer is that the computer has not been programmed to establish a feedback loop in its memory - to refer to its memory as an object of information to process. I other words, it is not self-aware in the sense that you and I are.

Some have proposed "wavicle". What do you suggest?
My question about Math & Metaphysics was philosophical, not scientific. So the distinction between Real and Ideal is relevant for a philosophy forum. :smile: — Gnomon

The key to understanding the relationship between philosophy and science is to realize that philosophy is a science and the conclusions of one branch of the investigation of reality must not contradict those of another. All knowledge must be integrated. Dualism causes problems. Monism solves those problems.

What is a wavicle?
"It is in your dictionary. Something which simultaneously had the property of a wave and a particle in physics. My physics class was over 70 years ago so I’m not up on that contradictory word. It is like saying something is frozen and liquid at the same time. Like an “honest thief”.

Its a rather pathetic attempt to assign one ( made up) word to the wave-particle duality of nature that is described in quantum mechanics mathematics. Wave–particle duality ___Wikipedia. — Gnomon

Either we take the attributes of waves and particles that do not contradict each other and integrate them into what it means to be a wavicle, or we come up with another word. What about process or information?

I appreciate your taking the time to lay all this out for me. Could I ask you to take this to a simpler level, and describe to me what you think happens when I imagine a purple cow? I'm still concerned about the hard problem, understood as the emergence of subjectivity (or the illusion of subjectivity, if you prefer) from chemical/neuronal activity, — J

I'm certainly not claiming that I am certain in what I am saying. I'm just trying to make sense of the mind-body problem by thinking that the problem is more of a language problem than anything else.

What I'm saying is that what you refer to as "chemical/neuronal activity" is just another process that lies outside of the process of your mind. We can continue to use those terms of "chemicals" and "neurons" but instead of thinking of them as physical things, we think of them as other processes. There are processes in the brain that are not related to our conscious mind. We can be unconscious and there is still brain activity. So when you imagine something your conscious process is accessing certain mental information stored in an unconscious process of your brain.

You might ask, 'Why would we need to be conscious of an imagining?" Why can't a p-zombie do the same thing but without the actual experience of imagining a purple cow? The answer is that I don't think the p-zombie is a valid argument. Blind sight patients still respond to their environment even though they don't have a visual experience but only to a limited degree. Blind-sight people do no behave in the same way than people that do have visual experiences. A blind-sight person would not be able to drive or operate complex machinery. Consciousness is necessary for learning and making predictions. It is a type of working memory. Just think of how you learn something and eventually become proficient at it. When you are learning something new you are fully conscious of what you are doing. You have an idea or prediction (which is the same thing as an imagining about some future state) about what you want to accomplish and use your senses to be aware of the current state and you process the information about how to get from the current state to the predicted state. You engage in certain behaviors to get to your predicted state and then observe the effects, and then try again (creating a sensory-behavior feedback loop) and again until you accomplish your goal. Once you are able to repeat the process to and continue to get the same results you become proficient at the task and eventually the information process is off-loaded to unconscious processes where you can accomplish those tasks without thinking much about it. Think about when you learned to ride a bike. You were fully conscious of every movement you were making and your balance in practicing to ride a bike. Now you can ride it without thinking about it, or without much conscious effort.

Because we evolved the ability to link different concepts together to come up with new ideas that can be applied to the world means that there will be times that our brains link together new ideas that cannot be applied to the world, or not in the way you might think. Can imagining a purple cow cause you to then paint a cow purple or genetically engineer a cows to have purple fur or skin? Imaginings, hallucinations and dreaming are these types of imaginings. Predictions are imaginings with some type of goal applied to them, whereas dreams and imaginings of purple cows are not.

Actually, direct realism is part of the hard problem. In asserting that you see the world as it is - as static objects and physical brains, and comparing that to how the mind appears and is described as being non-physical and immaterial is how the hard problem arises.
— Harry Hindu

:roll: That's not direct realism. Why bother? — jkop

In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences; out of the metaphysical question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by our conscious experience. — Wikipedia

If you're using direct realism in a different way then I would hope that you would explain.

I asked you what an observer is, and you didn't answer the question.
— Harry Hindu

For example, a bird observing its environment,, birdwatchers observing the bird, a prison guard observing prisoners, a solo musician observing his own playing, an audience observing the musician, scientists observing their experiments, a thinker observing his own thinking (e.g. indirectly via its effects). — jkop

All you are saying is that an observer observes. :confused:

Yeah, don't bother. :roll:

Computers operate according to the parameters, programming, and designs created by the scientists who build them. While it's true that large language models can generate unexpected insights based on their training data and algorithms, the key point is that these systems do not understand anything. They process and output information, but it's not until their output is interpreted by a human mind that true understanding occurs. — Wayfarer

Humans operate according to the parameters, programming, and designs created by natural selection. How does an unconscious process (natural selection) create consciousness, but a conscious process (human minds) can't?

What does it mean to understand something? Searle said the same thing using the Chinese Room thought experiment, but all he showed is that the man in the room understands something. He understands the language the rules are written in and he understands to write this scribble when he sees that scribble. But these are not how one learns a language. If he had instructions that show what the scribbles refer to in the world rather than what to write when he sees that scribble, he would understand Chinese in the same way that native speakers do.

Additionally, I dispute the idea that the brain is simply a 'physical object.' The brain might appear as a physical object when extracted from a body and examined by a pathologist or neuroscientist. But in its living context, the brain is part of an organism—embodied, encultured, and alive. In that sense, it's not just an object but part of a dynamic, living process that produces consciousness in ways that no computer can replicate. — Wayfarer

Sounds like you are agreeing with me by describing the brain as a process or a relationship. :up:

Likewise, when we experience seeing red, it's because that specific wavelength stands in contrast to other wavelengths of visible light. Therefore, within the neuronal circuits of the brain wherein we interpret the specific wavelength for red, there's nothing therein that's red because the relativistic effect that supports our experience of red exists within the context of the visual field of our eyes, not within the neuronal circuits of the visual cortex of our brain. — ucarr

But we can imagine and dream of red things. So it seems to me that the color red is the form visual information takes and stored as such for future use in making predictions about the world. For us to be able to apply what we predict to the world, our predictions need to be similar to what we attempting to realize in the world, or else how could we apply new ideas to the world?

Are Mathematics and Metaphysics "real" or "ideal"? — Gnomon

How about neither and we come up with a better word.

Is an electron a wave or particle? How about neither and we come up with a better word?

Yes. The "in here / out there" distinction is a product of dualistic thinking. Do we talk about a table being outside of the apple that is sitting on it in the same way we talk about this distinction between the mind and the world? What if we were to simply talk about the mind as a relationship, or a process, and acknowledge that everything else is a relationship, or a process. Talk about in here vs out there would become meaningless. We can only be ("access") what we are and our experience of things other than ourselves can only come in the form of relationships - of how these other things interact with our senses, in the same way that everything else is a relationship between it and its environment or its own parts, depending on which perspective we are taking.

Imaginings and dreams are amalgams of what we have experienced before. The mind isn't just colors and sounds. There is a logical process underlying it all in the way that it processes sensory information to produce valid responses. We often solve some of the biggest problems by blending together different ideas or experiences we have had prior into unique ideas that can be applied to how we function in the world.

We get most of our information visually so it is no wonder that most of what we imagine, dream and conceive of will take the form of visual models. If they didn't then how would we apply our imaginings and new ideas to what we actually see in the world? I think there are other underlying (unconscious) processes that our dreams "represent" in that dreams are relationships between the way our mind constructs reality using visual information and other unconscious processes.

Computers create models of the world. Does this mean that the computer can imagine things? What makes brains so special in that minds arise from them but cannot arise from a computer? Both are physical objects and both are doing similar things in processing (sensory) information. If a physical object like a brain can produce a mind, then why not a computer? That's the thing - neither a brain nor a computer are physical things. They are processes.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/

In my posts above I'm arguing against the property dualism that is implied in the so called hard problem of consciousness. The problem reappears also in epistemological forms of dualism, such as in indirect realism, or in any philosophy in which it is assumed that consciousness is inaccessible to our knowledge.

Those are not my problems. I'm a direct realist, and a monist, so there's no need for you to give me a lecture on the monist nature of the world. Likewise, when I'm talking of subjective and objective in their ontological and epistemological senses, I'm not trying to split the world in two. In a monist world, things can have different modes of existing, and some things are observer-dependent (e.g. money) while other things (e.g. mountains) exist regardless of observers. But thanks anyway — jkop

Actually, direct realism is part of the hard problem. In asserting that you see the world as it is - as static objects and physical brains, and comparing that to how the mind appears and is described as being non-physical and immaterial is how the hard problem arises because it does not account for causation and that causes are not their effects and vice versa. I have argued that the distinction between direct and indirect is incoherent. What does it even mean to directly or indirectly access something? I asked you what an observer is, and you didn't answer the question.

So it's not just an issue of perception. It's a problem of language-use. We don't need to use terms like, "direct", "indirect", "subjective" and "objective", even in a monist sense.

We agree that subjectivity could be a dualist illusion. (I don't think it is, but I'm happy to assume it for purposes of argument.) But if it is, we still need to know why. You say, rather cavalierly, "Abandon dualism." OK, I imagine a purple cow and I follow this up by saying to myself, "This experience of me-and-purple-cow-image is illusory. There is no separation." But this doesn't make the purple cow go away, or change into something else. I'm sure you don't believe this would happen either, but what do you believe? What changes, for you, in this sort of experience when you introduce the idea of monism? Is it that experience, as presented, becomes a sort of brute fact, about which it's no longer possible to ask questions? This isn't meant to be snarky, I'm genuinely interested. — J

How is it illusory? Are you imagining a purple cow or not? The fact that you can imagine things is not illusory. It is illusory when you project that purple cow into the world, as if it were not just an imagining. In asserting that the purple cow is an imagining, and not an organism, you dispel the illusion.

Monism solves the problem because your argument about how material objects like brains give rise to immaterial minds is a problem of dualism. In thinking that the world and mind are two different types of things creates the problem. Thinking of them as the same solves it.

Well, not entirely. You still have to also understand that the way the world appears is just a map and you are confusing the map's static symbols (perceptual objects) with the way the world is (not static objects), which is more like your mind than the way the world is represented by your mind. I do want to clarify that I am not arguing for idealism or panpsychism as that would be another type of subjectivity in projecting one's mind onto the world. Everything is process, relationships, or information. Take your pick. They all mean similar things. The mind is just a type of process, relationship, or information.

Well, there are GOP lawmakers who oppose morning after pills/url]. — Michael

And there are Democrat lawmakers quoted as saying that abortions should be allowed up to the moment of birth for any reason. I think we can both agree that there are extremists on both sides of the (any) issue. Fortunately it appears that more moderate minds are winning on this issue as many states are voting to keep a woman's right to choose, but with some restrictions.

The most common republican view, although not officially, is that abortion should be illegal except under certain grave circumstances. E.g., https://news.gallup.com/poll/246278/abortion-trends-party.aspx#:~:text=Views%20on%20Legality%20of%20Abortion%2C%20by%20Party%20ID .

Democrats commonly want it legal in all or most circumstances. You are making it sound like both republicans and democrats see eye-to-eye on abortion....not at all. — Bob Ross

I know many Republicans that believe that abortion should be allowed up to a certain point in the pregnancy for any reason. I don't know one Republican that says that if prior birth control (condoms, the pill, etc.) failed that the woman should be forced to carry through with her pregnancy.

To me, the issue becomes moral only when the fetus develops a nervous system and is capable of feeling pain. Zygotes do not have nervous systems. The brain and nervous system does not fully develop until the 2nd trimester. This is the grey area for me.

I think that abortions should be allowed for any reason through the first trimester. In the final trimester, the only reason to have an abortion would be because the life of the mother is at risk, and these cases are extremely rare and is stressful enough to not have the government deciding this for us.

If someone was raped or the birth control they were using failed, I would think that they wouldn't wait until the last moment to have an abortion. They have at least 12-16 weeks to make that decision because they already made the conscious choice to not get pregnant in the case of failed birth control. I personally do not know anyone that wanted an abortion waited until after 16 weeks to have one. I don't know if this even happens. So we could be making a mountain out of a mole hill here in this thread.

Ok, Husserl might not seem to be a dualist, but the assumption that consciousness is immaterial in the sense that it never appears as an object in a world of objects, implies an epistemological dualism, and the hard problem reappears. For if consciousness is immaterial, then it seems we have no way of knowing what it's like to be another observer, or how immaterial experiences arise in a material world.

A similar problem arises for indirect realists because of their assumption that we never see objects directly, only by way of seeing our own sense-data (or mental images) first.

For idealists for whom everything is consciousness, the hard problem does not arise from a metaphysical or epistemological wedge. Likewise, it doesn't arise for direct realists under the assumption that we see objects directly: e.g. what it feels like is what the object appears like. — jkop

Other minds do appear as objects in the world. Consciousness is a process. Consciousness models other minds as objects, as in other people's brains and bodies. The brain is not a physical, material object. It is a mental representation of other's minds.

The solution to your "indirect" realism problem is by understanding that effects carry information about their causes. You can get at the nature of other objects via the effect of your mind, just as you can get at the identity of a criminal by the effects they leave at the crime scene, or get at the age of the tree by how it grows throughout the year and the number of tree rings it has.

You can also get at your own state means of your mind. Your mind not only tells you about your environment, but also about the amount of light in your environment, and your own mental and body states. As I mentioned before, your mind is a relationship between you and your environment.

I think I could add "the illusion of" in front of every reference to "subjectivity" and it wouldn't alter the problem. If I understand you, you believe that subjectivity only becomes a "problem" when it is labeled as subjective and claimed to be a mirror or a window or something that validly reflects an external reality. But if none of that is so, and what I was calling "subjectivity" is in fact a dualistic illusion, we still need to know how this comes about, and why. — J

But that is what I've been saying - that seeing this as a dualist illusion IS the problem. Abandon dualism and introduce the idea of monism and see if that helps you solve the problem.

Subjectivity is the category mistake of asserting that what you experience is part of the object you are experiencing.

For instance,

I'm not sure our ignorance is so fundamental. Moreover, the word 'experience', like perceptual verbs such as 'see', are ambiguous. By clarifying their ambiguity we can get rid of some of the problems.

For example, in talk of the experience of seeing a cat, the word 'experience' or 'seeing' can refer to what is constitutive for having the experience: the feeling. But they can also refer to what the experience is about: the cat.

The cat is the object that you see, which causes you to feel a certain way. The way it makes you feel is what the cat is like when it is seen under those conditions, and what the cat is like is not a creation of anyone's brain, nor are the conditions under which the cat is seen. — jkop

How you feel and the experience is not what the cat is like. It is what you are like when looking at a cat.

Saying things like, "Chocolate ice cream is good and is the best!" is a subjective misuse of language as "good" and "best" are subjective in the sense that they are projected onto the object being talked about when ice cream is not good or the best. "Good" and "best" refer to your feelings and beliefs, not anything about the ice cream. Instead we should clarify by saying, "I feel good when I eat chocolate cream" or "I believe that chocolate ice cream is the best." Here we are talking about our self, not the ice cream.

I think a lot of the confusion is the result of trying to separate our experiences from the object. Which part of our experience is about us and which parts are about the cat or the ice cream? What if the experience of a cat or ice cream is a relationship between ourselves and the object being perceived or talked about, not one or the other? What if our minds are the relationship between our self and our environment?

It should be clear by now, that it depends on whether we use those words in their ontological sense or their epistemic sense. — jkop

Which words? It all resolves down to the ontological sense as epistemology is really the ontology of knowledge.

The mind is special in the sense that its existence is observer-dependent, unlike the world. The world doesn't depend on an observer to exist. They have different modes of existing. — jkop

Not according to some interpretations of quantum mechanics (the observer effect). What does it mean to be an observer other than being are more complex process of interacting with one's environment, which everything does, including tables, apples, and volcanoes. So we're simply talking about a difference in degrees of complexity.

I know, the right language is hard to find. What I think we want to describe is the subjective event that occurs when, say, I think of a purple cow. The image of the cow is rather like something that "appears to a mind" but if that seems too Cartesian-theater, no matter. We can perhaps find better language, but I hope the target concept is clear enough: First the cow isn't there (for me), and then it is, not as a pattern of neurons but as a cowish purply image. What has happened? That's the event we're concerned about, which I'm suggesting we could call a "phenomenon". — J

But you are already assuming your conclusion by describing some event as subjective. You could have said the same thing without using the word and it wouldn't change the meaning of what you said.

To say that there is something there and then it isn't there can be said about anything in the world. A rotten apple's ripeness was there but now it is not, and an apple's ripeness or rottenness can be described as an event, or process. Everything changes. The mind is not special in this regard. I prefer the term, "process" instead of "phenomenon". I think of everything as process (Whitehead).

When someone uses the word, "subjective" I'm thinking about the form the information takes in the mind as relative to one's person located in space-time. Visually, the world appears located relative to the eyes, but we understand that the world is not located relative to the eyes. It is in assuming that the world is as it appears that is subjective. In changing your perspective in understanding the mind as a map instead of a window to reality do you see your mind as it really is and take on a more objective view of one's own mind. Does your mind exist as it really is? If so, can you say that you have an objective, or direct, view of your mind? It seems to me that we have to have direct access to our minds at the very least, and just as the distinction between subjective and objective is incoherent, so is the distinction between direct and indirect realism.

The problem here is that, in order to get from "brain measurements of wavelengths of light and sound" to "an appearance in the mind" and the idea that "we" interact with the world, we have to import some new concepts. Mind? We? Where did this subjectivity come from? Once again, the hard problem: How do we get from here to there? Why should there be anything like an appearance in the mind, if the brain seems ideally equipped to do the measuring on its own and respond accordingly? — J

The problem is in assuming that you see the world as it is, as if the mind were a window to reality instead of a map to reality. In assuming that the world is at it appears with solid, static objects, (in a similar way that a map uses static symbols to represent a dynamic environment) and trying to reconcile that with the way the mind appears, does one come up against the hard problem of consciousness. Instead, I think of the world as process, or information, and the mind is just another kind of process, or information. To me, the solution to the hard problem lies in abandoning dualistic thinking and adopting a type of monism where the world is not material, or physical. It is a process.

To be a living system is to maintain a normative pattern of interacting with an environment in the midst of changing conditions. Sense-making is about pragmatically relevant actions , not concordance with ‘reality as it is’, whatever that’s supposed to mean. This doesn’t make what sense-making reveals as an illusion, or mere appearance as opposed to the really real. It shows us that this is what ‘reality as it is’ IS in itself. — Joshs

So sense-making is (part of) reality as it really is?

The world is independent of a map as well so this does not really get at what it means to be objective vs subjective.
— Harry Hindu

Consider cities and landscapes and most of the environments that people live in. Large parts of our lived world depend on the maps and drawings after which they were built. Those are parts of the actual world, and it is in this sense that the world depends on maps for being such a world. Without maps it would be a different world. — jkop

And the world would be different without humans and their minds, so I don't see how you've made any sensible distinction between what it means to be subjective vs objective.

..as if humans have this special quality of the world being independent from us.
— Harry Hindu
I can't make sense of that. — jkop

You said,

The world is objective in the sense that it is independent of us, and available for all of us. Also maps of the world have this objective mode of existing. — jkop

I was pointing out that the mind is not special in having things independent of it, so you have failed to make any sensible distinction between what is objective and subjective.

That's not what I say. Many humans and other animals are conscious. Consider the events in your physiology when you are having the conscious awareness of a tickle. Others may have similar events, but not those that exist in your physiology. The tickle exists whenever you feel it, and when you no longer feel it, then it doesn't exist anymore. This mode of existing is radically different from the way the world exists or the map — jkop

This can be said of anything, not just human bodies and their minds. An apple that is rotten is no longer ripe, yet it is still an apple.

Not so sure about "logical ideas" (maybe just "ideas"?) but otherwise I agree. — J

I included "logical" because you mentioned "rules" where 22 people are following some rules. So minds follow rules that we call logic as 22 people follow rules that we call soccer.

At this point we need to make sure it's not just a dispute over terms. What do we want "phenomenon" to designate? I vote for something like "appearance to a mind," so that the 22 people and the soccer game are two different phenomena. On that understanding, I want to say that neurons and consciousness are also two different phenomena, appearing from two different perspectives. But notice that it doesn't really matter how we understand "phenomenon" here. We could go the other way and stipulate that "phenomenon" designates a single event in time, in which case the soccer game and consciousness are now redescriptions of "the same phenomenon." Either way, we're left with the hard problem. I know many people want to do some arm-waving here and say, "Well, it's two different descriptions, what more do you need to know?" but surely the answer is, "A lot. Why are these descriptions as they are? What allows the passage from one description to another? Are we right in believing that the mental-level description is grounded in, but not caused by, the physical-level description? Does the physical-level description have a "translation" into Mentalese? When we encounter something as extraordinary as subjective experience, what else do we need to say about it to fill out the experience? Yes, consciousness is, in a sense, "only" a description of how things look to a subject, but don't we feel it's a lot more than that too -- somehow constitutive of identity?" etc. etc. — J

I don't know what "appearance to a mind" means. It seems to imply that a mind can be independent from some appearance as if something appears to a homunculus in the brain. It seems to me that some appearance is part of a mind, or is a necessary constituent of a mind.

Any appearance in the mind is the result of some measurement in that the brain measures and interprets wavelengths of light and sound and these measurements are the means by which we interact with the world. An interpretation of quantum mechanics includes the observer problem where the act of observing changes what is being observed and the measurement problem where we don't directly see the collapse of a wave function and the idea that mutually incompatible quantum states result in the concrete nature of the world once observed or measured.

Personally, I believe that irreconcilable differences between quantum physics and classical physics will be resolved with a proper explanation of consciousness.

What is real is what is denoted by the symbol, and that is not something that exists in the sense of being real independently of any mind (as only a mind can grasp number.) — Wayfarer

So what? There are many attributes and properties of things that do not exist independently of the thing itself. We don't say that the ripeness of this apple isn't real because it can't exist independently of this apple. You seem to be making an unwarranted special case for minds.

Symbols are real. Symbols exist. They are the effects of prior causes and causes of subsequent events. In this sense they are real and exist.

The world is objective in the sense that it is independent of us, and available for all of us. Also maps of the world have this objective mode of existing. — jkop

The world is independent of a map as well so this does not really get at what it means to be objective vs subjective. You seem to be trying to make a special case for humans, as if humans have this special quality of the world being independent from us. We aren't special in this sense. Is the universe independent of Earth?

Consciousness, however, is subjective in the sense that it exists only for the one who has it. All conscious states have this subjective mode of existing. Some conscious states are not only subjective in this sense, as some beliefs can also be objective in an epistemic sense. Justified true beliefs are both ontologically subjective and epistemically objective. — jkop

Earth is the only planet that we know to have human life. In this sense, is the Earth subjective in that Earth is the only planet to have human life? We can say this for just about anything. Everything is unique. Earth is not Venus or any other planet. The Sun is not Vega or any other star. Again, you seem to be trying to make a special case for human consciousness in that it is the only thing that has uniqueness. Everything has some property that makes it distinct from everything else.