The incessant attacks on every living being are inevitable.

In the beginning, when God created the universe, he decreed that everything in existence has the right to seek to perpetuate its own existence. What about me? Said the original nothing. Now that the universe exists, I have disappeared. Can I also seek to exist? The universal Lord responded: Yes. There are no exceptions to the law. You have the right to attack and destroy everything that exists in the universe in order to reappear, including every living creature.

The reason why the original nothing has the God-given right to attack and destroy us, is not an injustice. On the contrary, it is the consequence of divine justice. The original nothing is not doing anything illegal. On the contrary, he may be our enemy but he is also a faithful and obedient servant of the universal Lord. God could have chosen to be unjust to the universal nothing but he didn't.

Hence, creating a more moral universe than the one we live in today was not possible. Such universe would have been based on a glaring fundamental injustice. — Tarskian

Citations?

Really though, if God is eternal then there was never nothing to begin with. If nothing can speak, "What about me?" then how can you say that it is nothing as SOMETHING was said, or asked? These are the type of inconsistencies I am talking about. You make a claim without incorporating the other characteristics associated with God, like being eternal. You are compartmentalizing.

Because belief in the supernatural is one type of delusional belief. In being logical one rejects all types of delusion. My point was that consistency is a way of practicing monism in that one applies logic to all claims and rejects faith, not just those in the domain of religion. Theists do apply logic to some claims, but not consistently across all claims. Is there more evidence for the existence of the Abrahamic God than the Greek gods? If both claims have the same amount of evidence then why believe in one over the other? It has already been pointed out that theists are atheists when it comes to a majority of gods. This applies to all philosophical domains, including politics. If some theist claim has the same amount of evidence as some political claim made by some Democrat or Republican - none, then why would you believe one and not the other?

I could argue that the political parties have become like religions with their faithful followers that believe what their leaders tell them without question. Political parties should be abolished. I am as a-political as I am a-theistic (or anti-group-think).

What does theism mean by "separate from" if it still can affect its creation?
— Harry Hindu
Well, at best, theism is incoherent.

What type of connection is it between a cause and its subsequent effects - physical, idealistic, something else or none of the above?
"Idealistic" (i.e. supernatural).

Would it not be a naturalistic stance to take to say that because God has a causal relationship with its creation that God is natural?
Yes. However, theism posits a supernatural creator of nature, which is incoherent.

There simply isn't any valid evidence to support any of these claims .. reasonable/logical?
I prefer anti-supernatural (though absurdist (Zapffe-Camus) would do). — 180 Proof

I think that anti-supernatural is too restrictive. Maybe anti-delusion?

As for absurdism, I believe that meaning/information is the relation between causes and effects, so meaning is everywhere you care to look, hence my claim that information is fundamental, not mind or matter which are complex configurations of information.

What meaning/information is useful at any moment depends on ones present goal in the mind. This is why you may determine that some bit of information is irrelevant to your current goal but that does not mean it is irrelevant in all cases. It depends on what your goal is. Usefulness is a relation between some bit of information and your goal in the moment. One could say that it is process/relations all the way down (Whitehead).

That can be a problem in difficult times when what you need is hope while the situation looks utterly hopeless. There simply is no evidence that things will get better. It does not exist. Still, the only way to sit out a bad patch, is to believe it anyway in spite of having no evidence.

The rational person will reasonably give up, while the spiritual one keeps going. This phenomenon seems to be enough to explain why atheist societies do not last long enough to actually make it into the history books. — Tarskian

If God exists, then who created the circumstances of your hopelessness in the first place to then look to it for hope? God created childhood cancer, schizophrenia, our bodies that have the capacity to be tortured, etc. I can imagine a more moral universe than the one we live in today, but that doesn't mean that I don't want to live in this one. This one isn't all that bad, so hope isn't necessary for me to continue existing - just the curiosity to continue to see what happens next. As Christopher Hitchens once put it, death is like being told you have to leave the party when the party is still going on.

Insofar as theism posits a creator separate from, though affecting, its creation (duality), atheism means rejection of theism (non-duality), no? — 180 Proof

What does theism mean by "separate from" if it still can affect its creation? What type of connection is it between a cause and its subsequent effects - physical, idealistic, something else or none of the above?

Would it not be a naturalistic stance to take to say that because God has a causal relationship with its creation that God is natural?

When pressed for a quick label, I will use the label of “atheist”. However, it does give me pause when I do, because “atheist” is a parasite term. It needs “theist” to be defined before it is possible to be an “atheist”. For example, polytheists are justified in calling monotheists, “atheists” because they nowadays deny the existence of many gods. Or if your definition of God is the most powerful being then I might be a theist (Just depends on if you can prove power can be measured). So, in theist/atheist pairing, I can see one side of a non-dualistic relationship.

The question is the other side. Does theism need atheism to have meaning/exist? The best positive answer I can come up with is, “yes because without the denial (atheism) it quickly becomes pantheism”. If one cannot say this is not God then everything becomes God. And if everything is God, then “God” is functionally meaningless. Or it is a fun way to be a closet atheist. — Keith

Does "supernatural" need "natural" to exist or have meaning or is it the other way around? If its the other way around in that supernatural is only meaningful in the light of the natural, then it would seem that everything is fundamentally natural including God and the domain God resides in.

I wonder to what extent such a non-dualistic viewpoint offers a solution to the split between materialism and idealism, as well as between atheism and theism. — Jack Cummins

Information is both mind-like and physical-like. Information is fundamental, not mind or matter.

It also comes down to consistency in the way one accepts evidence for any claim. Theists, I would argue, are inconsistent because they require evidence for some claims to believe in them while others they depend on faith.

I, on the other hand, only accept any claim when there is sufficient evidence to support it. All claims with the same amount of evidence have the same amount of weight, regardless of the claim. Inconsistency is a type of dualism, in that you accept some claims based on evidence and some on faith with no logical reason as to why.

Non-duality would entail treating every claim the same in requiring evidence and dispensing with faith altogether. Claims for which there is no evidence are just that and not useful beyond making the claim.

This isn't to say that atheists are not inconsistent either. They make claims in other philosophical domains, like politics, for which there is no evidence or evidence to the contrary. I am talking about being consistent across all philosophical domains.

I don't consider myself an atheist anymore than I consider myself a non-believer in unicorns. There simply isn't any valid evidence to support any of these claims, but does that mean we need labels for every (potential or possible) claim for which there is not sufficient evidence to support it, or do we simply need one label - reasonable/logical?

At the clear-to-me risk, that in my insistence (as a courtesy) on brevity, I will repeat my failure, I may as well say something about this. It can happen because the physical, the only reality, is not really generating anything. That you think it is a new reality generated out of an existent utterly other reality, you are in the common human illusion. Or, you are, at least, mistaken. — ENOAH

I don't think a new reality is generated out of an existent other reality. I was referring to your use of the word, "generate". I didn't use the term. I initially responded to bert1's mention of the relations, "produces/causes/is-identical-with". I'm not a dualist. The dualist is the one with the hard problem, not a monist.

I don't see it as two realities. There is one reality and reality is a causally connected relationship. If there are multi-verses and those multi-verses have a causal impact with events in our universe, then the multi-verse is one reality. If they don't then there are multiple realities but we'd have no way of showing that and would be pointless to try.

I think traditional phenomenology, which addresses, as you raised, the problem of understanding objects as they "must be" vs as they "appear" to us; that is moving into new directions. One, is that the traditional did not throw its net out far enough. If it had, it would have left to Science how we sense red, or the aroma of coffee. The real question phenomenology is after is why we "experience" it as red. And this is the result of images, once constructed and saved in memory to trigger a feeling which in turn triggered a drive and action (like many sentient animal), now have developed into its own sophisticated system of constructing images (using neurons) to trigger ultimately feeling and action.

It is only because that once strictly organic system of conditioning responses for survival has evolved in humans into Mind, that "red" and "aroma" have meaning, a mechanism in the system wherein those once strictly organic feelings, are attached to Narratives--experiences.

And how does something physical generate these experiences? You rightly asked. It doesn't generate anything real at all. These are "codes" hijacking feelings to create this illusion of meaning and that meaning matters. It doesn't. Matter matters. — ENOAH

None of this explains how an illusion is created by something that is not illusory. An illusion is a misinterpretation of sensory data, not that the data itself isn't real.

A mirage is exactly what you'd expect to experience given the nature of light and how it interacts with your eye-brain system. In explaining the causes you don't dispel the illusion. Instead, you make it a real consequence of real causes.

The one thing that I am sure of is the existence of my mind. From there, everything else is unprovable. Yes, even solipsism could be true. I am not a solipsist because I wonder if there isn't an "external" world, then why does it seem like there is? The same could be asked about consciousness. If the mind is an illusion then why is it so brute?

We may not have direct access to the world but don't we have direct access to our "illusion"? My mind, illusion or not, is part of reality. There are causal forces at play where my mind is the effect of prior causes and my mind is the cause of subsequent effects. Culture is one of the effects of human minds on the world.

If the mind is an illusion then what does that say about all the scientific knowledge based on observations? If our observations of the world are not real, then does that mean our understanding of brains and neurons is not real? Asserting that the mind is an illusion, or not real, pulls the rug out from under all the scientific knowledge we've accumulated.

It seems to me that you do not mean by "reality" what most of us mean by it. Most of us mean by "reality" the kind of thing that we encounter in experience. When you say that reality does not generate real experience, you cannot possibly be using reality in this sense.

One test of whether something is real, is whether it can do something. Our experiences do many things. They inform us, modify our responses, etc. So, they pass the test. — Dfpolis

I agree. I define reality as a causally linked system.

As a theoretical physicist, I learned that whatever happens, happens for a reason, In physics, it is because there are laws of nature that make our observations turn out as they do. Over time physics has improved our descriptions of these laws -- call our descriptions "laws of physics". We do not try to explain the laws of nature, because that is not our remit, but that does not exempt them from also needing a reason for happening. Philosophy has the remit to provide that reason. So, what exempts your fundamental from the need for further explanation? — Dfpolis

If there is some fundamental aspect to reality then wouldn't it follow that there is an aspect of reality that does not need a reason for happening. I mean, what does fundamental mean if not that there is some aspect that "just is". If not, then there would be an infinite regress of reasons, or reality is an infinite causal chain with no beginning and no end, or another possibility could be a loop of causality.

What do you mean by "justifies its conclusion"? Causes "justify" their effects. It just seems like a misuse of language here. I would say that causes determine their effects and vice versa. With reasons and conclusions being a type of cause and effect, reasons determine their conclusions and vice versa.

If determinism is true, people's behaviour is not governed by reasons, but by causes. — Ludwig V

Reasons are a type of cause.

Similarly, holding people responsible is never possible if determinism is true.
BTW, the empirical evidence is that what deters people from committing crimes is not the severity of the punishment, but the likelihood of getting caught. — Ludwig V

Yes. I should rephrase. The likelihood of getting caught is a reason to not commit a crime.

The likelihood of getting caught implies the punishment.

Risking getting caught is an option, but is it worth it? This is something that has to be decided on a case-by-case basis. For each person, in different parts of their lives, and under different circumstances it will be different. For some, it is a simple solution as they would never consider committing a crime, but it may depend on the circumstances, of which there are many that we can choose from in the many philosophical discussions on ethics.

Not every moment is the same. It seems to me that both determinism can be true and it also be true that each moment is unique. Even though each moment is unique each moment has similarities to past moments. We can make predictions of the future thanks to these similarities but they fail when the novelty of the situation isn't taken into account. Some predictions don't need to take into account the novelties because they are irrelevant to the prediction.

Have you never done something that you didn't want to do - sometimes something you had decided not to do?
You may have felt that you did it without deciding to do it.

it would feel natural to reach the decision you made
— Harry Hindu
If it felt like that, it was probably based on reason, as opposed to some causal chain. — Ludwig V

Reasoning is a causal process. It takes time to reason. Your reasons determine your decision. I don't see a distinction between "physical" and "non-physical" causation so the act of reasoning is just a type of causal chain.

In what way did you make a decision you didn't want to? I think you're talking about making a decision you didn't like, or wouldn't fulfill some imaginary future where everything works out to perfection. You may not always make the decision you want, but you always make the decision you need to. It seems to me that what you are actually saying is that when your options are limited you feel less free - the more options the more freedom. This is what I mentioned before. The options available at any given moment are determined depending on the situation and your current knowledge.

I agree with his claim that seeing ourselves determined in this reductive way by our past leads to more ethical, compassionate behavior toward those who commit acts of violence and other anti-social behaviors than religiously based notions of feee will, which tend to embrace harsh, retributive forms of justice. — Joshs

I still believe that we should hold people responsible for their actions. Holding others responsible has an effect on theirs, and others, future behaviors, which is more of the point of punishment, not necessarily to take revenge on past behaviors but provide reasons to behave differently in the future.

Yes, of course. That's why, when I do something for those reasons, there is no compulsion, no restriction of freedom - except in the sense of opportunities voluntarily foregone. — Ludwig V

I don't know. Does a decision that was determined based on prior circumstances necessarily have to feel like it was forced? It seems to me that if it was already determined based on existing circumstances that it would feel natural to reach the decision you made, and not feel forced.

What would a decision that was forced feel like compared to one that was freely chosen?

Here's what I don't get about determinism. That process may determine my decision. But how does it force me to do anything? What sense does it make that I might be forced to do the right or rational thing, when the right or rational thing is what I want to do? — Ludwig V

Why do you want to do the rational or right thing? Don't you have reasons?

I'm not sure I understand what you're saying or how your explanation describes exactly how neurons "generate "images"".

I just think that using terms like "physical" and "non-physical" isn't helpful because you have to define what those words mean and how something that is "physical" can generate something "non-physical". It seems to me that the solution would involve some sort of monism where the objects of thought are of the same type as any other object - information.

Even "images" invokes some kind of Cartesian theatre. "Sensations", I think, would be better and attention is the amplification of certain sensations over others.

How does a colorless neuron generate the sensation of color, or an odorless neuron generate the sensation of smell? Why is it that when you attempt to observe my mental processes you see neurons and a brain but when I observe my mental processes I am observing an experience of the world made of shapes, colors, sounds, smells, tastes and feelings, but not neurons?

When philosophers like Chalmers ask questions like "Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel?" they don't really mean 'why' in the sense of "what evolutionary benefit has it?" They're looking for a 'how', as in "Explain how, exactly, that information processing (or whatever function) somehow produces/causes/is-identical-with consciousness?" — bert1

But it leaves no evolutionary role for consciousness to play, which was wonderer1's point. — bert1

I agree with you. How do we know that blind sight patients, or those that disassociate their awareness from their consciousness aren't merely misusing language in describing their experience? It seems to me that only someone that assumes that their consciousness is something like a soul that can exist apart from their body (which I would argue most people believe) would say such things.

Think about it. Do we go about our lives with the conscious experience of focusing on each step that we take when walking from one room to another? No. One could say that our walking happens unconsciously, yet we don't disassociate our self from the act of our walking. Walking is something that we learned a long time ago and we have become so good at it that it happens almost instinctively in that we don't have to put much, if any conscious effort into doing it. But when we were toddlers and we were learning how to walk we had invoke a conscious effort into doing it. We had to focus on the intricacies of the placement of our feet, our balance, the surface we were walking on, etc.

Now that we can walk on auto-pilot we don't disassociate our walking from our self because we say things like, "I walked over from my house..." It is only in these special (mystical) circumstances of blind sight and drug use that individuals use language in such a (mystical) way as to disassociate their selves from their awareness.

The same can be said regarding riding a bike and driving a car. Can a blind sight person do such things? Could a blind-sight person tell the difference between a ripe and rotten apple by their sight alone?

If the answer to these questions is "no", then p-zombies are false. There is a use to consciousness, and this is what defines us as humans and different than other animals.

I think the primary role of consciousness is in our learning, as it takes conscious effort to learn anything. Blind-sight is in the domain of the instincts. Instincts are built-in learned behaviors based on limited stimuli. Consciousness provides a much more detailed model of our environment and as such has made us much more adaptable to sudden changes in the environment that instincts are not able to. Instincts are best for environments that change little and slowly.

Of course, none of this actually addresses the hard problem of how "physical" neurons are produces/causes/is-identical-with "non-physical" consciousness. But, IMO, the hard problem is based another faulty assumption of dualism. I believe a type of informational-monism could be the solution where the world is not physical/non-physical. It's all information.

As I pointed out before, you are speaking from a position of ignorance. You simply don't know what LD knows. As I said, LD has a "Law of Everything". You do not, yet here you are arguing what would be impossible for LD.
— Harry Hindu
And as I pointed, Laplace never talked about and LD or a "Law of Everything" that we don't know, but assumed if some extremely well informed entity could make the extapolation from the present (or past), into the future. Laplace wasn't speaking of any divine power. As I said, what he was talking about is simple "Newtonian" physics extrapolation. That should be clear.

However coming back to your idea of LD having the "Law of Everything":

Let's first discuss this as this is one crucial factor here and should be discussed. Actually you aren't the first to make this argument.

Your argument (and please, do correct me if I'm wrong) is basically the "Black box" argument with LD: we don't know what logic, information and laws which LD is using (that we don't know, which is the Law of Everything. LoE) and hence for LD solving the problem is easy, even if it's not for us.

Ok,

The first question is then: If LD solves this problem using LoE, is then LoE equivalent to our logic that we use? Well, when one situation is that the correct forecast is a forecast that the LD doesn't give, obviously it isn't so, or then we really have understood very wrong basic logic. — ssu

Let's go back over what Laplace said:

We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past could be present before its eyes. — Laplace

The first sentence defines determinism.

The second sentence describes an intellect as having a Law of Everything. The Law of Everything is the law that defines all the forces that set nature in motion and all the positions of all items of which nature is composed...

The second part of the second sentence describes the intellect as being vast enough to submit these data to analysis, or logic.

In this sense, the LoE and logic are different things. Think of the difference between intelligence and wisdom. The former entails what you know. The latter entails how you use what you know. LD has both to such a degree that surpasses our capacity by factors reaching to infinity. LD has both all knowledge and access to all logical systems to the point where all of it's conclusions are valid. There could be more than one solution to a problem that ends up accomplishing the same result. Sure we can get to Pluto using our existing means of propulsion, but LD knows of other, more efficient ways of doing things.

I was really hoping you'd answer the question I posed earlier:

My question is, why did the NASA scientists not need to account for the solution to get to Pluto in the solution to get to Pluto and New Horizons still arrive at Pluto? Sure, it seems that if they tried to include the solution in the solution the New Horizons project would never moved past the planning stage, but it did by not accounting for it and the solution was a success. As I said before, some information is irrelevant to the forecast being made. NASA scientists also did not account for the speed at which the weeds in my yard grow to get to Pluto either. — Harry Hindu

I've never denied that determinism does not allow for free will. LD has no free will because it knows everything about everything in the present and can then extrapolate what it will do based on this understanding.
— Harry Hindu
Well, now you went ahead of me. Assuming that LD has no free will because it knows everything about everything and can extrapolate the future from the past with (LoE) is definately not something the Laplace had in mind. The point that LD would have no free will is quite a statement.

In fact, this is my point: One can say it that our free will limits this kind of simple extrapolation. Yet is this the correct way to state that theorem? Would it be perhaps better to say that simply there are limitations to what we can compute (or give a direct proof or), because we have free will? — ssu

It seems to logically follow that determinism and free will in the sense that most people think of it as being a decision that was not determined, are incompatible.

But decisions are made based on some reason and it is our reasons that determine a decision, or else we would say that we made an unreasonable decision.

To me, freedom entails options. The more options you have when making a decision, the more freedom you have, but this does not mean that you could have actually chosen another option because your actual decision was made based on certain reasons and you filtered those other options based on certain reasons to eventually arrive at the last option standing. You would have always made the same decision given the same options and the same circumstances. As I have said before, you only know that you made a mistake or could have made a different decision when you have more information (more options), but that is after the fact of your decision. Sure, if you had the other options you could have made a different decision, but at the moment of decision you didn't which is why you will always make the same decision given the same set of circumstances which includes the options you have at that moment.

Again your not getting the point. That turn hasn't happened yet, it's in the future. The pilot is flying the aircraft ordinarily, because the aircraft hasn't been attacked. He's looking at the potential AA site, but as the pilot observes he's not fired upon, no reason for evasive manuevers. Maybe the site is simply a fake or the gunners simply haven't observed him. The LD giving the firing solution and the firing of the gun only alerts the pilot to make evasive maneuvers. The LD solution is defined from the LD solution itself, you cannot get around it, sorry. — ssu

As I pointed out before, you are speaking from a position of ignorance. You simply don't know what LD knows. As I said, LD has a "Law of Everything". You do not, yet here you are arguing what would be impossible for LD.

Let's just remember how the LD makes the forecast in general. It knows everything at the present, and it can then extrapolate perhaps one nanosecond at a time to the future to millions of years from now. But this isn't anymore a simple extrapolation: here the correct model of future has to take into consideration the model itself. The LD solution happens partly because of the LD solution. That's circular reasoning. And here we come to the interesting philosophical issue at hand: here the LD has to make a subjective decision. It cannot be just an objective observer here. If it would be, then it wouldn't give any LD solution, the anti-aircraft gun wouldn't be fired and the pilot could perhaps fly aircraft in a straight line through the airspace where the AA gun could reach the aircraft. The gunners would angry at such fire control. — ssu

Which would certainly be a possible (non)action by LD as it knows more than the gunner. Let the gunner learn his lesson by firing at the pilot and never hitting them. If LD's goal was to bring down an incoming bomber then his knowledge would have given him some other options that you and gunner could not comprehend, much less think of yourself.

Maybe you should make a flowchart of how LD would make the decision. I think that the only thing that matters is what LD knows the pilot will do. LD's solution is based mostly on that.

Again, the pilot alters his flight if the aircraft is attacked (sees the muzzle flashes), that happens only after the LD's firing solution, so LD cannot just extrapolate from the present something that isn't yet done. — ssu

Yet here you are without a Law of Everything predicting that the pilot would perform evasive maneuvers in the future. Now, expand that to an infinite level of precision as LD would have and would you be able to say the same thing about what LD can forecast?

Here's the most important issue: LD just cannot extrapolate from the past, it has to make a choice when to give the firing solution and what firing solution. That's different what Laplace had in mind. There's many ways to do this, but it isn't simple extrapolation. — ssu

How so? Isn't that how we make any decision in that we must choose what and when to do it? We have to choose how and when to launch a space probe to Mars and we've done it multiple times successfully, more than just random chance would allow.

My question is, why did the NASA scientists not need to account for the solution to get to Pluto in the solution to get to Pluto and New Horizons still arrive at Pluto? Sure, it seems that if they tried to include the solution in the solution the New Horizons project would never moved past the planning stage, but it did by not accounting for it and the solution was a success. As I said before, some information is irrelevant to the forecast being made. NASA scientists also did not account for the speed at which the weeds in my yard grow to get to Pluto either.

This actually is very crucial to our usual way of looking at this: if there's determinism, can there be free will? That's the typical way to look at it. The LD example gives another way to look at this: here the LD has to make a subjective decision because it cannot be just an objective onlooker. And once it does, so, then not all computations can be done as earlier. A lot sure, but not all.

Perhaps in a way our free will simply limits our ability to calculate/prove/extrapolate everything about the future, if it is deterministic. — ssu

I've never denied that determinism does not allow for free will. LD has no free will because it knows everything about everything in the present and can then extrapolate what it will do based on this understanding. Sure, it must account for it's own actions and decisions which makes it exponentially more complicated, but that just means it is impossible for you, not LD.

Certainly, the macro physical universe is deterministic. We can calculate a whole lot of what's going to happen in the future. We know when Haley's comet will be back again. We know when the next high tide will be on any beach. We can shoot a moving target with a gun, drive cars, play baseball, and any number of other things.

Even if the quantum world is truly not deterministic, it's probabalistic to a very predictable degree, making the macro deterministic. — Patterner

The observer effect in QM seems to indicate that we might be confusing the map with the territory, or the measurement with what is being measured. It appears that the events on the atomic scale are indeterministic, but it is actually our measurements (consciousness is an act of measuring and what we experience in our mind is really a measurement of the world, not the world as it is) that are incompatible with what is being measured. We are trying to use macro-scale measurements on quantum objects.

Forecast = an accurate model of future
interaction means simply that LD or someone interacts with something in the universe. This means that an accurate model of the future (the forecast) has to take this action into account. — ssu

What would an inaccurate forecast be called? A weatherman's forecast is not always accurate. It seems to me that a forecast is simply a mental model of the future in the present. Whether it is accurate or not is a different matter.

Regarding "interact", LD is part of the universe it is forecasting so it's actions aren't any different than any other action it needs to account for in making an accurate forecast.

As I've said, there is absolutely no problem for LD when it isn't making the firing decision. But if it would be assisting the gunner, do notice that the equations isn't what Laplace was talking about: LD has to take into account his own firing decision. After all, the pilot will correct his flight path when he see's the muzzle flash, and then LD has had to give the firing solution. So when does the pilot alter his flight path, when the gun is fired and when LD has made it's firing solution. So the correct forecast is dependent of the forecast made itself. — ssu

With LD the solution would have included where the pilot would turn when they see the flash because the pilot is no different than any other obstacle, conscious or not, that might change the forecast between the moment one makes the forecast and the time the event that was forecasted to happen. The further ahead in the future the event is forecasted the more information you need to make an accurate forecast.

For a non-LD gunner, missing the pilot informs them what they missed in their prior forecast. You only know you made a mistake when you have more information.

But here's the point: the LD having to take it's actions into account already refutes Laplace's idea. Laplace wasn't talking about game theory. — ssu

How so when all of LD's actions that occur is part of reality that it is forecasting? Knowing everything about everything with infinite precision is knowing everything about itself too. If it has a causal relation with reality it is effectively part of reality and it's actions are no different than any other action, conscious or not, that must be accounted for in their forecast.

If LD knows everything about everything with infinite precision, then by definition "everything" includes human behaviors.
— Harry Hindu
No. that is incorrect. It's not almighty God. It doesn't know the future. It knows only the past. — ssu

That's not how I interpreted what Laplace said. What it knows is basically the "Theory of Everything" in the present. It is not defined as knowing the past. The past is something it has to extrapolate from the present state of the universe and it's Theory of Everything, just as it has to do with the future. For LD, it wouldn't actually be a "Theory" of Everything. It would be the Law of Everything.

But that is the question we are tying to answer. Ssu's "veto" and "free will" need to be defined. Even then our understanding of the brain is incomplete and we simply don't know how the brain makes decisions and what role the mind plays, or its relationship with the brain (the hard problem). The definition of LD seems to indicate that it knows the answers to the hard problem and fully understands how the brain works and what a mind is, and we don't, yet here we are asserting what LD knows or doesn't know from our own point of ignorance.

The quote can be found on anything number of sites...
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.
— Laplace
I believe this is saying that LD knows everything about everything IF everything about everything is deterministic. That, I believe, is the point of Laplace's thought experiment.

But if all of reality is not deterministic, LD's calculations would not be able to figure everything out. Comparing what, based on its calculations, it says the universe would look like at any given point with what the universe actually looks like, there would be discrepancies. I suppose LD would say, "Something non-deterministic took place at that spot." — Patterner

And that would be perfectly accurate for LD to say because once you assert an event was non-deterministic it requires no further explanation. Only in asserting determinism does one either need to further explain what initial conditions existed that determined the subsequent conditions and so on ad infinitum, or until you arrive at some non-determined condition that has always existed or something comes from nothing.

Then LD isn't really useful in determining whether or not the universe is deterministic. It is assumed that it is, hence LD. We would need to determine whether or not the universe if deterministic ourselves to then determine the validity of LD, but LD was never useful in allowing us to discover that fact.

The question then is if the universe is not deterministic, then why does it appear that it is? How are we able to make consistent predictions and when our predictions fail we can point to some information we lacked in making the prediction. We only know that our prediction failed when we have access to new information.

But there's the catch: that isn't interaction.

And even worse: that isn't a forecast. — ssu

Then define "interaction" and "forecast". It seems to me that every thing (atoms, molecules, cells, organs, organisms, societies, planets, solar systems, galaxies, and universes) is an interaction of smaller parts and technology is based on the science it is built on, and science is based on forecasting based on existing observations. Every time you use technology you are testing the forecast science has made regarding how the universe works.

Hope you see the point why you could not give an accurate forecast here. And it's likely that people don't bother to make a forecast when the game is told to them. First they'll think it's a 0.5 chance of getting it right or something. — ssu

Actually, I predicted that you would type 1 based on the conditions you provided, so I was able to give an accurate "forecast". I wouldn't really call it a forecast as you told me what you would do. :meh:

But this problem does come around in real world implications: — ssu

Then what use is it? A problem that does not come around in real world implications seems to be just a misuse of language.

When you think about, the problem is really similar: you can have all the flight data and tracking data of the target aircraft, know the perfomance specs of the aircraft and get a firing solution a the present for the future location some seconds in the future. If the aircraft isn't aware that it's shot and and follows the same line, it likely will get hit. But if the pilot has noticed your AA gun and will change the course after you have fired the artillery projectile, then no matter how accurate your targeting data and fire control was, you will miss or it's just a lucky chance you will hit the aircraft. — ssu

You're missing a key point of LD, and that is it knows everything about everything with infinite precision. The pilot and the gunner are both part of the everything about everything with infinite precision, so by definition LD would know how the gunner and pilot will react. LD would have predicted that the ability to evade the shot from the AA gun would have been the catalyst to develop new technology that cancels out the pilots ability to evade.

All you have done is explain how certain events in the world whether they are acts of humans, stars, disease, etc. can have an impact on our predictions of the future. I don't disagree with that as that is what I have been saying as well. It is you that is making a special case for human behavior, as if it has some special power to throw a wrench into our predictions where other events do not. It seems like you are basically begging the question of free will by implying that humans have this special power of freedom that disrupts potential predictions. If LD knows everything about everything with infinite precision, then by definition "everything" includes human behaviors.

The problem here isn't that we don't have all the relevant information, it's that you can use that relevant data even make an extrapolation and then do something else. That is basically negative self reference. — ssu

Yet we do it all the time. We use past experiences and an understanding of physics and calculus to make accurate predictions in getting to Pluto, using a computer, driving a car, riding a bike, etc. Even using our body parts in walking, holding, etc. is using our learned knowledge to be able to do these things. You don't remember but it took an effort to learn to walk and use your hands and only by repeatedly trying, observing the effects and trying again (a sensory feedback loop) do you become proficient. We use past information to acquire knowledge of the present and future. If all you can point to is some anthropomorphic notion of events in making a special pleading for human behaviors as a critique of using information to make predictions, then your argument is flawed.

I really have no idea. All I know is that quantum mechanics is supposed to be an argument against the LD. I don't know if that argument prevails or not, but not knowing would be an argument against LD, wouldn't it? — frank

Yea, I guess the revision is that however it works, LD knows how it works.

That's if you limit LD to so-called physical events, which automatically excludes non-physical things like numbers and mental states. We could imagine an LD that has knowledge of the non-physical stuff, right? — frank

I believe it is only the Copenhagen interpretation of QM that asserts that it is an argument against LD. I don't recall the definition of LD as restricting it's knowledge to physical events. It is simply defined as knowing everything about everything with infinite precision. As such, any criticism of LD based on our current knowledge of thermodynamics and quantum mechanics is flawed because our current knowledge of these things is incomplete so it is possible that reality is different than the way we describe it using terms like "physical". By definition, LD would have access to all dimensions and all space and time.

This is what I was asking about before, is the randomness we observe really a product of our own ignorance, the state of our minds and the information we have access to at any given moment, or is the randomness something inherent to reality outside of our minds? If the former then LD will know how to solve the problem of integrating quantum mechanics with classical/macro physics. If the latter then LD is invalid.

LD is defined as knowing everything about everything with infinite precision. I would think "everything about everything" does not limit LD to "physical" phenomenon. It just might be the case that the world is not physical at all and LD would know this and therefore be able to explain what consciousness is and it's relation with the rest of the world.

LD would also know that under special relativity there is no universal now. It would know the entire universe without any frame of reference - a view from no where. For LD there would be no present moment. All events would be accessible to it without limitations.

Chalmers adapted LD to accommodate quantum physics by just making it open ended. In other words, the demon knows how events unfold, however that may be (I think that's what he meant anyway). So couldn't we have an LD that know mental states and however it is they evolve? — frank

LD is defined as knowing everything about everything, which I would assume would include the solution to the hard problem.

I'm not sure that I'm understanding you correctly. Maybe I should have asked for an everyday real-world example - predictions that we make in our everyday lives that are either correct or incorrect, and how our correct or incorrect prediction came about by having or not having the proper information was not the case. Predicting that someone will write 1s or 2s at the beginning of their posts is not something we normally do.

Think about how I gave examples of sending a spacecraft to Pluto, or predicting where an asteroid will be 100 years from now, or your prediction that typing on a key on the keyboard will produce a letter on the screen, or your prediction that when you call a friend they will answer instead of going to voicemail, or what you will have for lunch tomorrow, etc.

It seems to me that there are many predictions that require your interaction to be correct, as in the case of you predicting that a k will appear on the screen when you type k on the keyboard. The k will not appear if you do not interact. In this case, your interaction is necessary for your prediction to come true, and necessarily absent for it to not be true (unless someone else comes along and types k on the keyboard for you).

No, It's not the lacking information, it's that interaction creates new information/situation. With negative self reference, there really isn't the capability just to extrapolate it from the old information. — ssu

Can you give a real-world example?

ANY interaction between the moment I predict a possible future and that potential future event occurring can render my prediction wrong. My actions are no different that anyone, or anything else's interaction with the world that causes certain effects.

Upon reading my post did you not formulate a response
— Harry Hindu
Sorry if I misunderstood you. Perhaps I didn't get the point. — ssu

After reading my post did you have some idea about how you would respond and then predict that typing on the keyboard would display your response on the screen? How did your interaction with the computer change your prediction that the computer will display your response on the screen? You had to have some model of the future in typing your words, or else why would you be tapping your fingers on the keyboard in the first place? Your model of the future was of your ideas being on the screen for me to see. If your interaction with the computer changes the outcome then how can you ever hope that what you intend to be on the screen is what ends up on the screen?

I'll try, I hope you have the time and the patience to go through it. If I repeat too much, mark then just understood and I go further. — ssu

If one does not have patience then one should not be engaging in philosophy. :cool:

Let's define "the future" as the all the events that really happen. Hence it is incoherent of talking that the "future" changed, the future is what happens.

Classic determinism starts from this kind of World view that "the future" is this line of events that will happen in the block universe going from the present to the future. Hence everything is determined. — ssu

I agree. Let me go further and say that I'm kind of in line with Einstein with his idea of block time, or block universe. One might say that the future has already "happened" and we are just playing it all out and perceive the flow of time as a result of participating in this block universe. Think about it like a first person computer game that has been coded in its entirety. The beginning, middle and end are all coded, but you as the player must play it out from beginning to end, with some parts of the world you never interact with even though they exist as code and are there to be called if you ever visit that part of the game world. You can even play the game differently each time doing things in different order but still eventually arriving at the end of the game. The game code is like the block universe in that everything has already happened and you are just a participant. It is the playing of the game that gives rise to the flow of time as a participant in this block universe.

A correct prediction of "the future" is a model, that is a true model that depicts the future. — ssu

Right, so the model and the future are two separate things. The model exists in the present moment as an idea and the other is the actual events that are "yet to happen".

It is the model, not the future that causes you to behave in certain ways so that your prediction is realized. This is why you tapped your fingers on the keyboard because you predicted that the appropriate letters would appear on the screen as you typed them and that the post would be successfully submitted after you click the Post Comment button.

Now Laplaces argument goes that with all information of the past and present and knowledge how things work, an entity can then extrapolate the future precisely, extrapolate the correct model of the future.

What's the problem? The entity being an actor in the universe. A lot of his actions don't have an effect on the future (the Milk Way will collide with Andromeda 4,5 billion years from now or something...), and some of his effects of his actions can be taken into effect. But in some situations, the entity simply cannot predict the future from the way Laplace stated. The extrapolation is simply impossible, yet still, there does exist a "the future" and thus a correct model of the future.

Are you still with me or did I loose you? — ssu

You simply said that the entity cannot predict the future but provide no reason as to why it would be impossible. But we know that we can predict the future accurately in many instances, but sometimes we cannot. What creates this distinction if not having access to the proper information or not?

I would need examples of what you are talking about - instances where we have a model of some moment in the future in the present moment that are not realized because of something we, as opposed to someone, or something, else. For instance, we can predict where a certain near-Earth asteroid will be in 100 years but some other event could happen within 100 years that could render our prediction wrong. It wasn't anything I did, or an interaction I had. It was something else entirely, like another asteroid colliding with it diverting its trajectory.

My point is that anything, not just you, could prevent your model from being correct. Any interaction you take is no different than any other interaction, like the two asteroids colliding, that could render your model as inaccurate. This is all that I mean by lacking information about what is happening now, in the past, or in the future that might affect your future model.

It depends on how far in the future we are talking about. Your model of the future where your ideas appear on the screen after typing them is more immediate than your model of where an asteroid will be in 100 years. There is a lot more information that needs to be known the more distant the future event is that you are tying to model, which is why you have less certainty of your model of distant events in the future.

What does then this mean. Well, you can say that the future is determined, but that there's a logical reason why we cannot know everything about the future. Why? Because the our actions at the present make a simple (hardly simple, but anyway...) extrapolation from the past information impossible.

Hence we have to use other many times not so exact models to describe the future. NASA engineers and astronomers can still rely basically on Newtonian physics to calculate the future state of the planets, but in some cases it isn't so. — ssu

But the present moment is the past relative the future model you have. For you to have an accurate model of the future, you must have an accurate model of not just the past, but the present and any future event that happens between now and the future you are predicting. Like I said, the further in the future you are trying to predict leads to a higher degree of uncertainty because its not just what is happening in the present that must be accounted for, but also any interaction in the future that happens before the event you are modeling. Again, all we are talking about is a lack of information about this block universe in all moments. Is it impossible to predict everything? Yes, because of a lack of information of all the events in the block universe, not for any other reason.

We do not have access to all the information necessary to say with certainty why any particular event happens.
— Harry Hindu
Not even so. Even if you have all the information, it still isn't possible. Let me explain:

Even if you would have all the information necessary to say with certainty why any particular event happens, that doesn't mean you can say the what will happen. You are part of the universe. You saying something can effect what is going to happen. Hence you saying anything, doing anything, can have an effect on what you ought to forecast. And what about when the future depends totally on what the forecast you give about it? You basically have the possibility of negative self reference and you cannot overcome that law of logic: you cannot say what you don't say. — ssu

I don't see how any of this disagrees with what I said. All you are doing is just describing another instance of us lacking information about all the causes that lead to a particular effect.

Not only that but it is deeply flawed. Upon reading my post did you not formulate a response in your mind and then harness your intent to communicate it by typing it out and then clicking the Submit button? Did your response appear on the screen as you had intended? If yes, then you obviously can make predictions about the future that involve your own actions and what you have to say.

The fluttering of a butterfly's wings in Africa has no effect on your typing your post and submitting it. You don't need to know everything to be able to predict something. How were NASA engineers able to predict the New Horizons spacecraft's rendezvous with Pluto when it is billions of miles away and takes years to get there? How is it that the technology that you rely on keeps working as predicted? Your argument only carries weight if we are talking about the future of the universe as a whole, but not for particular instances of a local system within the universe. A lot of information is irrelevant to making predictions about specific, small-scale events.

Possibilities and probabilities are just ideas in the present moment.
— Harry Hindu
Or I would say a great way make a useful model of the future what we cannot exactly know, especially many times when we do have this kind of interaction going on.

They do not exist apart from the process of our making some decision in the present moment.
— Harry Hindu
So, cannot we then define the future to be what really will happen? We can, but that doesn't help us much. Far better models perhaps can be the idea of a multiverse where we end up in some distinct reality. — ssu

I don't understand this. Can you clarify?

I was simply asking what the ontology of a "possible future" is. Are "possible futures" ideas that only exist in minds? Or are they external to the mind in the form of a quantum wave function or multiverses?

I have no idea what this topic is about. If I go to my refrigerator and take out the ham and cheese for a sandwich, then put it back and make pb&j, have I changed the future? Is that the idea? — Patterner

Did we really change the future or our belief of the future? We believed that we were going to have a ham sandwich, but are now preparing a pb&j sandwich, so we believe that we will be having pb&j for lunch except for the fact that we were ignorant to the fact that our friend is on their way to our house with chicken wings to share with us for lunch, so we end up having chicken wings for lunch and the pb&j is eaten for dinner instead. In this case, it wasn't any decision that I made that changed my possible future. It was my friends choices that determined my future.

there is a distinction between what the future is and our knowledge about the future. The same could be said of our knowledge about the past and even the present. We do not have access to all the information necessary to say with certainty why any particular event happens.

Ideas of possibilities, probability, randomness, etc. stem from the act of conflating our knowledge of the future with the future that is (the determined future). Where do possible futures exist relative to the present, past and the future that is, prior to us making some decision? Are possible futures ontological or epistemological?

Some future event will have a causal relation with another future event further down the causal chain. Do possible future events have any causal power? In what sense are possible futures real? In what way do possible futures exist independently of our minds to say that these things exist prior to making a decision and then change based on some decision that is made?

Possibilities and probabilities are just ideas in the present moment. They do not exist apart from the process of our making some decision in the present moment.

Those are the future possibilities, and it is because such future possibilities exist, it can be reasonable to hold people morally accountable for their actions. Knowledge that one will be held accountable may very well result in better behavior than would be the case if no accountability were expected. — Relativist

I believe that what makes one morally accountable for their actions is that one's actions contribute to a much higher degree to the consequences of those actions than some event prior to making the decision. The Big Bang and the formation of the solar system and evolution have much less of an impact on the consequences of some action than the act of some individual does. Some "possible" future has nothing to do with it because "possible" futures are just ideas in the present when making some decision. There is no "possible" future that can exist independently from the act of making some decision in the present.

We see colours. Colours are mental phenomena, perhaps reducible to activity in the primary visual cortex, often caused by light interacting with the eyes (although not always given the cases of dreams and hallucinations). That's indirect realism.

Direct realism claims that colours are mind-independent properties of distal objects à la the naive realist theory of colour.

These are quite clearly different positions and at least one of them is wrong. I say that the scientific evidence supports the former and contradicts the latter, e.g. from here:
A stimulus produces an effect on the different sensory receptors, which is being transmitted to the sensory cortex, inducing sensation (De Ridder et al., 2011). Further processing of this sensory stimulation by other brain networks such as the default mode, salience network and frontoparietal control network generates an internal representation of the outer and inner world called a percept (De Ridder et al., 2011). Perception can thus be defined as the act of interpreting and organizing a sensory stimulus to produce a meaningful experience of the world and of oneself (De Ridder et al., 2011). — Michael

This "evidence" sounds like a description from a naive realist, or someone who is describing the nature of perception from a naive realist perspective.

Where is the evidence for how neural activity interacts with the colors your experience? How does that happen? Is that a direct interaction? Neurologists talk as if they have a naive realist view of the brain as a physical object which creates the dualist dichotomy of the mind-body problem.

Indirect interactions are really accumulated direct interactions. It's possible that both indirect and direct realism are incorrect on their own, but true when understood that they are different parts of the same coin.

Indirect realism is dependent upon space and time having some objective existence where it takes time and space for the accumulated causes and their effects to happen. But what if space and time are like colors and are only mental phenomena? That would mean that the universe is happening all at once in the same place and everything is directly connected all at once. So your "scientific evidence" is based on a lot of assumptions.

Arguing over the grammar of "I experience X" leads to confusion and misses the substance of the dispute entirely. See here. — Michael

I can't argue with you about something you have been vague and evasive about. If I don't know what you mean by your use of certain words, then I can't make any coherent argument about anything you've said.

The whole point of asking where "I" is in relation to the things that are being perceived is to show that distal objects are only distal based on where "I" is. Mental phenomena are distal in the same way that your neural activity is, in that I can't directly observe them, I only use them as explanations for your behaviors. Like you said,:

Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc. — Michael

It depends on the parts we are talking about to then say that something is "distal" or not, or which parts are direct or not.

The question is whether or not I directly perceive some distal object. That I directly perceive some aspect of the world (i.e. my mental phenomena) isn't that I directly perceive the particular aspect of the world that direct realists claim we directly perceive (i.e. the distal object). — Michael

I don't see how using "direct" and "indirect" is useful here. We perceive objects. If there is no difference in the information acquired, then there is no useful distinction between "direct" and "indirect".

No, the hard problem of consciousness hasn't been resolved. Some believe that it is reducible to brain activity (e.g. pain just is the firing of c fibres), and some believe that it is some mental phenomenon that supervenes on such brain activity. Either way, few (if any) believe that conscious experience extends beyond the body such that distal objects and their properties are literally present in conscious experience. — Michael

The observer effect does not assume that objects are present in conscious experience, rather that act of observing distal objects has an effect on those distal objects and how they are perceived.

Different parts of me directly interact with different parts of the world. My eyes directly interact with light, the neurons in my brain directly interact with each other, etc. — Michael

Then "direct" realism is the case? Again, if we can directly interact with certain parts of the world and a direct interaction is a necessary component of an indirect perception, then "direct" and "indirect" is a false dichotomy. It's not either or. It's both.

No it doesn't. "I feel pain" doesn't entail a homunculus. "I see shapes and colours when I hallucinate" doesn't entail a homunculus." Saying that these very same mental percepts occur when awake and not hallucinate doesn't entail a homunculus. You're just reading far too much into the grammar of "I experience X". — Michael

How can I be reading to much into the grammar when I'm just trying to get some clarification of your use of the word, "I".

But as it stands the science of perception supports indirect realism and so a direct realist must reject the science of perception, although I don't know how he can justify that rejection. — Michael

Have scientists been able to explain how a physical, colorless brain causes visual experiences, like visual depth and colors? How do colors come from something colorless?

What role does the observer effect in QM play here?

If a color is directly perceived and the wavelength is indirectly perceived, and your mind with all of it's colors and sounds and feelings, are part of reality, then isn't it safe to say that you directly experience part of the world? If so, then doesn't the distinction between indirect vs direct realism become irrelevant?

What part of you directly interacts with the world? What is "you" or "I" in this sense? If you define "you" and "I" as our bodies, then isn't your body directly interacting with objects by holding them and with light by opening your eyes? Indirect realism only makes sense if you define "you" and "I" as homunculus in your head.

I think that the indirect/direct distinction is a false dichotomy.

An apple reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm. When our eyes respond to light with a wavelength of 700nm we see a particular colour. We name this colour "red". We then describe an object that reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm as "being red". — Michael

If we know that the wavelength is 700nm and that the apple is reflecting this wavelength of light while absorbing others, then what is different in the knowledge that an indirect realist has vs a direct one?

What is useful in knowing that the wavelength if light being reflected in our eyes is 700nm? What is useful in knowing that the apple is red? What is useful is knowing that the apple is either ripe or rotten and the color of the apple informs us which is the case. If knowing the apple is ripe because it is red is knowing something about the apple instead of the light, what is different between what the direct realist knows vs the indirect one?

What is the difference between direct knowledge and indirect knowledge of something if you both end up knowing the same thing?

The indirect realist recognises that this colour I see is a mental phenomenon and that this colour is the intermediary through which I am made indirectly aware of an object with a surface layer of atoms with a disposition to reflect light with a wavelength of 700nm (assuming that this is a "veridical" experience and not a dream or hallucination). — Michael

What is the "I" that is made indirectly aware via mental phenomenon? How is it separate from the colours, mental phenomenon and other objects to say that the mental phenomenon is an "intermediary through which I am made indirectly aware..."

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. — Wittgenstein

The misuse of language induces evil in the soul. — Plato

There is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance. — Socrates

Understanding that misuses of language creates philosophical problems goes all the way back to the Greeks. Plato is not only warning us about misusing language in the sense of bad grammar or syntax. Speaking badly also includes saying untruths, telling lies, creating a conflict between speech and reality - between what is said and what is. To misuse language in this sense is to sound a false note in the music of creation - to put yourself out of tune with the way things are.

In his book, "Abuse of Language, Abuse of Power", the German philosopher Josef Pieper observes that we use language for two purposes: to describe reality and to communicate with other people. Each function implies the other. When we describe how things are, we describe them to or for somebody else. And when we communicate with others, we try to tell them something about reality: what else could we talk about?

The liar violates both of these purposes of speech. The liar withholds some part of reality from the listener, preventing them from participating in something by knowing it. Talk that fails to communicate becomes monologue, or worse, manipulation. Those who weave a web of contradictions never say anything at all.

The background for these observations about language and reality is Plato’s critique of his rivals, the sophists. Sophists were teachers who travelled around ancient Greece, getting rich by claiming to sell wisdom. Of course, what they sold was not wisdom at all, but only skill with words. The sophists sold success: for the right price, they said, you can learn how to use words to gain power and money in the political assembly. You can convince the courts to give you a share of your neighbor’s property, whether you deserve it or not. Socrates and Plato fought to define philosophy against this brazen quest for success at all costs.

The Greek sophists were the first nihilists, teaching that there is no such thing as truth. Or better: teaching that we can and should speak without regard to truth. The sophist is interested in reality only as a topic for impressive speeches. What you say does not matter; the only important thing is how you say it, which seems to be what many members of this forum think, by the way the write. By severing speech from reality, the sophist makes truth an optional add-in. "I will teach you how to speak well," they might say, "and you can decide whether to speak truths or lies." The difficulty here is that attempting to speak as though reality has no claim on me corrupts my relationships with the world and with other people. It degrades my humanity and damages my soul, as Plato would say.

Much of philosophy relies on deliberate misuse of language. Because literary skill is the rigorous use of language in the pursuit of truth, the habit of literature, of serious reading, is the best defense against believing the half-truths of ideologues and the lies of demagogues. The abusers of language are our modern sophists: unscrupulous marketers, lawyers, politicians, philosophers that believe language is a game, those who push content-free slogans in place of genuine communication about the world.

Sophistical speech always has an ulterior motive: when it does not aim at communicating the truth of something to another person, speech must be directed to some other goal, a goal of the speaker’s choosing. When it abandons communication, speech becomes manipulation, and the relationship of solidarity between speaker and audience, as co-seekers of truth, is fundamentally compromised.

No. You again showed that you are a fool. Stay safe. — Banno

Why so emotional, Banno? I'm not the one contradicting themselves. Are you in love with Witt, too?

Sure, when you keep committing logical fallacies, I'll keep saying you've made a logical fallacy. Just admit that your are emotionally attached to Witt and what he wrote.

I agree, language needs both description and acquaintance. Neither is sufficient by itself.

The Rosetta Stone couldn't be deciphered without there being something external to it. As Wittgenstein wrote 5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits, We cannot say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also. — RussellA

I really can't understand the need assert language as being external or distinct from the world or what it references. We can translate another language because it refers to the same world as the language we're translating to. It's a lame attempt to reject meaning as reference - a causal relation. Meaning is a causal relation. Language-use requires a medium and that medium is the world. Those the decipher languages exist in the world. The ideas that generate language use are in the world. You can't have it both ways. Language can't be part of the world AND external to it.

As part of our evolution, humans learned that causes lead to certain effects (tool-making, harnessing the power of fire, agriculture, etc.). We learned to harness that with language. All we are doing is participating in the same causal relations that are the world. Going from understanding that someone's behavior informs an observer of their inner thoughts to understanding that scribbles can inform a reader of the writer's inner thoughts seems like a logical/natural conclusion to reach. Effects inform us of their causes. The problem is in interpreting those relations as such, but our interpretation is subject to the same causal relations as everything else. How we interpret some observation is dependent upon prior observations.

3.12 The sign through which we express the thought I call the propositional sign. And the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

How do you get from "the proposition is the propositional sign" to "propositional signs are distinct from propositions"? — Harry Hindu

This is why you have so much difficulty, Harry. A proposition is distinct from a propositional sign in that a proposition projects out into the world — Banno

:roll: Did I hit a nerve? So you're saying that Witt is contradicting himself? I wouldn't have so much difficulty if you weren't just pulling your assertions out of your nether regions.

So you remain stuck at "meaning is reference". — Banno

You certainly haven't been any help in freeing me from this position because you can't adequately answer questions you should be asking yourself, so you'll remain stuck at "meaning is scribble games".
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That it is written is a condition for me to comment not a cause that leads necessarily to me commenting. — Fooloso4

That I was born is by change. The ability to comment is a necessary condition for me to do so, but my being born is not the cause of me commenting. — Fooloso4

Intellectual dishonesty and cherry-picking. All of this ignores what I said in the same post you are replying to:

You seem to think that a single distant cause must necessarily determine a single effect in the future. The further back in time you go from some effect, the more causes become necessary for that effect to occur, not just one. If you want to talk about the cause that directly precedes you leaving a comment on this forum, then we'd be pointing to the last step in the process which would be something like the software the forum is running on working correctly in displaying your comment after you clicked the submit button. — Harry Hindu

So you are arguing with a straw-man.

I am not commenting because of what my parents did or their parents or what the first human did or because of life itself or that out of which life emerged. — Fooloso4

:rofl: You aren't even aware that you keep contradicting yourself. If causes are not necessary, then what your parents or their parents did or what the first humans did would have no necessary causal relation with your birth, but here you assumed that it does, or else why would you have mentioned these causes (which was not part of my list of causes) if they don't necessarily cause your birth? And you want to lecture me on logical necessity? :brow:

Right. We can in some grossly inadequate way trace what happened back to other things that happened. That is as far as we can go. That things did happen this way is not the same as claiming they necessarily had to happen this way. — Fooloso4

And if they didn't happen this way then we would find different reasons or causes as to why it happened differently.

Because those causes do not lead to a single necessary outcome. It is only after the fact that we can say what that outcome was. Again, the same conditions might have led to a different outcome. What happens is only one of the possibilities of what might have happened. — Fooloso4

And you have yet to show an example of the same event that follows different causes. The problem is that every event is unique and so are their causes, but that isn't to say that events and their causes cannot be similar and it is the similarity that allows us to make predictions in the first place.

The conclusion follows from the premises, the premises do not cause a certain conclusion. — Fooloso4

What does it mean to follow, if not to be caused?

Cause:
The producer of an effect, result, or consequence.
The one, such as a person, event, or condition, that is responsible for an action or result.
A basis for an action or response; a reason.

So it sounds like we're saying the same thing, but using different terms.

It is tautological that something must be written in order for that writing to be commented on. That is an example of logical necessity. — Fooloso4

Which is the same as saying that something must be written (cause) for that writing to be commented on (effect). What reason do you have to think that something must be written for it to be commented on? Logical necessity is a type of causal necessity. Certain premises necessarily cause a certain conclusion to be true or false.

There is no necessity that I would comment. Since it is not by necessity, and the only necessity he recognizes is logical necessity, that I interpret his work is Zufall, "a sort of accident" (2.0121). The German term also means 'chance'. Now if you believe that nothing happens by chance then we have a fundamental disagreement. — Fooloso4

But you did comment and Witt writing something is ONE of the many causes that led to your commenting. You had to be born, read Witt and become enamored by his writings, create an account on this forum, and intend to comment on it. If none of this happened, would we see your comments on this screen? Wouldn't all of those be necessary for us to see your comments on this screen? If we don't see comments of yours on this screen, then we assume that there was another necessary cause as to why we don't see any more comments of yours on the screen. Either you got bored with the conversation, real-life happened, etc.

2. an event that happens by chance or that is without apparent or deliberate cause.
b :lack of intention or necessity : chance — Fooloso4

Now, if what you're saying were the case, then comments of yours would just appear on this screen even though you were never born.

If you accept Laplace's demon then it is only by ignorance that we cannot determine a future that is determinate. This, however, is an assumption not an established fact. — Fooloso4

As I pointed out, the issue only applies to future events. We don't have this problem in laying out prior causes for present events. As you pointed out, it is logically (causally) necessary that Witt write something for you to comment on it. Why is that? Why are we ignorant of the future effects of present causes but not so with present effects of prior causes?

If the necessary conditions underlie both A and B, then A is no more or less the necessary outcome than B. It is necessary that I know how to read and write and have a device I can use to respond to you on TPF, but whether or not I do respond and what I will say if I do respond is not determined by necessity. — Fooloso4

But as we have shown different necessary conditions underlie both A and B. Witt writing something is a necessary condition, as well as all of the other conditions are necessary, for you to comment on it (A). Different necessary conditions would lead to B - you not commenting. Even though Witt wrote something, saying that doesn't necessarily mean you will comment on what he wrote is being disingenuous to the fact that there would be necessary conditions for you not doing so, such as you never being born.

You seem to think that a single distant cause must necessarily determine a single effect in the future. The further back in time you go from some effect, the more causes become necessary for that effect to occur, not just one. If you want to talk about the cause that directly precedes you leaving a comment on this forum, then we'd be pointing to the last step in the process which would be something like the software the forum is running on working correctly in displaying your comment after you clicked the submit button.

You obviously do not agree and assume some hidden causal nexus that can only lead to a single outcome that is already determined by conditions that extend back to some state of initial conditions of the universe. — Fooloso4

What is the nexus of logical necessity? What makes it hidden when it comes to causal necessity, but obvious when it comes to logical necessity?