Comments

  • Do Atheists hope there is no God?
    It wasn't me who brought up the issue of "degree in cognitive psych". How does it answer the OP question or anything? — Apollodorus
    How does it answer anything? Well, that was a response to this:
    People do tend to be reluctant to admit their own fears but that doesn't mean that those fears don't exist. Ask psychologists and they'll tel you. — Apollodorus
    ...sounds pretty relevant to me. You speculated about fears people have that they don't admit, and appealed to psychologists. 180 proof has a degree in cognitive psychology.

    I read that as a pretty reasonable response.
  • Do Atheists hope there is no God?
    Something isn't right there, don't you think? — Apollodorus
    Yes. I quoted the thing that's not quite right. Here it is again:
    If you've got a degree in "cognitive psych" then why can't you explain atheists' fear of religion? — Apollodorus
    I quoted it in my first post.

    You're pretending to be more reasonable than you evidentially are being.

    And you keep replying, over and over and over. And yet, none of your replies justify this level of speculation.
  • Do Atheists hope there is no God?
    But it isn't a reason to deny the theoretical possibility that in some cases at least atheism may be motivated by fear of something higher than oneself. — Apollodorus
    I think you're missing the objection. It is theoretically possible that some atheist somewhere is scared of a being higher than his/her self.

    But you have treated at least a variant of this seriously at least once:
    If you've got a degree in "cognitive psych" then why can't you explain atheists' fear of religion? — Apollodorus
    ...that phrasing suggests something quite distinct from "in some cases at least"; it suggests that this is a representative pattern.

    But as it stands, you still have yet to offer any justification that this is indeed the case.
    Could this be the case of 180? — Apollodorus
    And this is where you get even more nefarious. Apparently, @180 Proof has a condition; he's got a hidden fear of a being higher than himself he does not himself recognize, that drove him to research cognitive psychology. And the proof for this is that questioning it has not yet been proven, and his reaction to your gaslighting is emotional.

    Here's where I stand by the way in my expected burdens. That you might find among 7 billion citizens on the planet a particular atheist who is scared of a higher being? Fairly reasonable, but still need at least one good reason to buy it. That this is a representative pattern of atheists demanding an explanation in cognitive psychology? That smells quite dubious to me. That 180 Proof fits your descriptions? That sounds like an irresponsible fantasy.
  • Do Atheists hope there is no God?
    The most prudent thing an atheist could do is to say nothing. Otherwise, he has essentially endorsed another belief system. — 3017amen
    I'm not sure you're following this discussion.

    Let's grant that an atheist says something. Let's grant that said atheist cannot defend it. What has that to do with whether this atheist is afraid of the thought of there being anything higher than himself?
  • Do Atheists hope there is no God?
    If you can't prove your own statements why would anyone take them seriously? — Apollodorus
    Exactly.
  • Do Atheists hope there is no God?
    Why would they hope that? Possibly because they're afraid of a higher power, so fear would be a possible motivation. — Apollodorus
    Or possibly any other reason. I'm out of milk. Possibly it was stolen by a gremlin.
    And you haven't proved that this isn't the case. — Apollodorus
    Since when does not proving something isn't true justify that the thing is?

    You're being asked to provide proper justification, not excuses. You can choose to provide excuses if that's all you have, but you should realize that if this is your choice then you're basically asking people to not take you seriously.
  • Do Atheists hope there is no God?
    Not at all. It wasn't a "conclusion", it was a suggestion that I thought was already implied in the question - as already indicated. — Apollodorus
    A suggestion based on what?
    Just because you're labeling something (A), (B), (C), doesn't make your conclusion valid. — Apollodorus
    You've got this backwards. My conclusion is that (A) is lacking proper justification.

    You have to give proper justification for A before it can be taken seriously. I don't have to prove you didn't offer such a thing.
  • Do Atheists hope there is no God?
    (A) Atheists are afraid of the thought of there being anything higher than themselves hence they hope there isn't. — Apollodorus
    (B) People do tend to be reluctant to admit their own fears but that doesn't mean that those fears don't exist. (C) Ask psychologists and they'll tel you. — Apollodorus
    (D) I don't know why you're always jumping to conclusions. — Apollodorus
    Actually, (A) is jumping to conclusions. (C) is just a weird appeal to authority in an attempt to back up (B); it's weird because (B) is more an excuse to believe (A) without evidence than legitimate evidence for (A).
    Yeah, when you run out of arguments you start using threats and abusive language. — Apollodorus
    It's interesting that you would perceive a challenge to your jumping to the conclusion of (A) as threats and abusive language, especially in light that you offer emotional excuses to back (A) as opposed to legitimate reasons to believe it.
    If you've got a degree in "cognitive psych" then why can't you explain atheists' fear of religion? — Apollodorus
    Just to point out, (A) has mutated from fear of a higher power to fear of religion.

    Regardless, speaking of jumping to conclusions, it's kind of silly asking for an explanation for something that doesn't exist.
    Otherwise, I do find that your point about politics, and some athiest's emotional defensiveness as it were — 3017amen
    Emotional responses to gaslighting are easy to explain.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    Suppose I wanted to prove S = some dogs are black. I begin looking for black dogs and either I find one or I don't. — TheMadFool
    You want to prove S. So you're going to "set about trying to prove it" by commencing a task P. Essentially, P is a search algorithm; you're searching for a black dog.

    So let's say there are n dogs. Here's a table:


    Briefly, "row" is just a label; "claim" is what you are claiming and/or want to prove; "will prove" is what you'll wind up proving; "# dogs" is the number of dogs (set to n for all rows); "# black" is the number of those dogs that are black; "min" is the minimal number of dogs you check before you're done with P; and "max" is the maximum number of dogs you check before you're done with P.
    In regard to difficulty in re existential claims that pertain to the physical, it goes without saying they're much easier to prove than their negations but, as your example shows, positive existential claims that are amenable deduction are sometimes harder to demonstrate than their negations. — TheMadFool
    In the table above, the min and max columns are metrics of difficulty. What drives both min and max to be n on rows 1 and 2 is the fact that # black is 0, not the fact that you're claiming S (row 1) or ~S (row 2). In fact, each pair of rows {1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, and {7, 8} show the same min and max metric.
    In other words, it's harder to prove S than ~S. — TheMadFool
    But the claim has nothing to do with the difficulty (e.g., row 1 is exactly as difficult as row 2). The difficulty (how many things you need to search) depends on the state of affairs (in this view, how many black dogs there are). You don't know that state of affairs until you finish the task P, and once you do that, you no longer need burden of proof... it's already been met.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    The ordinary proof that the square root of 2 is irrational is not a proof by contradiction. — TonesInDeepFreeze
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_contradiction#Irrationality_of_the_square_root_of_2
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    Proof by contradiction/indirect proof works well for both positive and negative claims. It doesn't favor one or the other. — TheMadFool
    I think you're focused too much on proof by contradiction.

    Essentially, I gather you're imagining a "proof by testing each case" kind of method. By your difficulty metric, the difficulty of a proof is proportional to the number of cases you have to test by that method. The weakness of this approach is simply that it only applies when you're using "proof by testing each case". The irrationality of square root of two can be demonstrated using proof by contradiction, but that just so happens to be one other proof method besides "proof by testing each case". We can also prove things like "there are no even numbers greater than 2 that are prime"; such is also an easy proof, but it does not require proof by contradiction per se... it can be proven by simply examining the definitions of even and prime, and working things out by theory.

    If you wish to measure the difficulty of proving something, you need to account for all methods of proof, not just proof by testing each case.
    Coming to direct proofs, firstly, my argument that positive claims are easier to prove than negative ones, especially existential ones, stands. — TheMadFool
    Not really, because your argument is making a false comparison. You're kind of committing the epistemic equivalent of a base rate fallacy.

    Using the proof by testing each case method, you're comparing the work to prove ExP if ExP were true to the work to prove ~ExP if ~ExP were true; by doing so, you're ignoring what happens when you try to prove ExP if ~ExP were true and when you try to prove ~ExP if ExP were true. If you just take that into account, you would quickly realize that the claim is not what drives the difficulty you're talking about; but rather, the state of affairs is what drives it. If I'm trying to show there are black dogs, but it turns out there aren't, I still have to test every dog before I find out my mistake. If I'm trying to show there aren't any black dogs, but it turns out there are, I still stop early once I find the black dog.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    2. No As are Bs — TheMadFool
    There are no two integers p, q such that (p/q)^2=2.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    If ExP is true, then that requires a task, call it TaskE.
    If ~ExP is true, then that requires a task, call it TaskN.
    TaskE and TaskN are different.     — TonesInDeepFreeze
    Sorry, you're just repeating yourself.
    And there's an analogy to it in mathematics [I'm simplifying somewhat]:
    Let P be a computable property of natural numbers.     — TonesInDeepFreeze
    Sure, so say I write a program P to methodically check for counterexamples to the Goldbach conjecture (methodical in the sense that if there's a counterexample to be found it will check that counterexample in a finite amount of time). I'll grant that knowing whether P will halt or not is interesting. I'll grant that knowing if the GC is true or not is interesting. And I'll grant that the former is equivalent to the latter.

    But what is so interesting in saying "'the task P if the Goldbach conjecture is true' is a different task than 'the task P if the Goldbach conjecture is false'"? And what meaningful thing is conveyed when you say that, as opposed to, say, just saying it's the same task, and we just don't know if it will halt or not?
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    They cannot both be true. — TonesInDeepFreeze
    If they cannot both be true, then I'm not sure you're telling me anything interesting or meaningful when you say they are not the same task. There's a task that may or may not halt at (a), and may or may not halt at (b). About all you are telling me is that if we count the possible tasks as two tasks, we get two. But you seem to acknowledge that the task cannot both halt at (a) and halt at (b). So, sure, if we count what doesn't happen as a different thing, we get two, but why is that interesting?
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    Also, if discovery of proof proceeds by one-by-one examination of things, then yes, if ExP is true, then the sequence of proving by one-by-one examination for ExP is finite, while, if ~ExP is true, then the sequence of proving by one-by-one examination for ~ExP is indeterminate. And that holds with the example of "There is a black dog" vs. "There is not a black dog". They are not the same task. — TonesInDeepFreeze
    I wouldn't think this would have to be said, but I'm making the assumption that ExP and ~ExP cannot both be true.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    On what exactly? — TheMadFool
    It depends on how reasonable the claim is.
    Which is easier or conversely which is harder? — TheMadFool
    The question is supposed to be about burden of proof.
    To assert [PA?], all I need is a single specimen of an A that is also a B (a black dog).
    To assert UN, I need to find and examine each and every dog on the planet and check if they're black/not.     — TheMadFool
    It would appear to me that these are the same task. You start looking at dogs. You stop when either: (a) you have found a black dog, or (b) you searched all of the dogs on the planet. The task is no more made easier by asserting there's a black dog than it is made more difficult by asserting there isn't one.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    I'm approaching the issue with an open mind without any preconceptions or prejudices. My aim was to discover for myself why the burden of proof has to be borne by those making a positive claim and not the one making a negative claim. — TheMadFool
    My answer would be, "it depends".
    By way of a possible reason, I found out that, insofar as existential claims are the issue, proving the positive is much, much easier than proving the negative. — TheMadFool
    I would hope that if X does not exist, it should be difficult to prove X does exist; otherwise, our proof method would be in question.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    You missed the point. — TheMadFool
    No, I didn't miss your point. I dismissed it. This was quite explicit in the last post... you explicitly asked if I meant that the positive claim was harder to prove than the negative claim. And I explicitly said no, that I meant that some negative claims can be reasonably held with less burden than other negative claims.
    To prove that a horse is fitting/running/anything at all, all that's required for me to do is to open the fridge. — TheMadFool
    But TMF, it's not that I deny how easy this is to prove, it's that I deny its relevance to burden of proof. If Joe says there's no horse running in his fridge, I would accept that claim without checking. If Frank says there's no molded butter in his fridge, I would not accept that claim without checking. Therefore I place different burdens on different negative claims. How easy it is to check the claim is irrelevant; in fact, it's easier to show there's no horse running in a fridge than it is to show there's no molded butter.
    Someone denying this to be possible — TheMadFool
    And who would that be?
    That's still possible. — InPitzotl
    I don't base my burden of proof here on what's possible; rather, it's based on what's reasonable:
    It is hypothetically possible that there is a horse none of us know about, which is so small, that it can indeed actually run in my fridge. But for such a horse to actually be running in my fridge, hypothetical isn't good enough... it must be actual. — InPitzotl
    Put it this way. Allow me to describe a game. We take 1,000,000 fridges (all nice and plugged in and operational, like mine is). Every time we find a fridge with molded butter in it, you pay me 20 bucks, but only on one condition. If we ever find a single of these 1,000,000 fridges with a horse running in it, you pay me nothing; instead, I pay you 5,000 bucks. I feel safe playing this game.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    So, you mean to say the positive statement, "a horse is in the fridge" is harder to prove than the negative statement, "a horse is not in the fridge"? — TheMadFool
    No; I mean that some negative claims, like "there is no horse running in my fridge", can be reasonably held with less burden than other negative claims, like "there is no mold growing on butter in my fridge".
    The latter seems to follow in an immediate sense from the fact that a horse can't fit in a fridge. Thumbelina (2001 - 2018) — TheMadFool
    The negative claim is about a horse running, not fitting, in my fridge. But we can bypass this. It is hypothetically possible that there is a horse none of us know about, which is so small, that it can indeed actually run in my fridge. But for such a horse to actually be running in my fridge, hypothetical isn't good enough... it must be actual. That's still possible. But lest you forget, I'm not talking about what's possible or what burden any particular claim has... I'm talking about the equivalence of burden between negative claims. It would be quite surprising, for good reason, to find a horse running in my fridge. It would not be nearly as surprising to find molded butter.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    Why? — TheMadFool
    I don't need to check the fridge... there isn't enough room in my fridge for a horse to run in it.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    On what basis do you claim that is? — TheMadFool
    I don't understand the question (quite frankly, I have problems even parsing it). Are you asking why I think claims of the non-existence of something are negative claims, or are you asking why I think not all negative claims have equivalent burdens?
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    Note you say "all of these are negative claims." That's an equivalence if ever there was one! — TheMadFool
    It is indeed! They are equivalent in that they are all negative claims. But I don't think they have equivalent levels of burden. I don't see the self-contradiction. 4 and 7 are equivalent modulo 3, but you'd better believe I'd prefer 7 red velvet cup cakes to 4!
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    I didn't mention any equivalences between negative statements — TheMadFool
    You explicitly did exactly that:
    4. The bear = god — TheMadFool
    ...that's the same quote in the post you replied to.
  • Proving A Negative/Burden Of Proof
    To assert p is true.

    If so, you need to justify p.     — TheMadFool
    You're oversimplifying this. Ignore the negative part and focus on burden. Compare the following claims:
    • There's no dangerous mold growing on butter in my fridge.
    • There are no squirrels running around in my fridge.
    • There are no horses running around in my fridge.
    • There are no trilobites crawling around in my fridge.
    • There are no gremlins running around in my fridge.
    All of these are negative claims, but they are clearly not equivalent.
    4. The bear = god — TheMadFool
    That's a bad analogy. You're trying to prime the pump by using an agreed upon extant entity (bear) in an unlikely place (house), but that's precisely what makes the analogy bad. Bears are demonstrably extant entities that would fit in a house... they are more like squirrels in a fridge.

    But the above negative list isn't complete. It's possible we might both disagree on the existence of gremlins, but we might agree on the test for the gremlin... open the fridge and look. If you see a gremlin, there's one in the fridge. If you don't, there isn't one.

    I'm not sure god in the fridge fits this criteria... I suspect you believe god is omnipresent, but god being in a fridge looks exactly like what an atheist would expect a fridge without a god in it to look like. If that were the case, and you were expecting the atheist to show you there's no god in the fridge, what exactly is it you expect the atheist to show you? I would argue this is incredibly different than the bear in the house scenario, where not only do we all believe bears exist, but we agree what it would look like to see a bear in a room.
  • Is the gambler's fallacy really a fallacy?
    It can only mean that out of 6 times rolling the dice, the 6 will occur one time, right? — spirit-salamander
    Wrong.
    The only surprise for the angels, which there must be if it is to be a game of chance, would be that on the second roll they absolutely cannot tell whether the second roll will be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. — spirit-salamander
    If it is impossible to get a 6 on the second throw, then the probability of getting 6 on the second throw is 0, not 1/6. And if the probability of getting a 6 on the second throw is 0, you're not really tossing a fair die. The probability of getting a 6 on any throw of a fair die toss is 1/6... so your angels aren't tossing a die.

    The results you get are realistic, but they fit a completely different game. This is something more like drawing number tiles from a bag like one does in scrabble. In this scenario, we have 6 tiles in the bag. You don't replace tiles between draws until the bag is empty, at which point you put exactly 6 tiles back. That is the game that gives the results you describe, not die tossing. And it's not the only game in town... the angels could draw from a bag of 12 tiles, with two tiles each numbered from 1 to 6.
    In a merely practical or pragmatic sense it would be a fallacy, but not in a theoretical one. — spirit-salamander
    Your theory is flawed though. If this is a fair die, the probability of it landing on each number is 1/6 on every throw.
    It could be here that for all eternity only the 6 is always rolled or that it never appears for all times. In the former case the probability for 6 would be 100%, in the latter 0%. — spirit-salamander
    That would almost never happen with fair die. But it could happen. But you're confusing the theoretical probability with frequentist probability here.
  • Water = H20?
    All references to the external world in a simulation are just labels for bits of computer code. If simulations are even metaphysically possible, which I doubt. — RogueAI
    "Bits" assumes classical computers, simulating classical universes. Try instead to imagine a quantum computer simulating classical universes. As mentioned, it's not a huge stretch to say that MWI is at least a natural version of this very thing... and MWI is at least a mainstream interpretation. This is probably close enough to consider viable and close enough to the simulation hypothesis to at least be relevant.
  • Water = H20?
    If this is a simulation, what would you define water as? A combination of things or computer code? — RogueAI
    To me, the word "water" is a label that I attach to a particular kind of thing in my environment. The stuff that comes out of my taps when I open them that I can hold with a cup... that comes clear and has a particular familiar taste, qualifies as water. The part of the question where I presume this is a simulation bears no relevance to the answer.
    It means reality is such that water is not made of particles, but is an idea. — RogueAI
    Under the MWI, it's not really made of particles either. Under MWI, it's not so much that it's an idea as it is that it's a portion of the universal wavefunction oriented in such a way as to interact with certain other portions of the wavefunction consistent to simulate something like classical physics. So in a roundabout way, MWI is kind of a simulation hypothesis itself.

    But under MWI, I can still meaningfully talk about water being H2O. All I need mean by making such a claim is that H2O under the model of chemistry works to describe the thing in my environment that I attached the label "water" to. Per the approach I take above, I don't need to change my entire vocabulary every time I entertain a new hypothesis about what the ultimate reality is... and why should I? What do theories of the ultimate nature of reality have to do with what I call the stuff coming out of my taps?

    To me, the pondering of the underlying nature of the thing is a separate concern... maybe it helps understand more fully what that stuff is that I attached the label to, but it doesn't really change it... I don't presume to start with a complete model of what water is, so I don't have anything to correct when I learn more about it.
  • Water = H20?
    I have no problem with water appears to be H2O. I have a problem with water is (=) H2O. — RogueAI
    Any description of the physical world by any person is simply a model. This includes the description "water is H2O".
    When you unpack "water is H2O" you immediately run into a problem: "water is H2O" means, among other things, that water is a combination of things. I don't agree that water is a combination of things. — RogueAI
    I have a deeper problem that starts when I unpack "combination of things".

    I can demonstrate what I mean by water being a combination of things using electrolysis. If you agree that we can make hydrogen and oxygen using electrolysis while simultaneously reducing the total amount of water in direct accordance with the model of chemistry, then in what sense does your claim that it's not a combination of things mean something?
  • Water = H20?
    The materialist, of course, will not accept that as an answer. That's the mechanics of the issue (which I take you to mean "how things really are"). — RogueAI
    No, that's not what I mean.

    If I mix baking soda with vinegar, it will bubble. The bubbling produces a gas we call carbon dioxide. That gas is heavy; you can actually pour it into a candle holder with a lit candle in it, and put the candle out in such a fashion.

    What I just described above is mechanics; there are chemical mechanics that I described and physical mechanics that I described. In describing this scenario, I did not attempt to convince you of any "true nature" of things. I did not deny the notion that baking soda is ultimately made of ideas. All I did was tell you what would happen if you do certain things.
    The fact that this is a dream doesn't entail that I think I'll be able to fly. — RogueAI
    Of course it doesn't! But if the fact that this is a dream doesn't commit you to think you'll be able to fly by wishing it, why do you think the fact that this is a dream commits you to think mixing baking soda with vinegar won't form bubbles, or that the resulting thing cannot be poured over a candle and put it out? I am reading you as saying that thinking this is a dream absolutely commits you to deny chemistry (aka that H2O is a thing).

    But I say hogwash. It no more commits you to deny chemistry than it commits you to think you can fly by wishing it so.
    An idealist in chemistry, when asked "why are you observing what you're observing", will ultimately claim, "I observe whatever the mind(s) creating this reality want me to see." The materialist chemistry teacher will not agree with that. — RogueAI
    Okay, but if the mind wants me, an idealist, to see chemical mechanics, why should I deny chemical mechanics? If the mind wants me to see that the bubbles from baking soda/vinegar puts out candles, why would I deny that doing so can put out candles? If it wants me to see twice as much gas as the negative end as the positive end, why should I deny that?

    I think you're too keen to connect chemistry to materialism here. Certainly it works under materialism, but it works just fine under idealism too.
  • Water = H20?
    How on Earth would this work under idealism? The ideas of hydrogen and oxygen somehow combine to form a new idea (water) that is still composed of two distinct ideas (hydrogen and oxygen)? And this works only if they can share other ideas (electrons) that orbit around it? — RogueAI
    Pretty much. You have exactly the same mechanics here as you do with materialism. The only difference is that you posit those things to be composed of ideas.
    As an idealist, I would say water is just part of the dream, and it will do whatever the dreamer wants it to do. ... We've all had dreams of snow and rain and clouds. Why not dreams where water appears to be a collection of tiny particles? In idealism, there really isn't "water" just like there's no "water" in our dreams. — RogueAI
    I don't think this works in practice. We don't have idealists trying to fly by wishing they can fly. They still live in the same world self proclaimed materialists do, and still buy the same airplane tickets.

    An idealist in a chemistry class will still note twice as much gas being collected at the negative probe as they would at the positive probe. Such consistent behaviors of the idea-of-water and the idea-of-DC-circuits, which seems independent of the wishes of the person performing the experiment, deserves names to call them for pragmatic reasons. "Hydrogen" is a perfectly good name for the gas that comes out at the negative end; that's what other English speakers call it. "Oxygen" is a fine name to call what comes out at the positive end. You could even go so far as to get a PhD in chemistry; even win Nobel prizes for it, and still be an idealist... all you're committing to is that somehow these descriptions are describing ideas.
  • Water = H20?
    Idealism doesn't have to be substanceless. — frank
    If I grant this, then the explanation is wrong. H2O can be an idealistic substance.
    We could conjure a kind of idealism that allows water, but not H20. — frank
    But for this to be an explanation we need to fit some relevance criteria. So long as we're world building, let's grant "this" universe is materialistic. And let's just imagine a universe B the same as this one, except "water" in universe B refers to what we would call a cow. So now in universe B, water is not H2O. But that doesn't quite sound like it should be relevant to the nature of meaning in "this" universe; it sounds, rather, that universe-B-water is simply a different kind of thing than this-universe-water.

    But let's compare this-universe to idealist-universe. We now have this-universe-water which refers to the same thing as H2O, and we have idealist-universe-water which is not. But is that relevant to meaning in this-universe, any more than universe-B water not being H2O is?

    These things don't sound the same as semantics as I understand it. Clark Kent, in this universe, is Superman. So Clark Kent and Superman refer to the same person. If Lois was defenestrated and Superman saved her, it follows that Clark Kent saved her. But if Lois believes Clark Kent will help her write her next article, it does not follow that she believes Superman will help her write her next article. Here, we're talking about meaning in this universe, so it sounds relevant.
  • Water = H20?
    That's going overboard to find a wedge to drive between the terms.
    It's much easier than that.     — frank
    I have a feeling you're not even having a conversation with me. Why then do you reply?

    First you didn't respond to what I wrote. Then you claimed you didn't understand what I wrote. Now you're taking issue with the fact that I even said something. None of your three comments addressed the concern I raised.

    The question I have is, why does idealism have to deny H2O? Again, a direct quote from RogueAI: "H2O only refers to a physical substance."

    Replying to me without answering this question is... kind of pointless.
  • Water = H20?
    I don't know what you're talking about. — frank
    I quoted this in my post:
    H2O only refers to a physical substance. — RogueAI
    Again, RogueAI is explaining why H2O and water mean different things. But his explanation is that, under idealism, H2O doesn't exist, since H2O has to be a substance.

    I find the explanation a bit off. Is it really true that idealists cannot be chemists? If it's not true, this cannot be the explanation for why H2O and water mean different things.
  • Water = H20?
    I think the difference mainly shows up when we're talking about what people know or believe. — frank
    You're talking about something completely different. I'm responding to @RogueAI talking about idealism-water, which is not in fact H2O, because H2O must be a substance.

    Put it this way. Which of these do you agree with or disagree with?

    • Regardless of whether materialism or idealism is true, if I apply a DC current to water, I will collect a gas at the negative end we can call hydrogen, and half as much gas at the positive end we can call oxygen.
    • IF materialism is true but NOT if idealism is true, if I apply a DC current to water, I will collect a gas at the negative end we can call hydrogen, and half as much gas at the positive end we can call oxygen.
    • The above, and the only reason we can't call this hydrogen and oxygen under idealism is that we're compelled to give them different names under idealism.

    The first makes idealism a red herring. The second is equivalent to a claim that idealism is trivially testable. The third is equivalent to a claim that idealism somehow compels you to assign terms differently. What I want explained to me is why H2O must be a substance, not why H2O and water are different concepts.
  • Water = H20?
    H2O only refers to a physical substance. — RogueAI
    I don't understand. Surely under idealism, if I open up my tap and let that stuff go into a cup, that's called water, right? Surely then, under idealism, if I run a DC current through the water and collect the bubbles off of the positive side, that's called oxygen, right? And if I do that on the negative side, that's called hydrogen? Then why can't H2O be an "idea"?
  • Can existence be validated without sensory
    (-Facepalm-)
    Well minor sentence? — Corvus
    No! — Corvus
    No. — Corvus
    ...are examples of minor sentences. That in mind, your diatribe is kind of hard to take seriously.
  • Can existence be validated without sensory
    Who are you — Corvus
    I am just a member of this forum.
    No you don't speak in minor sentence or a word in philosophical discussion. — Corvus
    By whose authority? You're just another member of this forum.

    Yes, this isn't a pub. But, it is a philosophy forum open to the public. You would do better treating us like the peers we are, than low lives you have to get off of your high horse to talk to. Try adult-adult like transactions, and stop trying this adult-child mode.

    Anyway, I thought you were done with this argument?
  • Can existence be validated without sensory
    He was insisting "And" was a sentence. I told him that it is not. — Corvus
    Well technically he's right. It's a minor sentence. Whether or not it's a "proper sentence" sounds like something we shouldn't really care about.
    You seemed to have joined this "bandwagon of native speakers of English, and if one is not, then he must be wrong". — Corvus
    You seem to be missing a foundational point. Were it not for a "bandwagon of native speakers of English", there would be no such thing as English. Real linguists study how native language speakers speak; real lexicographers document how native language speakers use words; and so on. The definition of the language is in the commonality established by this bandwagon. (And just so there's no confusion, the context of "correct" here is simply "correct English").
    Anyway, it is not my interest debating about this with you anymore. — Corvus
    Good. In the future, you should not care about this stuff at the start. There's literally no point in telling someone about "proper sentences" having nouns and verbs. We're all speaking English; if something clear is being communicated, there's not really anything left to say. Just focus on content.
  • Can existence be validated without sensory
    A sentence requires at least a subject and verb to be qualified as one. — Corvus
    So? "Okay" isn't a sentence. "Aha" isn't a sentence. "Yes" isn't a sentence. "Yes, sir" isn't a sentence. But "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" is a sentence. Apparently, though, "So?", "And?", "Okay", "Aha", "Yes", and "Yes, sir" all communicate something meaningful in English, yet "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" does not.
    Being a native English speaker doesn't mean that how he communicates with English is always correct or right. — Corvus
    Twas brillig and the slithy toves did gire and gimble in the wabe.

    Pray tell, what point are you now lecturing me about? I don't accept your standard of correctness or rightness of English, so if you're going to lecture me about it, you're going to have to justify it with something a wee bit better than begging the question.

    ETA: For your question begging fun:
    https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/minor%20sentence
  • Can existence be validated without sensory
    A proper sentence has a subject and verb for minimum. — Corvus
    Huh?

    ETA: Just to emphasize, Banno is a native English speaker. Your factoid on English is just that... some factoid... something some grammar teacher taught you once. That doesn't make it correct. There is no Académie d'anglais. Feel free to ask Banno for clarification, but there's something fundamentally wrong about trying to lecture native English speakers about how they're supposed to speak English.
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