Edit. No, that last bit's wrong. It's the limited number of eggs that raises the probability, If there were only 12 ravens and eleven had been found to be black, your probabilities would work. It's knowing how many there are before you start looking at them that is problematic, along with making the existential claim that I have been pointing out all along. — unenlightened

If there are a limited number of ravens in the world (which there almost certainly are), does that change whether observations of black ravens (or non-black non-ravens) at least incrementally confirm the universally-quantified hypothesis "all ravens are black"?

I'm not talking about confirmation, i.e. proof. I'm talking about evidence. Evidence is just whatever increases the probability that the statement is true. — Michael

A minor terminological point here: in the context of hypothesis testing, "confirmation" generally means "make more likely," and is not to be confused with "verification," which is to demonstrate that the hypothesis is true. (In other words, verification is the limiting case of confirmation.)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/

I know they would deny (4). Propositions (1)-(3) were supposed to encompass what substance dualists do believe.

I don't think so. As I said, the interaction problem is not the only problem. Dualists are dualists because they believe that there are problems that a physicalist account of consciousness cannot resolve. That a physicalist account of consciousness can resolve the interaction problem by avoiding it entirely doesn't help it avoid the problems that dualists claim it does have. — Michael

I know. But we're here speaking only of substance dualism, not whether physicalism is true (to claim that if the former is false, then the latter must be true would seem a false dilemma).

And my question could be applied to any metaphysical thesis (or even any philosophical thesis whatsoever, I suppose). If a thesis has a central, potentially fatal problem, which hundreds of years of theorizing have failed to resolve, does that lead to a justifiably diminished confidence that said thesis is correct (or whatever passes for "correct" with regard to philosophical theses)?

I don't think it fair to say that dualism fails because it hasn't explained how the mind and the body interact. There are a lot of things that physics hasn't explained (which is why we don't have a theory of everything) but it doesn't then follow that it's fair to say that physicalism fails for this reason. — Michael

Speaking as a physics layman, my understanding is that theorists have been struggling to reconcile QM and relativity, as the theories work well in their own domains, but break down into nonsense when one attempts to integrate the theories (something about crazy infinities popping up all over the place, I think). Given this failure of reconciliation, would it not follow that at least one of theories (QM or relativity) are false (not that something like those theories couldn't be true)?

Translating this analogy to the thesis of substance dualism, the substance dualist (qua substance dualist) would likely assent to three core propositions:

(1) the mind is res cogitans.
(2) the body is res extensa.
(3) mind and body interact.

Of these three propositions (3) would seem to be on the most secure footing, and is therefore the least likely to be false. So, assuming that the substance dualist cannot dismiss mind/body interaction, and cannot reconcile the interaction problem, does it not follow (in the manner of QM and GR's reconciliatory failure) that (1) and/or (2) must be rejected? And if either (1) or (2) are false, then substance dualism is false.

That would be an argument from ignorance.

True. Historically, one of the more annoying responses to empirical demonstrations of some phenomenon is to dismiss it for want of a mechanism (e.g. plate tectonics). However, scientific theories can always be fleshed out by empirical observation and collecting more data. The same is not true of metaphysical theses, which only require thinking one's way to a solution. If, after a few hundred years of substance dualism, no one has yet posited a convincing resolution of the interaction problem, does that justify at least diminished confidence that substance dualism is the correct metaphysical theory of mind?

[Bannon's] employer is to preoccupied with how he looks to notice anything important. — Wayfarer

People say that Trump is preoccupied with figurative dick-measuring contests such as proclaiming how many people attended his inauguration, while forgetting that he was involved with literal dick-measuring contests during the Republican primaries.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nALb4lEbSbA

(My country 'tis of thee...)

...a single datum doesn't help us with the universal. — andrewk

This seemed to be Popper's view (as someone else pointed out). Let us consider for a moment the proposition that singular instances provide no confirmation of a universally-quantified hypothesis or statement (e.g. occurrences of white swans do not even marginally raise the probability of the hypothesis "all swans are white") by means of a thought experiment.

At the very least, this claim seems unintuitive under certain conditions. For instance, imagine that the world consists entirely of a carton of eggs, with a dozen egg cups, each containing exactly one egg. A "God's eye view" observer of the world formulates the hypothesis that "all eggs are white," and sets about inspecting each cup.

After the observer inspects, say, three of the eggs and finds that they're white, can he reasonably be more confident in the truth of his hypothesis to any degree whatsoever? After all, each cup which is found to contain a white egg is one less cup which can possibly hold a non-white egg (and we've stipulated that the world consists solely of this egg carton, so there is nowhere else for a non-white egg to hide). Does each observation of a white egg therefore confirm the hypothesis (even if only incrementally)? My intuition seems to say "yes," but of course, my intuition does not constitute any sort of rigorous proof.

But notice your non sequitur from "why should I care what Agustino thinks" to "why should I care what anyone thinks". Again, your style is more trollish than interesting. — Banno

Yea...I long ago dismissed Agustino as a moral lunatic. My question to the mods some time ago as to whether certain posters can be blocked from one's view was motivated pretty much solely by a desire not to see his ridiculous posts.

Sure, and Benghazi was about a video on youtube . — tom

Ahh, the dulcet tones of Benghazi references...how I have missed thee.

The Executive Order was drafted by Steve Bannon, white supremacist (and now an appointee to the National Security Council which never usually includes political operatives). America is being nazi-fied right in front of our eyes. — Wayfarer

The circus peanut-in-chief has his Goebbels at his side...the circle is nearly complete. Oh, well...America had a good 240 year run (not perfect, sure, but we generally kept democracy chugging along pretty smoothly for most of that time).

Yeah, but what exactly does it mean to supervene? According to Chalmers, physicalism require logical supervenience, which rules out strong emergentism and nonreductive forms of physicalism. — Marchesk

I am not particularly acquainted with the various flavors of supervenience (indeed, I already consider it to be a logical relation, so I'm not sure what distinction "logical supervenience" holds). Could you give an outline of Chalmers's position? Presumably, in order for his view to provide a problem for physicalism, he holds that mental states are "strongly emergent" from physical states, else the point is moot (I'm also not sure what "non-reductive" means here. Much philosophical confusion seems to have arisen over issues of whether A is "reducible" to B.).

You mean there is no objective method. Subjectively, I know that mental phenomena exist, because I experience it. That's how I can know with certainty that nobody else can be a solipsist, to the extent one takes solipsism seriously. — Marchesk

I don't see how this follows. Solipism is the belief or thesis that one's own mind is the only existing mind in the world. That you are certain that you have mental states (and thus a mind) in no way rules out that someone else may be a solipsist (it would only certify that they are incorrect in their solipsist belief).

I genuinely cannot figure out how physicalism overcomes this problem since intentional content is one of the things most apparent to us and it is clearly not physical. — Rawrren

I've seen definitions of physicalism which state that, roughly, everything which exists is either physical or supervenes on the physical. So, intentional (i.e. content-laden) mental states needn't provide a serious problem to physicalism, provided said states are understood to supervene on the physical.

Yes no wonder, the feminazis from Hollywood are in power... — Agustino

Please do me a favor, Agustino, and don't do me any favors.

Culture: women are more misrepresented in media and popular culture — Michael

I've heard this claim (that women are poorly-represented in media and popular culture) made before, and I honestly don't know what is the basis for it. I've said before: watch almost any rom-com, sit-com, commercial, etc. and tell me which gender is more often portrayed as childish, unreasonable, incompetent, or boorish (hint: it's not the woman).

Indeed, "pop culture" and media lately seem to be producing a steady stream of works in which a strong female is the protagonist (the two most recent Star Wars films come to mind, for example).

Sexist filth. — StreetlightX

Filthy...but genuinely arousing.

Qualifying terms like "significant" in such discussions usually poison the well from the outset, as "significant' is a subjective and elastic enough term to at least plausibly apply to whichever position one takes in such a dispute.

An interviewer asks a scientist, who personally engages in spiritual practices in the comfort of his own home, what the definition of spirituality is? The scientist proceeds to purposely avoid using the Oxford's definition of spirituality (which is anything related to the human spirit or soul). Instead, the scientist states that spirituality is a "Connection, a deep sense of meaning to something greater than yourself." What kind of fallacy or technique of argumentative persuasion did this scientist commit? — Darkaristotle

This scientist's definition of "spirituality" (which I bolded) is so nebulous that it could mean virtually anything (from belonging to a social club which gives meaning to his life or believing in a personal god who attends to his every prayer for intercession). So, which fallacy (if any) is being committed is unclear.

(By the way, does such a definition of "spirituality" entail that people who aren't spiritual believe in nothing greater than themselves, or only that they don't feel "connected" to this greater thing? Hmm...)

You could have a hundred times as many attacks and they still wouldn't be representative of the beliefs of the 1.7 billion Muslims in the world. It's not the religion that's carrying out the attacks, it's a tiny minority of the religious. — Baden

Nothing about any of my posts suggests otherwise. If all of the 1.7 billion or so Muslims in the world were engaged in violent jihad, the world would certainly look much different. However, the fact that most Muslims worldwide are not committing acts of violence in the name of their religion doesn't negate the fact that, in the modern world Islam has a unique problem among the world's major religions in producing violent radicals, and in harboring illiberal beliefs (which are often foisted upon people under theocratic rule).

And, as I've said, this is not just reflected in the spasms of Islamist violence which erupt with depressing frequency in places like Fort Hood, Texas; Berlin; or Cairo, but in the day-to-day theocratic humiliations and persecutions undertaken by regimes such as Saudi Arabia (an ideology which is not confined to its borders; the Saudis have made exporting Wahhabism a priority second only to oil exports, it seems).

If Vatican City, say, were stoning adulterers, hanging homosexual in public squares, or threatening apostasy with violent reprisal, I doubt that so many people would be rushing to defend the world's 1+ billion Catholics with protestations that such acts don't represent "true" Catholicism.

More broadsides from the "religion of peace." How much of this "peace" can the world handle, I wonder?

http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/29/europe/berlin-truck-attack-automatic-braking-system/

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/11/world/middleeast/cairo-coptic-cathedral-attack.html?_r=0

Then why mention the fact that they are "Muslim-majority" in the first place if not to make a point about the religion? — Benkei

My point was that I never said that all violence or human rights atrocities committed in, for instance, Saudi Arabia was a result of Islamic doctrine or theology (of any stripe). People commit horrific acts for any number of reasons, not all of which stem from their religious beliefs or practice.

I said that certain of the human rights abuses which occur in that country (and in certain other Muslim-majority countries) are the result of Muslim theocracy, e.g. forcing women to veil themselves, the stoning of adulterers, and the violent persecution of homosexuals. (And Islamist-driven violence is of course not limited to Muslim-majority countries.)

In response to this claim, you made the non-sequitur inference that that would imply that any untoward act occurring in the United States must therefore be a result of some Christian doctrinal imperative, as the U.S. is a Christian-majority country. But this simply doesn't follow: while there have indeed been some religiously-motivated acts of violence committed by Christians in the U.S., the vast bulk of violence committed in the U.S. has little, if anything, to do with religion. And the same may hold true in most Muslim-majority countries; that is, the routine, day-to-day violence which afflicts nearly every society may not have much to do with any Islamic doctrine or religious practice, and may not be in any way committed in the name of that religion.

However, when one makes comparisons between religions, in the modern world, there is one religion which stands out in its production of violent radicals, and in acts of violence carried out in the name of that religion (whether or not we wish to brand such interpretations as "extremist"), and that religion is Islam. Ceteris paribus, people have greater reason to fear Muslims than they do nearly any other denomination of any other religion, and that is because Muslims have given them such reasons.

For me this is a prime example of why one needs to distinguish Islam from Islamism. You make it sound as if 'Muslims' are violent extremists and 'Bangladeshis' are the victims. But most Bangladeshis are Muslims - Muslims who oppose machete-wiedling violence; most Bangladeshi Muslims support, albeit precariously, the separation of religion and State in their country even though it's 94% Muslim; the vast majority of Bangladeshi Muslim clerics have by way of a fatwa categorically and publicly opposed the killing of secular bloggers. It's a mistake to single out the 'Muslim'-ness of the extremists as if this were what sets them apart from their fellow-countrymen/women. — mcdoodle

No, it's the fact that they're Muslim which sets them apart from other religions in their behavior, which is the point of contention here. Christianity has dealt with bloody wars of religion: the fact that they pitted Christian vs. Christian doesn't negate the fact that religion was at least one causative factor. Ditto for Muslim-on-Muslim violence (though I would question how many of the murdered bloggers were actually Muslim, as opposed to being atheist/agnostic).

That's my persistent disagreement with this 'war' metaphor. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in my country, neighbourhood, accept the secular state. You cannot categorise 'Islam' because of the behaviour of some 'Islamists'. If you do that, you begin to Other a large number of innocent people.

I said that, in the modern world, of the major religions Islam inspires more doctrinally-driven violence and produces a greater proportion of violent radicals than any other, and that people rationally fear Muslims as a collective group more than they fear, for instance, Quakers or Unitarians.

This in no way impugns all Muslims any more than it impugns all men to say that the male gender produces a greater number of murderers than does the female gender. As a consequence, people likewise are more rational in fearing men more than they do women.

Quite clearly, the US being a Christian majority country, rape in the military is a Christian problem. — Benkei

Please don't strawman me: I never said that every untoward act committed by a Muslim and/or which occurs in a Muslim-majority country is related to Islam.

The Dutch were the primary European colonial power. Not many seem to be aware of it, but the Dutch were unusually contemptuous of and cruel to the people of the regions they colonized, even by European standards. — Ciceronianus the White

Yes. It is difficult to find historical examples of a truly benevolent empire. I just don't think there's any such thing (even if colonialism has had some positive impacts in some cases).

The classic example: you believe smoking is bad for your health, but you like to smoke. That creates cognitive dissonance, a contradiction between belief and action. There are several ways the brain tries to deal with it. It can simply minimize the health effects of smoking, or to trivialize the desire to smoke. That's what most people would do with such a conflict. But there are also extreme positions appeals to shadowy conspiracies to eliminate one side of the conflict. — swstephe

Uh, what? "Shadowy conspiracies"? Unfortunately, there's nothing "shadowy" about the shrill cries of "Islamophobia" every time it is suggested that, just maybe, certain cultures or groups should saw off just a few less limbs as punishment for petty theft, or throw just a few less gay people off of rooftops or hang them from cranes in public squares.

I'm not discouraging criticism. I criticize FGM and even male circumcision, forced marriages or child marriages. I admit that they happen.

Sure, you admit that they happen. But you seem to deny the role of Islam in certain of these practices (though I will give Islam a pass when it comes to male circumcision...).

I just think if you really want to do something about it, you politely reason with people and respect their identity and beliefs.

<Sigh> Why is it nearly exclusively in the realm of religion that one's beliefs must be "respected?" In nearly every other domain, beliefs are scrutinized, analyzed, and criticized, but religious beliefs must be "respected", for some reason. I'm not certain I even know how to respect a belief (a person, certainly, or an institution, but a belief?). The best I can do is be as objective as possible in analyzing them.

As for polite discourse, perhaps you should tell that to, for instance, the Bangladeshis who have been hacked to death by Muslims for daring to blog (yes, blog) about topics which they find disagreeable. I am sure the machete-wielding mobs will be highly receptive to your pleas for a civil discussion.

Islamophobia works on hatred and fear. It looks just like the days of the "Red Scare" which kept pointing to irrational fear to drive people into throwing out reason or any chance of dialog. The white savior complex is also real, (and just as much on the "left" as the "right"). It plays on feelings of compassion and generosity, but without thinking how it affects the target of those feelings. In NGO circles, there are many talks about how too much charity can disrupt an economy as much as a disaster.

People have greater reason to fear Muslims than they do, say, Quakers, Unitarians, or Episcopalians. They have greater reason because Muslims have given them such reasons. In the modern world, not all religions inspire doctrinally-driven acts of terror at equal rates, nor do all religions produce equal proportions of violent radicals.

The reasons for violence at any level are, of course, multifaceted, and religion is probably rarely the sole cause of any particular act of terror. And many acts of violence (from interpersonal to interstate) have nothing to do with religion whatsoever. However, in the year 2016 (soon to be 2017), there is one major religion which seems to have a unique problem with radicalization leading to violent acts, and that religion is Islam.

**To wit:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/five-things-that-saudi-arabian-women-still-cannot-do-a6765666.html — Arkady

You won't get any argument from me. Saudi Arabia is a bit of an extreme example, though, and most Muslims around the world complain and shake their heads -- but feel like nothing can be done as long as the rest of the world backs them up for oil. I haven't been to Saudi Arabia myself, but I did sponsor an Austrian guy and his wife who were driving from Europe to South-East Asia. They got pulled over by the police in Jeddah because they thought his wife was driving. The police opened the door, then stood there stunned when he didn't see a steering wheel in front of her. The Austrian guy said, "looking for this officer"? It was a right-hand drive car, like the UK, not left-hand like Saudi and the US. But things are rapidly getting betted since King Abdullah died. A prince there said that he thought women should be able to drive legally, (and royal opinion is basically law there). Actually, women can and do drive in remote areas. Also, there are many ways of going around without a member of their family. I've been told there are many different levels of society. There are the royals, the loyal government workers, the regular Saudi, who has 100s of ways to get around the rules, then there are many villages which have been ignored for historical reasons who still don't have electricity. If you really want to fight these problems, I'm all in favor of economic and political sanctions out of concerns for human rights -- but of course, most people will just expect them to become BFF with China and Russia then. Ultimately, it is the west that is supporting that treatment. It was the British who brought the Saud family there in the first place, and we give them money and weapons to crush or bribe any attempt at democracy or overthrowing them.

Yes, I agree that the West has gotten in bed with some rather unsavory regimes in order to further their own economic and political interests. However, it is an extreme interpretation of Islamic doctrine, not the meddling of Western powers, which is responsible for the myriad human rights abuses (both the rare and grotesque, and the more day-to-day) in Saudi Arabia. If tomorrow Saudi Arabia announced that it would, for instance, abolish public beheadings, I doubt that said announcement would be met with howls of protest in the halls of power in Berlin, Washington DC, or London.

As for the long-term prospects of women in Saudi Arabia in the wake of King Abdullah's successors, that remains to be seen (you will forgive me if my optimism is somewhat cautious...)

So I am accusing these Mullahs of falling victim to a "white savior complex" mentality, (which can actually affect anyone of any race or gender -- so not the best name). The symptoms are a commitment to dismissing the possibility of oppression in their own back-yard. — swstephe

I've already explained what's wrong with this sophistry. It is possible to acknowledge the misogyny and gender inequality in one's own country (the U.S. in my case) while decrying the far worse plight of women in some Muslim-majority countries (such as Saudi Arabia, which we've been discussing here**). This is nothing like a case of "cognitive dissonance," as you've claimed: cognitive dissonance in this case would amount to dismissing, ignoring, or even favoring gender discrimination in one's own culture, while also decrying it in others' (including in Muslim-majority nations). That's not the case here.

Your plaints about "white savior complex" are little different than cries of "Islamophobia" in such discussions: it serves only to deflect and discourage criticism by implying some sort of racism or white paternalistic/colonial mindset without at all engaging in honest discussion. It is good propaganda; it is, however, a poor way to do philosophy.

**To wit:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/five-things-that-saudi-arabian-women-still-cannot-do-a6765666.html

The emphasis on the burqa is interesting, It is very Othering. Some French people find it - but nothing about the way the supposedly oppressive male Muslims dress - so offensive they want to ban it.

I really dislike it too, very occasionally in Bradford I'll pass a woman wearing and it gives me the creeps.

It's not the sort of thing to go to war over, though. Islamic women aren't Other, they're my fellow students, my wife's co workers, strangers in the next street, bbc newsreaders, local councillors. Mostly round here they wear Western dress, or lots of variants on discrete dressing that are nevertheless colourful and fashionable. I have no cause for war with their religion, although in religious debate I explain I'm an atheist. It seems that in common with women in both Iran and Saudi, British Asian women outnumber men as graduates these days. Perhaps big changes are bubbling up while all this warlike rhetoric is being exchanged. — mcdoodle

For whatever it's worth, I agree that I dislike burqas. I also disagree with general burqa bans (excepting particular circumstances such as driver's license photos, workplace dress rules, etc). I believe that people should be permitted to engage in foolish, demeaning behavior if they so choose, without laws preventing them from doing so (and no, I don't find the rhetoric of some apologists that the burqa is "liberating" for women to be persuasive: a prison is never liberating, even if said prison is made of cloth).

This might be a good example of my point. Maybe at some point, you may have gotten a vague impression of a contradiction with fighting for women's rights in Saudi Arabia, while simultaneously oppressing women in your own country. So you broke that cognitive dissonance by denying that your society is oppressing women at all. It goes much deeper than wage inequality. Every week, the news comes out with a story about how a woman was raped, and the rapist gets away with a really minor sentence, while many leaders say "she was asking for it by her behavior". It is especially bad in the military, (chances of being raped has been estimated at 1 in 3). — swstephe

No, it's a good example of a false equivalency, which speaks to my point. Yes, in the U.S. some rapists are given light sentences, and military has a problem with institutional procedures relating to rape (by the way, the stats on male rape in the military are likewise depressing; this problem is by no means confined to the treatment of women.) And in some Muslim-majority countries, the female victim is persecuted for being raped! There is clearly an asymmetry here, despite your rhetorical attempts to conflate them. (I will be charitable in my reading of your post to not take it as saying that I personally have oppressed women in my own country, though your wording was a bit sloppy.)

Women in the U.S. (as I said) graduate college at higher rates than do men, have greater life expectancies, can open businesses, etc. Women in Saudi Arabia are beholden to severe restrictions on their movements, freedom of association, and dress. (And this is just one Muslim-majority country.)

Isn't that essentially what is wrong with "honor killing", that the officials in that country don't treat it as murder, like they would in the modern west?

Even when they do treat it as murder, it is ignored by "traditionalists" and (god help me that I have to say this in the year 2016) tribal leaders.

Take a look at any historical reference and you will see that "honor killing", started with Augustus Caesar's, "Lex Julia de adulteriis coercendis", and carried around Europe as part of Napoleonic code. I agree that FGM, honor killing, forced marriages, etc is evil and must be stopped, but it is easier to do by reinforcing identity than seeking to destroy it.

Ah, yes, the "well, practice X preceded Islam, and therefore its practice cannot be a result of Islamic doctrine" defense. Sorry, Islam may not have invented honor killing, but in the 21st century, if there's honor killing afoot, the perpetrator is almost always Muslim. Italians, not so much.

I put that statement about western women dressing up like porn stars in quotes because that is what people in strict Islamic countries are saying, not me.

Yes, and Nazis no doubt regarded the Allies as morally execrable as the Allies did the Nazis. What of it? The mere fact that each side may demonize the other in a dispute somehow implies that both opinions are equally valid? I highly doubt you'd say something like this, but your point eludes me.

I also know that they would use the same excuse as you do, that most do it out of choice and for complex social interactions, not because it is strictly enforced.

I notice your underhanded rhetorical jab about my statement being an "excuse." It's not an "excuse," it's simply a fact: women in the United States (outside of employer-mandated dress codes, which apply to men, as well, and statutes regarding public nudity and so forth) choose to dress themselves. They are not forced by threat of violent reprisal to drape themselves in black bags with a slit cut into them.

After living in a Muslim majority country, then coming back to the US, I was impressed how similar was the controversy over American women going topless during the "free the nipple" campaign, (ironically protests were carried out where it wasn't illegal). The west certainly has a lot to say about how women dress in their society, just look at how any female public figure is judged more by appearance than political views.

Yea, more false equivalency. The claim that women's going topless is morally and legally condemned in some quarters is akin to forcing women to live in a black bag (in a desert climate, no less) holds no water.

And, yes, I agree that, for instance, female politicians' looks probably come under more scrutiny than their male counterparts (though men are not exempt from this either; no one seems able to discuss Chris Christie for more than five minutes without mentioning how fat he is). But this is a far cry from mandating that women drape themselves from head to toe in black fabric (or even just cover their hair), stoning them for adultery, or mandating whom they must marry (under threat of violent reprisal).

We can ignore all the oppression we put women under at home, or how our treatment of the target country might have brought about the very conditions we are fighting -- and go on a sacred crusade against the infidels. I'm also sure the extremists on the other side are thinking the very same thing. "Those westerners are oppressing their women by dressing them up like porn stars, we have a holy mission to rescue them". The problem with hypocrisy I've seen is that our brains can't handle the cognitive dissonance for long. — swstephe

I see that false equivalencies are alive and well in these debates. The fact that you call women in the West "oppressed" and equate said oppression to the treatment of women under a number of Muslim-majority countries is spurious at best. Women in the United States live longer, graduate college at greater numbers, and best men in any number of metrics. But because they, say, make roughly 93 cents to the man's dollar, this is equivalent to the stoning to death of female adulterers.

You will note that women in the United States (unlike Saudi Arabia) choose what to wear, and if some of them opt to dress like "porn stars" (whatever such dress may look like), then that is their choice. No one is "oppressing" them, and no one "dresses them up."

More news from the "religion of peace":

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/10/05/she-wouldnt-listen-pakistani-man-explains-honor-killing-of-sister/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4bfdb3825642#comments

(Now cue the cavalcade of plaints that honor killings likewise "have nothing to do with Islam.")

Because the arguments appeal to observable aspects of nature in order to bolster their case for the existence of God (as opposed to relying upon revelation or pure logic-chopping as with the ontological argument and its ilk), something Wayfarer claimed that "real" believers don't do.

Hypotheses or theories, not arguments, make (or entail) testable predictions. Arguments simply purport to derive a conclusion from one or more premises, which is what those propounding the cosmological argument and the others attempt to do.

The argument from design, including the ID incarnation, and the cosmological argument allege to explain empirically observable phenomena, but do not themselves entail any empirical consequences or predictions. They are, therefore, quintessentially rationalist--not empirical--arguments. — Brainglitch

Then you and I have a different notion of empiricism and rationalism.

So, believers believe. But unlike intelligent design proponents, Catholics don't look to science to validate that belief. — Wayfarer

I doubt that Behe and company also look to ID to "validate" their belief in God. They likely believed in God long before the ID movement began. They probably believe in God for the same reason(s) that most anyone else believes in it. They use irreducible complexity and the other accoutrements of ID to try to convince others, including (presumably) nonbelievers.

Aquinas's theological proofs of God's existence were not intended as polemical devices to convert unbelievers, but as theological exercises for the faithful. Aquinas would always say that one must have faith at the outset.

But when someone deploys the cosmological argument for God's existence (or really any argument whatsoever), they do so with the intent to prove (deductively) or make probable (inductively or abductively) the conclusion of their argument, i.e. the existence of God. That's what arguments are for: they're intended to convert. Whether Thomists believe that God can be "known" through faith alone, they also believe that God's existence can be demonstrated by appeals to observable features of the universe. They thereby appeal to empiricism, in other words, something you've claimed that "real" believers don't do.

I personally find the cosmological argument philosophically persuasive, but I would never suggest it amounts to an empirical hypothesis. How could it? How could you empirically validate such an idea?

Well, this is part of the problem with these families of arguments (the argument from design, the cosmological argument, etc), as pointed out by Hume and others: we have no experience with a range of universes, some of which are created and some which are uncreated, in order to calibrate our notions of designedness vs. lack of design. We have to muddle through with resort to analogies with manmade artifacts (clocks, watches, and the like).

There was also a super awesome book that I forget the title and author of now (herhaps someone will know?), but it was written by a journalist, about the history of scientists themselves, what quirky crazy fucks most of them were, and how much infighting posturing, and tribalism is present among scientists, for some reason I remember the author being on a plain... or something... but anyway, it was a sweet counter-balance to the distancing/denotative/former language scientists like to use by focusing on the people themselves. — Wosret

Perhaps you're thinking of Laboratory Life by Latour and Woolgar.

In any event, is it any surprise that scientists are humans? Did anyone really think they were some kind of emotionless robots who valiantly strive for an understanding of nature, completely devoid of the human passions which are part of every other aspect of life?

We perpetually inhabit the present - the past is unobservable. — dukkha

Perhaps we do perpetually inhabit the present, but we arguably only experience the past, given that our sensory organs and brain require a nonzero amount of time in which to receive and process information from our environment. We experience the world not as it is, but as it was.

I had no idea that it was science that makes stuff fall to the ground. — Wosret

Nope. That would be gravity. You can read all about the scientific studies of this amazing force, which can tell you just how fast and how hard you'll hit the ground if and when you take the plunge out of that window.

It also, I hear, has improved life expectancy by a third, and instead of chanting theories like dogma, they're always opposed and ready for opposing the establishment! I hear that immortality is just around the corner too. That's usually a good sign that everything's legit.

Hmm, I wouldn't hold your breath for that last one. (I sense some implicit criticism of science here, but I'm not sure which scientists are claiming this. You aren't confusing, say, Ray Kurzweil for a scientist are you?).

Science is itself a myth without strictly adhered to principles... — Wosret

Try jumping out of a window and then tell me about the "myth" of gravity. :D

...besides trying to do what the last superstar did.

Nope: this is almost exactly backwards. Scientists make their bones by refuting the superstars.

I said that on the one side, 'intelligent design' arguments attempt to use empirical arguments to justify belief in God. On the other side, 'scientific materialist' arguments attempt to use empirical arguments against belief in God. But if the nature of God is transcendent, then it's a misapplication of empirical arguments. It is all based on a literal intepretation of Genesis. If you interpret texts such as Genesis allegorically, then they can still be regarded as meaningful, and not 'faux science'.

Have a look at Aquinas vs Intelligent Designers for an example of an argument which recognises this. It explains how Catholic philosophy differs with Intelligent Design philosophy. — Wayfarer

I don't think this article is saying quite what you think it says. For instance (bolding added):

"ID theorists are often perplexed—and even a bit put out—that Thomists do not acknowledge the cogency of Behe’s argument. After all, Thomists are quite open to the notion that Creation provides evidence for the existence of the Creator—cosmological arguments for the existence of God based on the order and operation of nature have long been the special preserve of Thomism."

In other words, even if Thomists are not on board with intelligent design creationism with regard to biological systems, they are quite happy to appeal to other facets of nature to argue for the existence of God. That is, their arguments are at least partly based on empiricism, a tact which you excoriate above.

http://www.catholic.com/magazine/articles/aquinas-vs-intelligent-design

Of course, it is possible to be a religious believer and a scientist.

The question is: Is it epistemically consistent to be a believer and a scientist? — Brainglitch

Indeed. It's possible to be a Catholic priest who molests children and a law enforcement officer who breaks the law: it doesn't follow that those activities can be reasonably reconciled. It only points out humans' capacity to rationalize (or not), compartmentalize, or explain away their quirks, inconsistencies, and hypocrisies.

OK, not 'many'! I will readily concede that. Here you go a public acknowledgement: several posts ago I said 'survey paper shows many scientists critical of Dawkins intolerance for religion. It is not 'many scientists' but a relatively small number of scientists. OK now? — Wayfarer

Ok now.

But in the case of the process of evolution, 'chance' is assigned a different kind of role, namely, as an alternative to the presumed 'intentionality' of divine creation. So, whereas in classical Western thought, there was a presumption that life was in a sense purposeful or intentional, the widespread view arising from the discoveries of 20th Century science is that 'life arose by chance', i.e. as the 'outcome of the accidental collocation of atoms'. — Wayfarer

But virtually any naturalistic phenomenon could be termed an "alternative to the presumed intentionality of divine creation," wouldn't you say? (Hippocrates, for instance, complained that people believed epilepsy to be divine, merely because they didn't understand it. We now understand epilepsy differently.)

The other philosophical point that is interesting is this: in what other sphere of debate, would the argument that 'something arises by chance', be regarded as a scientific hypothesis'? — Wayfarer

Uh, what? Stochasticity and randomness are hugely important concepts in all of the sciences, including biology. (You do realize that, in statistical hypothesis testing, chance is the null hypothesis, which is only rejected if the results meet a certain threshold of statistical significance, as determined by p-values or some other measure?)